Minchen Tseng*

Since the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has faced systematic attacks on its digital and telecommunications infrastructure. According to Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, approximately 25% of fixed-line networks have been damaged, more than 4,300 mobile base stations have been destroyed or impaired, and over 30,000 kilometers of fiber-optic cables have been affected by kinetic strikes.[1] In response, Ukraine adopted a hybrid telecommunications and digital governance strategy that redefined digital resilience as a core pillar of national survival in high-intensity warfare. Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that in contemporary conflict, the ability to sustain connectivity, preserve governance continuity, and defend the information environment can be as decisive as conventional military power. These lessons are particularly noticeable for Taiwan, which faces persistent gray-zone pressure, cognitive warfare, and the risk of infrastructure disruption. By examining Ukraine’s digital resilience during wartime, this article seeks to identify transferable lessons and strategic adaptations that can inform Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen its own digital resilience across connectivity, governance, and the cognitive domain.

IT and telecom personnel reservation: The Ministry of Digital Transformation gained authority around September 2022 to shield critical IT and telecom workers from military conscription, recognizing their specialized skills vital for digital infrastructure resilience during wartime.[2] This policy aims to retain essential tech talent, ensuring communication networks and digital services remain functional despite ongoing conflict.

Public connectivity measures: Since November 2022, the Ukrainian government has rolled out a nationwide network of “Points of Invincibility”—public hubs equipped with electricity, free Wi-Fi, device charging, and satellite broadband3 —which by 2023 had expanded to over 13,000 locations, providing civilians with guaranteed minimum digital connectivity and social stability during prolonged blackouts and repeated attacks on critical infrastructure.[4]

Redundancy and mandated service: Through regulatory coordination and industry consensus, Ukrainian mobile operators abolished domestic roaming fees and implemented emergency infrastructure-sharing arrangements, enabling subscribers to automatically connect to alternative networks when their home operator’s base stations were damaged or destroyed,[5] thereby transforming commercial competition into a de facto national roaming regime that significantly strengthened continuity of connectivity during sustained attacks on telecom infrastructure.

Infrastructure protection: The Ministry of Digital Transformation has revised national reconstruction standards to systematically prioritize underground deployment of electronic communications networks, reducing exposure to air and artillery strikes, improving survivability under repeated attacks,[6] and embedding physical resilience into Ukraine’s long-term postwar digital infrastructure rather than treating protection as a temporary wartime measure.

Power support: The largest Ukrainian telecom provider—Kyivstar has made large-scale investments in power resilience by deploying thousands of backup generators and nearly 200,000 batteries across its facilities, ensuring that core network nodes can continue operating during prolonged blackouts and thereby sustaining nationwide communications even amid sustained attacks on the power grid.[7]

Rapid satellite & operator response: During the war’s first two days, Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov sought help from Elon Musk, enabling Starlink to become the backbone of Ukraine’s communications.[8] Local operators—Kyivstar, Vodafone Ukraine, and Ukrtelecom—restored connectivity where infrastructure was damaged. Vodafone Ukraine used Starlink terminals to quickly reconnect 2G/4G services near Irpin and Romanivka,[9] while Kyivstar employed “Direct to Cell” satellite links and movable base stations to maintain SMS（Short Message Service）and data.[10] Ukrtelecom repaired fiber to restore high-speed services in liberated areas.[11]

Launched in 2020, Diia is Ukraine’s comprehensive digital governance platform, integrating digital identity verification, access to official documents, taxation services, and interfaces with online banking systems. Over time, Diia has evolved beyond a single application into a broader digital governance ecosystem that reflects a new philosophy of statecraft.[12] This ecosystem includes Diia.Business, which supports entrepreneurs through grants and expert advisory services; Diia.Education, a nationwide digital literacy initiative that has reached more than 2.6 million Ukrainians; Diia.City, a specialized legal and tax framework designed to support over 1,700 IT companies; and Diia.Engine, an open-source low-code platform enabling government agencies to rapidly develop and deploy digital public services.[13]

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many observers anticipated the collapse of Ukrainian government systems. Instead, the country’s digital infrastructure not only withstood the initial shock but expanded in real time. The Ministry of Digital Transformation rapidly shifted Diia from a peacetime convenience into a core instrument of wartime governance and national resilience. Within days and weeks of the invasion, new digital services were launched, including eAssistance, which delivered financial support to millions of internally displaced persons; eVorog, which enabled secure civilian reporting of enemy movements; eRecovery, which streamlined housing repair assistance and property damage claims; and eMarriage, allowing couples to marry remotely despite wartime disruptions.[14]

Despite sustained missile strikes, air-raid alerts, power outages, cyberattacks, and mass displacement, Diia has remained operational—continuing to deliver essential public services, safeguard civil rights, and facilitate civic participation. By 2025, the platform had grown to serve more than 22.9 million users, offering over 150 services via its web portal, 65+ mobile services, 33 digital documents, and a public–private ecosystem comprising more than 25,000 partners.[15] In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian War, Diia has emerged as a critical digital lifeline linking the state and society, ensuring the continuity of governance under wartime conditions. More recently, the platform has further evolved into Diia.AI,[16] incorporating artificial intelligence to enhance administrative efficiency, transparency, and the resilience of state–society interaction.

To ensure wartime continuity, AWS（Amazon Web Services）and the Ukrainian government executed an emergency high-speed migration, shifting critical data from vulnerable on-premises centers to the cloud. This unprecedented “digital evacuation” yielded significant results: 50 government authorities successfully migrated to AWS, protecting over 15PB of Ukrainian citizen data. Furthermore, 28 Ukrainian universities moved their operations to the cloud to preserve the nation's academic infrastructure.[17] On the other hand, Microsoft played an indispensable strategic role in constructing Ukraine’s digital resilience. Its contributions extended beyond mere technical support, serving as a critical pillar for maintaining government stability and cybersecurity. Local Microsoft experts provided state-of-the-art technical tools that significantly reduced the time required to export sensitive state registers and operational data.[18] By providing access to advanced cloud computing resources and productivity suites, Microsoft ensured seamless cross-departmental communication, which was vital for efficient decision-making during wartime. These metrics suggest that Ukraine’s resilience was not merely a result of pre-designed architecture, but rather a decisive, real-time intervention by external tech partners that saved an entire nation from digital destruction.

In wartime conditions, traditional administrative and mobilization systems—reliant on paperwork, in-person processing, and fragmented information flows—are incapable of supporting large-scale, time-sensitive mobilization. To address this gap, Ukraine launched Reserve+ in 2024 to digitally integrate millions of citizens into the military manpower system. The platform enables electronic military registration, verification of military specialties, and profession-based unit assignment,[19] significantly enhancing the efficiency, accuracy, and transparency of conscription. In parallel, Army+ was developed as a digital personnel management platform for active-duty soldiers, replacing cumbersome paper-based procedures. Through Army+, soldiers can apply for leave, submit logistical and welfare requests, request position transfers, participate in surveys, access integrated commercial benefits, and strengthen training and professional skills.[20] Together, Reserve+ and Army+ function as critical digital enablers of wartime mobilization and force sustainment, allowing Ukraine to rapidly scale manpower, maintain organizational cohesion, and preserve operational effectiveness under prolonged high-intensity conflict.

To secure the domestic information front, President Zelenskyy consolidated Ukraine’s media landscape into a single, 24-hour broadcast platform shortly after the war began. Citing the necessity of a unified message under martial law, the government launched “Yedyni Novyny” (United News). This unprecedented “TV marathon” included 1+1 Media, StarLightMedia, and Inter Media Group which joined forces to co-produce a continuous news stream. By August 2022, nine of the nation’s leading channels had integrated into this collective broadcast,effectively centralizing wartime communications.

Institutions such as the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), through its Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD), focus on identifying and countering high-level information threats that endanger national security, while the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy’s StratCom Centre manages daily official communication and public myth-busting.[23] Complementing these reactive measures, long-term resilience is reinforced through educational initiatives such as National Media Literacy project “Filter”,[24] which aims to improve media literacy and reduce societal vulnerability to hostile influence operations.

Civil society organizations form the frontline of Ukraine’s counter-disinformation ecosystem by providing rapid, decentralized responses to emerging falsehoods. Independent fact-checking NGOs, including StopFake and VoxCheck, act as first responders by verifying viral content using transparent methodologies, while media watchdogs such as Detector Media monitor broader narrative shifts and identify coordinated influence networks.[25] Crowdsourced verification initiatives, exemplified by Gwara Media’s Telegram-based reporting tools,[26]further enhance responsiveness by enabling citizens to flag suspicious information for expert review in near real time.

The technical and OSINT layer underpins the entire system by supplying verifiable, evidence-based refutations of disinformation. Groups such as InformNapalm and Molfar employ open-source intelligence techniques27 —ranging from satellite imagery and geolocation to facial recognition and digital forensics—to produce highly credible, difficult-to-dispute proof. This layer is reinforced through direct cooperation with major technology platforms, including Meta (Facebook and Instagram), Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, Telegram which helps prioritize verified Ukrainian sources and disrupt coordinated inauthentic behavior,[28] thereby translating technical findings into tangible enforcement and visibility outcomes.

Ukraine’s wartime experience demonstrates that connectivity resilience depends on early institutional adaptation, layered infrastructure redundancy, and rapid public–private coordination, showing that maintaining communications is as much about governance and planning as it is about technology. For Taiwan, the structural vulnerability of island geography is most evident in its dependence on submarine cable choke points. In recent years, China’s interference with Taiwan’s undersea cables has become increasingly systematic, combining gray-zone operations, technical sophistication, and plausible deniability. These actions fall short of open conflict yet aim to erode confidence, disrupt daily life, and test Taiwan’s response thresholds. To mitigate these risks, Taiwan must transition toward a hybrid connectivity architecture that integrates:

• Submarine cables as the primary high-capacity backbone;

• Microwave links for short- to mid-range terrestrial and cross-island redundancy;

• Geostationary and Low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite systems to ensure continuity during large-scale outages or maritime disruptions;

• Portable and rapidly deployable backup stations, pre-positioned across the island to support critical infrastructure, government operations, and emergency services.

Crucially, resilience is not purely technological; Ukraine’s experience highlights the importance of operational readiness and societal adaptation. Taiwan should institutionalize routine, peacetime connectivity drills across critical infrastructure operators, local governments, hospitals, financial institutions, and key industries to stress-test technical capabilities, refine public–private coordination, and reduce public panic by normalizing contingency procedures. Integrating these exercises into daily governance and business continuity planning would make resilience a habitual operational mindset, while multi-layered connectivity systems would serve both as a deterrent against coercive disruptions and as a confidence-building mechanism, reinforcing societal trust in the state’s ability to maintain essential functions under pressure.

Ukraine demonstrates that a unified digital platform—integrating identity verification, administrative services, taxation, and access to official documents—ensures citizens remain connected to the state even during crises. Such platforms are not merely administrative tools; they serve as strategic infrastructure for governance, societal cohesion, and national resilience. Taiwan can proactively develop a similarly integrated digital system to maintain core government functions—civil registration, social services, and emergency communications—without relying solely on physical offices, which may be disrupted during conflicts or disasters. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan implemented the Instant Mask Map, providing real-time information on the availability of face masks nationwide. The Central Epidemic Command Center also published daily updates to ensure citizens had access to reliable information, while traditional media channels—TV, radio, and broadcasts—continued to maintain communication with the public. Furthermore, multi-channel integration—including mobile, web, and AI-assisted services—combined with a robust public–private partnership ecosystem, can efficiently scale service delivery while providing redundancy in case of partial system outages.

China’s approach to Taiwan remains firmly within the gray-zone spectrum, emphasizing persistent cognitive warfare rather than overt kinetic confrontation. Leveraging local proxies, linguistic familiarity, and social narratives aimed at creating fragmentation, Beijing seeks to erode public trust and shape perceptions in subtle but pervasive ways. Ukrainian experience demonstrates that building resilience across the cognitive domain requires a comprehensive, whole-of-society system. This system integrates government institutions, media organizations, civil society, and broadcast networks into a coordinated, multi-layered defense capable of early warning, rapid verification, and sustained public engagement.

For Taiwan, establishing a credible “digital shield” begins with cultivating public trust. This includes fostering transparent, timely communication through trusted media and public figures, complemented by robust civil society participation. Civilian-led initiatives—ranging from independent fact-checking NGOs to crowdsourced reporting platforms—can act as rapid-response forces to detect and counter disinformation before it spreads widely. Strengthening public-private coordination is essential: AI-assisted real-time disinformation monitoring, Deepfake detection labs, and collaboration with social media platforms can ensure that verified information is amplified while coordinated influence operations are disrupted.

Equally critical is empowering autonomous social groups to act as decentralized nodes of detection and response, leveraging collective societal capacity to identify, verify, and respond to emerging threats. Over the long term, civic digital literacy must be treated as part of the nation’s security infrastructure, embedding media literacy, critical thinking, and verification skills into education and public awareness campaigns. By integrating these layers—strategic government oversight, civil society engagement, technical verification, and citizen empowerment—Taiwan can construct a resilient cognitive defense posture capable of withstanding sustained gray-zone influence operations.

Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that digital resilience is far more than a technical challenge; rather, it constitutes an integrated capability grounded in domestic capacity, wartime adaptation, and external support, enabling the sustained functioning of institutional systems while preserving societal, military, and informational advantages under the extreme pressures of wartime. Beyond maintaining connectivity or defending networks, resilience encompasses the ability to preserve governance continuity, coordinate rapid civil and military responses, and safeguard the integrity of truth in the information environment. For Taiwan, these lessons underscore the importance of building a proactive, whole-of-society digital resilience strategy. By combining democratic governance, technological agility, and societal trust, Taiwan can cultivate a “digital fortress island” capable of withstanding gray-zone operations, protecting its information environment, and maintaining strategic advantage even under sustained hybrid threats. In essence, Ukraine’s experience offers a blueprint: digital resilience is not only about networks or devices—it is a national capability rooted in foresight, coordination, and the empowerment of both institutions and citizens.