Maj Gen (Dr) S B Asthana[1]
BACKDROP
On taking over as President of PRC, Xi Jinping continued with ‘Peaceful Reunification’ of Taiwan as one of his aims and later had it included as a key goal in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, Article 1 of the PRC Constitution states that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Additionally, the preamble emphasizes the goal of achieving the complete reunification of the motherland, which includes bringing Taiwan under PRC sovereignty. Xi Jinping has called unification with Taiwan the “essence” of the country’s “rejuvenation,” which needs to be achieved by 2049, the one hundredth anniversary of the PRC.
Meanwhile, on 10 October 2024, President Lai of Taiwan (Republic of China) or ROC, said on the annual Double Tenth Day marking the 113th anniversary of ROC’s founding, that the two sides “are not subordinate to each other” and the PRC has no authority to represent the island. He believes in Taiwan’s sovereignty and it emphasises that its “absolutely impossible for the PRC to become the ‘motherland’ of the ROC’s people” because Taiwan has older political and democratic roots.
Consequently, the PLA has held military drills like “Joint Sword-2024B” on 13 October 2024 as a “stern warning to the separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces” to coerce Taiwan. Beijing continues to brand Lai as separatist and has continued coercive military posturing ever since the DPP was elected in 2016.
President Xi had earlier emphasised that the country’s reunification with Taiwan was “inevitable” in his last New Year’s address and also told President Biden that ‘Beijing will reunify Taiwan with mainland China but that the timing has not yet been decided’ with the word ‘peaceful prominently missing. Notwithstanding the fact that Taiwan has never been ruled by PRC, the fact it has operated as a separate political entity since 1949, with its own government, economy, and military, and other parameters qualify it as independent state. The inference drawn from Xi’s assertion is that PRC will continue to make an effort to reunite it with mainland China, but the questions remains How, When and at What cost?
WHY TAIWAN REMAINS A US-CHINA ISSUE, DESPITE PRC’S ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE?
The PRC may keep claiming Taiwan to be its domestic issue, but it has external dimensions. Diplomatically, the US may claim to follow the ‘One China Policy’ but it treats Taiwan no less than an ally. The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, effective from March 26, 2020 is an indicator of this. The Taiwan Relations Act,1979, Taiwan Travel Act signed in 2018, and National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2024 signed in 2023 to facilitate sale of state of the art weaponry and joint exercises justify the statement.
US will always like to trade and strategically partner with democratic Taiwan outside Beijing’s influence, rather than Taiwan under CCP. Moreover, in any potential invasion of Taiwan, the spill over of the battle space to Japan is obvious due to geographic proximity, and it is an ally the US is obligated to defend.
WHAT IS THE PRC TRYING CURRENTLY?
China is trying to pursue the idea of ‘Winning without Fighting’ using its Three Warfare Concept which entails public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and lawfare along with aggressive military coercion, air violations, firepower power demonstrations and a symbolic economic boycott of Taiwan, thus creating heightened tension around Taiwan to adequate deter the DPP leadership from declaring independence, and sending a stern message to Washington not to abandon the ‘One China Principle’. China, therefore, is using its Grey Zone tactics to control Taipei without firing a single shot, before escalating to the next level at appropriate time. In the meantime, the PRC is building its military capability to invade Taiwan in next few years, should its attempt at peaceful reunification fail.
The PRC’s warning to the USA not to arm Taiwan hasn’t shown results as Taiwan is to receive the first batch of F-16 Block 70 jets from an arms deal worth US$7.69 billion for 66 jets, with delivery due in September 2024, making Taiwan the third nation in the world to receive factory-fresh advanced fighter jets, besides approving $1.1 billion for upgrading its radars and missiles. The US $2 billion deal includes an advanced air defence system that has been used by Ukraine. In the 2025 budget, the Pentagon seeks US$500 million in arms support, indicating its intention of empowering Taiwan to have a military with a modern arsenal (HIMAR, ATACM, advanced air defences, anti-ship missile batteries) to defend itself against Chinese aggression.
IS FULL SCALE INVASION OF TAIWAN A VIABLE OPTION FOR PRC?
The cost of reunification by full scale invasion of Taiwan for Xi Jinping would be extraordinarily high, militarily, economically and politically. Chinese strategist Qiao Liang, a retired PLA Air Force Major General, has warned that taking Taiwan by force is ‘Too Costly’. The Chinese red line of “Taiwan going nuclear/declaring independence” has not been crossed as yet, giving no worthwhile justification for China to cross the US red line of ‘Changing status Quo by Force’.
A military invasion or forced reunification has the distinct possibility of direct involvement by the U.S. under the Taiwan Relations Act, as well as other regional powers like Japan, Australia and South Korea. The capture of Taiwan requires an amphibious assault bigger than the Inchon landing or D Day operations in Normandy in the Second World War, for which the Chinese amphibious fleet is currently relatively inadequate, but which will develop by 2027.
Analysis of the terrain of Taiwan reveals that besides the complexity of amphibious assault, it poses tremendous challenges for an invader. Taiwan’s landmass has rugged mountains, built up areas, and limited beaches, unsuitable for rapid moves by the invader. PLA may be able to cross the strait, but there are only few deep-water ports and beaches available in Taiwan which can accommodate a large landing force, which will invariably be hindered by sea mines, barriers, obstacles and anti-ship batteries on rocky terrain, as part of the ‘Porcupine or Honey Badger Defence Concept’ also referred as “Fortress Taiwan”. The east and west coasts of Taiwan have shallow water lined by steep cliffs, posing problems for the invading force. Fighting/movement in the built up areas of Taiwan’s major population centres is only possible through a few narrow passes and tunnels, which Taiwan can destroy or defend.
For political consolidation of Taiwan, capture of Taipei is essential. Its closeness to islands of Japan (Yonaguni Island, is just 110 km from Taiwan) will necessitate the PLA violating Japanese maritime space for a viable amphibious operation, which will drag Japan and its defence partner USA into a confrontation with China, notwithstanding the strategic ambiguity displayed by USA for decades. Mountainous terrain and street fighting in built up area has potential to prolong the war beyond Beijing’s expectations.
It may be noted that in case of invasion by the PLA, Taiwanese people will be fighting a ‘just war’ under a undeterred leadership, vowing to defend the democracy and security of Taiwan. A quick reference to the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War (the last combat experience of PLA) reveals that the PLA, when confronted with the determined people of Vietnam, fighting a ‘just war’ under strong leadership, and using the terrain to their advantage, were given a bloody nose despite the vast superiority of military assets of PLA. There is no reason that Taiwan can’t replicate it, given the kind of modern weaponry, determined military and more than adequate warning of PLA’s intentions. Taiwan will have to bear the brunt of the Chinese offensive, hoping US forces with its allies in the region join at the earliest. Taking Taiwan by force, therefore involves mobilisation of all the PLA’s combat resources, expecting an escalation from limited war to an all-out war.
Numerous think tanks’ wargames on a Chinese invasion of Taiwan have revealed a variety of results depending on the country wargaming it. CSIS (USA) developed one such wargame and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States, Taiwan and Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a very high cost to all the parties. PRC is also aware of such consequences, namely, that invasion might put its overarching aim of ‘National Rejuvenation’ in jeopardy, even if it gets some success in Taiwan.
CHINESE OPTION TO QUARANTINE TAIWAN
An option to Quarantine Taiwan is a low cost option, with the cost increasing with the degree of quarantine aimed at. Various scenarios have been worked out by CSIS starting from operations intended not to hermetically seal off Taiwan, but to punish Taiwan, assert Chinese sovereignty over the island, test the response from international shipping companies, and put significant pressure on Taiwan at the lowest level.
While China has the capabilities to successfully execute these and other quarantine variations, their success and risk for China depend on how Taiwan, the USA, and others would respond to it. The limitations of such an operations are that even if successfully executed, it can inflict temporary pain on Taiwan, but it will not force it to surrender its sovereignty. A military blockade will certainly be necessary for PRC to pursue its stated aim.
COST OF NAVAL BLOCKADES AND ECONOMIC DISRUPTION OF TAIWAN
Most of the military drills of the PLA have been to demonstrate the ability to blockade Taiwan, to force it to agree to its terms without risking an all-out war with USA. In order to prevent foreign ships from entering or departing Taiwanese seas, naval forces will be used to encircle the island, limiting access to its ports. Establishing air and sea control exploiting its superiority in quantity of military assets and posturing them to deter any ally of Taiwan is part of Chinese strategy. The idea of “Joint Blockade Campaign” finds mention in Science of Campaigns, a textbook published in 2006 by China’s National Defence University, which the PLA has improved upon incorporating modern capabilities. The PRC might seize one or more Taiwan-administrated outlying islands, including Kinmen or Matsu near China, Penghu near Taiwan, or Pratas in the South China Sea, besides enforcing a blockade of the main island of Taiwan.
A Washington-based think tank, the Foundation for Defence of Democracies (FDD), held a tabletop exercise in Taipei and mentioned the “Anaconda strategy”, through which the PRC uses covert cyberwarfare and non-kinetic disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, followed by a military blockade or other measures to strangulate Taiwan, rather than attempting an invasion. Prior to imposing a blockade, China might use its cyber capabilities to interfere with communications, vital infrastructure, and logistics, making it difficult for Taiwan to coordinate its supply chains and defences.
In addition, it could use propaganda, psychological and misinformation campaigns to undermine public support for the government in Taiwan and discourage external support. Blockade could also include economic measures, such as targeting trade routes and imports critical to Taiwan's economy, including food and energy supplies. Taiwan’s heavy dependence on imported liquefied natural gas and limited energy reserves makes it vulnerable to such a threat. Coercion of countries having diplomatic or trade relations with Taiwan is also part of the blockade planned by PRC.
The effectiveness of such a blockade would depend on Taiwan's readiness in military, economic and all other domains of warfare including reserves of critical resources, as well as the response from the international community. Taiwan will have to bear the brunt of China's initial onslaught and blockade, but the US and its regional allies could synergise their forces and utilize their air and sea resources to cut off Beijing's maritime lifeline both inside and beyond the South China Sea.
Chinese Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) outside the Nine dash line are still vulnerable to choking/blockade like in the Malacca Strait, and it will draw out PLA into conflict outside its comfort zone. The same Anaconda Strategy could thus be used in encircling the PRC and cutting off its SLOC, trade routes and essential energy, thereby "squeezing" it until its economy is crippled. If the US could ensure that Ukraine communications remained functional despite Russian cyber-attacks, there is no reason that ‘Star-Link’ will not do the same for Taiwan in future.
To this end, USA signed the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA) in 2014 with the Philippines and expanded US military bases to include four new sites in 2023, in addition to the five earlier. In addition, a Marine Rotational Force (MRF-SEA) deployment is likely to continue through March 2025 and includes six additional exercises and security cooperation engagements throughout Southeast Asia. This will ensure swift mobilization in the event of a Taiwan contingency.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COST
Economically, Chinese dependence on the US dollar remains significant, and a conflict over Taiwan would result in a substantial economic setback for China, leading to a rapid exodus of capital and the relocation of companies from the country, at a pace more accelerated than anticipated. This will also destroy the Chinese and Taiwanese economies, a result which does not suit a Chinese leadership struggling to revive its economy amidst trade war, failing BRI, real state crisis and domestic debt. China is Taiwan's top trading partner, with trade totalling $224 billion in 2023 with Taiwanese making over $100 billion investment in PRC. China is the top destination for Taiwanese exports, still accounting for approximately 30.7 percent of total exports in 2024 with Taiwan having substantial trade surplus, despite Taiwanese efforts to diversify, to reduce its dependence on the PRC. Taiwan is the world leader in semiconductor manufacturing, and any conflict that disrupts Taiwan's chip production would have a severe impact on global supply chains including those of China.
In the event of a military invasion, China could face severe economic sanctions from Western nations, similar to or even harsher than those faced by Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. Given China's deep integration into the global economy, these sanctions would likely target its financial system, technology exports, and key industries. Even after the reunification, China could face long-term isolation from Western markets, which could slow down its economic growth further.
Politically, forced reunification could damage China’s relationships with key trading partners and their allies. Asian neighbours may become more aligned with the USA and Western countries, undermining China's efforts to position itself as a rising superpower and responsible global leader. Such an image will take a further beating if the invasion doesn’t succeed. An invasion of Taiwan would damage China’s global reputation and undermine its soft power in many parts of the world.
Domestic unrest could result from a protracted or expensive conflict. The ability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to sustain stability and economic growth is crucial to Xi Jinping's leadership. Dissent within the Party and among the populace could arise from a conflict, particularly one that does not end in an immediate and resounding victory. Significant Chinese casualties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait could threaten the CCP's grasp on power. The public will increasingly look for democracy, inspired by democratic Taiwan, which the CCP has been stifling up until now.
CONCLUSION
While the leadership under Xi Jinping sees reunification with Taiwan as a central part of its national objectives, the costs associated with forced reunification, especially when considering the Anaconda Strategy or US led containment strategies, could be overwhelming. The potential military, economic, and political blowback could indeed make the operation unbearable for China, depending on how events unfold.
Taiwan’s geography, modernised military power, resolute capacity, its vital role within global supply chains and semiconductors dependency will pose a challenge to the PRC, notwithstanding the asymmetry in terms of military assets compared with the PLA. Taiwan’s determination to defend itself, growing defence spending and military capacity, strengthening reserve force, training and diversifying energy sources can increase the cost of the PLA’s misadventure.
The conflict if imposed by China will be deadly and Chinese, who want to win without fighting are not known for their appetite to accept body bags of dead compatriots for a cause which doesn’t give them economic benefit, but takes it away their dream of national rejuvenation.
Even though China’s military has modernized significantly, and maintains substantial numerical advantage over Taiwanese military, a full-scale amphibious invasion does not make any strategic sense for China, with good chance of reputational loss, globally and domestically, if the operations fail or are overly delayed.
The current strategic posturing and gaming will continue since neither the US nor China want to go to war, but neither wants to give a walkover either. In all fairness, Taiwan will expect the US and other allies to conduct military exercises/ activities close to the Malacca Strait to relieve Chinese pressure and serve as a subtle reminder of their vulnerable SLOC in the event that any aggression (coercion, quarantine, blockade, or use of force) becomes intolerable.
Although Xi Jinping is renowned for taking measured risks, the sum of these costs may lead China to choose a course of sustained pressure and coercion over direct military action. The PRC wants to keep President Lai under pressure so he refrains from declaring independence, hoping that the DPP loses the next election, and advantageous agreements that benefit China can be worked out with the opposition,.
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The views expressed are the personal views of the author, who retains the copyright. The author is a globally acknowledged Strategic and Security Analyst.