Following the end of the Cold War, a number of African countries shifted their foreign policies toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC), opening their markets to Chinese products and investment. This change has made China a major economic power on the continent, challenging the United States and the European countries, and made it Africa’s biggest trading partner.[1] Beyond the commercial dimension, China’s expanding power is broadly recognized to pose a direct threat to Western hegemony, with China employing soft power–particularly in the form of unconditional investment and infrastructure finance in pursuit of geopolitical interests.[2] However, the unconditional investment concept is challenged by China’s real practice in dealing with African countries. As China-Africa relation deepens, the question of what drives African governments to prioritize engagement with China and the potential long-term implications of this partnership becomes increasingly relevant. In contrast to Western donors, which frequently condition aid on governance reforms, human rights adherence, and transparency practices, China maintains a non-interference tactic in the political and policy affairs of the African states. This kind of engagement from China has been distinguished from North-South cooperation, or in other words, Africa-Western partnership.[3] It is this approach and model that have been particularly appealing to African leaders who wanted fast infrastructure development and economic growth without stringent conditions.
China’s BRI, launched in 2013, has significantly influenced Africa’s urbanization by financing large-scale infrastructure projects. After a decade of operation, the BRI initiative has attracted a significant number of participants from Africa. In 2023, 44 of 54 African countries had joined the initiative, with China investing 2.5 times more in African infrastructure than all Western countries combined. However, some high-cost projects risk becoming underutilized due to poor connectivity and financial sustainability. The BRI projects have not always been well-conceived or strategically chosen, leading to outcomes that fail to deliver the desired economic impact. Examples include Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway, which depends on extensions to Uganda and Rwanda for viability, and Uganda’s expensive Entebbe-Kampala Expressway, which faces repayment challenges without sufficient toll revenue.[4] While infrastructure investment can catalyze economic growth, some BRI projects lack long-term planning, raising concerns about debt sustainability and lasting benefits for the local communities.
The central objective of this article is to analyse the increasing Chinese investment in Africa, with a particular focus on BRI. The Africancountries are seeking infrastructural investment and development partnership with China. Therefore, several issues require attention: African leaders in the post-Cold War period see an opportunity in China, linking their engagement to historical grievances inherited from colonial powers. African states did not develop during colonialism, and the post-colonial era too; instead, their resources and human capital were used to enrich colonial powers. For example, commerce deriving from Africa helped a great deal to strengthen trans-national links within the Western European economy, bearing in mind that American produce was the consequence of African labour.[5] This grievance shapes how African leaders deal with China, framing it as a development partner rather than a former colonial master that dictates terms or controls their fate.[6] The second point to note, which is also valid, is that some African leaders, unwilling to relinquish power, have shifted their political alliances to China to retain control and remain in power. African countries seek Chinese investment precisely because it is detached from political conditions. Western donors and liberal financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) tie funding to human rights, democracy, and multiparty politics, where China disregards these factors in its financial engagements. This highlights the crucial difference between China’s transactional, development-oriented relationship with Africa and the West’s value-driven, conditionality-laden approach.
This article does not purport to generalize the challenges of Chinese investment across Africa; rather, it identifies and analyzes a pattern of issues emerging in a number of African countries that have received BRI financing. Stories circulate about African countries trapped in enormous Chinese loans. One prime example is Djibouti, a tiny state on the Red Sea facing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait–a critical maritime chokepoint for global trade, particularly oil and natural gas shipments. Not only Djibouti, but also there are similar examples such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Angola. This article, however, examines the dualistic nature of Chinese investment in Africa under the BRI. Moving beyond a simple cost-benefit analysis, it interrogates whether the extensive infrastructural projects through BRI ultimately serve as a catalyst for African sustainable development or as a strategic instrument for expanding Chinese geopolitical hegemony.
註釋
[1] Larry Hanauer & Lyle J. Morris, “How China-Africa Relations Have Developed,” in Larry Hanauer & Lyle J. Morris, ed., Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2014), pp. 19-44.
[2] Ambrosé Du Plessis, “The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, Ideas and Aid: National Interest(s) or Strategic Partnership?” Insight on Africa, Vol. 6, Iss. 2, 2014. pp. 113-130.
[3] Nele Noesselt, “China’s African Dream: Assessing China’s New Strategy,” in Christof Hartmann & Nele Noesselt, ed., China’s New Role in African Politics: From Non-Intervention towards Stabilization? (New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 17-31.
[4] Astrid R.N. Haas, “China’s Investments in Africa aren’t Working as well as They Should for Cities: This Needs to Change,” The Conversation, 2024, https://theconversation.com/chinas-investments-inafrica-arent-working-as-well-as-they-should-for-cities-this-needs-to-change-238046.
[5] Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salaam: Tanzanian Publishing House, 1973), pp. 127-142.
[6] Development Reimagined, “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: All You Need to Know Before FOCAC 9,” FOCAC Introductory Brief (London: Development Reimagined, 2024), https://developmentreimagined.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/FOCAC-Introductory-Brief-2.pdf,
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