Abstract
This paper discusses how deterrence can be applied to grey zone conflicts. Given that a defendant usually perceives of grey zone conflicts only after a threat takes place, it is questionable as to whether it is meaningful to speak of deterrence. This paper holds that insofar as preventing similar threats from happening is concerned, there is space for deterrence to work. Applying deterrence to grey zone conflicts, however, further involves revisiting both concepts. With respect to grey zone conflicts, it is suggested that the concept is desirable in politics and with security implications. But it is neither possible nor necessary for Taiwan to invest its resources in each threat; instead, Taiwan should focus on threats that are prone to escalation and altering the status quo. With respect to deterrence, this paper identifies several difficulties when traditional deterrence is applied to grey zone conflicts, and proposes that Taiwan may develop a strategy of cross- domain deterrence, which means taking advantages in one domain to deter or counter the opponent in another domain. It is further suggested that cross-domain deterrence requires paying attention to signaling and communication, so that an act of deterrence is understood correctly as such and not as provocation by all parties involved.
PDF Link: The Applicability of Deterrence to Grey Zone Conflicts.pdf
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