Abstract
As modern warfare increasingly depends on space capabilities, space-based systems for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, and navigation have become critical determinants of battlefield outcomes, while counterspace developments have turned outer space into a contested domain. Since the deployment of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, China has expanded its space capabilities through military–civil fusion and constellation-based approaches, integrating space into the core of the PLA’s informationized and joint operational framework. This has provided the PLA with advantages in precision strike, battlefield awareness, and communications resilience.
In contrast, Taiwan’s space development has focused largely on civilian and experimental missions, with limited military applications, resulting in a structural imbalance in space capabilities across the Taiwan Strait. This article examines China’s navigation, communications, ISR, and counterspace capabilities and assesses their implications for security and operational conditions in the Taiwan Strait. It argues that Taiwan’s lack of dedicated military satellites and its reliance on commercial and foreign services may constrain early warning, degrade wartime communications, and weaken operational resilience during high-intensity conflict.
To address these challenges, the article recommends strengthening Taiwan’s legal and organizational frameworks, prioritizing military communications and ISR capabilities, and integrating domestic and international resources to build a more resilient space support architecture.