Shao-cheng Sun*

During Trump’s first term, the US-Taiwan military-to-military relationship remained robust. However, Trump thought that Taiwan should pay the US for their defense. During his second term, Trump adopted an ambiguous approach regarding whether the US would intervene in the event of a China invasion against Taiwan, stating that “If I answer that question, it will put me in a bad negotiating position.” According to a 2024 survey conducted by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the number of Americans who supported the use of troops in a China-Taiwan war has decreased, from 52 percent in 2023 to 36 percent in 2024. The fatigue in US public opinion over the war in Ukraine could have a significant effect on public support for Taiwan. Thus, Taiwan must prepare its military readiness to operate independently in the event of a Chinese military invasion. Taiwan should demonstrate it is serious about its own defense by raising its defense budget, and communicating the imminent threats Taiwan faces from the Chinese military to the people of Taiwan. This paper examines the US security policy regarding Taiwan during Trump’s first term and explores his second-term security policy. Finally, the paper argues that Taiwan must fight for its own survival.

The Trump worldview was the promise of the “Make America Great Again” campaign to put “America first.” The Trump administration, under the influence of conservatives in charge of US security-related policy, such as John Bolton (National Security Adviser), Matthew Pottinger (National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs), and Randall Schriver (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs), showed sympathy toward Taiwan in opposition to China.[1] They guided Trump toward a hostile relationship with Beijing.

Journalist Bob Woodward recounted a January 19, 2018, meeting at the White House where Trump and his national security team discussed the rationale for the US’s defending Taiwan. Trump asked, “What do we get from protecting Taiwan?”[2] On June 1, 2019, the Pentagon released the “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” (IPSR), outlining the US vision for the region, and the defense strategy. IPSR had been labeled as the US military policy to contain a rising China. The US established the free and open Indo-Pacific architecture by forming the Quad network, which comprises Australia, India, Japan, and the US. The objectives were to pursue preparedness and partnerships in the region. The preparation focused on realistic training to confront China’s military buildup. The US increased interoperability to ensure that US military hardware and software could integrate with allies and partners, including Taiwan.

(1)The creation of the Taiwan Travel Act

For the past three decades, the Taiwan government has requested its US counterparts to elevate their high-ranking official contacts. With the persistent efforts of all parties in Taiwan and the US, the Taiwan Travel Act was passed by the US Congress and was signed into law by President Trump on March 16, 2018. The Act allowed the following activities. (1) Officials at all levels of the US government could travel to Taiwan to meet their counterparts. (2) The US allowed high-level Taiwanese officials to enter the US under respectful conditions when they meet. (3) The US encouraged the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to conduct business in the US.[3] In May 2019, Taiwan’s Security General of the National Security Council, David Lee, had a dialogue with the US National Security Advisor, John Bolton.[4] The Taiwan Travel Act enhanced bilateral strategic partnerships by facilitating collaboration between high-ranking officials.

(2)Mike Pompeo and Taiwan’s policy

Soon after becoming Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo realized that the US’s engagement with China had previously been based on not angering Beijing. Pompeo directed his team to reevaluate the US’s Taiwan policy and think creatively about engaging with Taiwan. Pompeo dispatched Under Secretary of State, Keith Krach, to Taiwan in September 2020. In the State Department, the Taiwan Contact Guidelines regulated matters, such as which federal buildings Taiwanese officials could enter, which Taiwanese officials could shake hands with US officials, and which rank of officials could visit Taiwan. Pompeo canceled the Guidelines in January 2021.[5]

(3)The US arms sales

The Trump administration increased arms sales to Taiwan and considered moving away from its previous “bundling” method toward a case-by-case approach. Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, stated that the US was committed to working with Taiwan and providing it with defensive weapons. In June 2017, the US announced the arms sale of $1.42 billion, including Heavy Weight Torpedoes, Joint Standoff Weapons, and High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles. In October 2018, the US approved the sale of spare parts for F-16s and other military aircraft worth up to $330 million. In April 2019, the State Department approved the third arms sale to Taiwan, which included pilot training programs, maintenance, and logistics support for Taiwan’s F-16 fighters, at an estimated value of $500 million.[6] At the June 2019 G20 meeting in Osaka, Xi urged the US not to sell arms to Taiwan. However, John Bolton and Mick Mulvaney persuaded Trump to agree with arms sales. On August 13, in a conference call with Trump, Bolton explained the huge political backfire if the sale didn’t proceed. Taiwan would pay $8 billion for the F-16s, and Boeing would get many jobs. Trump finally agreed.[7] During Trump’s first term, the US provided $15 billion worth of arms to Taiwan, dwarfing the Obama administration’s $14 billion in eight years.[8]

(4)The US’s response to China’s rising threat

The PLA increased pressure against Taiwan during the Trump administration. Beijing dispatched military aircraft and vessels to circle Taiwan. Accordingly, the Pentagon increased sending US military vessels and warplanes to patrol the Taiwan Strait to deter China’s coercion. In July 2019, Beijing warned that it was ready for war if Taiwan moved toward independence. In response, a US Navy warship sailed through the Taiwan Strait. A Seventh Fleet spokesperson stated, “The ship’s transit through the Taiwan Strait demonstrated the US commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.”[9]

The second-term Trump Administration focused on three aspects of the US- Taiwan relationship: the trade deficit, semiconductor manufacturing, and defense sharing. Trump’s general comments on Taiwan have focused on the microchip industry and Taiwan’s defense capabilities. Following the tariff threats, on March 4, 2025, TSMC announced plans to invest an additional $100 billion, bringing its total investment to $165 billion, to expand a semiconductor campus in Arizona. The expansion includes plans for three new fabrication plants, two advanced packaging facilities, and a major R&D team center, solidifying this project as the largest single foreign direct investment in US history. However, this development did not halt Trump from targeting Taiwan in his tariff plans. Trump has also been critical of Taiwan’s defense budget, which is less than 3 percent of its GDP on defense. He said that the number should be 10 percent.[10]

1.US-Taiwan Security Collaboration

In 2021, the head of US Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Phil Davidson, said that a conflict provoked by China and involving Taiwan could happen within the next six years. It is now known as the “Davidson window.”[11] On September 18, 2025, China’s defense minister, Dong Jun, emphasized that China would never allow any separatist attempts for Taiwan independence to succeed.[12] On September 30, Xi Jinping called on the nation to oppose Taiwan independence separatist activities and external interference.[13] The Pentagon, alarmed at the low weapons stockpiles the US would have on hand for a potential conflict with China, is urging its missile suppliers to double or even quadruple production rates on a breakneck schedule. The push to speed production of the critical weapons in the highest demand has played out through a series of high-level meetings between Pentagon leaders and senior representatives from several US missile makers.[14]

Taiwan unveiled its first missile to be jointly manufactured with a US company on September 17, 2025, marking a major step in the fast-growing defense cooperation. President Lai said in June he would deepen security cooperation with the US to jointly develop and manufacture weapons. The military-owned National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) displayed an autonomous and low-cost cruise missile. They said that it plans to produce the missile in Taiwan with a goal to build their entire production line locally.[15]

2.Taiwan’s Fate Is Its Own

Trump has been consistent in his statements about the US security commitment to defend Taiwan. When asked in February 2025 about his commitment to Taiwan, he said, “I never comment on that. I don’t want to ever put myself in that position.” Before his inauguration, in December 2024, Trump made a similar statement to NBC. When asked, “Are you committed to defending Taiwan?” He said, “I never say, because I have to negotiate things, right? Trump said that Xi Jinping “respects me, and he knows I’m crazy.” He elaborated, “I would say: if you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, but I’m going to tax you at 150% to 200%.”[16]

Arms sales are an important indicator of US and Taiwan strategic cooperation. However, the Trump administration has delayed delivery of F-16V and did not approve $400 million in military aid to Taiwan. To strike a trade deal with China and have a Trump-Xi APEC summit in late October 2025, Trump did not want to procced with arms sales during this sensitive period. Trump views Taiwan as an economically capable country. They should pay for their military equipment.

Vice President, J.D. Vance, suggested in 2024 that the US should take a more proactive role in Taiwan’s defense, stating: “We should make it as hard as possible for China to take Taiwan in the first place.” In March 2025, Secretary Hegseth emphasized that the US remains committed to sustaining credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, including the Taiwan Strait. A secret Pentagon memo mentioned the US should deter China’s takeover of Taiwan. China is the DoD’s sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese seizure of Taiwan, while defending the US homeland, is the sole pacing scenario.[17]

In mid-July, as reports surfaced of President Lai’s planned stopover in New York, Beijing voiced its protests. The White House advised Lai to postpone the stopover and hold off on Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo’s visit to the US. The Trump administration appeared to create a more conducive atmosphere for a summit between Trump and Xi. The Trump team’s decisions to postpone Lai’s transit and reschedule Koo’s visit were to protect a fragile trade talk.[18]

Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky met in the White House on Feb. 28, 2025. Trump castigated Zelensky. In Taiwan, the slogan of “Today Ukraine, Tomorrow Taiwan” resurfaced on social media in Taiwan after the fallout.[19] Randall Shriver, an assistant secretary of defense during the first Trump administration, acknowledged that “the search for the big deal is part of this president’s character.” This characteristic, combined with prolonged ambiguity, has led some to speculate that Trump may use Taiwan as a chip to strike a bargain with China.[20]

During Trump’s first term, he paid little attention to Taiwan by comparing Taiwan to the tip of a sharpie pen. However, most of the US Congress members were strong supporter of Taiwan. They enacted several pro-Taiwan acts. In addition, at that time the US and China experienced various conflicts in trade wars, espionage, and COVID-19. Therefore, Trump allowed these congressional initiatives to proceed without a veto.

Comparing the two terms of Trump’s policy, he has become more familiar with Taiwan-China relations and cautious in dealing with China in his second term. Now his hand-picked national security team has committed to implementing his cross- Strait policy. Trump focused on improving the US economy in his second term, by imposing a trade deal with China. Because of the war-weariness from the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Trump does not want to see another conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Trump appeared to believe that his own personal relationship with Xi would be the key factor in settling US-China disputes. Trump referred to Xi as a good friend and sought to build a personal relationship with him as a way of getting China to change course. As Xi became more authoritarian at home and assertive in his foreign policy, the US–China contentions over trade, military, and technology exacerbated their relationship.[21] Over the course of Trump’s first term, US officials came to view China as a rival or adversary. During Trump’s second term, his administration sent US naval ships to the Taiwan Strait. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2025, Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, warned about the Chinese military threat to Taiwan and the need to accelerate preparations. In June, senior Taiwanese officers were invited as observers to participate in a US-led multilateral air exercise in Alaska, highlighting the continued US security assistance to Taiwan. Meanwhile, continuity in US-Taiwan military cooperation and congressional support remain key sources of assurance and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.[22]

Taiwanese defiance toward China triggers aggressiveness from Beijing. Taipei must recognize that the US may not be there to help. A cross-Strait war would have no winners. Preventing one would secure Trump the place in history as a peacemaker that he so covets. [23] Preventing war serves the interests of the US, Taiwan, and China. Several conflict resolutions deserve our attention. First, the US should encourage Beijing to refrain from escalating tensions. Second, Taiwan and China should handle disputes peacefully through dialogue without any preconditions. Ultimately, Taiwan should transform itself into a warrior state to deter a hungry predator. Taiwan needs to build a strong military with cutting-edge weaponry and technology, well-trained personnel with fast and efficient responses to any crisis. Since Taiwan, the U.S., and China do not want to see a war begin, the leaders on all sides should prevent armed conflict from happening.