Dr. Harun Talha Ayanoglu*

Taiwan maintains one of the largest reserve forces in the world, with close to two million individuals registered in its mobilization system, placing it among the top five globally alongside Vietnam, Ukraine, South Korea, and Russia.[1] However, numbers alone have not translated into strategic credibility. Persistent concerns over training cycles, equipment availability, and rapid mobilization capacity raise doubts about how much of this force could be effectively deployed in a high-intensity contingency. The gap between headline figures and actual readiness has therefore become a central issue in assessing Taiwan’s defense posture.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reshaped how modern warfare is understood and influenced defense thinking in Taiwan. While much attention has been given to Ukraine’s use of distributed operations and precision strikes, a more significant shift lies in how manpower has been used alongside unmanned systems. Ukrainian forces integrated mobilized personnel into decentralized drone operations, extending surveillance, targeting, and strike capabilities to the squad and even individual levels. This experience is particularly relevant for Taiwan, which by early 2026 has entered the category of a super-aged society with a shrinking pool of conscription-age citizens. Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan faces long-term demographic pressure that challenges manpower-intensive defense models.

In this context, Ukraine illustrates how limited human resources can be strengthened through technology in war time, while South Korea shows that similar adaptations can be introduced in peacetime through institutional changes in conscription and training. Taiwan’s reserve force is therefore not only shaped by these developments but is increasingly moving in a similar direction, adapting its structure and training to align with the demands of a more technology-driven battlefield. This article argues that Taiwan’s ability to sustain credible deterrence will depend not on the size of its reserve force alone, but on how effectively it integrates manpower with scalable and operationally relevant unmanned systems under conditions of demographic constraint.

The use of drones in the Ukraine war represents a significant milestone, not only in terms of technological advancement but also how unmanned systems have been integrated into evolving combat concepts. In the early stages of the war, Ukraine relied heavily on foreign-manufactured drones as international support was at its peak. As the conflict shifted into a war of attrition, Ukraine began developing and fielding its own systems. Initially based on repurposed commercial platforms, these efforts evolved into domestically produced drones capable of fulfilling a wide range of operational roles, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike, and deep strike missions.[2] Combined with a broader transition toward a distributed, flexible, and scalable defense approach, the widespread deployment of drones became central to battlefield operations. The integration of unmanned surface vessels (USVs) further enabled Ukrainian forces to sustain precision strike capabilities despite ammunition shortages.[3]

This operational shift was accompanied by a transformation in Ukraine’s military-industrial model. Due to necessity, a decentralized and improvised production ecosystem emerged, in which civilians played active roles not only as operators but also as manufacturers. DIY drone production became a defining feature of Ukraine’s wartime economy, with individuals converting garages, workshops, and former industrial facilities into small-scale production sites.[4] Civilian-led manufacturing blurred the traditional boundaries between military and civilian domains, demonstrating that large-scale mobilization does not have to rely on conventional structures. Instead, decentralized and technology-driven production networks enhanced resilience and sustained frontline capabilities.[5] In this context, civilians became embedded in national defense across a wide range of roles.

While civilian mobilization itself is not unique, Ukraine’s integration of civilians as drone operators and contributors to a distributed production system marks a distinct development.[6] From the early stages of the war, mobilized personnel were increasingly assigned to drone-related roles as unmanned systems became dominant on the battlefield. Estimates suggest that approximately 60 percent of frontline strike capability and nearly 80 percent of casualties have been attributed to drone operations, underscoring their central role. To support this shift, Ukraine established drone training schools across the country, providing instruction to both civilians and reservists. Reports from these programs indicate that younger, tech-savvy individuals, particularly those with gaming experience, have been especially effective due to their familiarity with digital interfaces and control systems. Typically aged between 18 and 27, these individuals demonstrate strong hand-eye coordination and adaptability, while those with IT or engineering backgrounds often outperform others. Notably, even individuals with certain physical impairments have been successfully trained and deployed in drone operations.[7]

This transformation has been reinforced by continuous innovation in training and operational incentives. In 2025, Ukraine introduced the “Army of Drones Bonus System,” a game-based reward mechanism that incentivizes operators based on confirmed strike outcomes. Personnel accumulate points for destroying equipment or inflicting casualties, which can then be exchanged for drone-related hardware through online stores. Between August and September alone, participating units increased from 95 to 400, with reported 18,000 Russian casualties linked to drone operations.[8] Moreover, Ukraine sought to expand access to training through the release of the Ukrainian Fight Drone Simulator (UFDS) on the Steam platform in late 2025. Developed using frontline feedback, the simulator replicates real combat conditions and has been used to train over 5,000 operators.[9]

Taken together, Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that the significance of drones lies not merely in their tactical utility, but in their ability to reorganize the relationship between manpower, industry, and combat operations. Their relative affordability, scalability, and accessibility allow them to act as force multipliers in ways that do not depend on technological sophistication alone. At the same time, certain aspects remain context-specific, including the scale of wartime improvisation and the intensity of societal mobilization driven by existential threat. Nevertheless, the broader trajectory toward decentralized, technology-enabled combat supported by both military and civilian actors has begun to extend beyond the Ukrainian battlefield, shaping how other states approach the integration of manpower and emerging technologies in national defense.

The year 2022 marked a turning point in South Korea’s reassessment of unmanned systems in national defense. A series of North Korean drone incursions into South Korean airspace exposed critical gaps in surveillance and response capabilities, highlighting vulnerabilities in counter-UAV preparedness. In response, Seoul accelerated efforts to develop and deploy unmanned systems to monitor and deter North Korean activities. At the same time, the war in Ukraine demonstrated the growing centrality of drone-saturated, asymmetric combat concepts, where unmanned systems were not only force multipliers but integral components of operational design. Observing these developments, South Korea moved to incorporate similar principles into its defense planning. This shift extended beyond platform acquisition, aiming to embed drone capabilities within both active forces and the broader conscription system.

Based on these, in late 2025 Korea announced the “500,000 Drone Warriors” initiative, to be implemented from 2026 onward. The initiative seeks to enhance combat readiness by training all conscripts in drone operations while increasing civilian familiarity with unmanned systems. To support this effort, the Ministry of National Defense allocated approximately USD 22.9 million for the procurement of 11,184 small commercial drones for training. Currently, the armed forces operate around 1,100 training drones; with this expansion, the number of platforms will increase substantially, enabling each army squad to be equipped with at least one drone. This scaling effort reflects an intention to normalize drone usage at the lowest tactical levels.[10]

The doctrinal implications of this initiative have been explicitly acknowledged by Korean defense leadership. The Minister of National Defense described drones as a “second personal weapon,” signaling a shift treating drone proficiency not as a specialized skill but as a baseline capability for conscripts. Despite implementation challenges, the initiative represents a notable attempt to align conscription and reserve structures with the requirements of technology-intensive warfare.[11] More broadly, Seoul’s approach illustrates how lessons observed in Ukraine can be translated into peacetime force development. By institutionalizing drone training within conscription, Seoul is not only enhancing immediate military readiness but also cultivating a broader base of personnel familiar with unmanned systems before the onset of crisis. This experience provides a useful point of comparison for Taiwan, where similar pressures to adapt reserve and conscription structures are emerging under different structural constraints.

Population aging has long posed structural challenges to Taiwan’s social and economic sustainability, but by early 2026 it has acquired direct strategic significance. Data from the Ministry of the Interior confirms that Taiwan has entered the category of a “super-aged” society, with more than 20 percent of its population over 65.[12] With one of the world’s lowest fertility rates and a steadily shrinking population, the island faces long-term and largely irreversible pressures. While aging is common among advanced economies, Taiwan’s geopolitical environment makes this trend particularly consequential. Declining birth rates are narrowing the pool of conscription-age citizens, increasing strain on manpower planning for national defense. Despite maintaining a large mobilization base on paper, projections suggest that sustaining a manpower-intensive reserve system will become progressively more difficult over the medium to long term. Under these conditions, Taiwan’s demographic trajectory is not only a socioeconomic issue but a strategic constraint that challenges the long-term viability of Taiwan’s existing defense model.

Taiwan’s transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF), formalized in 2019 with the reduction of conscription to four months, was intended to reduce social and economic costs while building a smaller, more professional, and technologically advanced military. However, this transformation introduced new challenges. Despite professionalization efforts, concerns persisted regarding combat readiness, as the system often prioritized recruitment targets over training quality and operational capability. At the same time, demographic decline further constrained the pool of potential volunteers and conscripts, exacerbating manpower shortages.[13]

In response to the Ukraine War and rising cross-Strait tensions, Taiwan reinstated one-year conscription beginning in 2024, acknowledging the limitations of the previous system.[14] Nevertheless, structural constraints remain. Aging demographics continue to pressure on both annual conscription levels and long- term mobilization capacity. To mitigate this, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has sought to expand the eligible manpower pool by revising conscription standards. By the end of 2025, proposed amendments to the Physique Classification Standards of Military Service updated 80 out of 193 medical criteria, narrowing eligibility for exemptions and aiming to reduce an exemption rate of around 16 percent, which is high by international standards. This reflects growing concern over the sustainability of Taiwan’s manpower base.[15]

These constraints are also evident in the reserve force structure, where headline figures obscure limited readiness. While nearly two million reservists are formally registered, only around 700,000 fall within the category eligible for periodic training, and in practice, roughly 100,000 to 110,000 receive annual training.[16] As a result, only a small fraction of the mobilization pool is actively trained in any given year. Training duration remains uneven, with some reservists receiving as little as five to seven days, while others participate in slightly extended but still limited programs. Budgetary constraints, limited training facilities, and shortages of qualified instructors further restrict the system’s ability to expand training coverage. Consequently, despite its large numerical base, Taiwan’s reserve force remains only partially prepared, and the number of personnel that could be rapidly mobilized, equipped, and deployed in a high-intensity conflict remains uncertain.

The effectiveness of deterrence depends not on capabilities themselves, but on how capabilities are perceived by a potential adversary. In this regard, Taiwan’s reserve forces appear to carry limited weight in Chinese strategic assessments. Chinese military analyses from early 2000s acknowledged that Taiwan’s reservists could complicate amphibious operations, particularly in urban and mountainous terrain where terrain favors the defender. At the same time, these assessments consistently highlighted structural weaknesses, including shortened conscription periods, limited training, and resource constraints.[17]

More recent official discourse suggests even less emphasis on Taiwan’s reserves. High-level analyses tend to focus on six primary areas: Taiwan’s political leadership, defense strategy, military exercises, arms acquisitions, foreign military cooperation, and internal issues affecting morale. Within this framework, reserve forces are rarely treated as a decisive factor, even in discussions of mobilization and manpower.[18] This relative absence indicates that, at the strategic level, Taiwan’s reserve force does not significantly influence Chinese operational planning. In effect, while large in numerical terms, the reserve system contributes little to deterrence if it is not perceived as a credible and operationally relevant capability.

Following the lessons observed in the Ukraine war, Taiwan’s MND and Reserve Force Command have begun to reassess the role of unmanned systems within national defense. This shift extends beyond the military domain and reflects a broader understanding that effective drone development requires interagency coordination across sectors such as law enforcement, emergency response, agriculture, and civilian technology industries. In this sense, drones are increasingly viewed not only as military assets but as components of a broader national capability. At the same time, Taiwan’s strong technological base positions it well for advanced drone development. However, recent conflicts suggest that effectiveness in drone warfare does not necessarily depend on technological sophistication alone. Experiences from Ukraine and other contemporary battlefields indicate that relatively simple, low-cost, and scalable systems, when integrated into a coherent operational doctrine, can impose significant costs on adversaries and complicate their defenses. This raises the question of whether technological advancement alone is sufficient, or whether greater emphasis should be placed on scalability, deployment, and doctrinal integration.

At the same time, Taiwan’s conscription system has undergone parallel adjustments in response to the evolving security environment. In 2024, compulsory military service was extended from four months back to twelve months, reflecting concerns over combat readiness and the limitations of the previous all-volunteer force model. Under the current system, individuals enter the reserve force for eight years after service and are called for refresher training every two years, typically lasting fourteen days. Discussions within the armed forces indicate further reform considerations. According to former Reserve Command head, retired General Pai Chieh-lung, there is a long-term vision of restructuring the system toward a four-year reserve cycle with fourteen days of annual refresher training. While not yet implemented, such proposals indicate an effort to maintain a more consistently trained force. However, institutional change remains gradual, shaped by constraints in planning, budgeting, and personnel allocation. Previous adjustments, such as extending refresher training from five to fourteen days, required five years to implement, suggesting that transformation within the reserve system is incremental rather than immediate.

Within this broader reform trajectory, drone integration has emerged as a notable development. Beginning in 2025, Taiwan introduced drone training into its conscription program. According to the Executive Yuan’s 2025 Policy Address and subsequent implementation updates from the MND in 2026, this training is structured in two phases. The first phase provides basic knowledge, including flight principles, legal regulations, simulator familiarization, and introductory operation of drones produced by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). The second phase involves more advanced, unit-level training, including field exercises and specialized FPV training. Rather than applying a uniform model, the MND employs skill-matching to align training with conscripts’ civilian expertise, particularly in technical fields. Although current training remains limited in duration, there are indications that more advanced modules may be expanded.

In operational terms, the integration of drones into Taiwan’s force structure is most relevant when viewed against the island’s specific defense requirements and structural constraints. Given limited manpower and the need for dispersed operations, unmanned systems can enhance the effectiveness of both active and reserve forces in missions such as ISR in the littoral environment, as well as monitoring potential amphibious movements across the Taiwan Strait. They can also provide real-time targeting support for coastal defense and artillery units, improving precision without requiring large force concentrations. For reserve units, which may be mobilized under time and training constraints, drones offer a means to extend situational awareness in urban and complex terrain, as well as to detect and track airborne or heliborne insertion forces. In this sense, unmanned systems do not simply add new capabilities but help compensate for structural limitations by enabling smaller and less continuously trained units to operate more effectively within a distributed defense framework.

Reflecting this operational logic, drone integration has also been extended to reserve forces. Since October 2025, drone operations have been incorporated into the standard refresher training cycle, supported by the procurement of approximately 850 small drones distributed across reserve brigades, averaging 50 to 60 units per brigade. Training currently focuses on surveillance, reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment missions, while more complex systems remain restricted to specialized personnel.[19] At the same time, this integration has been partially linked to civilian skill development. Conscripts and reservists who demonstrate proficiency may receive training certifications that support applications for a “Remote Controlled Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator’s License” issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, creating overlap between military training and civilian employment pathways.

Taken together, these developments suggest that Taiwan’s reserve force is undergoing gradual adaptation rather than remaining static. However, the direction and depth of this transformation remain uneven. While Taiwan possesses strong technological capabilities, the experience of recent conflicts indicates that the effectiveness of unmanned systems depends less on technological sophistication than on how they are integrated into operational doctrine, scaled across units, and aligned with specific defense requirements. In this regard, Taiwan’s ongoing efforts can be understood as an initial phase of adjustment, in which institutional reforms, training practices, and technological development are gradually converging. The extent to which these elements can be coherently integrated will play a decisive role in determining whether drone-enabled capabilities can meaningfully enhance the credibility and effectiveness of Taiwan’s reserve forces.

Taiwan’s reserve force, long characterized by its numerical scale, is increasingly defined by the constraints and transformations outlined throughout this analysis. The Ukraine War has demonstrated that modern defense depends not only on manpower size, but on how that manpower is integrated with emerging technologies. Ukraine’s experience showed that drones can reshape the relationship between personnel, firepower, and situational awareness, enabling decentralized and scalable combat. South Korea further illustrates that such transformations can be institutionalized in peacetime by embedding drone training within conscription systems to enhance both military readiness and societal familiarity with new technologies.

In Taiwan’s case, these developments intersect with internal structural pressures, particularly demographic decline and a contracting mobilization pool. As the island becomes a super-aged society, the sustainability of a manpower-intensive reserve model becomes increasingly uncertain. Taiwan has begun to respond through the reintroduction of one-year conscription, adjustments in reserve training, and the integration of drone training into both conscription and refresher programs. While still limited in scope, these efforts indicate that the reserve force is evolving rather than remaining static.

At the same time, Taiwan’s experience highlights that the effectiveness of this transformation will depend not simply on the adoption of new technologies, but on how these technologies are aligned with operational requirements and structural constraints. Recent conflicts suggest that relatively simple, scalable, and widely deployable unmanned systems can generate significant operational effects when integrated into a coherent defense framework. In this context, the strategic value of Taiwan’s reserve forces will increasingly depend on their ability to leverage such systems to compensate for limitations in manpower, training depth, and mobilization speed.

In conclusion, the cases examined in this article suggest that the future effectiveness of reserve forces will depend less on numerical size and more on adaptability, scalability, and the integration of manpower with appropriately applied technology. For Taiwan, this implies that the ongoing transformation of its reserve system should be understood not as a discrete reform, but as part of a broader adjustment to the realities of contemporary warfare, where the credibility of defense rests on the effective combination of human resources, operational doctrine, and accessible technological capabilities.