SINGAPORE AND BIDEN’S INDO—PACIFIC POLICY
2021.07.01
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By Bilveer Singh
Introduction
By definition, the room for maneuver for small states in international relations is immensely constrained. This is especially for Singapore, with a total land area of slightly more than 700 square kilometers and hemmed in between Malaysia to the north and Indonesia to the south, and lying at the southern end of the strategically important Straits of Malacca. Mainly due to these geo-political and geo-strategic constraints, worsened by its near-total dependence on international trade and resources, and being essentially a Chinese state in a ‘Malay Sea’, Singapore has historically been extremely sensitive to postures and policies of the great powers, both in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.[1] This was also evident from Singapore’s response to Donald Trump’s Indo-Pacific policy that was enunciated in November 2017 and since then, to Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific policy.
Singapore and Trump's Indo Pacfic Policy
Singapore’s response to Trump’s Indo-Pacific policy was essentially determined by the fact that the republic had close ties with both the United States and China, and did not want to be placed in a position to choose sides to support or oppose one or the other. More fundamentally, since its inception as a sovereign state in August 1965, the fundamental mantra that has driven Singapore’s foreign policy is the desire to ensure a balance of power in Southeast Asia and to promote the existence of as many great powers in the region. It is essentially to ensure that no single great power or a coalition of great powers dominate the region.
This has been consistently enunciated by various official pronouncements. In May 1975, Singapore’s foreign minister, S. Rajaratnam stated that that “my Government believes that for us small countries, the more the big powers are around in this area [Southeast Asia] the better for us because our options are bigger”. [2] On 28 June 1976, Rajaratnam stated, “we in Singapore accept the fact of great powers and the fact of great powers’ rivalry in Southeast Asia”.[3]
Adopting a ‘balance of power’ foreign policy, namely, trying to balance the interests of great powers in the region, Mr. Rahim Ishak, the Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs stated: “The best way to ensure that no single power or coalition of powers exercise hegemony over Southeast Asia is to have a multiplicity of external great powers involved in the region, balancing each other. With such a state of affairs there are better chances for a power equilibrium to emerge, allowing small states in Southeast Asia greater room for maneuver”. [4]
Similarly, Rajaratnam reiterated in June 1976 “we accept the existence of great powers and their rivalries as an immutable fact of international life”.[5] Using the metaphor of great powers as ‘suns’, he argued that “when there is a multiplicity of suns, the gravitational pulls of each is not only weakened but also by a judicious use of the pulls and counter-pulls of gravitational forces, the minor planets have greater freedom of navigation”. [6]
Hence, the raison d’etre of Singapore’s foreign policy is to ensure, as many great powers are present in Southeast Asia and to resist any policy by any great power to gain dominance in the region. Equally pertinent, Singapore has resisted attempts by great powers to compel Singapore to take sides on issues, whether they are in the Southeast Asian region or beyond.
Prior to the onset of the Biden administration, in his annual National Day Rally, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated that the republic would resolutely adhere to its policy of maintaining good ties with both the US and China, especially since both powers were in conflict over an array of issues. The situation was particularly critical for Singapore, as over and above its close all-round ties with both great powers, it is also because Singapore is a Chinese-majority state and where Singapore’s actions and words can be easily misunderstood and misinterpreted. [7]
In March 2021, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reiterated the republic’s long-standing foreign policy posture when he said that it will not be possible for Singapore to choose between the United States and China given the extensive ties Singapore has with both and that this was a position that Singapore was not alone: “"I do not think we are the only ones in this boat".[8]
Based on the above-mentioned foreign policy imperatives, it is easy to explain Singapore’s discomfort and lack of support for Trump’s Indo-Pacific concept and strategy. Trump first presented his vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ in November 2017. Trump’s policy was aimed at replacing Obama’s ‘Pivot in Asia’ policy even though as a conceptual framework it has been around for sometimes, including Hilary Clinton referring to it to cover the geo-political and geo-economic spaces from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean with the aim of strengthening the US’s role in the region. Japan’s prime minister Shinto Abe had also championed the concept in the past with other states such as India and Australia, which border the Indian and Pacific Oceans, supporting the concept even though for different reasons and in reality, the concept also meant different things to different states.
Countries such as China and Russia openly began criticizing Trump’s Indo-Pacific policy as this was seen as a strategy to counter and contain the expansion of influence of great powers that were seen as rivals of the US. In this regard, increasingly Trump’s policies came to be seen as a new American chapter in containing China and its fast expanding political, diplomatic, economic and even military influence in the region. For some, it was an American-manufactured counter to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that was helping to expand Chinese tentacles in the Indian and Pacific region through the continents of Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America. In short, Trump’s Indo-Pacific concept came to be seen as an attempt to locate American interest, influence and position in the center of all things with supporters of Washington expected to ‘tow’ the line, especially in countering China.
The fact that Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy was premised on principles of commonality of political, economic, military and even ideological interest; it came to be seen as the precursor of a “New Cold War” in the region. This largely explained the discomfort of many states towards the concept, especially in Southeast Asia. The fact that the Trump administration championed the Quad, which involved the US, Japan, India and Australia, states which can be viewed as some form of hard and soft allies of the US, made it difficult for others to join the Trump-led Indo-Pacific bandwagon. The basic idea of American centrality in the new concept was something many found unpalatable in the new geo-political environment, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.
Singapore’s objections to the Trump-initiated Indo-Pacific policy was based on a number of considerations. First, Singapore, historically and from a time-tested policy and ideological position, did not want to take sides in any great power conflict. Second, as the Trump policy was seen as being anti-China and aimed at containing China, Singapore had no wish to be part of this policy. Many saw Trump’s approach as being aimed at scuttling China’s BRI and Singapore had no reason to back Washington as it saw many benefits in the Chinese initiative. Third, Singapore had abiding political, economic and even close social-cultural ties with China and was hence, in no position to adopt any kind of policy that was aimed at undermining and opposing China.
Finally, Singapore’s non-acceptance of Trump’s Indo-Pacific policy was also a direct result of ASEAN’s opposition to the policy and ASEAN’s unwillingness to join in a ‘united front’ to oppose China. ASEAN countries also feared that the 10-member organization would lose its ‘centrality’ in the region if it supported the American-minted Indo-Pacific concept that was essentially a call to arms against China. Singapore and its ASEAN partners had championed inclusive multilateralism and there was concern that Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy could force ASEAN member-states to side either China or the US and hence, divide the region once more as in the past.
ASEAN also prided itself as a multilateral forum that provided a framework for all key stakeholders to be involved in the region and it feared that the Trump’s Indo-Pacific approach could hurt ASEAN and its future. In this regard, in June 2019, ASEAN member-states came up with their own version of an Indo-Pacific strategy called “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” which emphasized the importance of ‘ASEAN Centrality’ in the light of geopolitical shifts and US-China competition, and the need to operate within existing ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms and not to create new ones. [9]
Singapore’s opposition to the Trump-led Indo-Pacific policy was openly enunciated in May 2018 by Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, Singapore’s foreign minister. Vivian argued that ASEAN must remain central to the regional security architecture, with the belief in the centrality of multilateralism and the rule of law. He made it clear that Trump’s free and open Indo-Pacific structure was seen as not just a competitor to ASEAN but also an instrument to counter China’s expansion. Vivian also stated that "if big powers are going to insist on settling things through bilateral negotiations, on what basis are you going to settle the outcome? Might is right? We want a rules-based multilateral system". [10]
This was in part a reference to Trump’s preference for bilateral deals, especially in trade over multilateral ones. Hence, while Singapore had close and deep political, economic, security and social-cultural ties with both the US and China, when it came to Trump’s Indo-Pacific policy, it preferred to walk a tight rope of working closely with both great powers in the name of championing Singapore’ s interests that valued close ties with both extraneous powers.[11]
Singapore and Biden's Indo Pacfic Policy
With Biden’s accession to the White House in January 2021, many of Trump’s policies were reversed but one area where this did not take place was with regard to the Indo-Pacific policy. Interestingly, during his presidential campaign and even Democratic Party platform, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ was missing and Biden preferred to use the older term, ‘Asia-Pacific’. Since January 2021, this has changed with Biden adopting a robust Indo-Pacific policy.
The question then is - since Singapore’s discomfort with Trump’s Indo-Pacific was clearly enunciated based on the view that it was seen as being driven by Washington’s anti-China policy, partly aimed at undermining the BRI, the need to organize the Asia-Pacific region in a new anti-China united front and where the US intended to place its political, economic, strategic, military and even ideological imprimatur in the region, and expected other states to follow suit - what has changed under Biden that Singapore would look anew at the Indo-Pacific policy of the new American administration.
May be one area where Singapore may be concessionary towards Biden would be the more conciliatory tone of Biden towards the Asian region even though America-first policies were now to be achieved through cooperation with friends and allies. While Biden continues to give premium to the Indo-Pacific region, he has stressed that his approach is somewhat different from Trump. He believes in ‘competitive co-existence’ with its rivals, including China and Russia. This was clearly laid out in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released in March 2021. For Biden, the Indo-Pacific remains the ‘front and center’ of US’s diplomacy. This was evident in Biden’s first major multilateral summit with Quad, with the leaders of India, Japan and South Korea. The US’s Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State made their first foreign visits to India, Japan and South Korea even though there was also a frosty meeting with Chinese leaders in Alaska in March 2021. Following the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar, Washington has also placed sanctions on the country, just as it has on some Chinese officials for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China. [12]
However, what will unsettle, even rattle ASEAN and especially Singapore, is Biden’s continuation of Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy with China as the centerpiece of the game plan. While Biden appeared in wanting to restore the US in leading its friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region, but by defining this policy in terms of safeguarding its allies and friends from China, including in the South China Sea, then it would be tantamount to adopting a Manichean approach to politics which Southeast Asian states such as Singapore are unlikely to support. While Biden had every right to call on Taiwan’s President Tsai as part of his reassurance to allies in the region, this does not mean that ASEAN states would support Washington’s bellicose policies in the region if these means taking on an anti-China posture. A 1947-type ‘Truman Doctrine’ by Biden is unlikely to find support in Southeast Asia and especially in Singapore as this type of black and white politics and foreign policy has no traction in the region and is against ASEAN’s inclusionary culture and DNA. This is also against the basis of Singapore’s foreign policy.
Clearly, while using the framework of ‘Indo-Pacific’, Biden’s policy seems to focus on China as the centerpiece of his political, diplomatic, economic, military and even ideological thrust. Since assuming the presidency, some of Biden’s China policies have been couched within the framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy, including expressing concerns about human rights in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong; criticizing Beijing for not condemning the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar; being prepared to defend Taiwan in the face of rising China’s aggressiveness; and building a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy with the Quad at its core, focusing on ties with military allies such as Japan and Australia, and a strategic partner, India, all of whom have serious concerns with China’s rising political, economic and military power and assertiveness. Biden’s militaristic focus was evident in early February 2021 when he dispatched two carrier groups to hold drills in the South China Sea with a destroyer conducting a ‘freedom of navigation operation’ through the Taiwan Strait.
In this regard, Biden seems to be following Trump in wanting to contain China. Trump’s China policy was made public when the secret US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, written in 2018, was declassified in early January 2021. According to analysts, the strategy commits the US to "devise and implement a defense strategy capable of, but not limited to: (1) denying China sustained air and sea dominance inside the 'first island chain' in a conflict; (2) defending the first island chain nations, including Taiwan; and (3) dominating all domains outside the first island chain". For many, this “is a very clear code for America holding its ground with Taiwan, with partners and allies in the South China Sea, with Japan, with Korea, really maintaining the integrity of those relationships and protecting them from Chinese assertiveness and Chinese aggression”. [13] China dismissed the document as it "purposefully distorted China's neighborhood policy" and sensationalized the "China threat" theory. [14]
In a way, this harks back to the US’s ‘moment of glory’, be it following the end of the Second World War in 1945 or the end of the Cold War in 1990. Following the end of the Cold War, Washington aimed to ensure that no rival power emerged so that it could maintain its ‘unipolar’ status. In short, global strategic primacy was the ultimate goal worldwide including in the Asia-Pacific region, now using the nomenclature of the Indo-Pacific region. The same policy seems to be pursued by Trump and among others, it also involved in countering China’s authoritarian and illiberal influence while promoting American values, norms and mores in the region.
In short, the Trump’s strategy was not just political, economic and military but also ideological. The Biden administration, by condemning China’s human rights policies, seems to be pursuing the same strategy including its response to the Myanmar coup. This is because Biden does not want to be seen as weak compared to Trump. Biden’s continuation of Trump’s policies of condemning China for its human rights policies, especially China’s policies in Xinjiang as ‘genocide’ is tantamount to weaponizing human rights as a political weapon. While Biden may make the US appear as a moral power yet in reality its own policies towards minorities, especially Blacks and continuing with the Guantanamo detention centre since 2001, represents the hallmark of its own human rights abuses and contradiction of what is championing abroad. Biden seems to be pursuing a policy of ‘do what I say, not what I do”, and this foreign policy hypocrisy is unlikely to win much support in Southeast Asia, especially in Singapore, especially if it couched within the Indo-Pacific policy.
Conclusion
From this perspective, if tensions and conflicts in US-China relations are not reduced and almost every major policy within the framework of the Indo-Pacific is centered on China, aimed at ‘containing’ Beijing’s all-round expansion and assertiveness, it is unlikely Singapore, including its ASEAN partners, would support Biden’s Indo-Pacific policy. While Singapore would strive to maintain its close political, economic and even security ties with the US and China, Singapore is unlikely to join the US in condemning China or supporting China in opposing the US in the region as Singapore’s strategy is to ensure that both powers should remain embedded in the region. How long Singapore’s policy can be sustained remains to be seen but judging from its past postures, this is likely to be the course of Singapore’s response to Biden’s Indo-Pacific policy.
Prof Bilveer Singh, PhD is the Deputy Head, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore; Adjunct Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; and President, Political Science Association, Singapore. The views expressed are strictly personal and not of any institution, the author may be affiliated with.
[1] See Lee Kuan Yew, “Basis of Singapore’s Foreign Policy”, The Mirror (Singapore), 14+ August 1965; Lee Hsien Loong, “Security Options for Small States”, The Straits Times (Singapore), 6 November 1984; Obaid Ul Haq, “Foreign Policy”, Jon S.T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow (eds.), Government and Politics of Singapore, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 280-285; G.G. Thompson, “Formative Factors in Shaping Singapore’s Foreign Policy”, in Singapore’s International Relations, Radio Talks, Series 7, (Singapore: Lembaga Gerakan Pelajaran Dewasa, 1966), p.80; Rahim Ishak, “Foreign Policy Based on Sound Premises”, The Mirror, 23 December 1968; S Dhanabalan, “Foreign Policy: Opportunities in the Margin of Possibilities”, in Issues Facing Singapore in the Eighties, (Singapore: Information Division, Ministry of Culture, 1982), pp.1-28; Bilveer Singh, Singapore: Foreign Policy Imperatives of a Small State, (Singapore: Centre for Advanced Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, 1988; Bilveer Singh, The vulnerability of small states revisited: a study of Singapore's post-cold war foreign policy, (Jogjakarta, Indonesia: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999).
[2] The Straits Times (Singapore), 14 May 1975.
[3] The Mirror (Singapore), Vol. 12, No. 28, 12 July 1976, p.1.
[4] The Mirror, Vol. 9, No. 17, 23 April 1973, p.1.
[5] Cited in Lee Khoon Choy, “Foreign Policy”, in C.V. Devan Nair, (ed.), Socialism that Works…The Singapore Way, (Singapore: Federal Publishers, 1976), p.110.
[6] Cited in Lee Khoon Choy, “Foreign Policy”, p. 110.
[7] Dewey Sim, “Singapore will continue not to take sides between US and China, says PM Lee Hsien Loong”, South China Morning Post, 18 August 2019.
[8] See Tham Yuen-C, “Not possible for S'pore, many countries, to choose between US and China, PM Lee tells BBC”, The Straits Times, 14 March 2021.
[9] Premesha Saha, “ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific outlook: An analysis”, Raisina Debates (Observer Research Foundation), 28 June 2019. See https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/aseans-indo-pacific-outlook-an-analysis-52542/
[10] Charrisa Yong, “Singapore will not join Indo-Pacific bloc for now: Vivian”, The Straits Times, 15 May 2018.
[11] Masayuki Yuda, “ASEAN seeks to steer middle path between US and China”, Nikkei Asia, 23 June 2019; William Choong, ‘How Long Can Singapore Walk the Tightrope between the U.S. and China?”, The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), 24 January 2020.
[12] Richard Maude, “Explainer: The Biden Administration and the Indo-Pacific”, The Asia Society (Australia), 7 April 2021. See https://asiasociety.org/australia/explainer-biden-administration-and-indo-pacific
[13] Brahma Chellaney, “Biden follows Trump’s footsteps in the Indo-Pacific”, The Hill, 25 March 2021, see https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/544860-biden-follows-trumps-footsteps-in-the-indo-pacific; Lyle J. Goldstein, “The Indo-Pacific Strategy Is a Recipe for Disaster”, Lawfare, 18 February 2021, see https://www.lawfareblog.com/indo-pacific-strategy-recipe-disaster; Laura Tingle, “Previously secret details of Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy revealed”, ABC News, 12 January 2021, see https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-12/details-of-trump-administrations-indo-pacific-strategy-revealed/13052216
[14] Ibid.