Abstract
In March 2024, Vladimir Putin strived to secure a high voter turnout and a significant share of the vote in the presidential election to solidify the legitimacy of his rule and subsequent decisions. With his position stabilized, continuity in Russia's Asia-Pacific policy is expected after the election, with adjustments primarily responding to changes in the broader environment.
Russo-Chinese relations remain a priority in Russia's Asia-Pacific policy, as Russia relies on Chinese support amid the Russo-Ukrainian War, making it willing to set aside disputes with China. Russo-Indian relations are also an essential pillar of Russia's grand strategy, although Russia can only strive to prevent India from becoming too pro-American. The military alliance with North Korea can be seen as an unexpected outcome of the war, with both sides likely to continue mutual support and resource sharing until the conflict ends. While the bloc of Russia, China, and North Korea appears to be taking shape, it has yet to withstand real-world tests. Aside from their limitations, a lack of willingness to actively support one another is a significant factor, and even if there is such support, it is primarily driven by self-preservation rather than being regarded as a genuine obligation.
Russia has not forgotten its past as a superpower, so it continues to seek opportunities to enhance its position in the Asia-Pacific region. However, given the political realities it faces, Russia can currently only promote economic cooperation. Constructing a security system in the Asia-Pacific remains its a long-term challenge, at best increasing the costs for the U.S. in building its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and alleviating some of the pressure it faces on the European front.