The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known in Chinese as One Belt One Road or OBOR (一帶一路), has dominated discussion and framing of China’s overseas economic and trade policy for more than a decade. Originally launched in 2013 in Kazakhstan with a narrower focus on connectivity in Central Asia and countries neighboring China, the initiative soon became a flagship program of Chinese president Xi Jinping, with up to 150 countries signing Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) acceding to the BRI.[1] The expansive growth of program beyond infrastructure to encompass almost all aspects of Chinese overseas economic and trade policy has engendered questions over the existence of BRI as a coherent economic program or statecraft agenda.[2] Hall andKrolikowski have invoked the term “Xi Show” to describe the degree to which the initiative has become associated with President Xi’s policies and persona, such that the BRI is enshrined in China’s constitution alongside other key developments of Xi Jinping Thought including “China Dream” and “Shared Destiny.”[3]
The deep association with Xi Jinping and his political thought has accompanied a trend of opposition developing from skepticism to outright hostility by China’s critics, chiefly the United States.[4] While early critiques focused on “debt-trap diplomacy,” the allegation that China has been using unfavorable lending terms to trap debtor nations into economically dire situations, from which China then extracts favorable diplomatic or other concessions, American discourses have since evolved to address more complex geopolitical questions raised by the gargantuan overseas expansion of China’s infrastructure and technology companies.[5] That China has in many cases utilized BRI projects ostensibly as carrots or sticks to achieve geopolitical goals, and in some cases has been accused of developing dual-use infrastructure facilities with military components, most notably the Port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which China took control of in 2017, have all raised awareness of potential downsides, economic and political, to continued membership in the initiative.[6]
The formal exit of Italy, the sole G7 member to formally join, from the BRI in December 2023 marked a turning point.[7] Coming on the heels of a high-profile exit by the Philippines in November, which included high- profile cancellations of on-going projects, formal membership in BRI began to symbolize in some circles and indicator of geopolitical alignment in an increasingly multipolar world. In addition to these prominent cases, this paper examines the more muted case of Estonia’s exit from the BRI in 2022, along with the highly publicized and contentious Panamanian exit in 2025. Each case study considers the geopolitical, economic, and domestic factors motivating an exit, along with the Chinese response to each country’s exit. The case studies present diverse examples across three continents and different development levels, with lessons both positive and negative for other countries that may explore a formal exit from the initiative. Case studies examine both the political and economic indicators, including whether departing countries faced economic “punishment” or coercion by the Chinese side. Further examined is the question of whether the BRI continues to exist as a meaningful paradigm, given that all countries continue to maintain robust diplomatic and economic ties with the PRC. Additional consideration will be given to the Taiwan factor in each case study, how engagement with Taiwan influenced decisions to leave or increased in a notable factor following each country’s formal exit.
[1] Christoph NEDOPIL WANG, Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – Green Finance & Development Center, n.d., accessed July 29, 2025, https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-roadinitiative-
bri/.
[2] Jacob Mardell, “Why We Should Stop Talking about China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Articles, Chinaobservers, November 7, 2023, https://chinaobservers.eu/why-we-should-stop-talking-aboutchinas-
belt-and-road-initiative/.
[3] Todd H Hall and Alanna Krolikowski, “Making Sense of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Review Essay,” International Studies Review 24, No. 3, 2022, viac023, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac023.
[4] Robert Sutter, “Why America Opposes the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?—A Second Look,” Pacific Forum, n.d., accessed July 29, 2025, https://pacforum.org/publications/pacnet-38-why-americaopposes-
the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-a-second-look/.
[5] Zenel Garcia and Phillip Guerreiro, “What American Policymakers Misunderstand about the Belt and Road Initiative,” US Army War College, accessed July 29, 2025, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3789926/what-americanpolicymakers-
misunderstand-about-the-belt-and-road-initiative/.
[6]Ibid.
[7] Carboni, “L’Italia è Uscita Dalla ‘Via Della Seta’ Cinese,” Il Post, December 6, 2023, https://www.ilpost.it/2023/12/06/italia-uscita-via-della-seta-bri/.