As competition increasingly unfolds across maritime domains, island and coastal states located along major sea routes have become structurally significant nodes in regional trade, connectivity, and security. Within the Indo-Pacific maritime system, Taiwan and Sri Lanka occupy distinct sub-regional environments but function as strategically consequential nodes along major shipping corridors linking East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.[1]

Despite differences in size, political systems, and material capabilities, they derive their strategic significance primarily from their geographic position within the Indo-Pacific maritime system rather than internal capabilities alone. This reflects a structural configuration of the Indo-Pacific in which geography directly shapes exposure to external strategic pressures. Both Taiwan and Sri Lanka are embedded in maritime spaces shaped by intensifying great-power competition, where the United States and China advance competing interests over access, influence, and regional connectivity. In such settings, policy autonomy is increasingly constrained by external pressures, reducing the scope for sustained neutrality.[2]

Taiwan and Sri Lanka experience these pressures in different forms. Taiwan faces direct security pressure through military coercion, grey-zone activities, and diplomatic isolation.[3] Sri Lanka faces growing economic pressures linked to competing external engagement in ports, logistics, and connectivity projects, particularly shaped by India-China competition.[4] These differences reflect variation in both intensity and nature of strategic exposure.

Although situated in different sub-regional contexts, both cases demonstrate a shared condition in which geography significantly shapes strategic relevance. Their importance is determined not only by internal capabilities but also by their position within wider maritime flows of trade, security, and competition.

In this context, the article examines Taiwan and Sri Lanka as strategic nodes within the Indo-Pacific maritime system and analyses how their location and functional roles shape their position under conditions of intensified maritime competition.

The Indo-Pacific maritime system is increasingly characterised by the growing strategic significance of geographically positioned maritime nodes.

Within the Indo-Pacific maritime system, Taiwan and Sri Lanka occupy different sub-regional theatres but function as strategic nodes within interconnected maritime systems. Their positioning along critical maritime corridors connects regional economies and shapes security dynamics. Their importance is not based on power status, but on geography and their role in sustaining critical flows of trade, energy and technology.

MacArthur’s characterisation of Taiwan illustrates how geography can generate strategic significance disproportionate to material capabilities. Even though Sri Lanka occupies a different strategic environment, its geographic location similarly amplifies its structural significance.

Since the United States has considered China a ‘strategic competitor’, Taiwan and Sri Lanka have gained greater importance in regional geopolitics, becoming key locations where major powers’ interests overlap and shape patterns of competition across the Pacific and Indian Oceans [5].

Taiwan is located between Northeast and Southeast Asia along maritime corridors linking the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the wider Pacific. Taiwan holds outsized geopolitical importance as a central point in the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China.

Its location is not merely a geographical fact but a central element shaping military calculations, trade routes, and the balance of power across the entire Indo-Pacific. This makes Taiwan central to US-China strategic competition. For the United States, it is tied to alliance credibility and regional security architecture, while for China, it is closely linked to sovereignty concerns and access to the surrounding maritime space.[6]

Its significance is further amplified by its dominance in advanced semiconductor production, led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which supplies most of the world’s high-end chips. This creates a direct link between Taiwan’s stability and the functioning of global technology and industrial supply chains.[7] As a result, any instability in Taiwan carries systemic economic consequences beyond the region.

Sri Lanka occupies a structurally significant position in the Indian Ocean due to its location along major sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. It is positioned close to the important Indian Ocean shipping corridors linked to the Strait of Malacca, placing it within major flows of global trade and energy.[8] This geographic position gives Sri Lanka strategic significance that extends beyond its material capabilities.[9]

Historically, Sri Lanka’s geostrategic position has attracted external interest due to its proximity to key maritime pathways. During the Cold War, both Western and Eastern powers viewed the island nation through the lens of wider maritime competition. In the contemporary period, this significance has increased as major-power competition has expanded further into the Indo-Pacific, reshaping regional maritime dynamics.[10]

Sri Lanka functions as a logistical and geopolitical node within wider maritime networks. It allows external actors to incorporate it into broader calculations of maritime access, logistics, and regional influence. As a result, Sri Lanka has become relevant to the strategic interests of major powers, including the United States, China, India, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan, across economic, diplomatic, and security domains.[11]

In the current strategic environment, intensifying competition in the Indo-Pacific has further elevated Sri Lanka’s strategic relevance.[12] China has expanded its engagement through infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative, while India deepens regional partnerships and economic cooperation. It made Sri Lanka a focal point for major powers seeking to expand influence and secure maritime trade routes.[13]

The Indo-Pacific maritime system is shaped by uneven and overlapping patterns of competition. The United States and China are the central rivals in the Western Pacific, while India-China competition is mainly concentrated in the Indian Ocean. US strategy focuses on securing maritime routes, strengthening alliances, and maintaining deterrence, with Taiwan playing a key role in regional security and global supply chain stability.

Whereas Sri Lanka functions as a strategic node where the US-China rivalry intersects with India-China regional competition. More broadly, the Indo-Pacific is characterised by intensified contestation over maritime space and evolving geopolitical boundaries. It brings together major economic and military powers such as China, India, and Japan, whose interactions collectively shape regional strategic outcomes. China’s military expansion has heightened US strategic concerns, particularly regarding critical sea lanes such as the South China Sea. India’s expanding economic and military capabilities have reinforced its role as a key balancing actor within the regional power structure and in broader US strategic alignments.

US-China relations reflect a long-term rivalry between an established power and a rising power, driven by China’s growing economic and military strength, the North Korean nuclear issue, and the Taiwan question.[14] In response, the United States has increased its regional military presence and cooperation with partners through initiatives such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative.[15] By doing this, the US prioritises countering China through alliances, defence spending reforms, and enhanced regional presence.[16] This rivalry shapes the behaviour of regional states. Countries such as India, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian states avoid firm alignment, seek strategic autonomy and instead balance relations with both powers. At the same time, rising military activity across the Indo-Pacific increases the risk of miscalculation, making stronger crisis management and the need for an evolving deterrence system to prevent open conflict.[17]

In the Indian Ocean, China has expanded its presence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), primarily via ports and infrastructure projects such as Gwadar, Hambantota, Kyaukpyu, and Djibouti. These facilities enhance China’s access to maritime routes and extend its logistical reach. This combines infrastructure development with a growing naval presence.[18]

India, as a resident power in the Indian Ocean, seeks to preserve regional balance through maritime partnerships, institutional engagements, and strengthening its naval and surveillance capabilities.[19] Its strategy is driven by the need to secure maritime routes while responding to China’s growing presence. Engagement with Sri Lanka forms part of this wider regional approach.[20] The ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy emphasises closer ties with Sri Lanka through development assistance, defence cooperation and economic partnerships.

India’s security environment is therefore increasingly shaped by China’s activities in the Indian Ocean, leading to persistent competition for influence.[21] In response, India has enhanced maritime domain awareness, naval strength, and cooperation with regional and extra-regional partners.

The Indo-Pacific maritime system reflects evolving structural dynamics shaped by the position of states within major sea routes and associated economic and strategic linkages. This has generated varying patterns of influence across key nodes. Taiwan and Sri Lanka reflect these dynamics: Taiwan faces direct security pressure linked to deepening US-China rivalry, while Sri Lanka is shaped by sustained external economic engagement within strategic competition between China and India. These differences reflect variation in both intensity and form of strategic exposure, rather than uniform regional effects.

At the same time, the region is no longer divided into separate Pacific and Indian Ocean theatres, as competition between major powers now operates across interconnected maritime spaces. As a result, developments in one part of the Indo-Pacific are increasingly affecting others, making regional stability more interdependent and raising the strategic significance of maritime states.

Both Taiwan and Sri Lanka are likely to operate in an environment where strategic value remains high, but autonomy becomes increasingly constrained and conditional.

For Taiwan, the central challenge is sustaining security and economic resilience within an evolving and structurally constrained strategic environment. Policy priorities are expected to centre on strengthening semiconductor supply chains, diversifying external partnerships, and enhancing asymmetric defence capabilities. Although its strategic space is likely to remain limited, its position within global technology networks will continue to remain an important source of leverage in shaping its external engagement.

For Sri Lanka, the key challenge is to manage external economic engagement without overdependence on any single power, particularly shaped by the dynamics of India-China competition. It must also leverage competing infrastructure projects for developmental gains. Its future trajectory will depend on its ability to balance competing external influences and manage economic dependencies in a pragmatic manner. This will require calibrated engagement with both India and China, alongside selective cooperation with wider Indo-Pacific partners to strengthen economic resilience and preserve policy autonomy within the evolving maritime order.

However, the two cases, while situated in different sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific maritime system, point to a broader structural shift where strategic autonomy is increasingly conditioned by the management of external dependence under sustained competition, rather than by formal alignment choices.