Abstract
This chapter discusses the current development of minilateral mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific as well as their prospect under the second Trump Administration. The rise of minilateralism — a small number of willing and capable states forming a mechanism to tackle specific issues — in the Indo-Pacific reflects in part the growing intensity of US-China strategic competition, and in part the small(er) regional powers’ strategy to divert the risk in the face of China. The chapter discusses the development of three “strategic minilateral mechanisms” including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), AUKUS and the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) and two emerging ones including the US-Japan-Korea Trilateral Partnership and US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral over the course of 2025. These mechanisms are established by the US and its partners and allies, suggesting that their existence hinges largely on a common threat perception of China. Therefore, despite the Trump Administration’s “America first” policy, the US and other member states are likely to see the minilaterals as assets to the US-led “hub-and-spoke” security architecture in the region.
Minilateralism is featured with flexibility and a low degree of institutionalization. The functioning of these mechanisms, or the lack thereof, is then explained by the political situation within the member state(s). The strained ties between the US and India over tariffs have undermined the significance of the Quad, while the fate of the AUKUS’ first pillar had been cast in doubt because of a US review of the submarine project. In the meantime, President Trump’s attitudes towards the TSD, the US-Japan-Korea Trilateral Partnership and US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral remain unclear. It is expected that these minilaterals will continue to function at the operational level, while high-level dialogues or summits may not be prioritized.