John Chuan-tiong Lim*

Shigeru Ishiba, the 102nd and 103rd Prime Minister of Japan, concluded his term after only 386 days on October 21, 2025. Despite its brevity, Ishiba’s tenure proved to be a critical inflection point for Japanese foreign policy, particularly concerning the Taiwan Strait.

The year 2025 began with the re-emergence of the “Trump 2.0” administration in the United States, immediately reigniting trade tensions, even with key allies like Japan. The Ishiba government was thus consumed by managing the complex security and economic relationship with Washington, a challenge amplified by Ishiba’s perceived inability to establish sufficient mutual trust with President Trump, which was cited as a potential factor in his early resignation.

Simultaneously, Ishiba dedicated significant effort to repairing Japan’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), achieving notable progress. Discussions with officials at Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) confirmed that the Ishiba Cabinet had “genuinely managed to narrow the distance with China” compared to its two predecessors. How Ishiba achieved this delicate balance requires deep examination.

While some media initially labeled Ishiba as “pro-China and distant from Taiwan,” this assessment is simplistic. His intentional visit to Taiwan before the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election, where he formally announced his candidacy, underscored his long-standing commitment to the Japan-Taiwan relationship. The central puzzle this paper addresses is: How did the Ishiba government successfully improve relations with Beijing while concurrently promoting the deepening of ties with Taipei?

In Tokyo’s strategic calculus, while Japan-Taiwan relations have gained autonomy, their correlation with Japan-China relations remains intricate. For Beijing, the view that “the Taiwan issue is the core issue of Sino-Japanese relations” is constant, demanding extreme caution from Japan. Ishiba’s chosen strategy was not a confrontational “pro-China/anti-Taiwan” or “pro-Taiwan/anti-China” approach. Instead, he pursued a “dual-track approach,” aiming to manage both Sino-Japanese and Japan-Taiwan relations simultaneously, effectively securing greater maneuverability between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

This paper analyzes the characteristics of the Shigeru Ishiba government’s cross-Strait policy, clarifying how he stabilized Japan-China dynamics in his short tenure, thereby establishing the necessary foundation for substantive progress in Japan-Taiwan relations.

Prior to Ishiba’s assumption of office, Japan-China relations had been in a prolonged state of political stagnation. The preceding four years under the Suga and Kishida cabinets saw no reciprocal prime ministerial visits, symbolizing a profound lack of strategic trust and political interaction.[1]Despite continued economic engagement, political tensions had severely worsened the pattern of “cold politics, warm economics”( 政冷經熱 ).[2]

The primary barriers to rapprochement were multifaceted:

1. Economic Coercion: Beijing’s comprehensive ban on Japanese aquatic products, imposed after the discharge of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, severely impacted Japanese fisheries and exports, ostensibly based on “food safety” concerns. [3]

2. Safety Concerns: The 2024 attacks on students at Japanese schools in Suzhou and Shenzhen highlighted rising anti-Japanese sentiment in China, generating strong safety concerns among Japanese expatriates. [4]

3. Legal Hostility: The suspension of visa-free entry for Japanese citizens and the intensifying use of the Anti-Espionage Law led to the detention of several Japanese businesspeople. These incidents drove Japanese public opinion against China to a low point, crippling bilateral trust. [5]

4. Territorial Disputes: The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea remained a persistent flashpoint. Throughout the year preceding Ishiba’s tenure, the Japanese government reported a record number of incursions by Chinese Coast Guard vessels into the contiguous zone and territorial waters around the islands, severely escalating tensions and fueling distrust within Japan’s security establishment.[6]

In contrast, Japan-Taiwan relations flourished, achieving a historical peak of intimacy. This was driven by several factors:

1. Emotional Bond: Taiwan’s massive financial aid following the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake created a deep, lasting emotional connection.[7]

2. Strategic Alignment: Shinzo Abe’s promotion of the strategic concept that "A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency" institutionalized bilateral security dialogue and exchange (2012–2022).[8]

9. Economic Security: The relocation of Taiwanese semiconductor giants, such as TSMC, to Kumamoto underscored a new era of industrial cooperation and economic interdependence, crucial for Japan’s economic security.[9]

Although the Kishida government verbally emphasized “stabilizing Japan-China relations,” its practical diplomatic efforts, particularly within the U.S.-Japan alliance framework, focused on deepening non-official security and parliamentary cooperation with Taiwan. The increased activities of the non-partisan Diet members’ group, the Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council, further cemented Taiwan’s role in Japan’s emerging security strategy.[10]

Ishiba thus inherited a challenging dual reality: a political deadlock with Beijing that needed urgent repair to mitigate economic and diplomatic risks, alongside a domestically popular and strategically vital relationship with Taipei. This context dictated his subsequent approach of managing an effective “reconciliation with China, deepening with Taiwan” policy.

Ishigeru Ishiba is known for his focus on security strategy and institutional politics. Recognizing China’s indispensable importance to Japan's stability, Ishiba concluded that a “stable Japan-China relationship” was essential for advancing Japan’s regional influence.

Given the deeply negative public and business sentiment toward China (with some advocating for “decoupling” or datsu-Chū), Ishiba took the bold step of explicitly rebranding and repositioning Japan-China relations as a “Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship” ( 戦略的互恵関係 ).[11] This concept, originally proposed by Abe in 2006 but long dormant, was given new, pragmatic meaning: establishing political stability with Beijing to carve out greater strategic maneuvering room for Japan in the region, particularly on the Taiwan issue.

Ishiba’s implementation focused on restoring high-level political dialogue:

1. Diplomatic Resumption: He immediately dispatched Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya to China and invited Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to reciprocate. This led to the restoration of the “Vice-Ministerial Level Strategic Dialogue” and the “Defense Authorities’ Communication Mechanism,” vital for reducing strategic miscalculation.[12]

2. Party-to-Party Ties: LDP Secretary-General Hiroshi Moriyama led delegations to Beijing, institutionalizing regular communication with the CPC’s International Liaison Department.

Beijing responded positively to Ishiba’s diplomatic overtures. In mid-2025, the PRC partially lifted the import ban on Japanese aquatic products and restored visa-free entry for Japanese citizens by the end of the year. Furthermore, the two sides agreed to relaunch the “High-Level Economic Dialogue” and the “Climate Change Cooperation Mechanism,” signaling a return to a stable political track.[13]

Crucially, Ishiba’s “Strategic Mutual Benefit” was not a simple pro-China stance; it was a pragmatic philosophy of “competitive coexistence” ( 競合共存 ). Domestically, he simultaneously reinforced the U.S.-Japan alliance, strengthened the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and pursued supply chain security. His approach was to pragmatically manage contradictions with China to prevent conflict escalation while maintaining Japan’s defense autonomy.

The underlying strategic objective of this China rapprochement was to secure greater diplomatic space for Taiwan policy. By lowering Beijing’s hostility toward Tokyo, Ishiba could advance substantive Japan-Taiwan exchanges without triggering severe countermeasures. The improved Japan-China relationship was a calculated means to achieve greater diplomatic initiative on cross-Strait affairs.

With the stabilization of Japan-China relations reducing Beijing’s immediate diplomatic heat, the Ishiba government implemented a strategy of “low-key pragmatism and gradual deepening” to elevate Japan-Taiwan interactions without overtly challenging the “official” sensitive line. The relative decrease in the intensity of Beijing’s protests was noted by officials at the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association (JTEA).

In just one year, the frequency and level of high-level Japan-Taiwan exchanges surged, setting new records. Notable examples of these frequent, albeit nominally“non-official practical exchanges,” include:

(1) December 2024: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Secretary-General Lin Yu-chang visited Japan and met with LDP Secretary-General Hiroshi Moriyama.[14]

(2) January 2025: Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu (Lin Chia-lung) interacted side-by-side at the Palau presidential inauguration ceremony.

(3) April 2025: Taiwan’s Deputy Minister of National Defense Po Hung-hui visited Japan.[15]

(4) July 2025: Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung visited Japan under the guise of a “private itinerary.”

(5) September 2025: Kuomintang (KMT) Legislative Yuan Caucus Convener Fu Kun-chi led a delegation of 27 KMT legislators to Japan.

(6) September 2025: Japan’s Vice Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Hiroshi Takinami, visited Taiwan.

(7) Mid-September 2025: Former President Tsai Ing-wen visited Japan for a“private vacation.”

(8) Late September 2025: Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu led a cross-party delegation to Japan.

(9) October 2025: Japan’s Parliamentary Vice Minister of the Environment, Hiroshi Nakada, visited Taiwan.

The Ishiba government oversaw four notable qualitative shifts in the relationship:

1. Recognition of “Taiwan” in Nationality Registration:

In a significant symbolic step, the Ministry of Justice announced in February 2025 that, starting in May, the designation “Taiwan” would be permitted in the nationality column of household registration records.[16] While this was officially characterized as a measure “not involving diplomatic recognition,” it signaled the government’s shift toward “respecting reality,” simultaneously accommodating Taiwanese sentiment and maintaining the non-official framework—a hallmark of Ishiba’s “pragmatic balanced diplomacy.”

2. The “Political rather than Official” Visit Model:

The visits by Vice Minister Hiroshi Takinami and Parliamentary Vice Minister Hiroshi Nakada to Taiwan utilized the innovative designation of “political visit”(seimu hōmon—in their capacity as a political figure) rather than “official visit” (kōmu shuppei—in their government post). This institutional innovation allowed vice-ministerial level officials to interact with the Taiwanese government in their capacity as “Diet members,” circumventing the long-standing restrictions on high-level official travel and establishing a significant precedent for future cabinets.[17]

3. Normalization of Minister-level Visits to Japan:

Under Ishiba, Taiwanese ministers, such as the Minister of Economic Affairs Kuo Chih-hui, frequently visited Japan under the guise of “attending events” or “cultural exchange,” avoiding formal meetings with central government officials. This arrangement institutionalized and normalized high-level interaction by balancing formal “non-official status” with the substance of indirect government-to-government contact.

4. Substantive Participation in the Osaka Expo:

Despite not being allowed to use the name “Taiwan Pavilion,” the arrangement for the 2025 Osaka Expo, brokered through extensive negotiation, successfully avoided the issue of “sovereignty expression” while securing Taiwan’s substantive participation in the international event. This demonstrated Tokyo’s ability to maintain its "non-official relationship” principle while maximizing Taiwan’s ”international visibility.”[18]

These four developments highlight Ishiba’s effective use of a dual strategy of “institutional innovation” and “semantic manipulation” to advance Japan-Taiwan relations. By adjusting policy language and administrative techniques, he expanded the space for cooperation without adopting a provocative “pro-Taiwan route.” This “sustainable pragmatic diplomacy” ensured that technological, security, economic, and civil society cooperation could continue deepening between Tokyo and Taipei.

The core success of Ishiba’s policy was that the advancement of Taiwan ties was strategically enabled by the stabilization of China relations. This strategic thinking of “advancing through stability” allowed his government to achieve a rare diplomatic equilibrium: significant progress with Taiwan without jeopardizing the stability he had successfully secured with Beijing.

Despite significant domestic pressure, the Shigeru Ishiba government successfully redefined Japan-China relations as a “Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship,” ending a 14-year political impasse. His key strategic achievement was replacing “strategic confrontation” with “pragmatic dialogue,” rapidly repairing the political distance inherited from the Suga and Kishida eras. The positive outcomes—including Beijing’s lifting of the seafood import ban and the restoration of visa-free entry—demonstrated the viability of this policy shift.

Simultaneously, Ishiba leveraged this stabilized China relationship to actively relax political constraints on Taiwan interaction. The resulting surge in high-level Japan-Taiwan exchanges, from ministerial to parliamentary levels, has become increasingly normalized. Ishiba’s foreign policy equation of “advancing within stability” propelled the substantive cooperation and social connection between Japan and Taiwan to a new level without crossing Beijing's established red lines.

The succession of Sanae Takaichi as Prime Minister in October 2025 marks a new political phase, and her initial foreign policy appears to carry forward Ishiba’s framework.[19] During the APEC meeting in Korea on October 31, Takaichi and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed the “Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship,” confirming Ishiba’s diplomatic legacy as the new baseline for Japan-China engagement.[20]

While the Takaichi government inherited Ishiba’s framework, the political styles and rhetorical approaches of the two leaders are vastly different. On November 7, Takaichi’s assertive statement regarding a “Taiwan contingency” ignited the largest diplomatic conflict between Beijing and Tokyo since Japan’s 2012 nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.[21] This immediate conflict suggests that despite the reaffirmed framework, the severe deterioration of the Japan-China relationship will make Beijing extremely guarded against any Japanese attempts to promote ties with Taiwan. Consequently, the advancement of Japan-Taiwan relations under Takaichi is likely to face greater difficulty than during Ishiba’s tenure.

Nevertheless, the Takaichi government is populated by prominent “pro-Taiwan factions”—most notably the appointment of Koichi Hagiuda, a close confidant of Shinzo Abe and a strong supporter of Taiwan, as Acting Secretary-General of the LDP. This political alignment strongly suggests the new administration will likely pursue the dual-track policy even more vigorously: “security-oriented towards China, deepening ties with Taiwan.”[22]

Ishiba’s brief but impactful tenure stabilized Japan-China relations while creating a more flexible and robust space for Japan-Taiwan relations. His pragmatic diplomacy established the policy groundwork for Takaichi to continue and deepen Tokyo’s strategic partnership with Taipei, moving their bond from mere symbolic “friendship” toward a more institutionalized and strategically aligned partnership.