Policymakers, academics and the general public grapple to understand the role Chinese nationalism plays in its outward behavior. Central to the debate is whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) caters to nationalism, and if so, whether this leads to assertive foreign policy behavior. As Taiwan remains an integral component of CCP’s ruling legitimacy, and is thus on the top of the party’s priority list, the question “does nationalism shape China’s foreign policy and make it more assertive, even aggressive?” matters to China’s Taiwan policy, and in turn has implications for stability in the Taiwan Strait.

While there are many factors that influence China’s policy on Taiwan, Chinese nationalism has affected its outwards behavior since ancient times, and incidents of Chinese nationalism driving Beijing to act aggressively towards Taiwan despite increasing cross-Strait economic and social ties have appeared since the 1980s. For example, during what analysts later called the “1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted large-scale military exercises and fired missiles across the Taiwan Strait as Taiwan prepared for its first presidential election. In 1999, after former President Lee Teng-hui announced the “special state-to-state relations” theory, Beijing put an immediate hold on official contacts with Taipei, and redoubled its military activities in the Taiwan Strait. Following Tsai Ing-Wen’s election as Taiwan’s president in 2016, Beijing cut diplomatic contacts with Taipei and exerted more military pressure on the island. This essay shows that Chinese nationalism under Xi Jinping has taken a different form, and with the party’s hardening stance on Taiwan, the likelihood of a more hawkish policy on Taiwan increases. Although Beijing seems unlikely to start a major conflict as Trump’s return to the White House brought uncertainties to the world, nationalism under Xi and its consequences still have negative implications for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese nationalism under Xi Jinping contains both “peaceful” and “assertive” elements. The promotion and the official adoption and revitalization of Chinese culture were meant to inspire Chinese national pride and collective unity. However, the reinforcement of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, the ambition to act as a great power (by presenting the Chinese economic model as an alternative to Western models and being central to global governance), and the strong promotion of propaganda initiatives, patriotic education and informational control indicate more assertive thoughts and actions. In fact, the party has cultivated a form of “state nationalism” characterized by a strong national agenda, intolerance of criticism of the CCP, and animosity toward Western values.[1]” As it called on China to abandon the “keep a low profile and bide your time ( 韜光養晦tao guang yang hui)” attitude and instead to actively project and fulfill its ambition, while reinforcing the division between “us” versus “them,” it represents the growing assertiveness of Chinese nationalism.

In recent years, the party leadership has been confronted with external and internal challenges. Partly due to the downturn of the real estate market, China has been struggling with continuing economic slowdowns and weak consumer demand, and analysts are not optimistic about the country’s short-term economic outlook.[2] A bleak economic outlook is tied to rising social instability—youth unemployment, labor protests, mental illness, suicides, random violence and other signs of social strains are being seen across the country. As tensions between the U.S. and China grow, and are seen by Chinese leadership as threat to its control, the CCP has called for more unity, resulting in a heightened emphasis on Chinese identity and national sovereignty. It is expected that rising socio-economic problems and nationalist sentiment will give the party more incentive to become more outwardly assertive, even aggressive.

Beginning in 2014, the CCP expanded the definition of Taiwan independence and its definition on the status quo, which meant that Beijing no longer accepted Taiwan’s definitions. Such a change also paved the way for Beijing’s more proactive and aggressive stance to ensure that Taiwan would not become independent (the stance is also directed towards the domestic audience).[3] Moreover, the unification of Taiwan and China was put in the context of China’s national rejuvenation: the importance of unifying Taiwan has been elevated, and China should use all its capabilities and means to achieve this end. This is different from Hu Jintao’s emphasis on peaceful development as the political basis for achieving unification.

In 2019, Xi delivered his first Chinese policy toward Taiwan, and introduced the “Two Systems, ‘Taiwan” solution. While analysts were divided over whether this solution was different to the longstanding Chinese stance on Taiwan, in 2022 China released a white paper titled “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” which was seen by analysts as Beijing’s more hardline approach to Taiwan. The 2022 white paper differed from previous policies on Taiwan.[4] First, the 2022 white paper used more explicit language to emphasize the necessity of using the Chinese military to achieve unification. Although the use of military force was also mentioned, previous policies focused more on economic, diplomatic and peaceful means to achieve unification. Secondly, the 2022 white paper presented the “One Country, Two Systems” formula as the way for Taiwan to preserve its social and economic systems, while previous policies presented the model more as an option for Taiwan. Third, the 2022 white paper took a stronger tone against Taiwanese independence, blaming Taiwanese independence activists for potential conflict and labeling them as a national security threat to China. Previous policies did reject Taiwanese independence, but the tone was softer and more focused on the peaceful nature of China’s approach. Fourth, the 2022 white paper showed a stronger stance against foreign interference, stating that any foreign interference will lead to “serious consequences,” while previous policies did not frame foreign interference as a threat to China’s sovereignty. Lastly, a major departure of this white paper from the previous two papers issued in 1993 and 2000 is that the promise of not stationing PLA troops or CCP administrators on Taiwan was omitted. Thus, the 2022 white paper lays out Beijing’s uncompromising stance on Taiwan, and the language and tone used indicate a tougher, even more militarized, stance on Taiwan.

At the 20th party congress held in October 2022, Xi made a remark regarding Taiwan: “The wheels of history are rolling on towards the unification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Complete unification of our country must be realized.” This has caused concern among international observers. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in a discussion at Stanford University on October 17, 2022, that China has determined that the current situation is no longer satisfactory and is eager to accelerate its agenda for “reunification within a significantly shorter timeframe.[5]” Also, it could be gathered from the speech that Xi would not hesitate to use a hardline approach—just like how Beijing treated Hong Kong—to achieve unification.

Up to Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections in 2024, Beijing increased military activities around the Taiwan Strait, threatened to impose sanctions, and even openly stated that the elections were a choice between peace and war.[6] It continued to exert pressure on Taiwan after the elections. On June 2024, the Chinese authorities unveiled guidelines on imposing criminal punishment on “diehard Taiwan independence” separatists. According to the guidelines, China’s courts, prosecutors, public and state security bodies should “severely punish Taiwan independence diehards for splitting the country and inciting secession crimes in accordance with the law, and resolutely defend national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.[7]” On October, 2024, four days after President Lai Ching-te’s speech on Taiwan (ROC) National Day, China conducted “Joint Sword-2024B,” large-scale military exercises around Taiwan and outlying islands. China’s maritime law enforcement forces also conducted unprecedented patrols around Taiwan. And in December, 2024, the PLA conducted the largest military drills in nearly three decades, deploying around 60 PLA Navy warships and 30 China Coast Guard vessels in areas ranging from the South China Sea to Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, complementing the 134-plus PLA warplanes operating in the island’s vicinity across a three-day period.[8] These activities reflect CCP’s increasingly hardline approach vis-à-vis Taiwan.

In the midst of rising nationalist sentiments and the party’s Taiwan policy, the Chinese public are more inclined to demand a harder approach vis-à-vis Taiwan. For example, right before former U.S. Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, many Chinese netizens applauded the tough rhetoric from government, military and media personalities who were attempting to thwart the visit. Some of them made a list of celebrities or influencers who did not publicly express support for China’s position on Pelosi, inviting social media users to pressure them to make a statement. A former editor of China’s Global Times wrote that China should “shoot down Pelosi’s plane.[9]”

Seeing Pelosi visit Taiwan, many netizens expressed disappointment, commenting that they were lied to by the government, and the government did not deserve people’s respect.[10]

In January 2024, Chinese nationalists, who are growing impatient, called for war in response to the Democratic Progressive Party’s victory in Taiwan’s presidential election. Prominent Chinese social media influencers, such as one called Midnight Knight, remarked that “It’s better to fight early than late, and it’s better to fight big than small.” Individual Chinese who were interviewed by Voice of America also echoed this thinking, saying that the victory of Lai could quicken China’s pace of unifying Taiwan by force. [11]

Aggressive, hardline opinions on the internet may not be representative of Chinese people’s views of Taiwan, and indeed public opinion polls shows that only a slim majority (55%) of Chinese respondents support Beijing’s armed reunification with Taiwan.[12] Still, netizen opinions could lead to the “tyranny of the minority”— the amplification and misrepresentation of some voices could overwhelm more moderated voices, and increase the pressures policymakers face.

Chinese nationalism under Xi Jinping could lead to even more hawkish policies on Taiwan. Nationalism acts as double-edged sword: while leaders can use nationalism to win domestic support, nationalism skews perspectives on outsiders, causing individuals to view adversaries as threatening and possessing harmful motives. This can get out of hand and force leaders to promote more hardline, aggressive responses as they wish to dominate others or think that defending their nation necessitates the use of force.

Alternatively, the CCP may be induced to invoke preexisting nationalism to consolidate control. According to diversionary theory, leaders facing domestic pressures may generate international conflicts to divert public attention to foreign troubles to stay in power. One study found that Xi Jinping relied on diversionary foreign policies to inoculate himself during the time when serious tensions between Xi Jinping and political elites occurred.[13] Some analysts and officials also deemed recent military drills by the PLA as part of Chinese internal propaganda, with the goal of winning domestic support.

While nationalist sentiment may drive Beijing to rely more on diversionary tactics, under the current geopolitical environment, Beijing has little incentive to start or engage in large-scale conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. government under Donald Trump is quickly reshaping international politics. Trump’s preference for a unilateral, transactional diplomatic approach may indicate more opportunities for authoritarian regimes (as shown by Trump’s plan for Gaza and attempt to end the war in Ukraine) to expand their influence, but Beijing has been expecting the Trump administration to implement tough policies on China.[14] What happened after Trump took office justified Beijing’s worries. On January 20, Trump imposed a 10% duty on all Chinese imports, which prompted Beijing to respond with countermeasures, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on February 14 at the Munich Security Conference that China will “’Play along to the end’ if the United States is bent on suppressing the country even though Beijing does not wish to be in conflict.[15]”

As the outlook of U.S.-China relations remains unclear, Beijing is likely to prioritize its relations with the U.S., while maintain its current policy stance when it comes to cross-Strait relations—intensifying pressure and advancing so-called integrated development measures on Taiwan. Diversionary tactics may come in the forms of further gray-zone aggression against Taiwan, which still increases tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Although the purpose of nationalism and diversionary aggression are for authoritarian rulers to maintain domestic control, and the likelihood of the CCP engaging in large-scale conflicts seems low in the near term, the increase in the frequency and intensity of nationalist sentiments will lead to negative responses from Taiwan. For example, a public opinion poll commissioned by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research showed that, when being asked to identify whether China’s territorial ambition constitutes a security threat, 64% of the respondents said it is a “critical security threat.[16]” The growth in distrust across the Strait makes unification by peace less feasible, and tensions more likely to occur.