CHINA’S UNMANNED UNDERWATER VEHICLES IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN: THREATS AND SOLUTIONS
2021.07.01
Views
458
By Jung-Ming Chang
INTRODUCTION
The world has in recent years witnessed the emergence of Chinese unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) in the South China Sea. These UUVs were “captured” by fishermen once in Vietnam and four times in Indonesia during the 2016-2020 period.[1] One explanation for the emergence of these UUVs is that they were deployed for the purpose of collecting hydrological data as well as conducting surveillance after South China Sea became a flashpoint. Arguably, the Pacific Ocean will become another South China Sea and we shall witness China-made underwater drones in it. This situation should be of interest to Taiwan and like-minded countries, and the underlying question is how do we deal with it.
WHEREABOUTS OF CHINESE UUVS
In 2019, China deployed 12 Haiyi [海翼or Sea Wing] UUVs in the Indian Ocean and claimed that all 12 of them were recovered. However, the original plan was to deploy 14 UUVs.[2] Since five Haiyi underwater drones have been captured in the region of South China Sea from 2016 to 2000 (see Figure 1), the inference is that Chinese UUVs have been deployed prior to 2019 and that an unknown number of UUVs have been deployed by China from 2017 to 2000. Currently, most UUVs are designed to surface after the depletion of power. Even though it is time and money consuming to retrieve these UUVs near the surface, it is a prevalent practice. There could be two critical reasons: one is to prevent them from falling into enemy’s hands to prevent reverse engineering; the other is to prevent an adversary from discovering the information UUVs gathered during active duty.

FIGURE 1: China’s Unmanned Underwater Vehicles Found Since 2016
(Source: H I Sutton, “Underwater Drone Incidents Point to China’s Expanding Intelligence Gathering,” January 15, 2021, Royal United Services Institute, https://rusi.org/commentary/underwater-drone-incidents-point-china-expanding-intelligence-gathering.)
In most cases, scientific research vessels are responsible for the recovery of UUVs. For example, a U.S. UUV was seized by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China when USNS Bowditch oceanographic survey ship was about to retrieve it in the South China Sea.[3] The situation of China is no different. China’s scientific research vessels are used to deploy and recover Haiyi UUVs. Logically, during the deployment phase, we should be able to observe the occurrence of survey vessels before UUVs. That is to say, survey vessels are followed by UUVs in the case of China. During the recovering phase, the sequence is just the opposite. One thing to note is that Haiyi UUVs, equivalent to Slocum G3 gliders, are small in size and could be deployed and recovered by means other than survey vessels.[4]
A report released by Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in April 2020 shows the footprints of various countries’ survey vessels in the Indo-Pacific.[5] As shown on Figure 2, China’s survey vessels are more clustered in the West Pacific, north of the equator. These survey vessels also visited the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, but less intensively. Since China’s survey vessels deploy and recover UUVs, there is reason to believe that China has already deployed UUVs in the Pacific Ocean. While 17 China’s scientific research ships conducted surveys in 32 locations in the Pacific Ocean, only two ships of the same kind explored one location each in the South China Sea.[6] Presumably, as the number of scientific research vessel increases, the quantity of UUVs also rises. Similarly, the more UUVs deployed, the more would become “missing in action.” If that is the case, then the UUVs found in Indonesia on January 22, 2020 and December 20, 2020, respectively, could have been deployed originally in the West Pacific Ocean and brought ashore by the North Equatorial Current.

FIGURE 2: Research Activity in the Indo-Pacific
(Source: “A Survey of Marine Research Vessels in the Indo-Pacific,” April 16, 2020, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://amti.csis.org/a-survey-of-marine-research-vessels-in-the-indo-pacific/.)
OBJECTIVES OF UUVS
One main objective of UUVs is to survey the underwater world. In the context of the South China Sea dispute, UUVs are possibly used to explore appropriate hiding places for submarines, in addition to collecting hydrological data and performing the function of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR). In order to achieve anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) for China, anti-ship missiles and surface vessels are certainly necessary. Submarines, however, are even more needed for their stealth and “phantom-like” function. Not knowing whether adversarial submarines are deployed, a fleet cannot rest assured of its safety; knowing that adversarial submarines are deployed, a fleet must keep on high alert during its tour. UUVs are, hence, used to survey appropriate hideouts for submarines to take out adversarial surface targets. One thing to note is that the PLAN has not equipped with offensive UUVs that could fire torpedoes or carry out attacks, such as Russia’s Poseidon[7], the offensive capability is neglected temporarily.
The other purpose is to gain support from the island states in the south Pacific. One feature of the Pacific Island states is that these countries are by definition surrounded by the sea. Moreover, these island states have at least one good harbor. Therefore, these island states are appropriate for China to deploy UUVs. In the long run, Pacific Island states that are closely associated with China can also provide supply and maintenance services for UUVs. As China continues the Belt and Road Initiative, there are plans from China to lease or invest in ports from these island states. For example, China’s state-controlled Fujian Zhonghong Fishery Company has signed a $200 million deal with Papua New Guinea to build a “comprehensive multifunctional fishery industrial park” in the Daru Port.[8] The superficial meaning of the investment is to construct a major fishery plant. However, since the company was controlled by the Chinese government, the investment could be turned from business purposes into military ones.
Similar cases are abundant. For example, a secret deal was signed in September 2019 between China and the Solomon Islands to lease the Tulagi island and its surroundings.[9] In 2018, after Chinese investments flowed into the Solomon Islands to construct an airport, aircraft maintenance facilities, and a shopping district on the island of Guadalcanal, there were concerns that China might turn this strategically important hub into military use.[10] Not to mention the preliminary talks between China and Vanuatu to build permanent military facilities in the island nation.[11]
It will be convenient for the PLAN to retrieve UUVs after having access to the ports in the Oceania. If China could finally use ports in the Pacific Island states, it is not urgent to conduct “scientific research” in waters adjacent to these island states for the time being. This could well be the reason why Chinese scientific research vessels were sent to other parts of the Pacific Ocean to conduct research of the seafloor in a “lawnmowing” fashion.
After making an inroad into the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain and expanding its influence in the Pacific islands, China’s sphere of influence will collide with that of the United States in the Pacific Ocean. As China continues to secure its position in world stage there could be an armed conflict with the United States. For now, it is too early to determine when the conflict would erupt. But, if a war between the two countries is unavoidable in the near future, what will that war look like could be of interest to the people and countries in the Pacific region as a whole. The significance of the Pacific Ocean differs from that of the South China Sea and Indian Ocean since JL-2 intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched from China’s 094-type nuclear submarines could reach the United States.
A SHRINKING PACIFIC OCEAN FOR MANEUVER
From Figure 2, it is clear that China’s scientific research vessels appear more in the region between the First Island Chain and Second Island Chain; some of the vessels’ footprints even go beyond the Second Island Chain. For other parts of the Pacific Ocean, Chinese vessels’ footprints are scarce. Footprint of China’s research vessels even never showed in South Pacific. This does not mean South Pacific Island states are of no interest to China.
Since the early days of the Cold War, three curvilinear chains of islands in the Pacific Ocean have been serving as three lines of defense for the United States. However, a new island chain has now emerged between the Second and Third Island Chains that could be used to challenge U.S. security interests in the Pacific. This emerging island chain starts from Papua Guinea, going eastbound to the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Niue, Cook Islands, and ends in Kiribati.
During peacetime, this emerging island chain is considered a political and economic attraction by other countries in the region, making China more advantaged than the existing regional and global powers, namely Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. During wartime or an armed conflict, the chain could serve supply and maintenance purposes. A majority of China’s allies in the chain have deep-water ports, such as the Port of Malau, Port-Vila, the Port of Nuku’alofa, the Port of Neiafu, and the Port of Alofi, which could support PLAN operations in the region. In other words, if the PLAN does not control deep-water ports in the region, regional countries can rest assured that the South Pacific would remain as peaceful as always. As mentioned earlier, China might be using a different way to utilize this island chain that has emerged among the island chains in the South Pacific.
Building upon the emergence of the new island chain, China could make the most out of the Pacific Island states through various means, such as leasing or investing in part of the territories. Commercial use of the ports in Pacific islands states could be the first step, then turn these ports into military use to prepare for a future contingency against the United States. After the PLAN constructs military facilities at the ports of the new island chain, the high seas south of the equator in the Pacific Ocean could likely be under the PLAN’s control. Then there comes two implications: 1) Australia will be isolated from the two flashpoints in the Pacific Ocean, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The emerging island chain could serve the function of keeping Australia out of East Asian affairs by deploying anti-air and anti-ship missile systems on those islands and threatening the regional traffic. Should it happen, not only will Australia lose its strategic importance but also some 1,600 U.S. Marines currently deployed on Manus Island will be refrained from coming to the aid of U.S. allies and partners. 2) The routes for the U.S. Navy vessels are likely to be limited. For maintenance and supply purposes, it is reasonable for the U.S. Navy to utilize the route in the South Pacific. If, however, the route is occupied by the PLAN and becomes hostile, the U.S. Navy will have to abandon using this route. One would argue that the Pacific Ocean is vast and expansive and there should be numerous routes for the U.S. Navy to use. Suppose, however, the flashpoint is in the South China Sea, not being able to use the route close to the emerging island chain could delay the rescue mission dramatically.
SOLUTIONS
Due to the global recognized doctrine of freedom of navigation on the high seas, there is no way to restrict China’s scientific research vessels from sailing in the Pacific Ocean. More importantly, UUVs can be deployed through means other than scientific research vessels. Then, is there any solution?
One way to prevent the PLAN from utilizing UUVs in the Pacific Ocean is to keep China from gaining access to Pacific Island states. Since the military perspectives have been inefficient in resolving this issue, diplomatic means that are both time and budget efficient must be better utilized.

FIGURE 3: Island Chains in the Pacific Ocean
(Source: Jung-Ming Chang, “Strategic Implications of China’s Investment in Papua New Guinea’s Daru Port,” Defense Security Bi-weekly, January 29, 2021, https://reurl.cc/NXm4bq)
In October 2020, the U.S. Department of States announced more than $200 million USD in new funding to the Pacific Islands as part of the Pacific Pledge. Additionally, the U.S. government could coordinate with donor countries, including Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, or even France, to allocate and distribute donations more efficiently. Establishing more air traffic routes to connect Pacific Islands is another possible way to win the hearts and minds of Pacific islanders. And It would create a stronger bond between South Pacific countries and other nations at the same.
This is, especially, the case after Palau, Federal States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Kiribati announced on February 4, 2021, in a joint statement to withdraw their membership from the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). One of the consequences was that the PIF became porous and vulnerable to China’s money diplomacy. The United States alone cannot deal with this situation in the South Pacific. It takes collaboration with like-minded countries, such as Taiwan, to tackle the expansion of China’s influence in the Pacific region. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands, Sandra Oudkirk remarked on April 16, 2021, that the United States and Taiwan could cooperate further on the Global Cooperation and Training Framework. Oudkirk is correct in this regard.[12]
CONCLUSION
After Chinese Haiyi UUVs were caught by fishermen in Vietnam and Indonesia, the world hence was aware of China’s deployment of underwater gliders for the purpose of ISTAR. Even though the Pacific Ocean has not become a flashpoint, compared to the South China Sea, a large number of Chinese scientific research vessels’ footprints in the West Pacific have been recorded. Since scientific research vessels have been a major means of deploying and recovering UUVs, these footprints demonstrate China’s attempt to survey the Pacific Ocean in preparation for submarine warfare. What makes submarine warfare in the Pacific Ocean different, and worse, is the possibility of Chinese submarines firing strategic weapons below the surface.
Jung-Ming Chang is a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of National Defense and Security Research. His research interests include U.S.-China-Taiwan relations and Taiwan-Pacific islands relations.
[1] H I Sutton, “Underwater Drone Incidents Point to China’s Expanding Intelligence Gathering,” January 15, 2021, Royal United Services Institute, https://rusi.org/commentary/underwater-drone-incidents-point-china-expanding-intelligence-gathering.
[2] H I Sutton, “China Deployed 12 Underwater Drones In Indian Ocean,” Forbes, March 22, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/03/22/china-deployed-underwater-drones-in-indian-ocean/?sh=3a22aa976693.
[3] “China ‘seizes US vessel’ in S China Sea,” BBC, December 16, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38347221.
[4] “Slocum G3 Glider Operators Manual,” Teledyne Webb Research, December 2017, http://gliderfs2.coas.oregonstate.edu/gliderweb/docs/slocum_manuals/Slocum_G3_Operator_Manual_20171219.pdf.
[5] “A Survey of Marine Research Vessels in the Indo-Pacific,” CSIS, April 16, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/a-survey-of-marine-research-vessels-in-the-indo-pacific/.
[6] This was done using the information provided by the interactive map on the CSIS website.
[7] Xavier Vavasseur, “Russia’s Poseidon Nuclear Torpedo Base To Be Ready By Summer 2022,” Naval News, January 27, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/01/russias-poseidon-nuclear-torpedo-base-to-be-ready-by-summer-2022/.
[8] Jamie Seidel, “China’s bold new fishing plan on Australia’s doorstep increases tensions,” news.com.au, December 16, 2020, https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/chinas-bold-new-fishing-plan-on-australias-doorstep-increases-tensions/news-story/a27224ce439fe490a93a7be81efb6148.
[9] Damien Cave, “China Is Leasing an Entire Pacific Island. Its Residents Are Shocked,” The New York Times, October 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/world/australia/china-tulagi-solomon-islands-pacific.html.
[10] Bernard Lagan, “Australia fears China’s military might on Pacific isle,” The Sunday Times, May 1, 2018, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/australia-fears-china-s-military-might-on-pacific-isle-cdh36vl9z; Christopher Woody, “A World War II battleground is now another flash point in China's influence campaign in the Pacific,” Business Insider, July 24, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/growing-chinese-influence-in-guadalcanal-worrying-the-us-and-australia-2018-7.
[11] David Wroe, “China eyes Vanuatu military base in plan with global ramifications,” The Sydney Morning Herald, April 9, 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-eyes-vanuatu-military-base-in-plan-with-global-ramifications-20180409-p4z8j9.html.
[12] “MOFA, State Department take part in virtual on Taiwan-US cooperation in Pacific islands,” Taiwan Today, April 19, 2021, https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post=198302.