Abstract
The Trump administration’s second-term cybersecurity strategy - often referred to as “Trump 2.0” - is defined by deregulation, privatization of responsibility, and offensive deterrence. It integrates cutting-edge tools such as Post-quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-driven cybersecurity applications. Together, these measures are intended not only to reinforce U.S. homeland defense, but also to shape a global security framework where technological thresholds become alliance thresholds. Under this approach, allies are encouraged - if not pressured - to upgrade their digital infrastructure and encryption protocols in lockstep with U.S. standards. For Indo-Pacific countries, this presents a dual reality: an opportunity to enhance capabilities through access to advanced technologies, and a challenge to maintain sovereignty and policy autonomy. While standardization and shared supply chains can strengthen collective defense, they also risk fostering technological lock-in, constraining domestic innovation, and deepening disparities in cybersecurity readiness. For Taiwan’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the stakes are particularly high. Without substantial government support or subsidies, meeting increasingly stringent cross-border security requirements could prove difficult, potentially turning these firms into weak points within broader alliance networks. Meanwhile, Washington’s intensification of retaliatory cyber operations against China raises the risk of the Indo-Pacific becoming a frontline for digital conflict. Over the next decade, regional actors will need to navigate the fine line between deepening cooperation with the United States and preserving technological neutrality. This will require not only strengthening domestic cybersecurity resilience, but also building robust cross-border cooperation and intelligence-sharing mechanisms to safeguard strategic autonomy amid a rapidly evolving global digital security order.