Japan’s Countering of the China Military Threat: Taiwan’s Role
2019.10.01
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By Michael Shao-Cheng Sun
Introduction
Chinese and Japanese relationships have been strained by Japan’s wartime past, China’s military modernization, and the Diaoyutai Islands dispute. Even though both governments have attempted to reduce these tensions due to the interests of lucrative trade, the historical animosity could easily break their fragile relationship. In recent years, Chinese government’s escalation of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military activities (intrusions of vessels and warplanes into Japanese territories and militarization in the South China Sea) have posed a grave security concern to Japan.[1] On June 1, 2019, the US Pentagon released the “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” (IPSR) that highlighted the development of a free and open Indo-Pacific region by working with the allies and partners. In support of US strategy, Japanese and US carrier groups jointly held a naval exercise from June 10th through 12th in the South China Sea.[2] Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen had a closed-door meeting
China-Japan Relations at Odds
Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Osaka, Japan in June 2019. (Source: The State Council Information Office of the PRC)
with Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in her pre-election visit to Japan to nurture an interpersonal relationship for the further development of a comprehensive Taiwan-Japan relationship.[3] In countering China’s mounting military threat, Tsai’s administration called for a renewed security dialogue with Japan and establishing a permanent diplomatic mechanism to streamline bilateral communication.[4] This research first, explores the current China-Japan relations by looking at their flashpoints of conflicts and examining China’s military escalation, second, explains Japan’s security strategy, and finally, suggests the roles of Taiwan within the framework of delicate China-Japan delicate relations.
China aims to realize the PLA’s modernization by 2035 and to transform the PLA into one of the world’s foremost military powers by 2050. Japan views the current PLA military activities as provocative. For example, China’s sea and air power is expanding and routinizing its operational areas close to Japan and Diaoyutai Islands, and increasing its land reclamation in the Spratly Islands.[5] Owing to economic interests, Japanese Prime Minister Abe paid an official visit to China in October 2018 in the hope of lessoning the growing tensions in its relations with China. While the visit was viewed as a success of thawing the previously frozen relationship, the bilateral relations remain fundamentally unchanged.[6] Some China-Japan developments deserve attention.
1) China-Japan stagnant relations
The Chinese government has shown willingness to improve its relations with Japan but without much success. Japan’s wartime atrocities have been the cause of its tension with China for decades. Particularly, the Nanjing Massacre has constantly become the trigger of China’s nationalism. In seeking an improved bilateral tie, China’s President Xi Jinping showed his restraint by sending verbal condolences instead of visiting the Nanjing Massacre memorial at the end of 2018. The lack of headline coverage for the Nanjing Massacre memorial also seemed to send an Olive branch to Japan.[7] Furthermore, China lifted its embargo on Japanese agricultural products in November 2018 due to the nuclear leak in Fukushima tsunami in 2011. However, Japan mobile phone carriers (SoftBank Group, NTT Docomo, and KDDI) have decided not to use Chinese equipment in their 5G networks due to rising cyber-theft concerns. China’s goodwill gesture has been disappointed by Japan’s sanctioning of electronic products.[8] China may retaliate against Japan’s unilateral sanction.
2) US interference in China-Japan relations
In addition to a long history of mutual distrust, China-Japan relations are also restrained by the US-Japan alliance and the escalating US-China rivalry. In March 2019, the Abe administration delayed its plans to invite President Xi on a state visit to appease the Trump administration. This comes at a time when a trade war, Huawei’s controversies, and criticism of China’s violations of human rights in Xinjiang, have brought US-China relations to a low point.[9] The US-Japan alliance is vital to Japan’s national security. Japan prioritizes its relationship with the US surpassing any other partners. Dealing with the Trump administration has become challenging as Japan faces increasing tariffs on its automobile exports to the US and spends greater expenses of supporting US forces in Japan.[10]
As the US-China competition intensifies, the room of improving China-Japan relations is restricted by Japan’s prioritization of the US alliance.
The Chinese government views the Japanese prioritizing for the US over China as the main cause of China-Japan tensions.[11] Regardless of Chinese leaders showing restraint in its relations with Japan, China still does not trust the US-Japan alliance. As the US-China competition intensifies, the room of improving China-Japan relations is restricted by Japan’s prioritization of the US alliance.
President Donald J. Trump joined by the Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe arrive aboard the JS Kaga Tuesday, May 28, 2019, in Yokosuka, Japan. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)
Japan’s Security Strategy
The Japan National Security Strategy (NSS) has laid out principles to achieve its own security grounded on international cooperation. The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), based on the NSS, conducts effective deterrence and responses to various situations. The Japan Self Defense Force (SDF) should be able to react to an attack on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, space and cyberspace attacks, and natural disasters by holding training and exercises, promoting defense cooperation, ensuring maritime security, and implementing international cooperation.[12] In the Japan Defense White Paper, the Japan-US security arrangements, Japanese defense strategy and security initiatives are the cornerstone of Japan’s security.
1) The US-Japan security arrangements
The Japanese government believes that the US-Japan alliance contributes not only to the stability of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes severe, the US enhancing its engagement with the regional countries has become critical to Japan’s security. It is crucial to have the presence of the US Forces Japan (USFJ) and to be prepared to respond to emergencies. The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation is the policy set forth concerning initiatives such as cooperation for regional security, and space and cyberspace cooperation to allow the US-Japan Alliance to function efficiently as a deterrent. In accordance with the guidelines, both countries will conduct more joint training and exercises, and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities.[13] Two US-Japan security policy consultative platforms that are critical to Japan’s security and US national interests are the US‐Japan Security Consultative Committee and US-Japan Defense Ministerial Meeting. These security platforms focus on commitment to strengthening their alliance in the Asia-Pacific, North Korea’s abandonment of nuclear weapons, monitoring China’s increased activities in the East China Sea, and confronting China’s militarization in the South China Sea.[14]
2) Japan’s defense strategy
The Japanese defense strategy has been viewed as a response to China’s military power. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) include converting two helicopter carriers into aircraft carriers, upgrading electronic warfare capabilities, purchasing land-based missile defense systems, and researching hypersonic weapons. In this NDPG, the most important change is the shifting of Japanese security posture from reactive to proactive and regarding China as an adversary.[15] In addition to the NDPG, the Chinese government also believes that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (a dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia, and India) and Tokyo’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy are evidence of Japan and the West containing China.[16]
3) Security Initiatives
The Self Defense Force (SDF) engages in surveillance activities in the water and airspace surrounding Japan so that it can respond to contingencies. Information gathered through these activities are shared with other government agencies.[17] In addition to that, Japanese security initiatives include, first, preparation against intrusion of territorial airspace. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) detects aircraft flying in the airspace surrounding Japan. In 2017, the ASDF scrambled 904 times. Among them, 500 were against Chinese aircraft. To respond to attacks on remote islands, SDF will actively detect signs at an early stage through ISR activities to secure maritime and air superiority.[18] The second initiative includes defense cooperation and exchanges with other countries. Japan will foster a cooperative mechanism through bilateral dialogues and exchanges. Recognizing the increasing need for international cooperation, Japan has enhanced bilateral defense relationships by joint exercises, and defense equipment and technology cooperation.[19] The third initiative is research and development for technological superiority. The Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) formulated the Defense Technology Strategy to ensure Japan’s technological superiority and to develop advanced equipment in an efficient manner. Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries to enhance its defense production and technology.[20]
Japan’s security strategy aims to respond to China’s rising military buildup. In recent years, the SDF has actively enhanced military training, ensured maritime security, and improved international cooperation. The US-Japan security arrangements have become more robust to ensure Japan’s security interests.
Taiwan’s Role
Japan had colonized Taiwan from 1894 to 1945. With the signing of the treaty with the Republic of China (ROC) in 1952, Japan returned Taiwan to the ROC. Since then, Japan followed the US in maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC on Taiwan. In 1972, Japan recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China and maintained its relations with Taiwan at an unofficial level.[21] Despite of unofficial relations, the bilateral trade and people-to-people exchanges have risen quickly. For example, in 2016, 1.9 million Japanese visited Taiwan while 4.17 million Taiwanese visited Japan.[22] Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu emphasized since both countries have mutual interests and face similar threats, there is plentiful room for closer cooperation on issues of maritime security, cyber-crime, natural disaster response, etc.[23] Looking ahead, both countries will likely be working on low-profile cooperation within existing frameworks because of Japan’s one-China Policy. However, there are several efforts that Taiwan can do to improve relations with Japan.
President Tsai Ing-wen poses for a photo with a delegation led by Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Chairman Mitsuo Ohashi. (Source: Office of the President, R.O.C. (Taiwan))
1) Building robust relations with Japan
From a geo-strategic perspective, having robust relations with Japan is significant to Taiwan’s security. Shortly after Tsai Ing-wen was elected president in 2016, Abe sent a congratulatory message, which is the first ever good-will gesture of such nature issued by a Japanese Prime Minister to a Taiwan president-elect.[24] President Tsai acknowledges the importance of collaborating with Japan in confronting China. After Tsai took the presidency, the two countries have made momentous diplomatic progress. In January 2017, Taiwan’s Association of East Asian Relations changed its name to the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association. In March the same year, Japan’s Vice Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Jiro Akama, visited Taiwan, who became the highest-level government representative to have visited Taiwan since 1972.[25] The name change of the association and official visit will provide further room for deepening bilateral cooperation and exchange.
2) Carefully managing differences
In spite of improved Taiwan-Japan relations, some constrained ties require the two countries to work together. While Japan insists that Diaoyutai Islands are their territory, Taiwan argues that its sovereignty over the islands is indisputable based on location, historical evidence, geological composition, etc. Regardless of being unable to agree on the territorial disputes, the two countries concluded three decades of negotiations on a civil fishery agreement in April 2013. Under this agreement, the two sides have agreed to handle fishery issues stemming from overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones and to discuss resource conservation and common fishing rules. Furthermore, the two sides have exempted their fishing boats from each other’s law enforcement agencies.[26] Though security cooperation between the two countries will take a long time to accomplish, it is apparent that prudently managing Taiwan-Japan differences are better than taking a confrontational approach.
3) Supporting non-traditional security cooperation
Despite the improvement in bilateral ties in recent years, there is a slim possibility that Tokyo is going to adopt an openly proactive stance on Taiwan. However, Taiwan government can encourage the Japanese government to create a mechanism with Taiwan for risk control at sea. This could be pursued through existing maritime dialogues. Another potential area would be coordination or cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief issues. At the end of 2016, the two sides held an inaugural maritime cooperation dialogue that focused on collaboration on maritime issues such as fisheries, scientific research, and collaboration of coast guards.[27] This maritime cooperation dialogue could further expand into security related cooperation.
Since 1972 when Japan shifted its recognition from the ROC to PRC, the one-China policy has become a roadblock for a robust Taiwan-Japan relation. As China is rapidly rising, Japan is facing a tremendous threat and its relations with Taiwan has become more flexible. Taiwan could seek to build closer relations with Japan and engage in non-traditional security cooperation. Dialogues and exchanges of views are beneficial to improve bilateral relations if both countries can seek common ground while minimizing differences.
The Taiwanese and Japanese defense ties and economic cooperation are essential to confront China’s assertiveness in East Asia and the South China Sea.
Conclusion
When the relationship with China turns sour, Japan is inclined to work with Taiwan more to signal its displeasure with China. Despite Japan’s increased attention on its relationship with Taiwan, Japan’s one-China policy continues to impose limits of how far Abe’s administration can push its tie with Taiwan while balancing its relations with China.[28] The Taiwanese and Japanese defense ties and economic cooperation are essential to confront China’s assertiveness in East Asia and the South China Sea.
This research introduced Chinese-Japanese relations, expounded Japan’s security strategy, and suggested how Taiwan can enhance its relations with Japan to secure Taiwan’s interests. The main findings were as follows: First, Xi’s administration has shown willingness to improve relations with Japan. However, the US-Japan alliance and the US-China intensifying rivalry have restrained China’s and Japan’s relations. Since Japan is not ready to accept China’s leadership in Asia, Japan’s defense strategy still aims to contain China’s rise by increasing military training and ensuring maritime security, particularly working closely with the US. Second, Taiwan can be more proactive in improving relations with Japan by carefully managing differences and supporting non-traditional security cooperation. Constant dialogues, exchanges of views, and cooperation are helpful to enhance bilateral relations.
There are several approaches to establish closer bilateral relations. First, Taiwan and Japan could develop better cooperation and exchange at various levels, such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief training, establishing information-sharing and response mechanisms to China’s cyber-attacks.[29] Second, President Tsai emphasizes greater reliance on domestic defense development. Since Japan has a well-established defense industry, Japan could assist Taiwan in developing indigenous weapon defense systems.[30] Third, it is in Taiwan’s and Japan’s interest to maintain robust economic ties. Taiwan has expressed a strong interest to Japan to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Even though supporting Taiwan in this endeavor will be difficult politically, it would support Tokyo’s strategy of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.[31] Finally, Japan has supported Taiwan’s inclusion in international organizations, such as becoming a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an observer in the World Health Assembly (WHA), and participating in the International Civil Aviation Organization. Japanese diplomats often express the importance of Taiwan to Asia-Pacific countries.[32] Japan could support Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations by bolstering Taiwan’s foreign relations.
The main take-away of this study is that in countering China’s growing military threat, both governments of Taiwan and Japan can skillfully and incrementally enhance and explore security exchange and cooperation for the sake of national and regional security.
Dr. Michael Shao-Cheng Sun is an Assistant Professor at The Citadel (The Citadel: The Military College of South Carolina). He specializes in China’s security, East Asian Affairs, and Cross-Strait relations. He can be reached at ssun@citadel.edu .
[1] Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2018, Retrieved October 22, 2018, from https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2018.html ; Stephen R Nagy, “Can China-Japan relations return to ‘normal’?” Asia and Pacific Policy Society, https://www.policyforum.net/can-china-japan-relations-return-normal/.
[2] Franz-Stefan Gady, “US, Japan Aircraft Carriers Conduct Naval Exercise in South China Sea,” The Diplomat, Retrieved June 12, 2019, from https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/us-japan-aircraft-carriers-conduct-naval-exercise-in-south-china-sea/.
[3] Lauren Dickey, “Taiwan-Japan Ties Deepen Amid Chinese Assertiveness,” China Brief, Vol. 16, Issue 16, Retrieved October 26, 2016, from https://jamestown.org/program/taiwan-japan-ties-deepen-amid-chinese-assertiveness/.
[4] Duncan Deaeth, “Foreign Minister proposes joint Taiwan-Japan emergency response mechanism,” Taiwan News, Retrieved March 15, 2019, from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3658581.
[5] Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2018.
[6] Leo Lin, “Will the China-Japan Reset Continue in 2019?” The Diplomat, Retrieved January 31, 2019, from https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/will-the-china-japan-reset-continue-in-2019/.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Minoru Satake, “Japan’s 4 carriers to shun Chinese 5G tech,” Nikkei Asian Review, Retrieved December 10, 2018, from https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Japan-s-4-carriers-to-shun-Chinese-5G-tech ; Leo Lin.
[9] Andrea A. Fischetti and Antoine Roth, “A Structural Constraint to China-Japan Relations,” Tokyo Review, Retrieved April 12, 2019, from https://www.tokyoreview.net/2019/04/a-structural-constraint-to-china-japan-relations/.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2018.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Leo Lin.
[16] Stephen R Nagy, “It’s too early to write off the Indo-Pacific strategy,” The Japan Times, Retrieved July 24, 2018, from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/07/24/commentary/japan-commentary/early-write-off-indo-pacific-strategy/#.XSznROhKg2w.
[17] Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2018.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Strong but constrained Japan-Taiwan ties,” RAND Corporation, Retrieved March 13, 2018, from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/strong-but-constrained-japan-taiwan-ties/.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Duncan Deaeth.
[24] Jeffrey W. Hornung.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Lauren Dickey.
[30] J. Michael Cole, “Why strengthening the Taiwan-Japan alliance makes perfect sense,” The Interpreter, March 23 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-strengthening-taiwan-japan-alliance-makes-perfect-sense .
[31] Jeffrey W. Hornung.
[32] Ibid.