

戰略與評估



Defense Strategy & Assessment Journal

**Vol.11, No.1,
June 2021**

論文

Chyungly LEE

ASEAN Models of Asia-Pacific Security
Multilateralism:
From ARF to ADMM Plus

Ming-Shih SHEN

Trump's Legacy of Korean Peninsula Policy
and Biden's Continuation

康曉嵐

無人飛行載具在防衛作戰運用的探討

廖哲偉

中共對臺現代政治作戰
與臺灣政戰體制之未來

戰略與評估

第十一卷第一期

Vol.11, No.1, June 2021

財團法人國防安全研究院



財團法人國防安全研究院
Institute for National Defense and Security Research
I N D S R



戰略與評估

第十一卷第一期 中華民國一一〇年 六月

Defense Strategy and Assessment Journal

Vol.11, No.1, June 2021

出版人：財團法人國防安全研究院
發行人：霍守業
主編：歐錫富
執行主編：沈明室
編輯委員：王高成、李瓊莉、李俊毅、李哲全、沈明室、林成蔚、
林文程、馬振坤、劉復國、歐錫富、蘇紫雲
(依姓氏筆劃排列)
助理編輯：林聖堯、陳彥廷
校對：沈明室、吳貞瑢、林聖堯、陳彥廷
出版企劃：胡國荃
電話：(02)2331-2360 轉 314
傳真：(02)2331-2361
電子信箱：dsaj@indsr.org.tw
院址：10048 臺北市中正區博愛路 172 號
I S S N：2223-9413

出版源由

衡諸 21 世紀國防事務發展趨勢，為整合國防政策之專業研究能量，拓展國際交流合作，以提升整體國防思維，建構符合國家發展、最適資源配置之政策建議，國防部參酌各先進國家國防智庫運作與發展經驗，捐助設立「財團法人國防安全研究院」，並發行本刊。本院設立宗旨：

- 一、增進國防安全研究與分析。
- 二、提供專業政策資訊與諮詢。
- 三、拓展國防事務交流與合作。
- 四、促進國際戰略溝通與對話。

本刊係國防安全研究院所發行之綜合性政策學術期刊，旨在提供國防安全研究專家與學者之專業諮詢與討論平台，提升我國國防安全研究能量。

稿約

- 一、《戰略與評估》以探討國防事務、區域安全情勢及戰略研究等議題為宗旨，每年三、九月出刊。本刊歡迎學有專精之學者、專家踴躍投稿。
- 二、論文請依一般學術論文規格撰寫，使用註解，說明來源，並以另紙書明中英文題目、姓名，兩百字以內之中英文摘要及四個關鍵詞。文長以一至二萬字為宜。來稿請附電子檔。來稿請一併示知服務單位、職稱、主要學經歷、研究專長、聯絡地址和電話。
- 三、本刊採隨到隨審方式，無截稿日期之限制。來稿均須經本刊正式審稿程序，本刊對來稿有編輯與刪改權。
- 四、請作者自留原稿影本或電子檔，來稿未刊登者，本刊恕不退件。來稿一經刊載，除贈送作者本刊外，另依本刊規定致奉稿酬。
- 五、本刊恕不刊登翻譯著作。
- 六、本刊所載文章為作者個人之意見，僅供學術研究發展之參考，不代表本單位及任何機關政策或立場。
- 七、若著作人投稿於本刊經收錄後，同意授權本刊得再授權國家圖書館或其他資料庫業者，進行重製、透過網路提供服務、授權用戶下載、列印、瀏覽等行為。並得為符合資料庫之需求，酌作格式之修改。
- 八、來稿如有違反著作權法，作者負完全之法律責任，另本刊不接受作者申訴。
- 九、稿件請以掛號郵寄「10048 臺北市中正區博愛路 172 號『戰略與評估』編輯部」或電子郵件寄至 dsaj@indsr.org.tw。

本刊論文內容屬作者個人意見，不代表本院立場

戰略與評估

第十一卷第一期

目錄

論文

| | | |
|--|----------------|-----|
| ASEAN Models of Asia-Pacific Security Multilateralism: From ARF to ADMM Plus | Chyungly LEE | 1 |
| Trump's Legacy of Korean Peninsula Policy and Biden's Continuation | Ming-Shih SHEN | 33 |
| 無人飛行載具在防衛作戰運用的探討 | 康曉嵐 | 73 |
| 中共對臺現代政治作戰與臺灣政戰體制之未來 | 廖哲偉 | 107 |

作者簡介

Chyungly
LEE

Chyungly LEE is a senior research fellow/professor at the Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University. Her area of research is centered around on Asia-Pacific security, Asia-Pacific multilateralism and conflict prevention in East Asia.

Ming-Shih
SHEN

Ming-Shih SHEN is a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research. His area of research is centered around on PLA study, military strategy, regional security, national security research, India defense security and military politics.

康曉嵐

國防大學戰略研究所碩士，現任陸軍工兵訓練中心中校研究教官。主要研究領域為：軍事戰略、軍備研究、國際關係。

廖哲偉

國防大學政治作戰學院政治系，現役陸軍上尉輔導長。主要研究領域為：國際關係、中共研究、政治作戰。

ASEAN Models of Asia-Pacific Security Multilateralism: From ARF to ADMM Plus

Chyungly LEE, Ph. D.

Research Fellow/ Professor

Institute of International Relations

National Chengchi University

Abstract

Geographical proximity is one of the key elements in the concept of security interdependence. One country's security policy often directly affects security calculations and strategic assessments of its neighbors. Security cooperation is thus more desirable at the regional level. In the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) exemplifies a political approach to security multilateralism; while the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) highlights a defense approach. This article discusses the origin and nascent development of the ADMM Plus to understand its institutional base and designated functions and tries to provide a fair response to the criticism of being ineffective. It argues that even in response to common transnational security concerns, the regional defense cooperation can hardly be "de-bordered". Instead of pursuing the institutional design of operational integration, the modus operandi of the ADMM Plus continue to follow the "protocol" of diplomacy. The recently revisited notion of defense diplomacy is useful to explain the rationales of members' acceptance to the ASEAN-centric arrangements.

Keywords: *ADMM Plus, ARF, ASEAN, defense diplomacy, security multilateralism*

亞太多邊安全主義： 從東協區域論壇到東協擴大國防部長會議

李瓊莉

研究員

國立政治大學國際關係研究中心

摘 要

地理位置相近是構成安全互賴關係的主要因素之一，一國的安全政策通常直接影響鄰國的戰略安全評估，因此，多邊安全合作在區域層次較容易形成。在亞太地區，以東協為制度中心的安全多邊合作模式包括了以政治途徑為主的東協區域論壇，以及以國防途徑為重的東協擴大防長會議。本文主要討論後者的源起與初期發展，擬藉由了解其制度運作基調，以回應一般對東協擴大防長會議效能不彰的評述。本文認為即使是應對共同的跨國性威脅，國防合作仍無法排除國界的限制；在制度設計上，東協擴大防長會議仍循外交模式，不以任務執行上的整合為目標；國防外交概念為各成員國支持這個以東協為中心的制度運作模式提供了一個註解。

關鍵詞：東協擴大防長會議、東協區域論壇、東協、國防外交、多邊安全主義

I. Introduction

Geographical proximity is one of the key elements in conceptualizing security interdependence. One country's security policy often directly affects strategic assessments and security calculations of its neighbors. Multilateral security cooperation is thus more desirable at the regional level. In the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) exemplifies a political approach to security multilateralism; while the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) highlights a defense approach. The ADMM Plus, however, has been receiving the same criticism as the ARF for not being effective or relevant in resolving long-standing conflicts and hard security issues (such as territorial disputes and geostrategic tensions in the South China Sea). This article hopes to suggest a fair response from perspectives of defense diplomacy.

The paper starts with discussions of the ARF, the first establishment of security multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific after the end of the Cold War. The second section studies the origin and nascent development of the ADMM Plus and hopes to answer the question that whether a defense approach suggests something different from the political approach adopted in the ARF. Interestingly, the institutional base and designated functions of both mechanisms have strong ASEAN connections. The third section thus explores the rationale of members' support for the ASEAN modality in the ADMM Plus.

In sum, I argue that even in response to common transnational security concerns that the ADMM Plus aims to tackle, the functional defense cooperation can hardly be "de-bordered". Instead of pursuing an institutional design of operational integration, the modus operandi of the ADMM Plus continue to follow the "protocol" of ASEAN model of diplomacy. The recently revisited notion of defense diplomacy, however, highlighting conflict prevention and defense statecraft, is useful to explain the rationale of members' acceptance to the ASEAN-centric arrangements.

II. A Political Approach to Security Multilateralism: ASEAN Regional Forum

Although there were bilateral, triateral or minilateral defense initiatives in the Asia-Pacific from 1950s to 1980s, most of them are threat-based alliances, featuring the principle of exclusive participation.¹ The collapse of U.S.-Soviet Union bipolar security blocs and strategic uncertainties caused from power vacuum as well as China's rise after the end of Cold War opened a door for regional countries to develop an inclusively region-wide security cooperation process. Japan, in search for the status of being a normal state, took this strategic opportunity and played a foremost role in pushing regional security institution-building.² The former Japanese foreign minister Nakayama Taro proposed a political dialogue to enhance mutual security with its ASEAN counterparts in the 1991 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. The idea was eventually extended into a set-up of security multilateralism: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the first establishment of security multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. The first ARF meeting was formally launched in Bangkok on July 25, 1994.

A. The Political Approach

ARF is to promote open dialogues on common security interests and concerns between the ASEAN members and non-ASEAN security stakeholders. In terms of membership, a state or a supranational organization having impacts on peace and security within the footprint of key ARF activities, regardless of its geographic location, can be admitted to the Forum. Such a unique formula invites membership and participation from

¹ For instances, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was signed in September 1954 as a collective defense organization to block communism in the region; the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) was established in 1971.

² More discussions about Japan's role in the region's institution-building can be seen in Chyungly Lee, "The Compatibility of East Asia and Asia Pacific Multilateralism: Japan's Strategic Rationales." in Rose, C and Teo, V., eds. *The United States between China and Japan* (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), pp. 423-457; Kuniko Ashizawa, "Japan, the United States, and Multilateral Institution-Building in the Asia-Pacific", in Ellis S. Kraussand and John T. Pempel, eds., *Beyond Bilateralism: US-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific* (Berkeley CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 248-271.

East Asia, South Asia, America, and Europe. More importantly, the modality of ARF is based on the concept of cooperative security and the principle of inclusiveness.³ Accordingly, political adversaries (such as India and Pakistan) or strategic rivalries (such as North Korea and the United State) could convene directly and regularly in a multilateral format under the ARF framework.

ARF extends ASEAN's political and diplomatic approaches to regional security.⁴ At the outset, ARF made the Foreign Ministerial Meeting the highest decision-making body, despite the designated scope of dialogue and consultation was security-related. Such an arrangement not only demonstrated ARF's political approach to security multilateralism but also reflected members' caution about inviting defense/military sectors to the Forum. The first ARF Defense Officials' Dialogue/Meeting was not held until 2002. Until now the level of defense dialogues and engagements among ARF members still remains at the senior official level. Defense ministerial meetings have not been institutionalized in ARF.

In the second ARF meeting, ministers adopted a concept paper to guide the future direction of the institutional evolution. Three stages - the promotion of confidence-building measures, the development of preventive diplomatic mechanisms, and the development of conflict resolution mechanisms - were identified in the 1995 Concept Paper.⁵ After a decade of promoting confidence building measures, ARF members agreed to move forward. Following a decision of the 12th Ministerial Meeting in 2005, the

³ More discussions, please see Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2013); Paul Evans, "Cooperative Security and Its Discontents in Asia Pacific: The ASEAN Connection." *American Asian Review* Vol. 19, No. 2 (2001), pp. 99-119; Jugen Haacke and Noel M. Morada, *Cooperative Security in Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum* (London: Routledge Curzon 2010).

⁴ Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring security the 'ASEAN way'," *Survival*, Vol.39, No.4, 1997, pp. 80-92; Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security. Adelphi Paper 302* (London: Routledge. 1993).

⁵ ARF, "1995 The ASEAN Regional Forum: a Concept Paper, adopted in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam on 1 August 1995," <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1995-THE-ASEAN-REGIONAL-FORUM-A-CONCEPT-PAPER.pdf>

ARF Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures was replaced by the ARF Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy.⁶ Although members were not ready to completely move into the second stage, the change signaled that members were more willing to discuss substantive issues than before and more comfortable in exploring action-oriented cooperation.

In the celebration of ARF's 15th anniversary in 2009, ARF members charted a vision for ARF and reaffirmed ASEAN's role as the primary driving force of institutional building. In addition to institutional enhancement, the Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ARF Vision Statement adopted the following year specified five areas of cooperation. They were disaster relief, counter terrorism/transnational crime, maritime security, non-proliferation and disarmament, and peacekeeping operations. Despite an ARF Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan and a new ARF Work Plan on Disaster Relief were announced in 2011 and 2012 respectively, the ARF foreign ministers reiterated and reaffirmed that the implementation of the ARF Vision Statement shall move *the ARF process forward at a pace comfortable to all participants*. Under such a guideline, with the principle of cooperative security based on a structure of peaceful relations among members and the inclusiveness of membership reflecting widely diverse security interests, the ARF process inevitably moved slowly, even stagnantly, toward the designated third stage: the development of conflict resolution mechanism.

B. The “Way”

Most of the studies on ARF's establishment and development, despite in different interpretation, recognize ASEAN in the driver's seat and take ARF as an ASEAN-extended model of regional security cooperation. As manifested in the ASEAN Charter, the “ASEAN centrality” in building regional architecture is not a power-based assertion. Rather, it is the “way”, not the organization itself, which prompts ASEAN to be in the center of

⁶ For more discussion, see Takeshi Yuzawa, “The Evolution of Preventive Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and Prospects.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, No. 5, 2006, pp. 785-804.

regional architecture.⁷ Even the modus operandi of recent establishments of defense cooperation continue to follow the ASEAN way of cooperation set earlier in ARF. Three features of the “way” particularly call for scholarly attention.⁸

The first feature of the “way” is the forum model. At the nascent stage of initiating region-wide security cooperation, the lack of mutual trust concerned many regional leaders. Yet, even with political will of cooperation, tactically, the region was too diverse and heterogeneous for countries within to commit to any treaty-based contractual body. The optimal agreed formula to start the process of security cooperation naturally was information and policy consultation in a forum model. Ironically, to ease the anxiety of being obliged to follow certain organizational mandates seemed to be a necessary condition to start. A forum model is certainly not designed to resolve any conflict or negotiate solutions for any specific problem. Rather, the pragmatic goal is for members to build consensus and gradually shape a common vision of regional security.

The second feature is voluntariness of implementation. Under a consensus umbrella, individual member states retain their policy to develop their individual pace of accomplishing the collective goals. There is no single formula of implementation. Some members might voluntarily expedite the process, while others carry out their policies cautiously. The flexibility of implementation allows members to be free from pressure of being discriminated against or sanctioned by other members. Such unilateral voluntariness has been critical in fostering the willingness of states to stay in the process and continue their involvement even when there are conflicting priorities between the region’s mandate and an individual country’s plans.

This pattern is evident in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

⁷ ASEAN, “The ASEAN Charter, adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore on November 20, 2007, ASEAN, December 15, 2008,” <https://asean.org/storage/November-2020-The-ASEAN-Charter-28th-Reprint.pdf>.

⁸ These features have been presented in author’s previous work: Chyungly Lee, “The ASEAN-Way and Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region,” *Asia-Pacific Research Forum*, No. 55, March 2012 pp. 1- 23.

(APEC), but also can be seen in ARF. When a certain level of defense capacity is required for members to jointly respond to transnational issues, not all the members are obliged to take the same actions. Member states sharing common risks and concerns are encouraged, but not compelled, to join the multilateral drills of non-traditional security, such as disaster relief management. Gradually the tacit understanding for implicit contracts de facto institutionalizes the principle of unilateral voluntariness in regional cooperation.

The third key feature of the “way” is the open-end evolutionary approach of institutional building which allows flexibility and room for members’ collective adaptation toward common goals. By not contracting into any fixed rules and regulations at the outset, all the members have the opportunity to shape the rules of the game through participation. Members are able to flexibly adjust the agenda, framework, and the pace of cooperation. While specific goals of cooperation are pre-set, this flexibility permits routes and timetables to be adjusted to the new dynamics of regional security and strategic environments. The orientation implies not only the aforementioned non-binding forum model, but also reserves flexibility for the future organizational developments. In ARF, that members agree to progress on the three stages manifested in the 1995 Concept Paper at a comfortable pace perfectly demonstrate the ASEAN’s evolutionary approach of cooperation.

Compared to other regional security organization of collective defense (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO), ARF members have been cautious about engaging military sectors. Even among ASEAN members, the defense minister’s meeting was not launched until 2006, almost 40 years after ASEAN’s establishment. The establishment of the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) and its extension to the ADMM Plus opened a new phase of security multilateralism with an emphasis on the role of defense.

III. Nascent Developments of Defense Regionalization: ADMM and ADMM Plus

The U.S.-led hub-and-spoke system of alliance has been the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific security. Unlike ARF's formula of inclusive membership, the hub-and-spoke model, constructed by a network of bilateral alliances and expanded to minilateral coalitions of like-minded countries,⁹ features its exclusively invited participation. Such collective defense arrangements are not for developing into a region-wide defense cooperation mechanism. In contrast, ADMM Plus, extended from ADMM and using ASEAN as an institutional base, has the potential to develop a unique formula of Asia-Pacific defense multilateralism. This section discusses the origin and early developments of the ADMM Plus to outline its institutional design and designated functions.

A. Before ADMM

At the onset of ASEAN's establishment, founding members adopted a *conflict avoidance* approach to manage tensions among themselves. Instead of directly tackling their unresolved territorial, political and historical conflicts, members agreed to put them aside and develop functional and economic cooperation to build mutual trust. This approach successfully prevented head-on confrontations among members. In addition, the principle of non-intervention and the assertion of state sovereignty consolidated regime legitimacy of individual members and safeguarded their internal stability from both penetration of international communism and interference of regional powers. The formula of conflict avoidance, however, also suggested that security issues were too sensitive to be addressed in ASEAN meetings. Consequently, there was an agenda vacuum of security cooperation in ASEAN until the end of the Cold War.

Although ASEAN was not able to develop a collective security agenda, ideas of bilateral or subgroup military cooperation were occasionally

⁹ For more discussion, see United States Department of State, U.S. *Collective Defense Arrangements*; Bruce Vaughn, *U.S. Strategic and Defense Relations in the Asia Pacific Region*, CRS Report RL33821.

presented by some of ASEAN leaders. ASEAN members saw that bilateral defense cooperation was more beneficial and relatively easier to deal with.¹⁰ Indeed, a “joint defense council” was proposed by Indonesia in 1976; a trilateral ASEAN military exercise was suggested by Singapore in 1982; an ASEAN joint command proposed by Malaysia in 1982; a concept of Defense Community promoted by Malaysia in 1989. Despite failing to reach organizational consensus, a “defense spider web”¹¹ has once emerged when the bilateral military exercises among the three core ASEAN states: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were held in late 1980s. Bilateral defense arrangements were initially mainly to address traditional threats from communist and regional border insurgencies but continued to extend their cooperation into broader fields even after communism has faded from the region. The areas of cooperation then included intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training.

The growing bilateral defense ties has formed a foundation for later development of multilateral defense cooperation. The impediments of ASEAN’s defense cooperation back then can be understood from three fronts. First, most ASEAN members only had very small militaries and had insufficient capabilities to project military force into a conflict zone. The lack of defense capacities would impede their ability to commit any direct military assistance to members under threats. Secondly, leaders were concerned that defense cooperation would limit ASEAN’s flexibility in managing existing intramural conflicts and economic cooperation. Thirdly, establishing defense cooperation could increase Chinese or Soviet suspicion and possibly trigger an attack against a member with a particular security alliance.¹²

Security issues were not formally included in ASEAN’s agenda until

¹⁰ Amitav Acharya, *Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Intl, 2002), p. 105.

¹¹ The term was firstly coined by the chief of Indonesian Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno, in 1989. For a brief review of pre-ADMM defense regionalization, see See Seng Tan, “The ADMM and ADMM-Plus: Progressing Slowly but Steadily?” In Sarah Teo and Bhubhinder Singh co-ed. *Roundtable on the Future of the ADMM/ADMM Plus and Defense Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific*, RSIS Policy Report, 2016, pp. 6-7.

¹² Amitav Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: “Security Community” or “Defence Community”?,” *Pacific Affairs* Vol. 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 159-160.

the fourth ASEAN Summit in 1992. The discussion led to the establishment of ARF. Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous section, ARF was not designed for military/defense cooperation. Rather, three stages of security cooperation manifested in the 1995 Concept Paper required substantial diplomatic actions. In other words, the ARF approach to the region's security is more a political process in which ministries of foreign affairs of member states were designated to be more important than defense officials in developing cooperation mandate.

B. ADMM

Since 1996, ASEAN started to hold defense-related meetings regularly, including ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting in 2000, ASEAN Navy Interaction in 2001, ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Meeting (or Chiefs of Staff) in 2002, ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting in 2003, and ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference in 2004. The Working Group on Security Cooperation of ASEAN Special Senior Officials' Meeting (Special SOM) had served as a venue of high-level defense officials of ASEAN member states to engage with each other. In May 2004, this Special SOM however proposed to upgrade the level of the region's defense diplomacy and initiate the idea of launching the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). The proposal was included in the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) Plan of Action and adopted at the 10th ASEAN Summit in November 2004.

The first ADMM was held in Kuala Lumpur on May 9, 2006.¹³ Issues discussed included the chronological tensions in the Korean Peninsula, the future of ARF, and mostly the nontraditional security agenda (such as terrorism, disaster relief, transnational crimes and terrorism). Institutionally, an ASEAN Defense Senior Officials' Meeting was created to support the ADMM. As for building an ASEAN peacekeeping force, despite being speculated before, members did not come to any conclusion of building any

¹³ Myanmar's defense minister was absent from this meeting because of the alleged "domestic commitments."

form of joint armed force of ASEAN in this inaugural meeting.¹⁴ It sent a strong signal that ASEAN members were not ready (politically and militarily) to institutionalize a joint armed force.

To avoid the same criticism of ineffectiveness as other ASEAN cooperation, the second ADMM adopted the Protocol to the Concept Paper for the Establishment of the ADMM. The Protocol provides an institutional framework of the ADMM and affirms that the ADMM is the “highest ministerial defense and security consultative and cooperative mechanism” in the region. It further stipulates a “chain of command” and requests ALL defense related meetings and activities taken place in Southeast Asia should be under ADMM’s purview, including those military-to-military interactions beyond the ASEAN framework.¹⁵ The agreement to report military-to-military interaction with non-ASEAN regional powers suggests members’ commitment to one of the objectives addressed in the Concept Paper, i.e. “building mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding, transparency, and openness”.

ADMM also announced its first Three-Year Work Program (2008-2010). The concrete work program to some extent indicated ASEAN’s resolve to correct the image of “a talk shop” and bolster practice cooperation of defense and security. Two areas of cooperation highlighted in the program were humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and peacekeeping. Both programs started with sharing the best practices and national Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Later, members agreed to conduct training drills and introduce the role of military. The same as other ASEAN processes, the development of practical cooperation in the ADMM has also been incremental, proceeding at a pace comfortable to all members. The Work

¹⁴ ASEAN, “Joint Press Release of the Inaugural ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,” May 9, 2006, <https://asean.org/joint-press-release-of-the-inaugural-asean-defence-ministers-meeting-kuala-lumpur/>.

¹⁵ ADMM, “Protocol to the Concept Paper for the Establishment of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM),” *ASEAN*, November 14, 2007, <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2007-Protocol-to-the-ADMM-Concept-Paper-1.pdf>.

Program continues and is reviewed and revised every three years to cope with the region's new security needs and goals. For instance, in addition to HA/DR and peacekeeping, ministers added another functional cooperation area in defense industry in the second three-year work program 2011-2013.¹⁶

HA/DR under the ADMM framework was indeed built on ASEAN's previous efforts in HA/DR.¹⁷ The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) was signed in July 2005 as a legal framework for members to respond to natural and man-made disasters. According, the ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response was announced. Members are required to report available assets and capacities in the case of conducting disaster relief operations. In the third ADMM in February 2009, the Concept Paper on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief was adopted to define the utilization of military assets and capacities, including modalities of deployment, joint training and exercises.¹⁸ It is hoped to "accelerate the ASEAN militaries' operational effectiveness" in disaster management.¹⁹ After ADMM's first three-year work program, ASEAN established the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center) in November 2011. The Center is to keep on earmarked military assets and capacities available for

¹⁶ ADMM, "ADMM Three-year-work Program 2011-2013.," *ANNEX 8*, The Concept Paper on Establishing ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration (ADIC) was adopted at the fifth ADMM.

¹⁷ The agreement mandated that ASEAN should establish Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures (SASOP) to be adequately ready for making effective responses in the case of disaster. Also, the "ASEAN Regional Program on Disaster Management (ARPDM) 2004-2010" was launched, leading to the establishment of a regional disaster management framework.

¹⁸ ADMM, "Concept Paper on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief," *Annex D*, <https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/document/18471-d.pdf>.

¹⁹ ADMM, "Joint Declaration of ASEAN Defense Ministers on Strengthening ASEAN Defense Establishments to Meet the Challenges of Non-traditional Security Threats," *ASEAN*, Feb. 26, 2009, <https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/3.%20Joint%20Declaration%20of%20ASEAN%20Defence%20Ministers%20on%20Strengthening%20ASEAN%20Defence%20Establishments%20to%20Meet%20the%20Challenges%20of%20NTS%20Threats.pdf>.

the standby arrangements and to issue early warnings of natural disasters.²⁰

In terms of peacekeeping, another focus of ADMM's first three-year Work Program, the objective is to build a network of peacekeeping centers among ASEAN countries. At its fifth ADMM in May 2011 in Jakarta, the ADMM adopted the Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network to outline goals at different stages of this process. Starting from sharing information and experience on peacekeeping training, the network hopes to assist all the ASEAN member states to establish their own peacekeeping center. The next stage would be to develop common peacekeeping training, operations and best practices manuals, and commence joint training. In the long run, the ADMM hopes to establish a common standby arrangement, enhance interoperability of peacekeeping forces, and develop existing centers into centers of excellence.²¹ Institutionally, following the adoption of this concept paper in the ADMM, ASEAN launched a formal meeting for establishing the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network in Bangkok in September 2012.²²

C. ADMM Plus

At the very onset in 2006, the ADMM was designated to be "open, flexible, and outward-looking". Ministers then adopted a concept paper to initiate ADMM Plus at the second ADMM in 2007 and another document

²⁰ ASEAN, "Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management," *ASEAN*, November 17, 2011, <http://wordpress-144887-1597394.cloudwaysapps.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Agreement-of-AHAC-Establishment-A5-20140703.pdf>.

²¹ ADMM, "Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defense Ministers on Strengthening D-efense Cooperation of ASEAN in the Global Community to Face New Challenges," *ASEAN*, May 19, 2011, <https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/5.%20-ANNEX%2011-%20Joint%20Declaration%20%20the%20Fifth%20ADMM.pdf>.; ADMM, "ADMM Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network, A-NNEX 9, <https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/document/18471-j.pdf>.

²² ADMM, "Brunei Darussalam Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defense Ministers, Securing Our People, Our Future Together," *ASEAN*, May 7, 2013, <https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/Joint-Declaration-ADMM-2013-5.%20Brunei%20Darussalam%20Joint%20Declaration%20of%20the%20ASEAN%20Defence%20%20Ministers%20-%2022Securing%20Our%20People,%20Our%20Future%20Together22.pdf>.

to manifest principles for ADMM Plus membership at the third ADMM in February 2009.²³ The impetus was clear that in order to effectively tackle the region's nontraditional security threats, ASEAN welcome more functional defense cooperation with non-ASEAN regional members. Within this context, ministers reached an agreement on the configuration and composition of ADMM Plus members at the fourth ADMM in May 2010. The formula was "ASEAN+X", rather than just "+1" or "+3", in order to keep "a good balance between effectiveness and legitimacy." Accordingly, the concept paper declared to invite eight ASEAN dialogue partners to join 10 ASEAN members as the founding members of the ADMM Plus.²⁴ In the same meeting, ministers also outline the modalities and procedures to operate.²⁵ Although it temperately set the AMDD-Plus meetings to be held once every three years, members decided to meet more frequently soon after their first meeting.

Since ADMM Plus is actually extended from ADMM, ASEAN remains at the center of the institutional design of the ADMM Plus. All the ADMM Plus related concept papers defined important modalities to ensure that ASEAN would remain in the driver's seat of this extended multilateral framework. First, the ADMM would determine the areas and levels of interaction with counterparts outside ASEAN. Second, applications to participate in the ADMM Plus should be submitted to the chair of the ADMM, and the chair would consult the other members to reach final decisions. The ADMM should only invite extra-regional countries to the ADMM Plus based on the consensus of all ASEAN members. And third, the chair of the ADMM shall assume the chairmanship of the ADMM Plus

²³ ADMM, "Concept Paper on the ADMM Plus: Principles for Membership." adopted at the 3rd ADMM, Pattaya, 25 - 27 February 2009
<https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/7.%20ANNEX%20E%20ADOPTED%20Concept%20Paper%20ADMM-Plus%20Membership%20Principles.pdf>.

²⁴ ASEAN, "The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-plus (ADMM-plus): Configuration and Composition," ASEAN,
<https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/document/18471-g.pdf>.

²⁵ ASEAN, "ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS' MEETING-PLUS (ADMM-PLUS): MODALITIES AND PROCEDURES," ASEAN,
<https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/document/18471-h.pdf>.

as well. The institutional design to keep ADMM at the center in the “plus” meetings allows ASEAN to intervene the agenda of ADMM Plus in response to the group’s demand.

The first ADMM Plus was held in Hanoi on October 12, 2010. ASEAN’s eight dialogue partners – Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia, and the United States - all attended the meeting. Despite the increasing tensions with China in the South China Sea at that time, Vietnam, as the 2010 ASEAN Chair, managed to put aside bilateral disputes and accommodate participation of China and other big powers. By focusing on discussions on issues of nontraditional security in this inaugural ADMM Plus, ministers again adopted ASEAN’s conventional conflict avoidance approach. The meeting concluded with an agreement of functional defense cooperation in five areas: maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster management, peacekeeping operations, and military medicine. Experts’ Working Groups (EWG) would be organized to explore the cooperation agenda.

ADMM Plus is not ASEAN’s first intent to engage external militaries in building peace and security in the region. ARF also had various defense-related meetings to promote military-military interactions but has been criticized for its ineffectiveness. In contrast, however, the ADMM Plus has steadily developed practical cooperation in various aspects and hopes to avoid being as only a “talk shop.” In June 2013, the ADMM Plus successfully conducted the first HA/DR and military medicine exercise in Brunei Darussalam. Approximately 3,200 personnel, seven ships, and 15 helicopters were deployed. In addition, military medical, engineering, and search/rescue teams and assets from 18 member countries were dispatched for exercises based on scenarios, including collapsed buildings, landslide and flash flood. Exercises such as the evacuation of casualties and displaced personnel, and the delivery of aid to affected areas were conducted by joint multinational forces. The US Navy deployed a cargo ship; China sent a hospital ship; and Japan dispatched more than 300 troops.²⁶

²⁶ Tomotaka Shoji, “ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus: A Japanese Perspective,” *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security*, No.14, December 2013, p.13.

Despite several members of the ADMM Plus being involved in the increasing tensions in the South China Sea in early 2010s, none of them were absent in the first ADMM Plus joint drill. This phenomenon seemed to give a hope for ADMM Plus to reinforce substantial and practical defense cooperation in the region and to be an institutional base for developing the defense approach to Asia-Pacific security multilateralism. Most of the studies agree that ADMM Plus has outperformed ARF but remain cautious about challenges ahead.²⁷

IV. Rationales: Defense Diplomacy

As opposed to the traditional use of military assets or forces for advancing particular foreign policy goals, i.e. the so-called coercive diplomacy,²⁸ the ADMM Plus provides a platform for militaries and defense ministries with diverse national interests to undertake a wide range of functional nontraditional security cooperation in peacetime. The significance of military and defense cooperation in peacetime is no longer limited to the physical defense arrangements for deterrence or coercion but extended into at least two other aspects: conflict prevention and defense statecraft. This developing trend has reset the instrumental definition of defense diplomacy. This section explores the rationales behind members' participation in the ADMM and the ADMM Plus from these two perspectives of defense diplomacy.

A. Conflict Prevention

In the post-Cold War era, defense diplomacy was first referred to missions of armed forces with the goal to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces.²⁹ Pacific and/or cooperative initiatives made by national defense establishments and military practitioners were actually used for trust building

²⁷ For instance, See Seng Tan, "Is ASEAN Finally Getting Multilateralism Right? From ARF to ADMM +", *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 44, No. 1, November 2019, pp. 1-16.

²⁸ B. S. Sachar, "Military Diplomacy through Arms Transfers: A Case Study of China," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2004, p. 290.

²⁹ George Robertson, "Strategic Defence Review," *United Kingdom Ministry of Defence*, July 1998, pp. 106-107.

and conflict prevention/resolution.³⁰ Measures in the tool box include exchanges of military and/or civilian defense officials, appointing defense attachés to each other, military cooperation, personnel trainings, support of military equipment, joint training.³¹ Such an instrumental definition of defense diplomacy has shifted scholarly attentions from physical defense arrangements to the latter half of the term: diplomacy.³² Defense diplomacy, involving both civilian and military resources, possibly creates a low-cost and low-risk “continuation of dialogue by other means” to reduce the likelihood of conflict among former or potential enemies.³³

For a long time, both ASEAN and ARF adopted political/diplomatic approaches to the region’s security. Members hope to see peaceful changes through confidence and trust building³⁴ and at the same time refrained themselves from military/defense cooperation. When the defense sector was introduced in ASEAN and ASEAN-extended meetings, the conventional norms stuck. Defense diplomacy is deemed as a process to forge positive and productive relationship among militaries in the region, leading to the creation and maintenance of a peaceful and stable security environment. Such a concept is neither based on any threat perception³⁵ nor for preparing a NATO-

³⁰ See Seng Tan and Bhuhindar Singh, “Introduction,” *Asian Security*, Vol. 8, No.3, 2012, pp.221-231; David Capie, “Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia’s Defence Diplomacy,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2013, pp. 4-5, Juan Emilio Cheyre, “Defence diplomacy,” in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 297-306

³¹ A. Cottey and A. Forster, “Reshaping Defense Diplomacy: New Role for Military Cooperation Assistance,” *The Adelphi Paper*, 365, 2004.

³² Jun Yan Chang, ‘Defense diplomacy in ASEAN?’, *Thinking ASEAN*, Issue 17, November 2016, p. 5.

³³ Evan A. Laksmana, “Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” *Asian Security* Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2012, pp.254; Garren Mulloy, “Japan’s Defense Diplomacy and ‘Cold Peace’ in Asia,” *Asia Journal of Global Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, November 2007, p. 3; Cottey and Forster, *Reshaping Defense Diplomacy*, Ch. 1.

³⁴ Timo Kivimaki, “Southeast Asia and Conflict Prevention: Is ASEAN Running Out Of Stream?” *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2012, pp. 403-427.

³⁵ Lianita Prawindarti, “The First ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting: An Early Test for the ASEAN Security Community?” *RSIS*, May 16, 2006, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO06034.pdf>.

like collective defense arrangement. The pattern of interaction in this process also follows the “protocol” of diplomacy. That is, the principle of non-interference³⁶ should be kept according to the ASEAN way. State authorities have the sovereign rights to decline the visits of foreign militaries. Therefore, the ADMM Plus is indeed more a platform of intergovernmental cooperation, rather than a legalist “community” defined in the European experience or a supranational organization of operational integration.

The establishments of ADMM and ADMM Plus are important steps in ASEAN Community building. Traditionally, ASEAN members perceived a security community as a group of sovereign states to maintain confident expectations of a peaceful and stable security environment for a fairly long time.³⁷ The concept of such an imaginary security community started to evolve when ASEAN formally kicked off the process of building the ASEAN Community in 2003. Under Indonesia’s chairmanship and leadership, ASEAN members signed Bali Concord II to show their collective political will to reinvent ASEAN as a more unified and cohesive actor in the region as well as the international community after external powers vigorously involved in the region’s recovery from the 1997-1998 political-economic turmoil. The Bali Concord II manifests a strategic goal of building the ASEAN Community with three pillars: security, economic, and socio-cultural communities.³⁸

Indonesia took the advantages of being ASEAN chair and suggested various projects under the umbrella of ASEAN Security Community (ASC) to tackle emerging security threats in the ASEAN region, such as establishing a counter-terrorism center, conducting joint training in peacekeeping operations, and convening regular meetings of police and defense ministers. However, these projects could hardly be done only through ASEAN’s

³⁶ David Capie, “Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia’s Defence Diplomacy,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2013, pp. 4-5.

³⁷ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 16.

³⁸ James R. Ferguson, “ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional Development,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.26, No.3, December 2004, pp. 393-415.

traditional “non-military” ways. Some of members started to suspect that military alliance or at least a joint armed force in ASEAN was behind Indonesia’s intent. With such suspicion, member states were cautious about moving beyond ASEAN’s longtime perception of security community.³⁹ Consequently, the principles of ASC defined in the 2003 Bali Concord II continue to follow ASEAN’s traditional way of cooperation, emphasizing political and diplomatic consultation for the region’s comprehensive security.

As discussed in the previous section, ADMM was a result from the adoption of Vientiane Action Program (VAP) in the 2004 ASEAN Summit. VAP was to specify strategies and goals of the ASEAN community building. The VAP of ASC extended the original idea of ASC into domains of political developments. The VAP stipulated that the ASC should be realized to enhance peace and stability through political and security cooperation in five strategic thrusts referred in the Bali Concord II: political development; shaping and sharing of norms; conflict prevention; conflict resolution; and post-conflict peace building. Among other measures suggested, convening annual ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting was considered one of the measures of conflict prevention. Although the concept of ASC later evolved into a broader ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) in 2007, which placed a greater emphasis on political cooperation in promoting human rights and democracy, the scope of ADMM, launched in 2006, remains more close to Indonesia’s original initiative of ASC than APSC.

The ADMM Plus has also been used as a venue for regional powers to influence each other’s strategic views by persuasion, not coercion.⁴⁰ Some argue that members in a multilateral defense mechanism tend to use the forum to exert soft power.⁴¹ When strategic rivalries share the same platform,

³⁹ Alan Collins, “Forming a Security Community: Lessons from ASEAN”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Vol. 7, Issue 2, March 2007, pp. 203-225.

⁴⁰ Winger emphasizes the notion of soft power in defense diplomacy but not necessarily in a multilateral forum. See Gregory Winger, “The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defence Diplomacy,” *Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen*, 2014, https://files.iwm.at/jvfc/33_10_Winger.pdf.

⁴¹ Ektewan Manowong, and Witchayanee Ocha, “Defense Diplomacy and ASEAN Community Integration: Opportunities and Challenges”, *APHEIT Journal*, Vol. 6, No.1, 2017, pp. 5-14.

military forces or defense infrastructure can be peacefully used to influence strategic thinking of other members. Defense cooperation in a multilateral format is no longer only for supporting diplomatic allies militarily. Instead, the low risk and low cost cooperation and exchanges, as measures of conflict prevention, are expected not only to enhance defense ties among mutually friendly states but also to mitigate tensions among potential rivals or former enemies.

B. Defense Statecraft

Like other ASEAN-extended regional cooperation mechanisms, the formation of ADMM Plus suggests ASEAN's strategy to enmesh major powers in security governance of the ASEAN region. The success of this strategy, however, heavily depends on the willingness of major powers, especially the United States, China and Japan, to participate in this framework. With disparity of defense capacities between non-ASEAN members and ASEAN members, if not for defense aids, what is the rationale for regional powers to stay in this platform? More and more evidence suggest that defense statecraft is now one of the domains of the overall agenda in conducting diplomacy. The fundamental goal is to pursue national interests without using actual or physical armed forces. For regional powers, in particular, defense collaborations and engagements with ASEAN states in a multilateral format to a great extent are for pursuing their broader regional agenda and advancing their long-term strategic aims.

Indonesia has been seen as a leader in ASEAN's development. The idea of ASEAN's defense cooperation was actually pushed by Indonesia. Nevertheless, Indonesia was leading the development of the ADMM framework in accordance with its own national interests. On the one hand, defense diplomacy is for strategic engagement with regional powers; while on the other hand, it is for the military modernization of Indonesia. By initiating ADMM, Indonesia tries to cope with geopolitical changes whilst maintaining the country's defensive ability against regional uncertainties.⁴² The push for

⁴² See the chart in Iis Gindarsah, "Indonesia's Defence Diplomacy: Harnessing the Hedging Strategy against Regional Uncertainties," *RSIS Working Paper* No. 293, June 2015, p. 7.

cooperation in countering terrorism, in particular, serves Indonesia's national interests. Indonesia applied a direct model of defense diplomacy to enhance its capacity in combating terrorism, and at the same time, create confidence building measures (CBM) among ASEAN countries.⁴³

Japan has played a bridging role between powers and ASEAN members and an initiator of Asia-Pacific security multilateralism. In particular, Japan's active participation in the ADMM Plus can be understood from at least three aspects. First, reinforcing security cooperation with ASEAN has been a key to secure the sea lane of transportation for Japan's economic security. Second, maintaining contacts with regional powers through the channel of the ADMM Plus allows Japan to promote its regional security interests, especially in the context of managing tensions with China. Third, historically, multilateralism is one of the important instruments for Japan's security policy.⁴⁴ Among other projects, the capacity-building cooperation led by Japan's Ministry of Defense in particular coverages Japan's longtime endeavors of engaging ASEAN and the building of ASEAN Political Security Community.

In the first ADMM Plus held in Hanoi in 2010, China's defense minister Liang Guangkie indicated China's support by stating that non-traditional security threats are transnational and unpredictable, and thus require joint response.⁴⁵ Such a statement had almost locked the ADMM Plus agenda to non-traditional security cooperation. But China's strategic goal did not rest on participating in nontraditional security cooperation in a multilateral platform. In the following years, China has used the "nonplus" ADMM

⁴³ Aji Widiatmaja, "Indonesia Defense Diplomacy Strategy in ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) to Build ASEAN Security Architecture in Counter-Terrorism," *Indonesia Defense Diplomacy Strategy*, 2019, pp. 1-20.
https://www.academia.edu/42286623/INDONESIA_DEFENSE_DIPLOMACY_STRATEGY_Indonesia_Defense_Diplomacy_Strategy_in_ASEAN_Defense_Ministers_Meeting_Plus_ADMM_Plus_to_Build_ASEAN_Security_Architecture_in_Counter_Terrorism_Cooperation

⁴⁴ Tomotaka Shoji, "ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus: A Japanese Perspective", *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security*, No. 14, December 2013, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁵ Evan A. Laksmana, "Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *Asian Security* Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2012, pp.255.

format to conduct informal defense dialogues with ASEAN member states bilaterally or minilaterally. Informal meetings between China and ASEAN members have been held on the sidelines of the ADMM meetings since 2011. China uses these informal meetings to maintain its presence in the region.⁴⁶ The views exchanged in these informal meetings are not limited to non-traditional security issues but extended into their common geostrategic and geopolitical concerns. Later China and ASEAN launched ASEAN-China Defense Ministers' Meeting. The increasing intensity of China-ASEAN defense exchanges suggests that supporting ADMM Plus at the onset opened a door for China to consolidate regional trust and to deepen its engagements with ASEAN members, individually and collectively, in the defense sector.

For the United States, after the policy neglect of the Bush administration, one of the key aspects of Obama's Asia policy was to resume leadership in the region's multilateral diplomacy.⁴⁷ In addition to becoming a new member in the East Asia Summit, the U.S. joined ADMM Plus as a founding member. As China had been substantially involved in various regional institutional building processes since 1997, to gain back the agenda setting power in regional cooperation was essential for America's return. The United States, however, emphasized the effectiveness of regional cooperation and preferred functional security cooperation to informal policy consultation and dialogue.⁴⁸ Under the ADMM Plus framework, it has been leading joint non-traditional security drills and helping the defense capacity building of ASEAN members. As opposed to its traditional approach of forming defense alliances, America's participation in the ADMM Plus was not merely for increasing its military presence in the region but indeed for advancing its strategic interests and extending its influence sphere in the Asia-Pacific region.

⁴⁶ Ali Abdullah Wibisome, "ASEAN-China Non-Traditional Security Cooperation and the Inescapability of the Politics of Security", *Global & Strategis*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2017, pp. 39-54

⁴⁷ Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2011, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>.

⁴⁸ Hillary Clinton, "Remark on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principle and Priorities", *Secretary of State*, January 12, 2010, <http://m.state.gov/md135090.htm>.

V. Conclusion

It has been well studied and documented that the ASEAN model of cooperation and community building are different from the European style. The former stresses “consultation” and “diplomacy”, while the latter carries out the legalist style of integration. The essence of the ASEAN way is indeed “diplomacy”. ARF, highlighting the role of non-military actors, well exemplifies ASEAN’s political and inclusive approaches to regional security and shows how soft institutional balancing contributes to the inclusion of all the non-ASEAN regional security stakeholders in one single security cooperation mechanism. The ADMM Plus, prioritizing functional defense cooperation on nontraditional security issues, also includes participation of non-ASEAN regional powers. However, its modus operandi remains consistent to the ASEAN model of intergovernmental cooperation, rather than achieving supranational operational integration.

The most common criticism on ADMM or ADMM Plus has been its irrelevancy to resolve territorial and maritime conflicts in the region. Nevertheless, as discussed in this article, both mechanisms have instrumental roles in defense diplomacy. They are not created for the purpose of directly solving hard security issues. It is only fair to make the assessment based on their designated functions. The ADMM Plus was never meant to play a role of conflict resolution in hard security tensions, but more and more voices suggest that long-standing hard security issues should also be included in the ADMM Plus agenda. With an ASEAN evolutionary approach of institutional building, the possibility for ADMM Plus to play a role in preventing the eruption of armed confrontation in military hot spots, such as the South China Sea, should not be totally excluded.

One of the lessons from the cooperative experience in ADMM Plus was that tackling non-traditional security issues could be the most convenient entry point to start defense cooperation among powers with diverse interests. However, the overall regional capacity building of responding transnational threats has been constrained by ASEAN members’ general commitment to non-confrontational and non-interventionist principles. Joint operation in combatting common transnational threat can hardly be de-bordered but to

follow the protocol of diplomacy. ASEAN's longstanding sovereign norms to a certain extent impede ADMM Plus members from achieving the operational readiness and responsiveness at the regional level.

The ADMM Plus is certainly not the only defense summit on Asian security. The IISS Shangri La Dialogues launched in 2002 has been a well-recognized venue for defense ministers from all over the world to exchange views and flash policy signals. However, it is initiated and organized by a London-based think tank: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Participants in the Dialogue neither hold any membership commitment nor have any institutional binding in between the annual meetings. It is a successful think-tank project that inspires policy makers, but has no sign to be developed into an intergovernmental cooperation platform. The momentum and dynamics of the Dialogue are not comparable to either ARF or the ADMM Plus.

There are also other regional endeavors for prompting cooperation in specific nontraditional security areas. For instance, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia (the ReCAAP Agreement) was signed by 14 regional countries in 2006 to enhance regional cooperation in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships through information sharing, capacity building and cooperative arrangements. Such a single issue specific cooperation pattern might be focused and effective to accomplish tasks. Nevertheless, by taking ASEAN as an institutional base, the ADMM Plus process not only accommodates all the key regional security powers but also covers a more comprehensive non-traditional security agenda that meets region-wide needs.

Theoretically, the phenomenon that regional powers (such the United States, China, and Japan) yields to a formula suggested by a group of relatively small and middle-sized countries (ASEAN) directly challenges the argument of power-based institutionalism, which emphasizes the need for hegemony to start and stabilize multilateral institutions. In contrast, the experience in the Asia-Pacific region suggests that the ASEAN-way diplomacy is not only a necessary condition to start regional multilateralism but also a sufficient element to create an equilibrium for constructing

multilateral regional order in the Asia-Pacific region. The stability would be sustainable if no regional power could ensure to be better off by exiting the ASEAN-centric arrangement. The developing trends in the ADMM Plus to a certain extent are in line with this optimistic note.

Bibliography

Book

Acharya, Amitav, 2001. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge.

Acharya, Amitav, 2002. *Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific*. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Intl.

Ashizawa, Kuniko 2004. "Japan, the United States, and Multilateral Institution-Building in the Asia-Pacific", in Ellis S. Kraussand and John T. Pempel, eds., *Beyond Bilateralism: US-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific*. Berkeley CA: Stanford University Press.

Cheyre, Juan Emilio, 2013. "Defence diplomacy," in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Emmers, Ralf, 2013. *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*. London: Routledge Curzon.

Haacke, Jugen and Noel M. Morada, eds. 2010. *Cooperative Security in Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum*. London: Routledge Curzon.

Leifer, Michael, 1993. *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security. Adelphi Paper 302*. London: Routeledge.

Journal

Acharya, Amitav, 1991/4-6. "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: "Security Community" or "Defence Community"?", *Pacific Affairs* Vol. 64, No. 2, pp. 159-178.

Almonte, Jose T., 1997. "Ensuring security the 'ASEAN way'," *Survival*, Vol.39, No.4, pp. 80-92.

Capie, David, 2013. "Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia's Defense Diplomacy," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*,

Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 1-26.

Collins, Alan, 2007/3. "Forming a Security Community: Lessons from ASEAN", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Vol. 7, Issue 2, pp. 203-225.

Cottey, A. and A. Forster, 2004. "Reshaping Defense Diplomacy: New Role for Military Cooperation Assistance," *The Adelphi Paper* No. 365.

Evans, Paul, 2001. "Cooperative Security and Its Discontents in Asia Pacific: The ASEAN Connection." *American Asian Review* Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 99-119

Ferguson, James R., 2004/12. "ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional Development," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.26, No.3, pp. 393-415.

Gindarsah, Iis, 2015/6. "Indonesia's Defence Diplomacy: Harnessing the Hedging Strategy against Regional Uncertainties," *RSIS working paper* No. 293.

Kivimaki, Timo, 2012. "Southeast Asia and Conflict Prevention: Is ASEAN Running Out of Stream?" *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 403-427.

Laksmana, Evan A., 2012/9. "Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *Asian Security* Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 251-270.

Lee, Chyungly, 2012/3. "The ASEAN-Way and Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Asia-Pacific Research Forum*, No. 55, pp. 1-23.

Lee, Chyungly, 2013. "The Compatibility of East Asia and Asia Pacific Multilateralism: Japan's Strategic Rationales." in Rose, C and Teo, V., eds. *The United States between China and Japan*, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 423-457

Manowong, Ektewan and Witchayanee Ocha, 2017. "Defense Diplomacy and ASEAN Community Integration: Opportunities and Challenges", *APHEIT Journal*, Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 5-14.

- Mulloy, Garren, 2007/11. "Japan's Defense Diplomacy and 'Cold Peace' in Asia," *Asia Journal of Global Studies* Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.2-14.
- Sachar, B. S., 2004. "Military Diplomacy through Arms Transfers: A Case Study of China," *Strategic Analysis* Vol. 28, No. 2.
- Shoji, Tomotaka., 2013/12. "ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus: A Japanese Perspective", *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security*, No.14, pp.3-17.
- Tan, See Seng, 2016. "The ADMM and ADMM-Plus: Progressing Slowly but Steadily?," In Sarah Teo and Bhubhinder Singh co-ed. *Roundtable on the Future of the ADMM/ADMM Plus and Defense Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific*, RSIS Policy Report, pp. 6-9.
- Tan, See Seng and Bhubhinder Singh, 2012. "Introduction," *Asian Security*, Vol. 8, No.3, pp.221-231.
- Tan, See Seng, 2019/11. "Is ASEAN Finally Getting Multilateralism Right? From ARF to ADMM +", *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 1-16.
- Yuzawa, Takeshi, 2006. "The Evolution of Preventive Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and Prospects." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, No. 5, pp. 785-804.

Internet Material

- Chang, Jun Yan, 2016/11. "Defense Diplomacy in ASEAN?", *Thinking ASEAN*, Issue 17, November 2016.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329670340_Defense_Diplomacy_in_ASEAN
- Clinton, Hillary, 2011/10/11. "America's Pacific Century", *Foreign Policy*,
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>.
- Prawindarti, Lianita, 2006/5/16. "The First ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting: An Early Test for the ASEAN Security Community?" *RSIS*,
<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO06034.pdf>.

Wibisome, Ali Abdullah, 2017. "ASEAN-China Non-Traditional Security Cooperation and the Inescapability of the Politics of Security", *Global & Strategis*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 39-54.

Widiatmaja, Aji, 2019. "Indonesia Defense Diplomacy Strategy in ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) to Build ASEAN Security Architecture in Counter-Terrorism," *Indonesia Defense Diplomacy Strategy*, pp. 1-20.
https://www.academia.edu/42286623/INDONESIA_DEFENSE_DIPLOMACY_STRATEGY_Indonesia_Defense_Diplomacy_Strategy_in_ASEAN_Defense_Ministers_Meeting_Plus_ADMM_Plus_to_Build_ASEAN_Security_Architecture_in_Counter_Terrorism_Cooperation.

Winger, Gregory, 2014. "The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defence Diplomacy," *Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen*,
https://files.iwm.at/jvfc/33_10_Winger.pdf.

Official Documents

ADMM, "ADMM Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network, ANNEX 9,
<https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/document/18471-j.pdf>.

ADMM, "ADMM Three-year-work Program 2011-2013," ANNEX 8,
<https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/document/18471-i%201.pdf>

ADMM, "Brunei Darussalam Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defense Ministers, Securing Our People, Our Future Together," ASEAN, May 7, 2013,
<https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/Joint-Declaration-ADMM-2013-5.%20Brunei%20Darussalam%20Joint%20Declaration%20of%20the%20ASEAN%20Defence%20%20Ministers%20-%2022Securing%20Our%20People,%20Our%20Future%20Together22.pdf>.

- ADMM, “Concept Paper on the ADMM Plus: Principles for Membership.”
adopted at the 3rd ADMM, Pattaya, 25 - 27 February 2009
<https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/7.%20ANNEX%20E%20ADOPTED%20Concept%20Paper%20ADMM-Plus%20Membership%20Principles.pdf>.
- ADMM, “Concept Paper on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief,” Annex D,
<https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/document/18471-d.pdf>.
- ADMM, “Joint Declaration of ASEAN Defense Ministers on Strengthening ASEAN Defense Establishments to Meet the Challenges of Non-traditional Security Threats,” ASEAN, Feb. 26, 2009,
<https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/3.%20Joint%20Declaration%20of%20ASEAN%20Defence%20Ministers%20on%20Strengthening%20ASEAN%20Defence%20Establishments%20to%20Meet%20the%20Challenges%20of%20NTS%20Threats.pdf>.
- ADMM, “Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defense Ministers on Strengthening Defense Cooperation of ASEAN in the Global Community to Face New Challenges,” ASEAN, May 19, 2011,
<https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/5.%20-ANNEX%2011-%20Joint%20Declaration%20%20the%20Fifth%20ADMM.pdf>.
- ADMM, 2009/2. “Protocol to the Concept Paper for the Establishment of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM),” ASEAN, November 14, 2007,
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2007-Protocol-to-the-ADMM-Concept-Paper-1.pdf>.
- ARF, 1995/2. “1995 The ASEAN Regional Forum: a Concept Paper, adopted in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam on 1 August 1995,”
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1995-THE-ASEAN-REGIONAL-FORUM-A-CONCEPT-PAPER.pdf>

ASEAN, “Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management,” ASEAN, November 17, 2011, <http://wordpress-144887-1597394.cloudwaysapps.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Agreement-of-AHAC-Establishment-A5-20140703.pdf>.

ASEAN, “ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-plus (ADMM-plus): Modalities and Procedures,” ASEAN, <https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/document/18471-h.pdf>.

ASEAN, 2006/5/9. “Joint Press Release of the Inaugural ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,” , <https://asean.org/joint-press-release-of-the-inaugural-asean-defence-ministers-meeting-kuala-lumpur/>.

ASEAN, 2007/11/20. “The ASEAN Charter, adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore on November 20, 2007, ASEAN, December 15, 2008,” <https://asean.org/storage/November-2020-The-ASEAN-Charter-28th-Reprint.pdf>.

ASEAN, “The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-plus (ADMM-Plus): Configuration and Composition,” ASEAN, <https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/document/18471-g.pdf>.

Clinton, Hillary, 2010/1/12. “Remark on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principle and Priorities”, Secretary of State, <http://m.state.gov/md135090.htm>.

Robertson, George, 1998. “Strategic Defence Review,” United Kingdom Ministry of Defence July.

United States Department of State, *U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements; Bruce Vaughn, U.S. Strategic and Defense Relations in the Asia Pacific Region*, CRS Report RL33821.

Trump's Legacy of Korean Peninsula Policy and Biden's Continuation

Ming-Shih SHEN Ph. D.

Research Fellow

Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts

Institute for National Defense Security Research

Abstract

Following the recent launch of several short-range missiles test from 2020-2021 by North Korea, observers are worrying about whether Pyongyang will go back to war or play the brinkmanship game, to increase its bargaining chips. But recent reports suggest the regime of Kim Jong-un may have dozens of nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Looking into the nature, however, it can be identified as a typical balance-of-power case.

This paper argues that, although there have not been any substantial agreements on denuclearization, the current condition, or stall perhaps, can be taken as the result of interactions among the US and the two Koreas. This paper concludes that given the lack of progress after three summits, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula still has a long way to go. What can be assured is tentative de-escalation of the conflict on the Peninsula. The resolution of North Korea's nuclear weapons seems to have returned to the US old policy. The United States has not regarded the North Korea nuclear issue as its top priority during the US-China strategic competition. A summit between Biden and Kim Jong-un will not be held in the short term before North Korea has expressed its attitude towards the US-South Korea joint statement and close cooperation.

Keywords: *North Korea Nuclear Issue, Trump-Kim Summit, Denuclearization, Korean Peninsula*

美國川普政府朝鮮半島政策遺緒

與拜登政府的延續

沈明室

研究員

國防安全研究院中共政軍與作戰概念研究所

摘 要

在朝鮮從 2020 到 2021 年發射數枚短程導彈後，觀察家們擔心朝鮮是否會重新挑起戰端或重回戰爭邊緣策略，以獲得更多的籌碼。最近報導發現，金正恩政權的軍火庫中可能已經擁有數十枚核彈頭，然而從本質上看，北韓升高籌碼的對峙，被視為是一個典型的權力平衡遊戲。本文認為，儘管在無核化問題上尚未達成實質性協議，但朝鮮半島情勢或許停滯不前，可以看作是美韓兩國長期互動模式的結果。有鑑於川普與金正恩三次高峰會的結果不盡理想，朝鮮半島要實現無核化還有很長的路要走，但至少朝鮮半島衝突能夠暫時緩和。朝鮮核問題在美中戰略競爭中，並非首要解決的問題，美國政府的更替，讓北韓核武器問題又重回到美國原有政策脈絡。在北韓對近期美韓聯合聲明和合作明確表態之前，美國新總統拜登短期內不會和金正恩舉行高峰會。

關鍵詞：北韓核問題、川金會、無核化、朝鮮半島

I. Introduction

US President Joe Biden and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea met in the White House in May 2021 and produced a comprehensive and substantive joint statement emphasizing cooperation on many security issues, such as climate change, global health, sustainable development, and the Myanmar democracy situation. The central issue remains to defend against the threat posed by North Korea.¹

The text of the joint statement suggests the United States to renew its commitment to “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” to affirm the 2018 accords Kim Jong-un signed with Mr. Moon and with former President Donald Trump, and to endorse the establishment of “permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

When the negotiation on the prospect of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula was locked into a stalemate between the United States and North Korea in July 2019, former President Trump on a visit into South Korea, paid a surprise visit to Panmunjom where he met Kim Jong-un, North Korea's supreme leader.² The meeting ended as expected with no substantial resolutions. Significant effects on the domestic fronts of the two countries were noticeable, though. Earlier, President Trump and Kim had met in a second round North Korea-US summit in Hanoi, where they departed with an unhappy ending, leaving the agenda on a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula in limbo. While Washington insisted on the promise made by Pyongyang to carry on with de-nuclearization, Pyongyang reiterated the precondition needed to be lifting of the sanctions, issued with an unyielding attitude backed by occasionally testing missiles and laying bare its nuclear assets.³

¹ Nicholas Eberstadt, “Biden and Moon Are Getting North Korea Wrong,” *New York Times*, May 26, 2021,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/26/opinion/north-korea-biden-moon-jae-in.html>.

² Peter Baker and Michael Crowley, “Trump Steps into North Korea and Agrees with Kim Jong-un to Resume Talks,” *New York Times*, June 30, 2019,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/world/asia/trump-north-korea-dmz.html>.

³ “North Korea Tests New Weapon,” *New York Times*, April 17, 2019,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/.../north-korea-missile-weapons-test.html>.

During the G20 Osaka Summit, the purpose of President Xi Jinping's high-profile visit to North Korea, which extended an exceptionally warm welcome, spoke volumes. Strategically, these were for mutual support and better bargaining positions in the negotiation process vis-à-vis the US.⁴ President Trump's instant response was also clear-cut. Immediately after the Osaka Summit, Trump paid a visit to South Korea, which prepared the top meeting with Kim Jong-un at Panmunjom along the 38th parallel. A triangular mode of engagement between Washington, Pyongyang and Seoul was established, which may de-escalate the eruption of a crisis.

Brinkmanship or going back on one's words has already been taken as Pyongyang's old tricks on the issue of nuclear weapons.⁵ North Korea is known to the world as often resorting to radical measures, including escalating the crisis with a view to gaining more practical interests in hand.⁶ These measures act to catch the world's attention on the issues of Pyongyang's survival and give the impression that the regional security is chaotic.⁷

For years, successive US administrations have been puzzled by Pyongyang's aberrant behavior and are often caught by the policy dilemma between military means and peace settlements. Take for instance the eight-year tenure of George W. Bush, who highlighted anti-terrorism as a means to national security. With this, President Bush saw it important to sustain the Six Party Talks among the main actors in the neighborhood of Northeast Asia. To the extent that there was a joint statement issued on February 13,

⁴ "US-North Korea: Trump and Kim Agree to Restart Talks in Historic Meeting," *BBC News*, June 30, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48814975>.

⁵ Thomas C. Schelling formalized deterrence and the effect of nuclear weapons in terms of game theory, a field of economics which attempts to model strategic interactions between states in terms of mathematical models. His two books, *The Strategy of Conflict* and *Arms and Influence*, are still heavily cited in political science work today for the insights they provide on conflict and cooperation. Game theory heavily relies on the notion of rationality and credibility. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), p.116.

⁶ Ming Shih Shen, "The Korean Peninsula Bombardment and North Korea Power Succession," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 68, December 2010, pp.16-19.

⁷ Ming Shih Shen, "The Situation and Development of North Korea's Brinkmanship by Nuclear Test," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 19, November 2006, p.17.

2007,⁸ there was a hope that Pyongyang was to close its nuclear reactors and go through the monitoring mechanism of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Despite the public announcement and warm expectation, things have become even more complicated and any possible solution was eventually found to no avail, for Pyongyang changed the tone, asking to have a bilateral approach to the US before giving up its entire nuke plans.⁹

The stalemate went on during the Obama administration. Given President Obama was keen to promote a strategic rebalancing policy in Asia, where military cooperation was underlined, the issues of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula were again forcefully and starkly placed on the table.¹⁰ Pyongyang, however, was not willing to back down. Contextual factors at that stage indicated that with tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang on the rise, the Chinese influence subsequently amplified. Pyongyang knew the delicate equation of power too well. It launched the harshest criticisms on the South Korea-US alliance and rounds of joint military exercises that had been held.¹¹

Under this circumstance, the sanctions that the Obama administration set to North Korea proved ineffective. They failed in preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons at the end of the day. When a dozen of nuclear warhead is proven in the hands of North Korea, the prospect for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is increasingly remote in the eyes of international society.¹² The situation on the Peninsula was filled with uncertainties. On the one hand, President Trump was known to have

⁸ Jim Yardley, "North Korea to Close Reactor in Exchange for Aid," *New York Times*, February 13, 2007, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/world/asia/13cnd-korea.html>.

⁹ Ming Shih Shen, "The Implication and Influence of Hill's Trip to North Korea," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 27, July 2007, pp.30-33.

¹⁰ Ming Lee, "Obama's Peninsula Policy (2009-2012)," *Perspective Foundation*, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 2014, pp.1-52.

¹¹ De Hai Liou, "The Peninsula New Situation after the Obama Administration Started: North Korea Perspective," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 48, April 2009, pp.14-17.

¹² David Brunnstrom, "North Korea May Have Made More Nuclear Bombs, But Threat Reduced: Study," *Reuters*, February 12, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-nuclear-study/north-korea-may-have-made-more-nuclear-bombs-but-threat-reduced-study-idUSKCN1Q10EL>.

a military plan as a final resort to root out the potential threats from North Korea's nuclear stockpiles. On the other hand, Moon Jae-in, President of South Korea, after reviving the Sun shine Policy, was keen to have direct talks with his counterpart in the North with a view to deescalating tensions across the Korean Peninsula. To President Moon, the North-South coalition team as one unit to compete in the 2018 Winter Olympics, was quite suggestive.

In retrospect, it has become obvious that Pyongyang was trying to settle the disputes via a bilateral route with the US. It is Washington, the driving force, to decide whether to impose further sanctions against North Korea or just lift them. However, although the agenda for a peaceful settlement of the nuclear dispute was brought forward in the wake of the Panmunjom meeting, if core interests are not guaranteed, how North Korea carries out denuclearization remains the key to eventual settlement of nuclear disputes in the Peninsula. Uncertainties linger between Pyongyang's habitual practice of brinkmanship and its intention to trigger overt conflicts.

U.S. President Joe Biden described his North Korea policy in his speech to a joint session of Congress marking his first hundred days in office, as a combination of "diplomacy, as well as stern deterrence." He tried to adopt the classic middle ground policy option of a "calibrated, practical approach"—framed between former Presidents Barack Obama's "strategic patience" and Donald Trump's "grand bargain."¹³In fact, Biden's policy on the Korean Peninsula is like Trump's handling of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Based on US interests, Biden must continue such a legacy.

¹³ Scott A. Snyder, "Biden's Policy Review Leaves North Korea Challenge in Limbo," Council of Foreign Affairs, May 19, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/bidens-policy-review-leaves-north-korea-challenge-limbo>.

II. Trump's Legacy: Three Summit Talks between US and DPNK

A. The Singapore Summit, 2018

It is commonly agreed that, with a series of setbacks and intentional escalation by North Korea, the year 2016 witnessed the Seoul-Pyongyang relations falling to their lowest since the end of the Korean War. Within months of each other, North Korea carried out five rounds of nuke tests. Kim Jong-un's menacing remarks that North Korea could fire missiles into Guam dramatically alerted the US, which also reacted with military plans to address the threats from North Korea.¹⁴ To prepare for the unexpected, the US sent four Carrier Battle Groups (CBG) into Northeast Asia with special task forces mobilized in California, readied for power projection into the Korean Peninsula. Military options included uprooting Pyongyang's nuclear assets by surgical strikes and launching decapitation operations aimed at Kim Jong-un.¹⁵ In parallel, President Moon Jae-in, who had just come into office, began the New Northern Policy, as a substitute for the previous confrontational line that had been taken by former President Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye.¹⁶

North Korea softened its hardline and goodwill across the two Koreas re-emerged perhaps due to Washington's intransigence and Seoul's new policy. The two sides of the Peninsula joined hands in the Winter Olympics held in Pyeongchang in January 2018, when Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un's younger sister, took part in the opening ceremony—a symbol of

¹⁴ Alex Ward, "Exclusive: Trump Promised Kim Jong Un, He'd Sign an Agreement to End the Korean War," *VOX*, August 29, 2018, <https://www.vox.com/2018/8/29/17795452/trump-north-korea-war-summit-singapore-promise>.

¹⁵ "America Has Military Options for North Korea," *National Interest*, January 4, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-has-military-options-north-korea-theyre-all-bad-23940>.

¹⁶ Rick Noack and Joyce Lee, "The Historic Kim-Moon Meeting as it Unfolded," *Washington Post*, April 27, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/27/the-historic-kim-moon-meeting-as-it-unfolded/>.

icebreaking.¹⁷ Together with the following meeting held between the two leaders from Seoul and Pyongyang at Panmunjom in April 2018, it may be not farfetched for this paper to say that the basic interactive mode of the two Koreas had already been set. However, US participation and as guarantor remain the bedrock of conflict resolutions to the dispute. Ultimately, North Korea is seeking a bilateral talk with the US, which Pyongyang views as the final troubleshooter of the entire issue.

In June 2018, the Trump-Kim Summit held in Singapore caught the eye of international society. It became the focus of the media not only because it was the first round of summits between the US and North Korea but the public expectation was that it more or less soft-pedalled the nuclear disputes, opening a window of opportunity to end the hostility on the Peninsula.¹⁸ Why in Singapore? Singapore was asked to be the host of the historic meeting because it's one of the few countries with diplomatic relations with both the United States and North Korea, a White House official told CNBC.¹⁹

In actuality and with malice towards none, goodwill was indeed exchanged and there was positive coverage widely across the international news media. The meeting ended with a joint statement that was substantiated by four points as follows.²⁰

¹⁷ "Pyeongchang 2018: North and South Korea to March under 'Unification Flag' at Winter Olympics," *ABC*, January 18, 2018, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-18/pyeongchang-north-and-south-korea-agree-to-joint-team/9338032>.

¹⁸ Kate Lyons, Matthew Weaver and Benjamin Haas, "Singapore Summit: What We Learned from the Trump-Kim Meeting," *The Guardian*, June 12, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/12/singapore-meeting-what-we-know-so-far>.

¹⁹ Yen Nee Lee, "White House Explains Why It Chose Singapore to Host Summit with North Korea," *CNBC*, June 8, 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/08/why-trump-and-kim-picked-singapore-for-meeting.html>.

²⁰ White House, "Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit," June 12, 2018, White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/>.

1. Washington and Pyongyang promised to build new relations to suit the hopes of the people of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
2. Washington and Pyongyang would make joint effort to build sustainable and stable peace regimes in the Korean Peninsula.
3. Pyongyang promised to abide by the *Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula* publicized on April 27, 2018,²¹ making effort to ward ultimate status of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
4. The US and North Korea promised to continue the effort of identifying the remains of prisoners of war (POWs) and return those having been identified.

Looking into the contents, we can infer that the former two points are symbolic with a shared objective at most. In other words, what was forced upon Pyongyang to perform and observe were the promises of returning POW remains. There have been no substantial moves in terms of the progress of de-nuclearization. The shared security concern and public alert in this region still lingers. If there is any relief that can be taken, this would refer to North Korea not eating its words as far as our observation goes. On the other hand, in the words of President Trump, first, Kim Jong-un promised to tear down engine test stands of missiles; second, US sanctions against North Korea would stay awhile; and third, the US would suspend its joint military exercise with South Korea, and the US military, as Trump said, would be looking forward to an eventual withdrawal from South Korea.²²

Although what President Trump publicized to the mass media was not in print in the joint statement, we noticed that Washington did suspend grand military exercises, limiting the scale of military signature to command

²¹ "Korea and DPRK Summit Panmunjom Statement," *Yonhap News Agency*, April 27, 2018, <https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20180427010100881>.

²² "Trump Orders Pentagon Consider Reducing US Forces in South Korea," *New York Times*, May 3, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/.../trump-troops-south-korea.html>.

post exercises (CPXs). President Trump insisted that it would not be until a complete nuclear-free North Korea would Washington lift sanctions against North Korea. However, due to its lack of substance, the summit held in Singapore left the prospect for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula with a flimsy foundation. This paper hastens to add that it is a good start to have had a talk between the two top leaders. The challenge for the next phase, as could be anticipated, would be whether Washington remained firm on its position over the issue of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and whether Pyongyang would renege on its promises. These uncertainties turned out to be even more elusive when bilateral exchanges between Washington and Pyongyang became more complicated the talk's moved into the next stage in Hanoi.

B. The Hanoi Summit, 2019

The contents of joint statement publicized after the Singapore Summit in 2018 aroused waves of expectations from international society. Nevertheless, due to Pyongyang's hesitant effort of de-nuclearization that was not fully up to the US expectation as well as no substantial proof that North Korea had slowed its step towards nuke development, the US was still unwilling to lift sanctions against Pyongyang, nor realize of an instant calling off of military exercises. Security concern remained for South Korea after the Singapore Summit. Despite an accumulated goodwill, it was insufficient to reduce the suspicion, let alone settlement of the dispute. Given the burning need to sustain the dialogue and continue the negotiation, the second round of summits between Trump and Kim Jong-un was therefore scheduled.

This time Hanoi was chosen, as it was reported that Kim could avoid flight risks by taking trains via the Chinese mainland into Vietnam, and avoid a need to use a charter plane from Beijing as had been done for the first round of the summits in Singapore.²³ Another reason was Vietnam is one of the few communist states that survived through the end of the Cold War in the early 1990, Vietnam (alongside with China) is a rare case in which rapid economic growth did not lead to the collapse of the one-party political system. Thus, it

²³ Olivia Enos, "The US and North Korea: Lessons from Hanoi," *The Diplomat*, April 01, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/the-us-and-north-korea-lessons-from-hanoi/>.

seemed clear that Kim wanted to replicate the steps made by Vietnam during the 1980s in escaping from political isolation by being “a friend and reliable partner of all countries in the international community,” and achieving unprecedented growth by abandoning the centralized model of economic development.²⁴

Unfortunately, despite Trump's keenness to conclude a substantial result suggestive of a future nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, the outcomes of the second summit in Hanoi proved disappointing. As was made public to observers on the international front. North Korea this time demanded the US to, at least partially, lift the sanctions on 5 items listed on the UN resolutions. According to Pyongyang, these 5 items were only science and technology related to people's livelihood. Preconditioned on this, North Korea claimed that Pyongyang was willing to tear down all the nuclear facilities in Nyongbyon under the joint surveillance of the international experts but could not go further with a completely nuclear-free North Korea.²⁵ It became apparent at this stage of the talk that North Korea offered the nuclear facilities in Nyongbyon as a bargaining chip in exchange for partial sanctions.

Nevertheless, partial lifts of the sanctions cannot produce effects as traumatic as they are supposed to be and, North Korea was calculating in its process of negotiation. Trump undoubtedly understood Kim's tricks well and would not agree for the former grew up as a businessman. Trump was emphatic of his determination that sanctions would not be lifted until the day we see a nuclear-free North Korea. For Trump, the very reason for Pyongyang to accept talks lay in the two-prong pressure—military threat and economic sanctions.²⁶ Economic sanctions take time and call for international cooperation to bring about the desirable effect. Partial lift of the sanctions or

²⁴ Viet Phuong Nguyen, “Trump-Kim 2: Why Hanoi?” *The Diplomat*, February 15, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/trump-kim-2-why-hanoi/>.

²⁵ Jer Shin Sun, “Why Trump and Kim Hanoi Summit Failed?” *BBC*, March 1, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world-47422155>.

²⁶ Alex Ward, “At the Vietnam Summit, Trump Has A Chance to Prove Everyone Wrong on North Korea,” *VOX*, Feb 26, 2019, <https://www.vox.com/world/2019/2/26/18239694/trump-north-korea-kim-jong-un-vietnam-summit>.

frequent military re-deployment will offset the overall effect of sanctions and pressure on North Korea.²⁷

One of the reasons for the lack of tangible outcome in the Hanoi Summit lies in the different cognition towards the blueprint of a nuclear-free North Korea between the US and North Korea. Although North Korea promised to make effort toward denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula during the Singapore Summit, there has been so far no course of action and working objectives, all of which were subject to subsequent negotiations held in the future. In this cognitive dissonance, North Korea boasted the effort it had made and the fruits it had reaped, whereas the US complained that North Korea did nothing but surrender those non-functional nuclear facilities in Nyongbyon. While the US was also suspicious that North Korea might rebuild its nuclear facilities at other locations or reactivate its nukes covertly, it would be impossible for the US to consider a lift of sanctions.²⁸ With a demand for partial sanctions having been rejected, Kim Jong-un was also disappointed at the Hanoi Summit, for a partial lift was what Kim badly needed. Kim obviously looked for something that in a timely manner address the increasingly isolated economic situation on his domestic front. In a fog of rage, Kim reshuffled the entire high-ranking representatives in the nuclear talks.²⁹ It was also known that Kim sought supports from Beijing and Moscow without positive responses.³⁰ Ultimately, Pyongyang has to be aware of the cognitive dissonance between the US and North Korea. It also has to take actions rather than paying lip service.³¹

²⁷ Sue Mi Terry, "Assessment of the Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit," CSIS, February 28, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-trump-kim-hanoi-summit>.

²⁸ Jer Shin Sun, "Why Trump and Kim Hanoi Summit Failed?" *BBC*, March 1, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world-47422155>.

²⁹ Choe Sang-Hun, "The Huge Purged after the Hanoi Summit? Korea Media Reported Kim Executed Many Officers," *New York Times*, May 31, 2019, <https://cn.nytimes.com/asia-pacific/20190531/north-korea-envoy-execution/zh-hant/>.

³⁰ "North Korea's Kim Heads to Russia to Revive old Friendship," *Japanese Times*, April 22, 2019, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/22/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-heads-russia-revive-old-friendship/#.XSrnKh-Wcw>.

³¹ Simon Denyer, "The US Wants North Korea to Follow, the 'Miracle' of Vietnam's Path, It Might Be Disappointed," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2019,

C. The DMZ Summit, June 2019

Building domestic consensus and winning international confidence become two signposts for the previous two rounds of summit talks. As the issue in point is fundamentally related to the national interests of the United States and North Korea, when the talks evolve into core areas of the bargaining, any significant switches will be encountered with domestic suspicions and there cannot be any quick magic tricks. Worse still was the unhappy ending of the second summit in Hanoi, to the extent that there had not been any deal regarding the time and place for a subsequent meeting. To balance President Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea earlier, Trump sought to have a breakthrough by taking the opportunity from the G20 Osaka Summit, July 2019.³² This could be a welcome move.

To Xi Jinping and as the structure and process proved, Beijing stood as a relatively disadvantaged place in the US-Chinese trade dispute. In other words, to back down from the trade dispute could ease the tension with the US and rescue the economies —only to leave a soft belly ready to be attached by the disgruntled and suspicious opposition inside the Communist Party.³³ Given the relatively weaker bargaining position, it was to Xi's interest that along with partial compromise on the Chinese side, a docile North Korea subject to Beijing in the Washington-Pyongyang talks could deal Xi Jinping a better hand. Likewise, it was also sensible for President Trump to have a direct talk with Xi on the summit, seeking to strike a constructive deal over the issues of US-China trade and the Korean Peninsula so that there could be

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/the-us-wants-north-korea-to-follow-the-miracle-of-vietnams-path-it-might-be-disappointed/2019/02/24/be77f83c-352c-11e9-8375-e3dcf6b68558_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ad9496393681.

³² Grace Liu, "Another North Korean Provocation Ahead of the G20 Summit? Don't Count on It," *The Diplomat*, June 26, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/another-north-korean-provocation-ahead-of-the-g20-summit-dont-count-on-it/>.

³³ Soo W. Kim, "US Economic War on China Weakens Nuclear North Korea, Too," *Rand*, October 18, 2019, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/10/us-economic-war-on-china-weakens-nuclear-north-korea.html>.

some visible credit to boost Trump's re-election campaign.³⁴

The above interpretation coming from public opinion on the international front that Beijing could possibly play a “North Korea card” in exchange for President Trump's goodwill was evidenced in June 2019, when President Xi paid a visit to North Korea, which triggered the attention of many analysts and mass media.³⁵ President Xi made it clear that “Beijing supports the process for political settlement of the issues on the Korean Peninsula, a process that accumulates a basis and constructs conditions for a final resolution”, and that “Beijing is willing to provide affordable assistance to security and development sensible to Pyongyang's own interests”. With these, Beijing came out as a good officer before the eyes of the world. It forced Pyongyang back to the negotiation table with the US,³⁶ yet remained detached from the role of a guarantor—and even the mover and shaker—for the prospect of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.³⁷

As anticipated, in the wake of President Xi's state visit to Pyongyang, the autograph request letters were exchanged between leaders from Washington and Pyongyang and both declared their willingness to have the third round summit, this time at Panmunjom.³⁸ In Panmunjom it was

³⁴ “The Historical Meeting Between US and North Korea Would Not Be a Show Only,” *Central Daily*(Seoul), July 1, 2019, https://chinese.joins.com/big5/article.aspx?art_id=190799.

³⁵ Faras Ghani, “Trump-Kim Summit: Will Two Leaders Meet for Third Round of Talks?” *Aljazeera*, September 6, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/trump-kim-summit-leaders-meet-talks-190905111656760.html>.

³⁶ Justin McCurry and Agencies, “Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un Reboot Alliance with Talks and Mausoleum Visit,” *The Guardian*, June 20, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/20/xi-jinping-north-korea-kim-jong-un-nuclear-trump-talks-g20>.

³⁷ Liou Shen Jr and Cheng Yu Ju, “Xi Jinping: China Would Provide Help to DPNK for Security Problem Resolved,” *Central Daily*(Seoul), June 21, 2019, https://chinese.joins.com/big5/article.aspx?art_id=190540.

³⁸ Lee Cheng Un, “US: Nuclear Frozen Begin Not the Final End,” *Donga Daily*(Seoul), July 11, 2019, <http://www.donga.com/tw/article/all/20190711/1786536/1/%E7%BE%8E%E5%9C%8B%EF%BC%9A-%E6%A0%B8%E5%87%8D%E7%B5%90%E6%98%AF%E9%96%8B%E5%A7%8B%EF%BC%8C%E8%80%8C%E4%B8%8D%E6%98%AF%E6%9C%80>

an historic photo opportunity for Trump, when he crossed the demarcation line in the demilitarized zone to meet Kim, becoming the first-ever sitting US president to set foot on North Korean territory. He also confirmed his personal commitment to the negotiations, believing that direct talks between leaders can lead to stabilization of the Korean Peninsula. For Kim, meeting in Panmunjom with a US president on North Korea's own territory strengthened his position as the leader of the nuclear state and an equal partner of the United States.³⁹

The meeting was meant to be dramatic. Trump came out from Freedom House in the territory of South Korea towards the 38th parallel, where he waited for Kim, who trotted down from Panmungak, the symbolic building for North Korea in the Joint Security Area (JSA). The two then walked each other towards the southern territory, where Moon Jae-in stood as the host. This was followed by a one-hour closed door meeting, a process that significantly represented the breakthrough of the North Korean-US relations.⁴⁰ As President Trump became the first incumbent president of the United States that entered the territory of North Korea,⁴¹ the Panmunjom Summit was widely taken as having signaled more to the outside world than the Singapore Summit did.⁴²

According to the description made by President Moon Jae-in in the press conference, a consensus was made that Trump and Kim would have a fourth

<https://www.france24.com/en/20190629-trump-proposes-third-meeting-with-north-koreas-kim>.

³⁹ "Kim-Trump Meet in Panmunjom," July 2, 2019, PISM,

https://pism.pl/publications/KimTrump_Meet_in_Panmunjom_.

⁴⁰ Ankit Panda, "US-North Korea Doldrums Return After Third Trump-Kim Summit," *The Diplomat*, July 17, 2019,

<https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/us-north-korea-doldrums-return-after-third-trump-kim-summit/>.

⁴¹ Steve Holland, Joyce Lee, "Trump Asks What a Third North Korean Summit Would Yield," *Reuters*, September 24, 2019,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-southkorea/trump-asks-what-a-third-north-korean-summit-would-yield-idUSKBN1W82PZ>.

⁴² "Trump proposes third meeting with North Korea's Kim," *France 24*, 29 June, 2019, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190629-trump-proposes-third-meeting-with-north-koreas-kim>.

summit with details to be discussed.⁴³ It was a relief to the international society that, rather than being caught by the stalemate in the negotiating process towards the goals of denuclearization, Trump and Kim did manage to sustain what had been achieved from the previous two summits.⁴⁴ The international society also greeted the effort of dialogue that, despite no concrete results so far as a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is concerned, it helped reduce domestic suspicions inside the US, South Korea and North Korea.

Rumors abounded before the Panmunjom Summit. It was reported that Xi planned to take the occasion of the 2019 G20 Osaka Summit and to have a bilateral talk with Trump, to be followed by a state trip to North Korea. It was also said that Washington intended to spread the news that US arms sales to Taiwan would be factored into a successful G20 Osaka Summit, which was badly needed by the international community. The facts speak for themselves, though. Washington in July 2019, the same month, announced its decision to sell main battle tanks to Taiwan. It was a clear indication that the US was not going to jeopardize Taiwan's national interests in a bid to get an upper hand in the trade war, or to encourage Beijing to play broker to the Panmunjom Summit.⁴⁵ Trump's baseline in the negotiation was simple and clear-cut: lessons learned and experience accumulated have taught the US that it would not believe Pyongyang's claim before North Korea takes effective course of action to fulfil denuclearization. Attached below is the table to show the contrast of the three summits.

⁴³ Glyn Ford, "A Third US-North Korea Summit Is the Last Best Chance for Resolving Nuclear Crisis," *South China Morning Post*, May 15, 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3010062/third-us-north-korea-summit-last-best-chance-resolving>.

⁴⁴ "The Historical Meeting Between US and North Korea Would Not Be a Show Only," *Central Daily* (Seoul), July 1, 2019, https://chinese.joins.com/big5/article.aspx?art_id=190799.

⁴⁵ Franz-Stefan Gady, "US Administration Accused of Delaying F-16 Fighter Jets Sale to Taiwan," *The Diplomat*, July 31, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/us-administration-accused-of-delaying-f-16-fighter-jets-sale-to-taiwan/>.

**Table 1: Summary of the Trump-Kim Talks
(Compiled by the Researcher)**

| Year/ Month | Location | Outcome | Notes |
|--------------------|-----------------|--|---|
| 2018/June | Singapore | Four Points as Consensus | No Course of Action Mentioned |
| 2019/February | Hanoi | Unhappy Departure | US Complaints About North Korea's Do-nothing; Pyongyang's Suggested Partial Sanction Rejected |
| 2019/June | Panmunjom | Triangular Meeting Among the US, the South and North Korea | Declarative Notes in the Dialogue Without Substantial Contents |

III. Prospects for a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula after Trump Administration

After observing the processes and summarizing the contents of the three Summits mentioned above, it can be said that the unhappy ending of the Hanoi Summit has to be attributed to discrepancy over the goal between a lift of sanctions and denuclearization. To begin with, it is commonly agreed that no armistice signed to end the military hostility across the Korean Peninsula has long been the root of regional concern. In this context, when North Korea backed down from its bargaining line (even only verbally) but without anticipated utilities in return, it made sense for North Korea, from its point of view, to re-escalate the crisis ladder.⁴⁶

Owing to Trump's reckless suggestion that the US plan a withdrawal of US troops and re-deployments, the defense ministries of the US and South Korea came forward with the decisions that two US-South Korean joint

⁴⁶ Atsuhito Isozaki, "Why Kim Jong Un Has Turned to 'Tributary Diplomacy'," *The Diplomat*, January 23, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/why-kim-jong-un-has-turned-to-tributary-diplomacy/>.

military exercises nicknamed *Key Resolve* and *Foal Eagle* would be replaced by *Dong Maeng*, a smaller scale joint military exercise, and other training projects.⁴⁷ The Pentagon's response was quite suggestive. Although there is room for advancement in sorting out the details and reaching a consensus between the US and North Korea over the issues of denuclearization as well as ending the status of hostility, the effort towards lowering the tension on the Korean Peninsula, generally speaking, remains the underlying trend. However, with recent several rounds of short-range missile tests, uncertainties are still there. The regional states cannot be sure whether North Korea will play the old tricks, banking on the brinkmanship. Or, again attempt to escalate the crisis ladder, seeking more bargaining chips in hand.⁴⁸

Pyongyang had its plan in hand. Had Pyongyang gained the US confidence at the Hanoi Summit, it could have signed an international treaty to end the current status of hostility on the Korean Peninsula, which would have had UN to lift the sanction against North Korea. In other words, if North Korea had concluded an agreement with the US before Pyongyang put into practice its promises on denuclearization, Kim could have easily been ridded of economic sanctions on North Korea from the international community. With this, Kim could have enjoyed multiple returns including a firmer basis for his authority, and a better opportunity for economic recovery. It was obvious that Kim was thirsty for these kinds of results.

However, Pyongyang's plan proved wishful thinking. The US went through rounds of Pyongyang's stalling and insincerity.⁴⁹ The Trump administration was not amenable to North Korea and continued its concrete course of action over the issue of denuclearization, rather than lifting any

⁴⁷ Ji Daryum, "South Korea, US Begin Scaled-down Joint Military Exercises," *NK NEWS*, August 5, 2019, <https://www.nknews.org/2019/08/south-korea-u-s-begin-scaled-down-joint-military-exercises/>.

⁴⁸ Ankit Panda & Viping Narang, "Why North Korea Testing Missiles Again," *Foreign Affairs*, May 16, 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2019-05-16/why-north-korea-testing-missiles-again>.

⁴⁹ Ming Shih Shen, "The Strategic Implication of North Korea Continued Military Action," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 51, July 2009, pp.19-24.

sanctions. Any promise by the US side to sign a treaty without taking Pyongyang's behaviour into account would not only prove that the US failed in winning anything back in the game, but also pave the way for a disaster in foreign policy. It is therefore quite natural to see a typical Trump cut short the talks in Hanoi and leave disgruntled when there could not be any substantial agreements, particularly when the US knew Pyongyang's ongoing effort of developing nuclear weapons in secret, and its refusal to hand in nuclear warheads. Without escalating military pressure on the US side then, Trump's dramatic departure from the Hanoi Summit can be read as a constructive move. It actually set a healthy foundation for the next summit round.

An empty-handed North Korea was then left with nothing, except to purposefully escalate the tension across the Korean Peninsula. It tested fire unknown missiles or exhibited bulky weaponry to provoke the US and South Korea. It reproached South Korea, demanding Seoul to say good-bye to US policy, and sought to destabilize the South Korean-US alliance.⁵⁰ This kind of violent response embarrassed South Korea more. On the one hand, if neither the US nor North Korea refused to concede their positions or to sign a treaty before a concrete compromise was in place to carry out denuclearization, the potential threat of the Korean Peninsula would be lingered on. That North Korea reacted with a test firing missile was most disappointing to South Korea. It indicated nothing but the potential risks and Seoul's continual policy failure in de-escalating the conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Ultimately, there has been a significant degree of unspoken consensus between the US and the two Koreas that they need to work out a de facto peace and prevent military clashes. What discriminates their positions lie in the preconditions to lift the sanctions and courses of action. To President Moon Jae-in, the purpose of South Korea in the Panmunjom Summit was both to have North Korea as a stakeholder and encourage the US to stay vested in a peace agenda. President Moon was clearly of the view that, as long as there were mutual engagements, Kim Jong-un would find no easy

⁵⁰ "North Korea's Dangerous Provocation Tests US and South Korea's Patience," *Central Daily* (Seoul), May 13, 2019, https://chinese.joins.com/big5/article.aspx?art_id=189539&category=002005.

excuse to test fire missiles or secretly develop nukes, which in turn would add credit to Moon Jae-in's policy towards North Korea.

A conclusion from the three summits between Trump and Kim Jong-un is that the biggest difference between the two countries is the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Kim Jong-un asked the United States to abandon its nuclear umbrella toward South Korea, as a prerequisite for North Korea's denuclearization, which is difficult for the United States to accept. However, after the Biden administration finally announced its North Korea policy, the denuclearization policy, which was difficult to achieve, became the main axis of the Biden administration's policy towards North Korea.

To Pyongyang, it means that it is willing to dismantle its nuclear program if and only if South Korea also denuclearizes. But South Korea doesn't have any nuclear weapons. What it does have is what's called the US "nuclear umbrella." That basically means that the US promises to defend South Korea from the North — up to and including with the use of US nuclear weapons.⁵¹

For the US, the denuclearization policy means Pyongyang is the only one that must make nuclear concessions. It's a final goal that would see North Korea give up all of its nuclear weapons while South Korea is still under US nuclear protection. US will not agree to withdraw military strength from South Korea.

It is possible that the Biden administration will adopt a policy of welcoming Kim Jong-un's proposition, to bring North Korea back to the negotiations, and then gradually restart negotiations with North Korea after obtaining the understanding of the allies. In fact, such a policy may let North Korea to gain breathing space, continue to insist on possessing nuclear weapons, and even expand its development.

⁵¹ Soo Kim, "Biden's North Korea Plans Come into View," *Interpreter*, May 5, 2021, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/biden-s-north-korea-plans-come-into-view>.

IV. Trump's Legacy to Biden's Policy

A. US-ROK Defense Mechanism as a Necessary Condition for Situation and Peace in the Korean Peninsula

Frankly speaking, the past 58 years of South Korean-US joint military exercises and related military activities have witnessed impressive combat readiness of the bilateral alliance as well as a productive effect to deter military aggressions from the North. This explains partially why the US decided to gradually withdraw its force from Seoul and after re-deploying the US contingency array, South Korea followed by reducing its force structure and cutting its force sourcing.⁵² North. This explains partially why the US decided to gradually withdraw its force from Seoul and after re-deploying the US contingency array, South Korea followed by reducing its force structure and cutting its force sourcing.

Suspension of military exercises can be seen as a signal to North Korea. The move is to highlight the intent on the side of the US and South Korea in their pursuit of peace for the Korean Peninsula. With this signal ahead, North Korea can be assured of negotiation space to continue with talks, and not leave the table merely because there has not been a treaty to ink. On the other hand, to further motivate the effort of de-nuclearization, President Trump's public declaration not to have South-Korean-US joint military exercises triggered one major concern voiced by some experts was that the US hegemonic influence might erode. In response to this concern, there is also the argument that judging from relative US capabilities, the US still can fill in the vacuum by re-starting a military exercise at any time whether Pentagon is calling a halt of military activities in this region or not.⁵³

⁵² Michael R. Gordon and Gordon Lubold, "Trump Administration Weighs Troop Cut in South Korea," *Wall Street Journal*, July 17, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-weighs-troop-cut-in-south-korea-11595005050>.

⁵³ "Peninsula Situation and Development after the Trump-Kim Meeting and the Implication to the US-China Strategic Arrangement," *Asia-Pacific Peace Research Policy Report*, No. 107005, July 2018, p. XII.

Admittedly, the mechanism of defense cooperation between the US and South Korea is still in place. Excluding field exercises, the two actors, as some experts argue, can opt for war games and command-post exercise to assess and practice the contingency plans against any eruption of clashes.⁵⁴ Having noted this, other experts express the concern of the force readiness elevated at the former stage may sound a transition within a snap of finger without realizing that defense mechanism could deteriorated as time goes by. The issue here, then, is not whether the South Korean-US cooperative mechanism can resume the operation at the previous stage. Rather, it is more to do with the opportunity cost that may be too high to recover. In other words, once North Korea continues with its old tricks, i.e., brinksmanship, the US will be forced back to its same response—the coercive approach by staging joint military exercises in the field but with an even more serious security dilemma ahead.⁵⁵ Traces of Pyongyang's tricks are not difficult to find in history. North Korea intended to have a stall in exchange for its breathing space during the Six-Party talks.⁵⁶ When Washington switched its attention onto other regional issues as time went by, it proved that North Korea succeeded in its stalling tactic as a coping measure to the pressing demand of denuclearization.

B. Domestic Uncertainty as a Key Factor in Peninsula Stability

When the news of the abrupt end to the Hanoi Summit spread across the region, North Korea muddled through the reports, whereas people inside North Korea secretly voiced the concern that it shook the confidence in Kim's regime and its sustainability. There was also news coverage in South Korea that political elites inside North Korea smuggled cash in hand to the Chinese mainland, as possibly an act of emergency. This was followed by a

⁵⁴ "US, S. Korea to Replace Spring Exercises with Smaller Drills: Officials," *Reuters*, March 2, 2019,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-southkorea-military/us-skorea-to-replace-spring-exercises-with-smaller-drills-officials-idUSKCN1QI5FO>.

⁵⁵ Yeh Chung Lu, "The Security Dilemma in the Korean Peninsula-In the Aftermath of the 2010 Cheonan Incident," *Perspective Foundation*, Vol.16, No. 1, January 2015, pp.143-184.

⁵⁶ Ming Shih Shen, "Six Party Talks and Northeast Security," in Wong, Ming-hsien, Chunqi Jiang, Wu, Jian-De, eds, *International Relations*, (Taipei: Wunan Press, 2006), pp.475-490.

deficit in foreign reserves as a result of US sanction on coal exports. When Kim was caught by a shortage of financial resources, his relations with the military became fragile and his leadership, faltering. As a matter of fact, discords happened between Kim and military hardliners inside the regime in the process of denuclearization.⁵⁷ Pyongyang shooting short-range missiles and the US intercepting a DPRK-registered cargo vessel would be events that should be factored into the forthcoming agenda of negotiations as well as the contents of agreements. They will contribute not only to the incessant tension in the Korean Peninsula, but also the potential clashes between factions and hardliners inside North Korea.

President Trump made it clear the US will not hasten the negotiation process on the issue of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula. This gives us a “let-it-be” impression. When Biden took office, one thing was sure: no matter who was US president, little space can be expanded in US foreign policy towards North Korea. The domestic situation inside North Korea on the other hand can be destabilizing, for Kim is badly in need of an early lift of sanctions, without which there will be fewer opportunities to see fruitful outcomes from his five-year (2016-2020) strategic plan for state economic development.⁵⁸ That said, if the domestic situation in North Korea worsens, Kim will blunt his leadership effectiveness inside the regime.

C. Seeking a Potential Linkage to Enhance Strategic Advantages

Initially, President Trump deliberately intended to have a complete settlement of the nuclear concern on the Korean Peninsula by means of US-DPRK negotiation. A nomination and even a win of the Nobel Peace Prize could have contributed to his re-election -- a blueprint aborted by North Korea's tricks at the table. It is therefore not farfetched to anticipate that the

⁵⁷ Lee Jeong-ho, “North Korea’s Kim Felt ‘Very Close’ to The South’s Moon at Summit in Pyongyang,” *South China Morning Post*, September 18, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/2164700/moon-and-kim-begin-landmark-summit-after-limousine-ride-through>.

⁵⁸ “Korea Should Quit the Discussion about the Nuclear Issues: Should Cut Down the Frozen Deal by US-Korea Cooperation,” *Donga Daily* (Seoul), July 6, 2019, <http://www.donga.com/tw/List/article/all/20190706/1782126/1/>.

US will not back down on Pyongyang's identifiable promise to surrender its nuclear activities and terminate its military coercion. The US will step up its effort of cooperation and coordination to reinforce the US-ROK alliance. Also, in the midst of US suspicion about Beijing and Pyongyang's joint countermeasures against the regional effort of denuclearization, by no means will the US back away from the UN sanctions against North Korea, especially when the latter dithers about the supposed steps towards denuclearization. Furthermore, if Washington's suspicion about Beijing's constructive role in encouraging a naughty Pyongyang becomes writ larger, the Sino-US strategic confrontation will continue, and North Korea will enter into the strategic equation in the grand plan of balancing China.

In the context of Sino-US trade dispute, it is impossible for China to prompt North Korea that there is no need to do anything but to pay lip service on the issue of de-nuclearization or even challenge the US before Washington's very nose.⁵⁹ Beijing's strategic move, if any, is to assist North Korea, behind the close doors, in finances, economy, energy and food out of the concern that North Korea may collapse itself. In other words, if Beijing intends to intervene, it should act as a supporter behind North Korea in the engagement process of the two Koreas. If Beijing seeks to add bargaining chips for Kim in his deal with the US, Washington will certainly broaden the linkage of the issues inclusive of the Sino-US trade dispute, conflict resolution of the Korean Peninsula and all the related issues that strengthen the US bargaining chips on the diplomatic front.

D. UN Sanctions against DPRK Allows US Greater Leeway in Managing Other Challenges

Even with a new US president, a new round of US-DPRK summit is unlikely to take place, since no substantial demands to meet were made on Pyongyang in the Hanoi Summit. Moreover, time is on this side of the US. If on the other hand the UN sanctions continue in place, Kim will have more

⁵⁹ Lee Seong-hyon, "Kim Jong-Un in Beijing: Is North Korea A Bargaining Chip in US-China Trade Talks?" *South Chinese Morning Post*, January 14, 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2181677/kim-jong-un-beijing-north-korea-bargaining>.

and more domestic problems and eventually may find no foreign support but Beijing and Moscow. Unlike in 2003, when North Korea and Iran were understood to have coordinated with each other when both faced international criticisms about their conduct that was equated to proliferation of nuclear weaponry.⁶⁰ Now that security issues related to Iran have re-entered the US agenda, Washington can be described as having too many irons in the fire that it is forced to re-deploy troops into the Middle East.

Under this circumstance, it may not be a stretch to say the long-standing regional concern around the Korean Peninsula has tentatively been shoved to the wayside. To put it more bluntly, as long as Pyongyang does not test fire missiles or explode its nuclear warheads, Washington's prior concern in its strategic calculation at this moment is the Sino-US trade dispute and Iran, thanks to the UN resolution to apply economic sanctions against North Korea. With this mechanism, the US is left with a leeway to cope with the Sino-US trade dispute and the trouble emerging in Iran. The sanctions can also be target-oriented, pressing North Korea one step ahead towards the negotiation table by accepting the preconditions demanded of Pyongyang. Ultimately, the criteria have already been set by Washington: Final, Fully Verified Denuclearization (FFVD) or Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID). What the US seeks is to uproot weapons of mass destruction, not to freeze them into a static seal as Pyongyang claims.⁶¹

V. Biden's Policy Continuation

Fort the reason of Trump held three summit meetings with Kim but achieved no breakthrough other than a pause in nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests that has lasted since 2017. U.S. President Joe Biden has settled on a new approach to pressuring North Korea to give up nuclear

⁶⁰ "What Iran Is Learning from North Korea," *New York Times*, July 2, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/podcasts/the.../north-korea-iran-nuclear-deal.html>.

⁶¹ Lee Cheng Un, "US: Nuclear Frozen Begin Not the Final End," *Donga Daily*(Seoul), July 11, 2019, <http://www.donga.com/tw/article/all/20190711/1786536/1/%E7%BE%8E%E5%9C%8B%E5%87%8D%E7%B5%90%E6%98%AF%E9%96%8B%E5%A7%8B%E5%8C%E8%80%8C%E4%B8%8D%E6%98%AF%E6%9C%80%E7%B5%82%E7%9B%AE%E6%A8%99>.

weapons and ballistic missiles that will explore diplomacy but not seek a grand bargain with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Seeing from the strategies taken by Kim, DPRK's state objectives seem to have consistently been unification of the Peninsula, rising as a regional power, and holding an independent status away from intervention by Washington and Beijing.⁶² Pyongyang's radical socialist approach to the planned economic system is not working well. To the extent of its economic recession and backward subsistence, North Korea has no option but must rely on China for economic aid, military assistance and energy supplies. While there exists a conventional brotherly affection between Beijing and Pyongyang, that does not mean that Pyongyang is happy to identify itself as a puppet regime subject to China, whose national interest points to a status quo on the Korean Peninsula, i.e., two separated Koreas.⁶³ Pyongyang, ever since President Xi's rise to power, has been increasingly assertive in its policy line. It sticks to patrimonialism in power transfers rather than political reforms. Its missile tests and nuclear development continue to be the source of regional concerns that have also kept President Xi consciously aloof.

Pyongyang's insistence on going nuclear is understandable. To be a regional power and military strength, nuclear capabilities play an important role. After six rounds of nuclear tests, North Korea has gone across necessary thresholds in the process of nuclear development. With less than a hundred nuclear warheads in hand, North Korea is well qualified as a member of the "Nuclear Club". As seen with India and Pakistan, those two countries had been sanctioned for violating the norms in developing nuclear weapons. They also continued the effort, despite the sanctions. When a new situation eventually emerged into the sub-continent, the sanctions were put to bed. This is exactly what North Korea is looking forward to, for developing nuclear warheads, as India and Pakistan showed, seems to be a game of two

⁶² Jei Guk Jeon, "North Korean Leadership: Kim Jong Il's Balancing Act in the Ruling Circle," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, Issue 5, August 2010, pp.761-779.

⁶³ Arthur Ding, "China's Response to North Korea Nuclear Test: Maintain the Korean Peninsula Splited Situation," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 19, November 2006, pp.9-12.

halves. That said, giving up nuclear capabilities or casting aside nuclear warheads will not be a ready option for North Korea.

A contrast to the India and Pakistan cases, here is that Pyongyang does not bear any expectation for economic aid from the international community. Giving up developing nuclear capabilities solely based upon fear of international sanctions will be encountered with questions such as whether the decision to quit is legitimate. On the other hand, Kim is keen to see economic development. However, Kim is hesitant to liberate the economy, for liberation of the market will bring about contradictions against the totalitarian regime. In light of these contradictions, Kim Jong-un and his party cadre will keep at nuclear capabilities. Pyongyang sees to it that its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are as reassuring as an amulet, capable of reaching the US continent.

If the military option stays, small scale exercise and war gaming is not the problem. It is after a long period of peace time, the re-newed cost of the US-South Korea large scale joint operations will increase. As long as North Korea continues to play the brinkmanship strategy, the United States will conduct drills against the North Korea. North Korea will not take initiative and attack the US until the day when Pyongyang is mature in its military capabilities. When this day really arrives, what concerns the US most is a possibility that North Korea allies with Iran, China and Russia to boycott or counteract the US leadership in managing international affairs.

Here emerge two sets of competing interpretation over the issue of nuclear weaponry. On the one hand, the purpose of US readiness and preventive measures is to counter North Korea's effort of developing nuclear weapons and unifying South Korea. On the other hand, Pyongyang's aggressive move to develop nuclear capabilities is out of the fear that the US may retaliate against North Korea at the end of the day.⁶⁴ Judging from the dilemma featured by fear, one scholar argued that if North Korea can

⁶⁴ Evans J. R. Revere, Mataka Kamiya, "Staying in Sync on North Korea's Nuclear Program," Carnegie: Endowment for International Peace, October 10, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/staying-in-sync-on-north-korea-s-nuclear-program-pub-80022>.

be granted by the US with sufficient degree of security and North Korea abides by the promise of non-proliferation, the two may find their ways to eventually settle disputes over the Korean Peninsula.⁶⁵

By no means does the US have the purpose to swallow up North Korea militarily. What the US is busy at, instead, is to prevent military clashes, to ensure survival and security of South Korea, and to maintain peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. Washington is also aware that Pyongyang's military activities and brinksmanship have to be understood as expedients.⁶⁶ The ultimate purpose these of these military ventures was to exert pressure on South Korea and spread the mistrust into the South Korean-US alliance.⁶⁷ Viewed in this light, we may expect that President Moon Jae-in, who is known for his cooperative line with North Korea, can facilitate more coordination from North Korea than his predecessors Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. We may also expect that Kim may not reiterate nationalist jargons and level criticisms at South Korean-US cooperation, as he used to. President Moon is accepted by North Korea because the Moon's administration underscores economic cooperation with its counterpart including logistical supplies and investment funds.

Looking into the near future, if North Korea feels the threat from US coercion again, Pyongyang has South Korea as leverage on US military options. In other words, even Pyongyang's effort of denuclearization, if any, has been criticized for its being slow-paced, as long as the interactive mechanism exists between the two Koreas, the US will find it hardly legitimate to escalate the crisis ladder in this region or resort to military solutions.

⁶⁵ Leon V. Sigal, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding the Failure of the 'Crime-and-Punishment' Strategy," Arms Control Association, May 1995, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-05/features/north-korean-nuclear-crisis-understanding-failure-crime-punishment-strategy>.

⁶⁶ Ming Shih Shen, "The Strategic Implication of North Korea Continued Military Action," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 51, July 2009, pp.19-24.

⁶⁷ Cheng Yi Lin, "North Korea Situation and The Peace of Peninsula," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 47, March 2009, pp.6-9.

The US attitude towards this issue is worth closer observation. First, South Korea in its engagement with North Korea needs security assurance and strategic support. However, President Trump seems hesitant to further invest more resources into the Korean Peninsula, let alone Trump's open remarks earlier on force withdrawal. Second, although economic aid and political integration help realize the South Korean dream of unification of the entire Peninsula, South Korea cannot achieve it without US support. South Korea will find it even harder to deal with a North Korea backed by nuclear weaponry, if the US withdrew its nuclear umbrella or extended deterrence. It is quite apparent that healthy engagement between the two Koreas needs the support of the US.⁶⁸

For North Korea, there are some baselines that can be helpful to a unification of the entire Korean Peninsula: sowing discord between the US and South Korea, maintaining some sort of military capabilities that force the US to have a second thought whenever Washington threatens to act, and keeping its military strength tremendously superior to that of the South Korea. For South Korea, under the circumstance of a fairly stable South Korean-US relations, North Korea will find its strategic goal—to annex South Korea—a castle in the air. Looking into the future, unless North Korea falls into a distressful situation, a promising prospect of denuclearization calls for more dialogues and detailed haggling.

As long as North Korea does not directly threaten the US by missile test and nuclear weapons, the critical issue for Washington is still the US-China trade war and Iran. To increase economic sanctions pressure on North Korea may force this hungry and poor state to accept the premise and return to the negotiating table. However, given the vicissitude of North Korea-US relations and Pyongyang as a totalitarian regime in nature, a voice full of reproach or an outbreak of hostility will still be on the bargaining list.

⁶⁸ Ming Shih Shen, "The Situation and Development of North Korea's Brinkmanship by Nuclear Test," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 19, November 2006, pp.17-20.

Biden administration will pursue a “calibrated practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with” North Korea and making “practical progress” that increases the security of the United States and its allies. The United States had consulted with South Korea throughout the policy review process and Washington had informed Seoul of its conclusions in advance. The Biden administration has simultaneously signaled a hard line on human rights, denuclearization and sanctions, while making diplomatic overtures that officials say have been rebuffed by Pyongyang, which has long demanded sanctions relief.

VI. Conclusion

Biden's policy change to North Korea cannot bring peace to the Korean Peninsula, unless North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is willing to abandon his revisionist aims. Due to Kim Jong-un's persistent commitment to nuclearization, even limiting North Korea's nuclear development attain to “complete denuclearization” appears not to be a possible job that is only achievable through the inordinately costly course of regime change.

In addition to the joint statement issued by the United States and South Korea after the May 2021 summit, they also emphasized the friendship between the two countries and pledged their alliance relationship to remain unchanged.⁶⁹ With regard to South Korea's most pressing epidemic, the United States promises to supply vaccines. The US authorized the Moderna vaccine to be produced in South Korea. This is the first foreign production base of the Moderna vaccine. It can not only supply South Korea, but also allow South Korea to play a vaccine card against other countries.⁷⁰

On the North Korean issue, in the US-Korea Joint Statement, the United States stated that it will adopt “calibrated and practical” diplomatic way

⁶⁹ White House, “US-ROK Leaders' Joint Statement,” White House, May 21, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/>.

⁷⁰ Maria Ponnezhath and Sangmi Cha, “Moderna, Novavax to Produce more COVID-19 Vaccines in S. Korea,” *Reuters*, May 22, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/moderna-south-korea-sign-production-deal-mrna-vaccines-2021-05-22->.

with North Korea, and that diplomacy and dialogue will be “based on past commitments between the two Koreas and the US and North Korea.” This statement indicates the United States will not take a hardline on the North Korean issue. The United States has also terminated a “Revised Missile Guidelines” that restricts South Korea’s development of missile technology.⁷¹ South Korea is free to develop missiles and space technology, and the United States will launch cooperation projects with South Korea in space cooperation and overseas nuclear power plant technology.

South Korea has promised to increase the supply of automotive chips, making South Korea a close technological ally of the United States, and bolstering the United States’ response to China’s technological war. South Korea actively supports the US climate plan, welcomes US to be the leadership on global climate issues, and promises to be more active in achieving emission reduction targets.

Regarding regional security issues, South Korea emphasized the “fundamental importance” of trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea and Japan in response to North Korea, to safeguard mutual security and prosperity, support common values, and consolidate a “rule-based order”. Emphasizing that the importance of US-South Korea relations goes beyond the Korean peninsula, with particular emphasis on the importance of Southeast Asia, and that the ties between the US, South Korea, and Southeast Asia should be strengthened, indicated that the United States will return to Southeast Asia.

The United States and South Korea have reached a consensus on their important interests and positions, and the United States may not take a military intervention policy against North Korea. The resolution of North Korea’s nuclear weapons seems to have returned to the past policy, and the United States has not regarded the North Korea nuclear issue as its top priority during US-China strategic competition. Because of this, the summit

⁷¹ Brian Kim, “US Lifts Missile Restrictions on South Korea, Ending Range and Warhead Limits,” *Defense News*, May 25, 2021, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/05/25/us-lifts-missile-restrictions-on-south-korea-ending-range-and-warhead-limits/>.

between Biden and Kim Jong-un will not be held in the short term before North Korea has expressed its attitude towards the US-South Korea joint statement and close cooperation.

The Biden administration needs to find a best way to induce or impose self-restraint on the expansion of North Korea's nuclear capability, otherwise the dimensions of the North Korean nuclear threat will continue to grow.

Bibliography

Book

Schelling, Thomas C., 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Shen, Ming Shih, 2006. "Six Party Talks and Northeast Security," in Wong, Ming-hsien, Chunqi Jiang, Wu, Jian-De, eds, *International Relations*. Taipei: Wunan Press.

Journal

Ding, Arthur, 2006/11. "China's Response to North Korea Nuclear Test: Maintain the Korean Peninsula Splited Situation," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 19, pp.9-12.

Jeon, Jei Guk, 2010/8. "North Korean Leadership: Kim Jong Il's Balancing Act in the Ruling Circle," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, Issue 5, pp.761-779.

Lee, Ming, 2014/4. "Obama's Peninsula Policy (2009-2012)," *Perspective Foundation*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp.1-52.

Lin, Cheng Yi, 2009/3. "North Korea Situation and The Peace of Peninsula," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 47, pp.6-9.

Liou, De Hai, 2009/4. "The Peninsula New Situation after the Obama Administration Started: North Korea Perspective," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 48, pp.14-17.

Lu, Yeh Chung, 2015/1. "The Security Dilemma in the Korean Peninsula-In the Aftermath of the 2010 Cheonan Incident," *Perspective Foundation*, Vol.16, No. 1, pp.143-184.

Shen, Ming Shih, 2007/7. "The Implication and Influence of Hill's Trip to North Korea," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 27, pp.30-33.

Shen, Ming Shih, 2010/12. "The Korean Peninsula Bombardment and North Korea Power Succession," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*,

No. 68, pp.16-19.

Shen, Ming Shih, 2006/11. "The Situation and Development of North Korea's Brinkmanship by Nuclear Test," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 19, pp.17-20.

Shen, Ming Shih, 2009/7. "The Strategic Implication of North Korea Continued Military Action," *Journals of Strategic and Security Analyses*, No. 51, pp.19-24.

Internet Material

2018/1/4. "America Has Military Options for North Korea," *National Interest*, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-has-military-options-north-korea-theyre-all-bad-23940>.

2019/7/2. "Kim-Trump Meet in Panmunjom," *PISM*, https://pism.pl/publications/KimTrump_Meet_in_Panmunjom_.

2018/4/27. "Korea and DPRK Summit Panmunjom Statement," *Yonhap News Agency*, <https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20180427010100881>.

2019/7/6. "Korea Should Quit the Discussion about the Nuclear Issues: Should Cut Down the Frozen Deal by US-Korea Cooperation," *Donga Daily* (Seoul), <http://www.donga.com/tw/List/article/all/20190706/1782126/1/>.

2019/4/17. "North Korea Tests New Weapon," *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/.../north-korea-missile-weapons-test.html>.

2019/5/13. "North Korea's Dangerous Provocation Tests US and South Korea's Patience," *Central Daily* (Seoul), https://chinese.joins.com/big5/article.aspx?art_id=189539&category=002005.

2019/4/22. "North Korea's Kim Heads to Russia to Revive old Friendship," *Japanese Times*, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/22/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-heads-russia-revive-old-friendship/#.XSrnhKh-Wcw>.

- 2018/7. "Peninsula Situation and Development after the Trump-Kim Meeting and the Implication to the US-China Strategic Arrangement," *Asia-Pacific Peace Research Policy Report*, No. 107005.
- 2018/1/18. "Pyeongchang 2018: North and South Korea to March under 'Unification Flag' at Winter Olympics," *ABC*,
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-18/pyeongchang-north-and-south-korea-agree-to-joint-team/9338032>.
- 2019/7/1. "The Historical Meeting Between US and North Korea Would Not Be a Show Only," *Central Daily*(Seoul),
https://chinese.joins.com/big5/article.aspx?art_id=190799.
- 2018/5/3. "Trump Orders Pentagon Consider Reducing US Forces in South Korea," *New York Times*,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/.../trump-troops-south-korea.html>.
- 2019/6/29. "Trump Proposes Third Meeting with North Korea's Kim," *France 24*,
<https://www.france24.com/en/20190629-trump-proposes-third-meeting-with-north-koreas-kim>.
- 2019/3/2. US, S. Korea to Replace Spring Exercises with Smaller Drills: Officials," *Reuters*,
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-southkorea-military/us-skorea-to-replace-spring-exercises-with-smaller-drills-officials-idUSKCN1QI5FO>.
- 2019/6/30. "US-North Korea: Trump and Kim Agree to Restart Talks in Historic Meeting," *BBC News*,
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48814975>.
- 2019/7/12. "What Iran Is Learning from North Korea," *New York Times*,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/podcasts/the.../north-korea-iran-nuclear-deal.html>.
- Baker, Peter and Crowley, Michael, 2019/6/30. "Trump Steps into North Korea and Agrees with Kim Jong-un to Resume Talks," *New York Times*,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/world/asia/trump-north-korea->

dmz.html.

Brunnstrom, David, 2019/2/12. "North Korea May Have Made More Nuclear Bombs, But Threat Reduced: Study," *Reuters*,
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-nuclear-study/north-korea-may-have-made-more-nuclear-bombs-but-threat-reduced-study-idUSKCN1Q10EL>.

Choe, Sang-Hun, 2019/5/31. "The Huge Purged after the Hanoi Summit? Korea Media Reported Kim Executed Many Officers," *New York Times*,
<https://cn.nytimes.com/asia-pacific/20190531/north-korea-envoy-execution/zh-hant/>.

Denyer, Simon, 2019/2/24. "The US Wants North Korea to Follow, the 'Miracle' of Vietnam's Path, It Might Be Disappointed," *Washington Post*,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/the-us-wants-north-korea-to-follow-the-miracle-of-vietnams-path-it-might-be-disappointed/2019/02/24/be77f83c-352e-11e9-8375-e3dcf6b68558_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ad9496393681.

Eberstadt, Nicholas, 2021/5/26. "Biden and Moon Are Getting North Korea Wrong," *New York Times*,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/26/opinion/north-korea-biden-moon-jae-in.html>.

Enos, Olivia, 2019/4/1. "The US and North Korea: Lessons from Hanoi," *The Diplomat*,
<https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/the-us-and-north-korea-lessons-from-hanoi/>.

Ford, Glyn, 2019/5/15. "A Third US-North Korea Summit Is The Last Best Chance for Resolving Nuclear Crisis," *South China Morning Post*,
<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3010062/third-us-north-korea-summit-last-best-chance-resolving>.

Gady, Franz-Stefan, 2019/7/13. "US Administration Accused of Delaying F-16 Fighter Jets Sale to Taiwan," *The Diplomat*,
<https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/us-administration-accused-of->

delaying-f-16-fighter-jets-sale-to-taiwan/.

Ghani, Faras, 2019/9/6. "Trump-Kim Summit: Will Two Leaders Meet for Third Round of Talks?" *Aljazeera*,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/trump-kim-summit-leaders-meet-talks-190905111656760.html>.

Gordon, Michael R. and Lubold, Gordon, 2020/7/17. "Trump Administration Weighs Troop Cut in South Korea," *Wall Street Journal*,

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-weighs-troop-cut-in-south-korea-11595005050>.

Holland, Steve, and Lee, Joyce, 2019/9/24. "Trump Asks What a Third North Korean Summit Would Yield," *Reuters*,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-southkorea/trump-asks-what-a-third-north-korean-summit-would-yield-idUSKBN1W82PZ>.

Isozaki, Atsuhito, 2019/1/23. "Why Kim Jong Un Has Turned to 'Tributary Diplomacy,'" *The Diplomat*,

<https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/why-kim-jong-un-has-turned-to-tributary-diplomacy/>.

Ji, Daryum, 2019/8/5. "South Korea, US Begin Scaled-down Joint Military Exercises," *NK NEWS*,

<https://www.nknews.org/2019/08/south-korea-u-s-begin-scaled-down-joint-military-exercises/>.

Kim, Brian, 2021/5/25. "US Lifts Missile Restrictions on South Korea, Ending Range and Warhead Limits," *Defense News*,

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/05/25/us-lifts-missile-restrictions-on-south-korea-ending-range-and-warhead-limits/>.

Kim, Soo W., 2019/10/18. "US Economic War on China Weakens Nuclear North Korea, Too," *Rand*,

<https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/10/us-economic-war-on-china-weakens-nuclear-north-korea.html>.

Lee, Cheng Un, 2019/7/11. "US: Nuclear Frozen Begin Not the Final End," *Donga Daily* (Seoul),

<http://www.donga.com/tw/article/all/20190711/1786536/1/%E7%BE%8E%E5%9C%8B%EF%BC%9A-%E6%A0%B8%E5%87%8D%E7%B5%90%E6%98%AF%E9%96%8B%E5%A7%8B%EF%BC%8C%E8%80%8C%E4%B8%8D%E6%98%AF%E6%9C%80%E7%B5%82%E7%9B%AE%E6%A8%99>.

- Lee, Jeong-ho, 2018/9/18. "North Korea's Kim Felt 'Very Close' to The South's Moon at Summit in Pyongyang," *South China Morning Post*, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/2164700/moon-and-kim-begin-landmark-summit-after-limousine-ride-through>.
- Lee, Seong-hyon, 2019/1/14. "Kim Jong-Un in Beijing: Is North Korea A Bargaining Chip in US-China Trade Talks?" *South Chinese Morning Post*, <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2181677/kim-jong-un-beijing-north-korea-bargaining>.
- Lee, Yen Nee, 2018/6/8. "White House Explains Why It Chose Singapore to Host Summit with North Korea," *CNBC*, <https://www.cnb.com/2018/06/08/why-trump-and-kim-picked-singapore-for-meeting.html>.
- Liu, Grace, 2019/6/26. "Another North Korean Provocation Ahead of the G20 Summit? Don't Count on It," *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/another-north-korean-provocation-ahead-of-the-g20-summit-dont-count-on-it/>.
- Lyons, Kate, Weaver, Matthew and Haas, Benjamin, 2018/6/12. "Singapore Summit: What We Learned from the Trump-Kim Meeting," *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/12/singapore-meeting-what-we-know-so-far>.
- McCurry, Justin, 2019/6/20. "Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un Reboot Alliance with Talks and Mausoleum Visit," *The Guardian*, June 20, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/20/xi-jinping-north-korea-kim-jong-un-nuclear-trump-talks-g20>.
- Nguyen, Viet Phuong, 2019/2/15. "Trump-Kim 2: Why Hanoi?" *The Diplomat*,

<https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/trump-kim-2-why-hanoi/>.

Noack, Rick and Lee, Joyce, 2018/4/27. "The Historic Kim-Moon Meeting as it Unfolded," *Washington Post*,
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/27/the-historic-kim-moon-meeting-as-it-unfolded/>.

Panda, Ankit, & Narang, Viping, 2019/5/16. "Why North Korea Testing Missiles Again," *Foreign Affairs*,
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2019-05-16/why-north-korea-testing-missiles-again>.

Panda, Ankit, 2019/7/17. "US-North Korea Doldrums Return After Third Trump-Kim Summit," *The Diplomat*,
<https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/us-north-korea-doldrums-return-after-third-trump-kim-summit/>.

Ponzezath, Maria, and Cha, Sangmi, 2021/5/22. "Moderna, Novavax to Produce more COVID-19 Vaccines in S. Korea," *Reuters*,
<https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/moderna-south-korea-sign-production-deal-mrna-vaccines-2021-05-22->.

Revere, Evans J. R., and Kamiya, Mataka, 2019/10/10. "Staying in Sync on North Korea's Nuclear Program," *Carnegie: Endowment for International Peace*,
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/staying-in-sync-on-north-korea-s-nuclear-program-pub-80022>.

Shen, Liou Jr and Ju, Cheng Yu, 2019/6/21. "Xi Jinping: China Would Provide Help to DPNK for Security Problem Resolved," *Central Daily*(Seoul),
https://chinese.joins.com/big5/article.aspx?art_id=190540.

Sigal, Leon V., 1995/5. "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding the Failure of the 'Crime-and-Punishment' Strategy," *Arms Control Association*,
<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-05/features/north-korean-nuclear-crisis-understanding-failure-crime-punishment-strategy>.

Snyder, Scott A., 2021/5/19. "Biden's Policy Review Leaves North Korea

- Challenge in Limbo,” *Council of Foreign Affairs*,
<https://www.cfr.org/blog/bidens-policy-review-leaves-north-korea-challenge-limbo>.
- Soo Kim, 2021/5/5. “Biden’s North Korea Plans Come into View,” *Interpreter*,
<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/biden-s-north-korea-plans-come-into-view>.
- Sun, Jer Shin, 2019/3/1. “Why Trump and Kim Hanoi Summit Failed?” *BBC*,
<https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world-47422155>.
- Terry, Sue Mi, 2019/2/28. “Assessment of the Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit,” *CSIS*,
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-trump-kim-hanoi-summit>.
- The White House, 2021/5/21. “US-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” *White House*,
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/>.
- Ward, Alex, 2018/8/29. “Exclusive: Trump Promised Kim Jong Un, He’d Sign An Agreement to End the Korean War,” *VOX*,
<https://www.vox.com/2018/8/29/17795452/trump-north-korea-war-summit-singapore-promise>.
- Ward, Alex, 2019/2/26. “At the Vietnam Summit, Trump Has A Chance to Prove Everyone Wrong on North Korea,” *VOX*, Feb 26, 2019,
<https://www.vox.com/world/2019/2/26/18239694/trump-north-korea-kim-jong-un-vietnam-summit>.
- White House, 2018/6/12. “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” *White House*,
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/>.
- Yardley, Jim, 2007/2/13. “North Korea to Close Reactor in Exchange for Aid,” *New York Times*, February 13, 2007,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/world/asia/13cnd-korea.html>.

無人飛行載具在防衛作戰運用的探討

康曉嵐

中校研究教官

陸軍工兵訓練中心

摘 要

隨資訊及人工智慧科技發展帶動新一波的軍事事務變革，戰爭已經從傳統型態演進至智慧化戰爭，戰具以無人科技為主，改變未來作戰模式。本研究先探討中共軍用無人飛行載具對臺灣威脅，接續反思現階段無人作戰系統發展與運用，檢討出臺灣未來仍須強化的問題及目標。結論歸納出建軍願景規劃期程，將無人飛行載具需求項目依作戰需求急迫性及技術等級發展，區分近、中、遠程階段性逐步籌獲所需裝備。

關鍵字：無人飛行載具、無人機、防衛作戰

A Study on the Application of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Taiwan Defense Operations

Hsiao-Lan Kang

Lt. Col., Research Instructor

Army Engineer Training Center

Abstract

With the development of information technology and artificial intelligence, history has witnessed a new wave of reforms in military affairs, as war has evolved from a traditional construct to an intelligent one. The development of combat equipment will seem to be dominated by unmanned technology, which is to change the future combat mode. This research first explores the development and threat of the China's military unmanned aerial vehicles, continues to reflect on the development and application of our unmanned combat systems, then examines the problems and goals that we still need to strengthen in the future. The conclusions summarized the planning period of our military building vision. The various demand for unmanned aerial vehicles is divided into the near, medium, and long-range phases and developed in accordance with the urgency of combat needs and the level of technology.

Keywords: *unmanned aerial vehicles, drones, defense operation*

壹、前言

美國國家科學研究委員會曾預言：「21世紀核心武器在無人作戰系統」，¹以現在趨勢而言，這預言正逐漸成為現實。從二次世界大戰以後的幾場現代化戰爭，如越南戰爭、贖罪日戰爭、科索沃戰爭、美、英在阿富汗、伊拉克的反恐怖主義戰爭和以色列與巴勒斯坦、黎巴嫩等衝突、葉門和利比亞內戰、敘利亞戰爭到2020年納卡戰爭，無人飛行載具（Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, UAV）被廣泛且大量地運用於戰場。雖稱不上作戰主力，但已成為作戰中不可或缺的一環。²尤其在伊拉克、阿富汗等戰場部署使用，產生顯著的作戰效益與軍事價值。除運用戰場上，平時也運用於邊界、海域守備、情報蒐集等任務。因此，各國正如火如荼加緊腳步開發及取得各類型無人飛行載具。

本文有感於現今防衛作戰延續二戰經驗，形同在準備上一場戰爭，忽視科技趨勢帶動無人系統運用，再加上近年戰機失事頻傳、共機頻繁對臺襲擾等，應參考各國在無人飛行載具發展趨勢，思考如何運用於防衛作戰，期能以低成本、零傷亡、高作戰效能等不對稱作戰思維，掌握戰場主動，達成防衛作戰的目標。

貳、中共軍用無人飛行載具對臺灣的威脅

一、總體軍事威脅

美國國防部於2020年提出中共軍力報告書中，提到中共對臺行動方案，基於其在多項領域持續增強之能力，有各種軍事選項得以威脅臺灣，企圖拒止美國介入臺海戰爭之可能，或採不對稱、有限度戰爭，以遲滯或擊退美國之介入。³2020年中旬起，中共多次派有人/無人機擾臺，加大對臺威脅，讓臺海情勢升溫。中共似乎不傾向採取「登陸戰」，

¹ 〈21世紀戰場核心武器！美軍測試作戰機器人系統，固有模式被打破〉，《每日頭條》，2019年1月14日，
<https://kknews.cc/zh-tw/military/b59m6mo.html>。

² 楊濟誠，《共軍無人飛行載具（UAV）發展之探討》，淡江大學國際事務與戰略研究所碩士論文（2019），頁1。

³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,” September 1, 2020, p. 113,
<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF>.

而是要發動「灰色地帶」戰術（Gray-zone Warfare）麻痺警戒，⁴以非常規衝突形式，對臺施壓，以侵蝕臺灣的抵抗意志。⁵中共「攻臺戰役」的戰略構想，主要結合陸、海、空、天、電等五維作戰模式的各類型武器裝備，發揮最大戰力，對臺灣產生戰略嚇阻效益。⁶當今共軍無人飛行載具研發已有相當成果，其配合海、空軍運用之戰略意涵包括「延長戰略縱深，增進遠程兵力投射能力」、「融合軍種戰術，形成聯合作戰系統」、「減少飛行員傷損與降低總體戰力消耗」等，對臺灣產生的軍事威脅則有「進行顛倒正面戰術」、「快速打擊，反制美國介入」、「預警時間短」等。⁷

中共領導人習近平於 2019 年 1 月《告臺灣同胞書 40 周年》提出「一國兩制臺灣方案」，重申未放棄武力犯臺選項。中共持續挹注高額國防預算，加速推動國防軍事現代化進程，加劇臺海軍力失衡，並透過戰區實施跨軍種聯訓等作為，提升對抗外軍及兵力投射等戰力，對國防安全構成嚴重威脅。⁸不排除潛伏在臺的特工利用多架小型無人機對臺灣重要首長與政經據點發動群攻作戰的可能性。2020 年 7 月習近平視察中共空軍航空大學無人機實驗室及操控教學後，強調要加強無人作戰研究，加強實戰化訓練與培養指揮人才。⁹

有學者認為，解放軍武力犯臺，需出動精銳正規部隊兵力約 40 萬，編組北、中、南、東，四路登陸部隊以 26 個加強營級兵力，結合 3 個空降旅一個特種作戰旅，及無人機 500 架對本島實施登陸。¹⁰中共現階段已部署 300 具以上「翼龍」無人攻擊機及以色列製「哈比」無人機等，

⁴ 黃順祥，〈消磨臺灣戰力！不直接動武！中國採用「灰色地帶」戰術〉，《Newtalk 新聞》，2020 年 12 月 14 日，<https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2020-12-14/508465>。

⁵ 〈路透：中國發起灰色地帶戰術 消磨臺灣抵抗意志〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020 年 12 月 11 日，<https://udn.com/news/story/6809/5085918>。

⁶ 呂兆祥，〈中共對臺軍事武力發展對我防衛作戰之影響〉，《國防雜誌》，第 30 卷第 4 期，2015 年 7 月，頁 83。

⁷ 錢尹鑫，〈共軍發展無人飛行載具之戰略意涵與對我海軍影響之研究〉，《海軍軍官》，第 3 卷第 37 期，2020 年 4 月，頁 45-48。

⁸ 中華民國 108 年國防報告書編纂委員會，《中華民國 108 年國防報告書》（臺北：國防部戰略規劃司，2019 年），頁 30。

⁹ 吳書緯，〈反制無人機斬首 蔡適應：注意干擾槍能否及時發揮功效〉，《風傳媒》，2020 年 7 月 26 日，<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3240571>。

¹⁰ 宋兆文，〈兩個旅就拿下澎湖？共軍退將喊話犯了兵家大忌〉，《ETtoday 新聞雲》，2019 年 12 月 26 日，<https://forum.ettoday.net/news/1611070#ixzz6bJWxNpPI>。

可追蹤攻擊臺灣防空雷達與飛彈陣地，干擾防空系統。¹¹ 作戰初期，解放軍各型無人機，不受天候環境限制，可能穿透綿密防空網對發起猝然攻擊，精準打擊並摧毀關鍵軍事設施，對臺產生威脅影響、瓦解偵測及即時反擊能力，限縮預警能力，運用非接觸性作戰創造局部性區域衝突等。¹²

二、中共無人飛行載具作戰能力

20 世紀末，中共無人飛行載具發展逐漸加速，先後研製出 B、D、ASN 系列多種型號軍用無人機。隨精確導引武器的廣泛應用，中共將「偵打一體」的觀念發展成具備打擊功能的作戰無人機，先後研製「彩虹」、「翼龍」系列「偵打一體」無人機及「長鷹」BZK-005 偵察無人機、「利劍」隱形無人機與「翔龍」高空長航時偵察無人機。¹³

近年無人飛行載具之體系發展完整，各類型戰略 / 術偵察無人機可為戰術飛彈、巡弋飛彈及砲兵等部隊以執行戰場偵察，提供目標跟蹤、指引、定位、火砲射擊校正及戰場毀傷評估。未來將以先進之戰略 / 戰術無人飛行載具，結合「烽火」與「神通」系列的通信衛星、「尖兵雷電」系統的偵察衛星、「北斗」系統的導引衛星，全天候掌控國軍動態。¹⁴ 軍用無人飛行載具列裝於陸、海、空軍及火箭軍（如表 1），持續發展多種中高空、長航時、自主導引和自動返航的功能，以提升遠程偵察與打擊能力。

¹¹ 新境界文教基金會國防政策諮詢小組，〈二〇二五年中國對臺軍事威脅評估〉，《國防政策藍皮書第五號報告》，2014 年 3 月，頁 30，《新境界文教基金會》，http://www.dppnff.tw/uploads/20140305230307_2072.pdf。

¹² 徐康榮、孫亦韜，〈中共運用無人載具對我海軍艦隊作戰影響〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第 52 卷第 5 期，2018 年 10 月，頁 79-83。

¹³ 郭勝偉，《無人化戰爭》（北京：國防大學出版社，2011 年），頁 63。

¹⁴ 唐承平，〈中共無人飛行載具發展對我防衛作戰影響之研究〉，《砲兵季刊》，第 188 卷，2020 年 3 月，頁 22。

表1：共軍各型無人飛行載具分類

| | 諸元 | 微型 | 短程 | 中程 | 中空 長航程 | 高空 長航程 | 攻擊型 |
|------|---------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 適用範圍 | | 可實施戰術偵察、目標校準、誘餌等任務，裝備於單兵或排、連級部隊。 | 可實施戰術偵察、打擊、目標校準、誘餌、靶機等任務，做為旅級以下之單位裝備。 | 可實施戰前快速偵察，主要裝備於陸、海、空旅級以上部隊。 | 可實施戰術偵察、戰術打擊，是各國主流裝備。 | 可實施戰略偵察，是各國偵察無人飛行載具發展的重點方向。 | 可實施偵察與攻擊等任務，是新一代無人飛行載具未來發展方向。 |
| 性能諸元 | 高(KM) | 小於 1 | 小於 3 | 3-7 | 5-14 | 大於 18 | 10 |
| | 起飛重(KG) | 小於 25 | 25-600 | 600-1,000 | 1,000-5,000 | 大於 6,000 | 大於 6,000 |
| | 航時(HR) | | 大於 2 | 大於 6 | 大於 12 | 大於 24 | 大於 2 |
| | 航程(KM) | 小於 50 | 小於 300 | 500-1,000 | 1,000-4,000 | 大於 5,000 | 大於 500 |
| 代表機型 | 含非現役機型 | ASN-215 ASN-212 | ASN-206 ASN-209 天翼 -3 JWP-2 | 彩虹 -3A | 彩虹 -4 BZK-005 鵠鷹 -2 翼龍 | 翔龍 WJ-600 銳鷹系列 | 利劍 |

資料來源：參考唐承平，〈中共無人飛行載具發展對我防衛作戰影響之研究〉，《砲兵季刊》，第 188 卷，2020 年 3 月，頁 22 製表。

（一）偵察預警能力

解放軍常態性派遣各型偵察機（含無人機）進入臺灣西南外圍空域實施情蒐，已具備第二島鏈以西的海、空動態預警能力，不利國軍各級部隊隱蔽，可威脅海、空軍艦機任務遂行。¹⁵ 解放軍各式無人飛行載具特別強調有效載重項目，是執行偵察、監視、電子對抗、打擊與戰場評估任務的關鍵；有效提升續航時間，得以長時間擔任情報偵察、監視和海陸勘察等任務。¹⁶

¹⁵ 同註 8，頁 40。

¹⁶ 蔡志銓，〈共軍無人飛行載具發展現況與我海軍因應作為〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，

從中共建政 70 周年大閱兵，首度公開空軍的「無偵-8」超音速無人偵察機，飛行速度在 3-5 馬赫之間，可對戰略、戰役目標實施有效「突防」，為各級作戰部隊提供偵察和打擊效果評估情報，任務是對中遠程反艦、對地攻擊飛彈進行打擊效果偵察，能藉助極佳的隱形設計執行穿透敵方防空網的秘密偵察任務，任務範圍甚至可覆蓋整個西太平洋。¹⁷

另外，2020 年 10 月福建、廣東聯合登島軍演中，陸軍第 73 集團軍使用手拋型無人機從外形似彩虹 802，尺寸小巧，升限高達 3,000 公尺以上，且噪聲和雷達反射截面積都很小，很難被發現，是進行隱蔽戰術偵察的利器。對登陸作戰來說，可偵察地面目標，適時回傳圖像和數據，指揮部接收圖像和數據後處理，由砲兵對目標實施打擊。¹⁸

（二）精準打擊能力

在全球定位系統、空中預警機以及衛星通信系統的支援下，經傳輸影像、視訊處理後分送至各部門，讓無人飛行載具遂行精準打擊時，得到有力的支持。解放軍未來將更加依賴來指揮火炮校正或實現飛彈的超視距能力，確保遠程火力的精準度。¹⁹

（三）偵打一體能力

從過去單純執行偵察任務，通過增加攻擊系統，躍升能執行攻擊任務，以執行戰略、戰役和戰術偵察，監視戰場，為部隊的作戰行動提供情報，必要時實施攻擊等任務，將對未來戰爭產生影響。從中共建政 70 周年大閱兵公開「利劍」無人攻擊機，是高空、長航時「偵打一體」無人機，能夠全天候遂行偵察打擊任務。²⁰

（四）飽和攻擊任務

美國軍方曾在 2018 年提及，解放軍無人機可在台海衝突中破壞臺灣防禦體系，採用反輻射無人機，如哈比和 ASN-301，及成群的自殺

第 54 卷第 2 期，2020 年 4 月，頁 31。

¹⁷ 吳賜山，〈中共大閱兵，無偵 8、攻擊 11 無人機首次亮相〉，《壹讀》，2019 年 10 月 1 日，

<https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2019-10-01/305636>。

¹⁸ 〈無人化裝備正在對我軍戰鬥力提供巨大助力〉，《壹讀》，2020 年 10 月 11 日，<https://read01.com/zyJz86B.html#.X5J4Z9AzY2w>。

¹⁹ 同註 16，頁 31。

²⁰ 同註 17。

無人機壓制防空或高價值武器平台。解放軍將其退役的殲 6 戰鬥機轉換成無人機，並部署於福建的基地。²¹ 相關機型及威脅分析如下：

1. 哈比、JWS01 反輻射無人飛行載具：屬消耗性載具，可壓制（飽和式攻擊）對手的防禦系統。基此，對預警、戰管與防空飛彈射控雷達造成相當程度之威脅。於 2004 年在臺海附近進行的軍事演習中，就曾用此款模擬攻臺。²²

2. ASN-301 反輻射 UAV：仿「哈比」無人機，可對敵方防空雷達、防空飛彈陣地及指揮通信體系進行硬殺，達到癱瘓性的摧毀目的。在衛星定位系統的導引下，多架 ASN-301 無人機飛至目標區後自動搜索與識別目標，依「蜂群攻擊」作戰模式，目標區的資訊通過資料鏈傳回到控制站，經進一步確認目標後即可逕行攻擊。配備寬頻帶處理能力，可覆蓋並攻擊多種目前常見搜索及照射雷達。可由運輸機進行空中投放，或從海上貨櫃輪上放出，對岸置防空、制海武器的雷達觀通系統造成威脅。²³

3. 殲 -6 無人攻擊 / 布雷機：為「殲 -6」戰機研改，研製具有地面無線電指令導引無人作戰能力，可裝載 1,500 公斤各式彈藥，對目標採集群、自殺式襲擊。²⁴ 可擾亂臺灣的防空戰管系統，對雷達站等關鍵基礎設施轟炸，封鎖海上運輸線；此機型類似於對地攻擊巡弋飛彈，用於攻擊地面固定目標，將迫使臺灣防空體系做出反應並接戰，形同消耗戰。²⁵ 起飛前可設定攻擊目標的座標參數，起飛後按預先植入的飛行線路與自動地形匹配，飛向目標實施攻擊，可對中央山脈後的目標實施攻擊。

另海軍則負責殲 -6 無人布雷機專案，掛載水雷在預定海域、港口、航道上進行布雷作業，封鎖港口和海上運輸線。²⁶ 加拿大《漢和防務評

²¹ Elsa Kania, *The PLA's Unmanned Aerial Systems: New Capabilities for a 'New Era' of Chinese Military Power* (Montgomery: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2018), p. 9.

²² 許然博，〈中共無人飛行載具發展對我海軍威脅〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第 51 卷第 5 期，2017 年 10 月，頁 117。

²³ 蔡翼，〈科技將改變台海作戰型態〉，《台北論壇》，2019 年 5 月 22 日，http://www.taipeiforum.org.tw/print/P_531.php。

²⁴ 同註 16，頁 33。

²⁵ 楊俊斌，〈殲 -6 改成無人機 70 架部署武夷山〉，《中時新聞網》，2019 年 5 月 15 日，<https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20190515000162-260301?chdtv>。

²⁶ 張國威，〈陸千架殲 -6 無人機，開戰可封鎖台海〉，《中時新聞網》，2016 年 12

論》2018年9月指出中共的殲-6無人機分別在福建惠安、武夷山機場、龍田機場、福建連城等地部署近150架，離臺海中線最短距離不到220公里，²⁷其成軍目的主要是臺海戰爭爆發時第一波實施攻擊，將使臺灣雷達戰管系統左支右絀。²⁸

（五）電戰干擾能力

組建各型電子干擾裝備，同時陸續完備海、空軍主戰裝備電戰能力整備，運用電子偵察機及反輻射無人機，機上電子戰裝備可對C4ISR、陸基、防空飛彈及射控、預警等雷達實施干擾或攻擊，²⁹壓制臺灣防空系統或執行突然攻擊任務。

（六）通信中繼能力

無人飛機是通信中繼的有效解決手段之一，搭載相關通信設備升空飛行做通信中繼的節點，與地面（海上）通信節點建立戰術範圍內寬頻網路，可實現節點間的數據、語音、圖像高速傳輸，³⁰以完善各級部隊垂直與橫向指管通聯，其聯合指揮範圍可涵蓋第一島鏈以西區域。

（七）有人/無人協同作戰能力

混編有、無人飛行載機，組成戰術機群。從彩虹7型可與第四代戰機資料鏈連結引導後方戰機進行打擊，實現有人/無人戰機協同作戰。

三、中共無人飛行載具運用

（一）軍事演習

2019年，解放軍陸軍第76集團軍某合成旅實彈實兵演練，期間全程使用無人機及無人車等裝備破除障礙，及於高原環境實施檢驗，無人機為獲取即時戰場資訊，引導火力打擊。³¹

月6日，<https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20161206000841-260301?chdtv>。

²⁷ 平可夫，〈我國面臨更大的空防壓力〉，《漢和防務評論》，第167期，2018年9月，頁26。

²⁸ 楊俊斌，〈殲-6改成無人機70架部署武夷山〉，《中時新聞網》，2019年5月15日，<https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20190515000162-260301?chdtv>。

²⁹ 同註8，頁40。

³⁰ 同註16，頁32。

³¹ 葉琪，〈解放軍陸軍實彈實兵演練 無人車及無人機登場〉，《香港01》，2019年8月20日，

2020年10月福建、廣東聯合登島軍演中，陸軍第73集團軍將所屬的兩棲合成旅與陸航、特戰、電子對抗、無人作戰等戰力融合，組成聯合立體登陸群，檢驗部隊實戰能力，推動聯合戰術兵團的轉型，提升部隊聯合登陸、立體突擊的實戰能力。³² 此次僅有手拋型無人機、無人破障船及3款無人地面車等，大型無人機未出場。

2020年11月在蘇北一場跨海突擊演練中，無人機對目標海域進行偵察搜索目標，再由無人機地面站導引直升機進入射程，在高空無人機導引下，對目標實施跨海精準打擊，火力打擊後，由運輸直升機將戰鬥員落地，展開地面進攻戰鬥。³³

（二）區域衝突

2013年9月中共部署無武裝的BZK-005無人機巡弋日本行政控制權的釣魚台，為回應中共無人機部署行為，日本防衛大臣小野寺五典宣布日本會考慮擊落進入日本空域的無人機。中共則回應，如果日本的任何行動造成無人機損失，甚至擊落無人機都將構成戰爭行為，並警告日本將採取堅決措施反擊。³⁴

從2020年中旬開始，解放軍對臺灣周邊海、空域襲擾更加頻繁，更於2020年10月派遣BZK-005無人機進入西南空域。早從2013年開始，經常現身東海，並多次飛到釣魚台島嶼附近；2016年在南海永興島部署，除定翼式外另裝備旋翼式V-750型，主要做為目標鎖定，並可

<https://www.hk01.com/%E5%8D%B3%E6%99%82%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B/365837/%E9%82%81%E5%85%A5%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E5%8C%96%E6%99%82%E4%BB%A3-%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E9%99%B8%E8%BB%8D%E5%AF%A6%E5%BD%88%E5%AF%A6%E5%85%B5%E6%BC%94%E7%B7%B4-%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E8%BB%8A%E5%8F%8A%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%A9%9F%E7%99%BB%E5%A0%B4>。

³² 〈東南海域，登島演練〉，《新浪財經》，2019年10月10日，

<https://finance.sina.com.cn/wm/2020-10-10/doc-iivhuipp8934762.shtml>。

³³ 林則宏，〈共軍展示無人機如何導引直升機跨海精準打擊〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020年11月7日，

<https://udn.com/news/story/7331/4996273>。

³⁴ Michael S. Chase, Kristen A. Gunness, Lyle J. Morris, Samuel K. Berkowitz and Benjamin S. Purser, “Emerging Trends in China’s Development of Unmanned Systems,” *RAND*, 2015,

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR990.html。

對岸上目標實施超視距飛彈攻擊。³⁵

2020年中印邊界緊張衝突情勢，中共在兩國邊界部署AR500C高原型無人直升機，用於高空偵察及通信中繼，以防邊界衝突發生。³⁶後續利用演習機會，執行無人機「集群」任務，為海拔4,500公尺高原的部隊送餐。³⁷

（三）葉門和利比亞內戰

2020年這場代理人戰爭，意外成為無人機戰爭舞台。聯合國安理會2020年初發布報告就指出，分別為軍閥與利比亞政府軍撐腰的阿拉伯聯合大公國（簡稱阿聯酋）與土耳其，各發動超過850次、250次無人機攻擊。另交戰雙方的17架土耳其「拜拉克塔」（Bayraktar TB2）與8架中共「翼龍」等大型無人機被毀，儼然成一場世界最大規模的無人機大戰。³⁸阿聯酋部署中共供應的「翼龍-1」型無人機部隊，以打擊葉門和利比亞內戰中的目標。期間阿聯酋的無人機發射空對地飛彈，成功擊毀試圖躲避的主戰戰車；另派出「彩虹」無人機執行重要偵察任務。³⁹

綜合上述之案例，中共對於無人飛行載具之運用，不論是在戰略戰術、偵察搜索、猝然攻擊、作戰後勤、破除障礙等，都經過實際演練測試，已經具備實際操演經驗。這些經驗可以轉用於台海衝突，而在各種海空武力對台文攻武嚇的演練中，無人飛行載具也扮演一定角色。

³⁵ 李忠衛，〈共機衝著國軍西南空域操演？〉，《公民新聞》，2020年10月23日，<http://news.dnnews.com/china/big5/news/2017-12-11/60028960.html>。

³⁶ 施怡姮，〈大陸研製「AR500C」高原型無人直升機 部署在印度邊界防衝突〉，《ETtoday新聞》，2020年5月25日，<https://www.ettoday.net/news/20200525/1721956.htm#ixzz6slQxMXSc>。

³⁷ 陳亦偉，〈作戰無人機大對決 顛覆戰爭遊戲規則〉，《奇摩新聞》，2020年12月7日，<https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E4%BD%9C%E6%88%B0%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%A9%9F%E5%A4%A7%E5%B0%8D%E6%B1%BA-%E9%A1%9B%E8%A6%86%E6%88%B0%E7%88%AD%E9%81%8A%E6%88%B2%E8%A6%8F%E5%89%87-034113332.html>。

³⁸ 同前註。

³⁹ 〈中東地區戰雲密布中國無人機異軍崛起〉，《BBC中文網》，2019年9月24日，<https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-49800202>。

參、臺灣防衛作戰因應

近期興起運用無人機作戰的概念，並非無人戰爭。至於無人防衛系統能否對抗無人機蜂群攻擊，還需更多驗證。⁴⁰不過值得國軍省思的是，現階段缺乏對無人戰爭理論、戰術與戰法的研究，無法指導國軍如何前瞻未來作戰及建軍規劃。

一、臺灣軍用無人飛行載具部署與運用

現階段軍用無人飛行載具主要由中科院所承攬研發、製造為主，近年空軍因應與日俱增的敵情威脅及戰備需求，針對大型無人機作戰需求，為現階段蔡政府向美國政府所提出 7 項軍購案⁴¹之一，以加速達成建軍及提升戰力目標。中共近年所研發生產軍用無人機已超過 55 種機型、總數達上萬架，相較之下，臺灣所使用無人機數量過少，中科院應帶頭加快與無人機廠商合作研發。⁴²強化無人飛行載具在各軍種的運用與部署。

(一) 陸軍

國軍陸軍七個打擊旅及關渡指揮部重新整編的「聯合兵種營」，⁴³在 2020 年 4 月完成整編，並增設無人機圖資官。⁴⁴過去「銳鳶」中型戰術無人機原隸屬陸軍航特部戰術偵蒐大隊，2017 年 9 月移編海軍。陸軍前瞻未來作戰環境及敵情威脅，依整體防衛構想指導及「打裝編訓」建案思維，於 2020 年提出「戰術型近程無人飛行載具」建案需求。期望將未來地面部隊轉型成小型、機動、能獨立作戰的靈活特遣隊，其中無人機的運用極具重要性。⁴⁵

⁴⁰ 羅慶生，〈未來戰場無人化—打上一場的戰爭必敗〉，《中時新聞網》，2021 年 4 月 8 日，<https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20210408000026-262110?chdtv>。

⁴¹ 7 項武器品項包含標槍反戰車飛彈（增購）、拖式反戰車飛彈（增購）、HIMARS 多管火箭系統、M-109A6 自走砲、陸射魚叉反艦飛彈、MQ-9 無人機以及智慧水雷。

⁴² 吳書緯，〈臺灣無人機研發 經緯航太：中科院應帶頭加速〉，《自由時報》，2021 年 4 月 2 日，<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1440707>。

⁴³ 目前初步分別有 4 個裝甲旅（542 旅、564 旅、584 旅、586 旅）、3 個機步旅（269 旅、234 旅、333 旅）及關渡指揮部成立聯合兵種營，編制有步兵、裝甲兵、海 / 空軍及陸航等不同單位聯絡官，及 UAV 無人機操作手、刺針飛彈、狙擊組等不同專長官兵。

⁴⁴ 洪哲政，〈各軍搶餘額！國軍聯兵營 4 月 1 日全編成 無人機「有編無裝」〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020 年 2 月 9 日，<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4331789>。

⁴⁵ 許智翔，〈國軍戰備不只應該納入無人機，更該學習如何防備無人機〉，《關鍵評論》，2020 年 7 月 13 日，<https://www.thenewslens.com/article/137463>。

(二) 海軍

國軍現役無人機部署於海軍部隊的「紅雀」及「銳鳶」無人機，近年因人為、機械或環境等因素，而造成事故發生撞山、墜海或墜毀跑道等，導致載具數量遞減，數量僅維持於訓練運用。另對於合格證照外部操作手培訓、人員數維持也是執行單位待解決問題之一。⁴⁶ 各類型無人系統運用分述如下：

1. 小型紅雀無人機：部署於海軍陸戰隊，主要用以強化連 / 排級部隊日夜間偵蒐、目獲能力，可連續飛行 15-20 公里，偵蒐範圍最大 10 公里，可即時追蹤目標的移動方位，結合迫砲射擊能量，執行彈著修正，提高攻擊成效，可迅速拆解組裝及攜行，以手擲方式起飛並以傘降方式回收。⁴⁷ 目前折損 3 架，餘 27 架服役。⁴⁸

2. 中型銳鳶無人機：為戰術型 UAV，部署於海軍艦隊指揮部，由 UHF 頻段導引，具有快速部署、長時滯空巡偵、目標監偵定位、電子反干擾與即時影像傳輸等功能，可執行日 / 夜間偵蒐、戰場監控、目標搜尋、戰損評估等任務，所獲情資可即時回傳地面控制站，搭配情資後傳系統，將監偵與指、管、通、情通聯（C4ISR）整合，發揮先發制人及聯合作戰的效應。⁴⁹ 2016 至 2019 年 1 月底止折損 6 架，餘 26 架服役。⁵⁰ 2020 年中旬，兩岸情勢緊張加劇時，銳鳶無人機部署至東沙與太平島，使部隊能夠更快地應對突發情況，並擴大其偵察能力。⁵¹

⁴⁶ 洪哲政，〈陸軍採購無人機 立法院曝國軍無人機現況〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020 年 10 月 27 日，

https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4967228?from=udn-referralnews_ch2artbottom。

⁴⁷ 〈小型紅雀無人機〉，《國家中山科學研究院》，

http://www.ncsist.org.tw/csistdup/products/product.aspx?product_Id=19&catalog=56。

⁴⁸ 游凱翔，〈跨軍種聯合運用 陸軍將設紅雀無人機訓練班隊〉，《中央社》，2019 年 4 月 19 日，

http://www.ncsist.org.tw/csistdup/products/product.aspx?product_Id=19&catalog=56。

⁴⁹ 〈中型中翔無人機〉，《國家中山科學研究院》，

http://www.ncsist.org.tw/csistdup/products/product.aspx?product_Id=20&catalog=56。

⁵⁰ 同註 48。

⁵¹ Gabriel Dominguez, “Taiwan Deploys Albatross UAV to South China Sea Islands,” *Janes*, August 27, 2020,

<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/taiwan-deploys-albatross-uav-to-south-china-sea-islands>.



圖1：臺灣現役軍用飛行載具圖

資料來源：

1. http://www.ncsist.org.tw/csistdup/products/product.aspx?product_Id=19&catalog=56
2. <https://m.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3310351>

(三) 空軍

因應未來在防空制壓作戰能力之需求，空軍已同步規劃，包含對美軍購 MQ-9B 無人機、中科院自主研發「劍翔」反輻射無人機將於 2019 年到 2024 年生產 104 架、及大型「騰雲」無人機規劃於 2018 年到 2021 年重新設計，偵蒐型改良成可加掛飛彈的攻擊型。



圖2：臺灣空軍未來無人飛行載具圖

資料來源：

1. <https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20190815000143-260301?chdtv>
2. <https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20190531000013-260417?chdtv>
3. <https://www.flightglobal.com/unmanned-mq-9-reaper-achieves-one-million-flight-hours/116262.article>

二、臺灣反制無人系統作法

現今反無人機技術發展，著重於偵測與預警、攔截科技、干擾技術與偽裝欺騙等 4 大部分。偵測與預警在於運用人工或雷達等感測器，感應無人機入侵；攔截科技著重於雷射、火力、微波等；干擾技術包括數據鏈、訊息干擾等，使無人機失去控制；偽裝欺騙則包含光學、電子等方式隱真示假，降低敵方無人機作戰效能。⁵²

對於來犯之敵所使用無人系統載具，其外型大小、是否具有匿蹤效能等因素，將影響是否能即時偵獲。如為小型、低飛目標如迷你無人飛行載具，現有防空系統未必能搜獲並接戰，即使偵獲，以現有大型長射程防空飛彈，形同殺雞用牛刀，雖可以爆炸時之破片或衝擊波擊落小型載具或使其失效，但以高價、數量有限之長程防空飛彈攔截廉價的小型載具，不符成本效益。⁵³

國防部於 2021 年首度針對國軍反制無人機方案進行說明，面對中共無人機威脅，國軍依「早期預警，先期應處」指導，運用聯合情監偵系統，有能力掌握共軍各型無人機，運用地面短程防空飛彈、快砲予以擊落共軍中、大型無人機，小型無人機則將運用中科院無人機防禦系統，進行電子干擾方式反制，⁵⁴ 以有效反制敵無人系統對奇襲進犯。

（一）預警探測手段

看得見和分辨得清楚，是反制無人機作戰的第一步，有效探測、識別、追蹤和定位是成功反制無人機的前提條件，檢視現階段臺灣防空體系預警能力，摘述如下：

1. 全方位預警系統：長程預警雷達，如「鋪路爪」雷達（Pave Paws）、空中預警機（E-2 機）和衛星組成的地面、空中和太空立體配置，區分近、中、遠程探測手段結合的全方位預警系統，⁵⁵ 並配合運用

⁵² 〈精進技術與研發 反制無人機攻擊〉，《青年日報》，2019 年 9 月 19 日，<https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1179549>。

⁵³ 舒孝煌、許智翔，〈臺灣發展不對稱戰力的利基〉，《2018 年國防科技趨勢評估報告》，2018 年 12 月，頁 110，《國防安全研究院》，<https://indsr.org.tw/Download/%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E7%A7%91%E6%8A%80%E8%B6%A8%E5%8B%A2%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A.pdf>。

⁵⁴ 洪哲政，〈國軍反無人機方案首曝光 短程飛彈快砲擊落中共無人機〉，《聯合報》，2021 年 3 月 11 日，<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/5310796>。

⁵⁵ 同註 16，頁 35。

雷達變頻、雷達誘標、輻射管制等措施實施，後續可朝向發展雙基或低頻雷達（Lower-frequency, Directed Anti-stealth Radar），以偵測敵隱形飛機。⁵⁶

2. CS/MPQ-90「蜂眼」機動點防禦相位陣列雷達：空軍「鷹式」飛彈將以專案由中科院整合機動式相位雷達車，由「蜂眼」機動點防禦相位陣列雷達。這是首個能 360 度偵蒐目標國產的相列雷達，具有抗電子干擾的功能，射控雷達搜索距離為 40 公里，可同時追蹤八個以上的目標，且具備高度擴充性，可導引「鷹式」、AIM-120 地空飛彈與劍二陸射型，還具有掃描帶追蹤（TWS）功能。

另陸軍於 2020 年底，透過中科院採購 17 套「蜂眼」雷達，5 套移防烏坵等外島部署，其中一套因應情勢緊張而部署東沙島，搭配海軍陸戰隊的雙聯裝刺針飛彈，作為反低空目標用途，可反制無人機與直升機之用，達到提前預警的目標。⁵⁷

3. 搜索雷達：空軍「鷹式」飛彈連所汰換下來搜索雷達，原每個連配屬一部 AN/MPQ-50 脈衝搜索雷達、一部 AN/MPQ-55 連續波搜索雷達、一部 AN/MPQ-51 測距雷達，將移交給六、八與十軍團所屬砲指部防空營，「鷹式」搜索雷達有效距離 100 公里，可強化軍團野戰防空預警效率。⁵⁸

（二）硬殺擊毀打擊手段

1. 飛彈系統：反制無人機最直接的方式，就是通過硬殺傷將無人機擊毀。現階段有「天弓二/三型」、「鷹式」、車載「劍一」飛彈系統、肩射型刺針防空飛彈及「天兵系統」等。可依據無人機威脅大小、攔截距離遠近等，長程防空飛彈用於濱海決勝區外、中程防空飛彈用於濱海決勝區、短程防空飛彈用於灘岸殲敵，形成整體性「重層嚇阻」防空火網。⁵⁹ 故應確保臺灣彈性因應敵方各種不同的作戰行動，保留適當戰

⁵⁶ 同註 53，頁 112。

⁵⁷ 洪哲政，〈陸軍蜂眼雷達移防東沙，反制共軍無人機與直升機〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020 年 11 月 1 日，<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4979821>。

⁵⁸ 洪哲政，〈陸軍接收鷹式飛彈搜索雷達，野戰防空預警延伸至百公里〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020 年 11 月 1 日，<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4979785>。

⁵⁹ 李建鵬、翁翠蓮，〈中共無人飛行載具對我防空作戰〉，《空軍學術雙月刊》，第 677 期，2020 年 8 月，頁 75。

備彈供後續階段作戰使用，同時可因應突發戰況或即時目標反應。未來「天弓」飛彈同時具備反地面目標或反艦能力，「天劍二型」防空飛彈或是反戰車飛彈也能攔截小型無人飛行載具，並射擊地面或近程的海上目標。⁶⁰

「劍二」型飛彈係陸軍新型野戰防空武器系統，內容包括 246 枚陸射「劍二」型飛彈，中科院專案研發出以 40 公釐機砲與陸射「劍二」型飛彈搭配的近程防空系統。該型系統除汰換「槲樹」飛彈系統，能以更高的作戰效率，有效防範進犯的航空器、無人機及巡弋飛彈等攻擊，確為重要防護目標與部隊安全。⁶¹ 臺灣海軍、陸軍向美國提出肩射型刺針飛彈之軍購案，美方考量將兩案合一，預定 2021 年底重新議價簽約，美軍同樣於 2021 年簽下 26 億美元合約升級刺針飛彈，主要也是在提供部隊對抗無人機的威脅。⁶²

2. 輕重兵器：國軍於平日戰備訓練，除加強情報教育辨識共軍無人載具，編組對空監視哨，於離地 10 公尺視距內，一旦發現共軍各式無人飛行載具，立即循戰情系統回報，運用干擾器癱瘓或擊落。⁶³ 相較美軍在歷次黑鏢 (Black Dart) 演習期間，以實彈把各種無人機打下來，除了動用頻道與電磁波干擾的軟殺外，各種能打的武器都使用過。如美軍曾有在直升機上，以狙擊槍擊落小型無人機，美軍也用「地獄火」飛彈、50 機槍、20 機砲等將無人機擊落。⁶⁴

3. 雷射武器：2019 年臺灣有意向美國雷神公司採購先進型 HEL-WS-MRZR 高能雷射武器系統，惟此系統不在軍售討論項目且未經美國防部同意輸出；經國防部評估，由中科院啟動雷射武器系統研發計劃，以 4 年時間研發出高能雷射 (High-Energy Laser, HEL) 系統；先以低

⁶⁰ 同註 53，頁 110。

⁶¹ 洪哲政，〈陸軍司令部：「獵隼案」能反無人機與巡弋飛彈〉，《聯合報》，2018 年 10 月 11 日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/5039299>。

⁶² 〈美軍簽下 26 億元合約升級刺針飛彈對抗無人機系統〉，《自由時報》，2021 年 4 月 17 日，
<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/3502639>。

⁶³ 吳姝璇，〈中共無人飛行載具發展對我防衛作戰威脅之研究〉，《陸軍學術雙月刊》，第 55 卷第 568 期，2019 年 12 月，頁 97。

⁶⁴ 羅添斌，〈反制無人機威脅 我獲邀觀摩美軍「黑鏢演習」〉，《自由時報》，2017 年 9 月 10 日，
<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2188973>。

空防禦的武器系統為研發重點，防禦低空無人機、火箭彈、砲彈等威脅，第二階段研發目標將朝向艦載型或空載型的雷射武器系統進行研發。⁶⁵

（三）軟殺制壓干擾手段

1. 電子戰方式：為更經濟的反制方法，透過電子干擾、電磁脈衝等電子戰方式，斬斷控制鏈路，阻斷、隔絕地面控制站機發射的無線電控制信號。然而電戰方面能力則相當不足，相關設備技術早已過時，美海軍第七艦隊前司令奧西恩（Joseph Aucion）曾指出臺灣缺乏電戰能力。⁶⁶中科院研發偵蒐測向機動車與干擾機動車可偵測通信頻段無線電波信號，支援電子戰攻防任務，藉由掌握戰場上通信電子設施與活動狀態，提供先期預警、支援監偵識別、指管決策、作戰行動、效益評估等各項電子戰作為，具有分析、比對、辨識、記錄、儲存多種通信發射源參數，能精確測向等功能。⁶⁷

2. 干擾致盲遮蔽耳目：藉干擾定位和感知設備，定位的導引衛星信號、機載偵察和控制設備等，使無人機因失去位置數據陷入迷茫，喪失繼續執行任務的能力，被迫著陸或返航。⁶⁸臺灣製造的 RAYSUN MD1 無人機干擾器，設備能發射干擾電波距離達 1,000 公尺，海軍採購並部署於警衛連，作為營區警戒；伊拉克軍方以此裝備於伊拉克戰場，來對付大疆四軸無人機的攻擊，讓其在干擾 3 秒內失去控制和衛星定位，同時也具有影像傳輸干擾功能，讓操控者無法看到無人機上的影像進而達到有效驅離。⁶⁹

在針對政軍重要人事的要員防護，未來可以考慮參考其他國家作法，車隊配有一輛專門反制無人機的設備車，設備車就整合軟 / 硬殺系統，甚至攜帶刺針飛彈，對來襲的各類型無人機即時作反制。⁷⁰ 中科院

⁶⁵ 周永素，〈高加索衝突給臺灣的警示—無人機應用與反制是台海戰爭一大關鍵〉，《風傳媒》，2020 年 11 月 2 日，

https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=81074。

⁶⁶ 朱明，〈強化防禦能量 中科院以「雷護專案」進行雷射武器研發〉，《上報》，2020 年 2 月 16 日，<https://www.storm.mg/article/3161115>。

⁶⁷ 〈偵蒐測向機動車與干擾機動車〉，《國家中山科學研究院》，http://www.ncsist.org.tw/csistdup/products/product.aspx?product_Id=74&catalog=11。

⁶⁸ 同註 53，頁 110。

⁶⁹ 〈 RAYSUN MD1s Multicopter Defender 無人機干擾器〉，《駿安科技有限公司》，http://www.jiunan.com.tw/tw/defense/MulticopterDefender_s.html。

⁷⁰ 吳書緯，〈反制無人機斬首，蔡適應：注意干擾槍能否及時發揮功效〉，《風傳媒》，

於 2016 年整合雷達偵測、光電影像辨識、頻譜監測管理、射頻干擾、自動導引及攔截無人機等相關技術，完成無人防禦系統開發，可干擾並捕捉無人機，已納國軍建案需求籌獲中，中科院仍持續研發出無人機電子偵蒐與干擾系統、多頻段干擾彈及多載台自動防禦系統等產品。⁷¹

| 組成 | 系統操作台 | 光電目獲追蹤系統 | 射頻干擾系統 | 被動偵測系統 | 威脅預警雷達 | 干擾槍 |
|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 圖片 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

圖 3：中科院研發之無人機防禦系統

資料來源：<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/5310796>

肆、臺灣無人飛行載具未來發展

臺灣本島受限地理條件，防衛作戰則有「預警短、縱深淺、決戰快、持續難」等特點，面對中共無人系統偵察與打擊能力，將對臺海防衛體系增加壓力，國軍有必要採取應對措施，建立即時的防禦與反擊無人系統，以掌控戰場態勢、扭轉被動的局面。⁷² 人工智慧結合無人載具是各國近年熱絡研發方向，多數運用於偵察、巡邏或探測等工作，而未來勢必配備武器系統，執行戰鬥任務。如此可大幅減輕第一線戰鬥部隊的風險與負擔，改寫部隊後勤支援方式，進而改變戰場的遊戲規則。⁷³ 以下針對整體防衛構想「戰力防護、濱海決勝、灘岸殲敵」三階段作戰，來探討在發揮「創新 / 不對稱」之作戰思維下，無人系統載具未來如何發展。

2020 年 7 月 26 日，
<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3240571>。

⁷¹ 洪嘉豪，〈中科院研發無人機防禦系統 維護營安〉，《經濟部工業局》，2016 年 12 月 7 日，
<https://www.casid.org.tw/NewsView01.aspx?NewsID=1ad32a2d-1dbc-46ae-a8bd-83b886a72ebc>。

⁷² 同註 16，頁 35。

⁷³ 王臻明，〈戰場上的 AlphaGo：人工智慧帶來的軍事革命已悄然展開〉，《鳴人堂》，2021 年 1 月 29 日，
<https://opinion.udn.com/opinion/story/120873/5213045>。

一、戰力防護階段

中共攻臺作戰初期，癱瘓指管系統，快速縮短兵力投射的距離與精準打擊武器的精度，賦予新的作戰概念，實施猝然突襲，以出奇制勝。⁷⁴戰力防護階段貫穿作戰全程，是戰力發揮的關鍵。國軍藉由機動、隱蔽、分散、欺敵、偽裝、護衛、謀略、誤導，以及快速有效之損害管制，降低敵先期攻擊之危害，確保國軍戰力完整，以有效支持後續作戰。⁷⁵臺灣雖有高密度雷達監視海峽兩岸，但相關系統對於遠距離偵測目標常有誤判情勢，雷達常有自動濾除之誤差，可藉無人飛行載具進行重點海域偵搜與識別，為達此目的，無人飛行載具須有基本的製造能量，才能應付戰損所需。⁷⁶

故對於三軍地面部隊而言，為能有效維持戰力，俾利爾後作戰，分析在軍用無人飛行載具發展需求項目如下：

（一）微 / 小型

成本較低廉約幾千美元左右，攜帶及維護方便，用於蒐集及傳輸影像，體積小、機動性強，具低空飛行優勢，⁷⁷適用於臺灣地小人稠的守勢作戰環境，三軍地面部隊於短距離偵察。目前有手投擲起飛的「紅雀」微型無人機，偵察範圍在十幾公里左右，適合地面連、排級部隊的戰術偵蒐，適合納入近程建軍規劃。

（二）戰術型

現階段外、離島須採「獨立固守」作戰方式，然因應急迫威脅所伴隨武器載具多樣化發展，外島除配備視距外防空及反艦武器外，亦可部署無人飛行載具，削弱射程範圍之敵空中、海上載具，阻滯敵進犯進程，並減緩敵對臺我投射武力。⁷⁸因應情勢升高，東沙目前海軍偵蒐大隊「銳鷲」無人機登島部署，巡邏周邊海域。⁷⁹

⁷⁴ 同註 6，頁 83。

⁷⁵ 同註 8，頁 59。

⁷⁶ 同註 7，頁 51。

⁷⁷ 同註 63，頁 97。

⁷⁸ 同註 53，頁 106。

⁷⁹ 同註 57。

海軍之前就曾希望購買美製 MQ-8B，但因美方售價太高而讓海軍打退堂鼓。海巡署同樣也有類似需求，也建案購買民用型無人偵照直升機；期間，還因為海巡署認為「銳鳶」無人機需要跑道起降，不符合需求而不考慮購買，引發是否支持國貨的爭議。以同樣四面環海澳洲來看，引進美製的 MQ-4C，這是「全球之鷹」高空無人偵察機的海洋版，可用於海上偵蒐、監視與巡邏。⁸⁰

為能有效彌補現行海軍觀通系統、雷達偵測目標不足，於艦艇或外島地區配置具有垂直起降功能之戰術無人機，如美國海岸防衛隊所部署的鷹眼，可用於艦艇及陸地雙重部署，並實施定時、重點區域偵巡、監視與鑑別，⁸¹ 以有效支援艦隊防空作戰，可納入中程建軍規劃。

（三）反輻射

反輻射作戰是獲得戰場空優，短暫性摧毀敵軍防空雷達系統的關鍵性因素。將無人機用於制空作戰尚未成熟，仍在發展階段，而中科院所研發出「劍翔」反輻射無人機，即將量產，執行防空網壓制任務。可納入近程建軍規劃。

（四）運輸型

為大型四軸或多軸式 UAV，能垂直起降並運送物品，向前線運送補給品、燃料、彈藥等，減少因交通線被截斷或後勤兵源不足之困擾。⁸² 美國海軍陸戰隊於 2009 年由波音 A160T「蜂鳥」和洛克希德·馬丁/卡曼 K-Max 展示連續 3 天在不到 6 小時移動 2,722 公斤的能力，還通過海軍研究辦公室為「未來貨運無人機系統」的研究提供預算。該計畫為無人貨物補給任務開發專用飛機，諾斯羅普·格魯曼公司之前已經公開了一種稱為 MUVR 的貨運「黃貂魚」概念，以減少對車隊的需求。⁸³ 可納入遠程建軍規劃。

⁸⁰ 紀永添，〈軍用無人載具發展下的未來戰爭〉，《上報》，2020 年 3 月 20 日，https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=59259。

⁸¹ 藍明華，〈無人飛行載具（UAV）遂行海峽情、監、偵任務之研究〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第 44 卷第 2 期，2010 年 4 月，頁 50。

⁸² 同註 53，頁 109。

⁸³ Stephen Trimble, "US Forces Plot New Role for Unmanned Cargo Resupply," Flight Global, August 13, 2009, <https://www.flightglobal.com/us-forces-plot-new-role-for-unmanned-cargo-resupply/88392.article>.

表2：戰力防護階段無人飛行載具作戰運用需求分析

| 類型 | 功能性/作戰需求考量 | 需求單位 |
|--------|---|---------------------------------------|
| 微 / 小型 | 攜行方便，單人操作，可短距離偵察範圍在十幾公里，以利地面連、排級、海軍艦艇部隊的戰術偵蒐。 | 三軍地面部隊連 / 排級單位、海軍艦艇部隊 |
| 戰術型 | 可垂直起降，設計用於從地面和海軍艦艇平台部署，以執行反潛 / 反水面艦 / 反水雷戰等情監偵和通信中繼的任務。 | 空軍主力部隊 陸軍聯合兵種營 海軍艦艇部隊 海軍偵蒐大隊 |
| 反輻射型 | 為獲得戰場上的空優或是短暫性的摧毀敵軍防空雷達系統，執行防空網壓制任務。 | 防空部隊 |
| 運輸型 | 能垂直起降並運送重貨，用以向前線運送補給品、燃料、彈藥等，減少因交通線被截斷或後勤兵源不足之困擾。 | 地面部隊營級以上單位 |

本文製表。

二、濱海決勝階段

中共近年大量研發無人飛行載具，落實於平時演訓以實兵驗證作戰效能，以實施截擊作戰。⁸⁴ 在濱海決勝階段，主要選擇空中兵力及岸置火力可涵蓋範圍，慎選決戰海域，形成局部優勢，發揮統合戰力，阻殲敵航渡船團於半渡。⁸⁵ 為達成阻殲敵航渡船團於半渡，爭取制空權及制海權，系統發展需求項目如下：

（一）隱形長航程無人攻擊機

用以攻擊敵海上集結之登陸船團及敵當面戰略及軍事目標，減少對空軍主力戰機之依賴，減輕戰時戰機任務負擔，可作為誘餌以消耗敵防空飛彈。⁸⁶ 中 / 大型無人機體積大、飛行高、速度快、隱蔽好、成本高，適用在遠端大範圍內執行持久情報監視偵察、通信中繼、精確打擊等任務，機體表面覆蓋有反雷達塗層，能穿透嚴密防空體系，探測敵關鍵目標，可為友軍提供火力引導，亦可搭載武器進行攻擊。

⁸⁴ 同註 6，頁 85-86。

⁸⁵ 同註 8，頁 59。

⁸⁶ 同註 53，頁 106。

面對解放軍高密度、精準飛彈或戰轟機威脅，制空戰力須轉向低度依賴基地跑道與後勤設施、低人員傷亡風險的多元戰具發展，持續推動先進隱形長程無人攻擊載具應列為自主研製的重點，以爭取在解放軍奇襲下主戰機隊恢復戰力所需時間縱深。⁸⁷ 近期美國批准 MQ-9B 的軍購案，有利於對解放軍進行海平面以外目標的監控與瞄準。⁸⁸ 可納入遠程建軍規劃。

（二）大型自殺型

發現目標時即予摧毀，故發展能夠威脅敵方大型艦艇的長航程、偵搜系統的大型自殺式無人飛機，在智慧化武器加裝動力及彈翼，增加其滯空時間，在作戰時大量部署於臺海戰場空中盤旋，本身載有高爆炸藥或武器，能在空中依設定航線巡航，自行發現目標並伺機加以攻擊。⁸⁹ 可參考各國對於軍用無人系統之發展及運用效益，如大型無人機執行長時間海 / 空域監視任務，滯空時間可達 10 至 20 小時以上，透過資料鏈將監視資料下傳至接收站，可減少派遣空中預警機之負擔，⁹⁰ 大幅減低人員執行任務風險。可納入遠程建軍規劃。

（三）反輻射

空軍因應未來在防空制壓作戰需求，不考量回收，因需單向航程的飛行能力，貫穿目標不需要配備彈頭，透過高速俯衝就能對敵雷達或天線進行破壞，可減少燃料和載重負擔，大幅縮小機體。⁹¹ 因此，整合反輻射飛彈與無人飛行載具於一身的反輻射無人機，對當前各國的作戰需求而言，都有其未來的發展趨勢。⁹² 可納入近程建軍規劃。

⁸⁷ 同註 11，頁 3。

⁸⁸ 莊蕙嘉，〈重大對臺軍售案有譜？CNN：川普政府將批准〉，《EBC 東森電視》，2020 年 9 月 18 日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/6813/4865280>。

⁸⁹ 同註 53，頁 111。

⁹⁰ 同註 53，頁 108。

⁹¹ 吳明杰，〈「劍翔」反輻射無人機通過作戰測評 國軍握有摧毀對岸雷達能力〉，《風傳媒》，2017 年 10 月 2 日，
<https://www.storm.mg/article/338432?page=1>。

⁹² 〈以色列反輻射無人機〉，《南科航太關鍵系統技術升級推動計畫》，2018 年 8 月 13 日，
<http://www.acsc-stsp.org.tw/NewsView01.aspx?NewsID=50c95893-9e62-4b24-b609-6d9f82f7365e>。

(四) 空中加油機

空軍為爭取空優、對外離島制空權，面對當面空中之敵機纏鬥或機場跑道遭敵炸毀破壞，如無法獲得盟邦支援而短時間內無法降落，勢必需要藉空中加油方式，以爭取更多滯空時間。美國海軍 MQ-25 無人加油機，即將於 2021 年間完成開發，⁹³ 以擴大海軍在空對海作戰範圍，可見空中加油機是延續空中戰力很重要選項。可納入遠程建軍規劃。

表3：濱海決勝階段無人飛行載具作戰運用需求分析

| 類型 | 功能性 / 作戰需求考量 | 需求單位 |
|---------|--|------------------|
| 隱形長航程攻擊 | 機體表面覆蓋有反雷達塗層，能穿透嚴密防空體系，探測敵關鍵目標，為友軍提供火力引導，亦可搭載武器進行攻擊。 | 空軍主力部隊 海軍艦艇部隊 |
| 大型自殺型 | 自殺式可大量部署在空中依設定航線巡航，發現目標就立刻摧毀。 | 空軍主力部隊 |
| 反輻射型 | 反輻射型可自主的摧毀敵軍防空雷達系統，執行防空網壓制任務。 | 空軍防空部隊 |
| 空中加油機 | 空軍為爭取空優、對外離島制空權，更多滯空時間，是延續空中戰力很重要選項。 | 空軍主力部隊 |

本文製表。

三、灘岸殲敵階段

中共多元化的發展臺登陸輸具，直升機、氣墊船及地面效應飛行器在兩棲作戰運用之比例將提升，登陸後推進的縱深也往內陸延伸，將兵力投射運送到灘岸守備部隊後方，作戰重心將由爭奪水際灘頭，轉變為摧毀縱深重要目標的。⁹⁴ 灘岸殲敵階段，乘敵甫行登陸、艦岸運動之際，統合三軍兵、火力及預置障礙阻絕，擊滅登陸之敵於泊灘岸地區，使其

⁹³ 江飛宇，〈美國海軍 MQ-25 無人加油機 即將完成開發〉，《中時新聞網》，2021 年 3 月 17 日，

<https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20210317006262-260417?chdtv>。

⁹⁴ 同註 6，頁 87-88。

無法登陸立足。⁹⁵ 為能有效嚇阻敵登島企圖，軍用無人系統發展需求項目如下：

（一）短程偵察

體積小、飛行高度低、速度慢、隱蔽性好、成本低，適於在局部區域執行情報監視偵察任務，如美國海軍陸戰隊主要借助 RQ-12、RQ-20、RQ-21A 等小型無人機為營級以下作戰單位提供戰術情報支援。考量國軍基層部隊需求急迫性，可納入近程建軍規劃。

（二）戰術型

2019 年陸軍因應「聯合兵種營」編成，為滿足早期預警、爭取反應時間，同步辦理「戰術型近程無人飛行載具」的籌建與配賦，偵蒐範圍 30 公里、滯空停懸監控偵蒐達 1 小時以上、酬載 30 公斤、起降不用跑道的機動性等，以充實「聯合兵種營」偵蒐能力，⁹⁶ 未來可納入中程建軍規劃。

（三）小型自殺式

為增強灘岸殲敵作戰戰力，國防部從 2019 到 2022 年 4 年期程，以研發具掃瞄定位，鎖定目標進行攻擊小型自殺式無人機系統，將之運用在灘岸殲敵作戰上，對低空進犯的直升機、搶灘各式登陸艇、野牛級氣墊登陸艇等，都將成為自殺式無人機鎖定攻擊的目標。對應中科院所訂出「定翼無人機系統」的規格，與波蘭 WB 國防工業集團所推出的「戰友」（Warmate）小型自殺式無人機相符，⁹⁷ 後續可納入中程建軍規劃。

（四）誘餌機

亞塞拜然使用大量「安-2」無人機作為誘餌，未來可發展廉價的誘餌機編隊充當誘餌，消耗解放軍防空飛彈。可由無人機、雙翼飛機，甚至是老化戰鬥機組成，擴充編隊誘敵，攻擊目標。⁹⁸ 如藉研改屆壽期

⁹⁵ 同註 8，頁 59。

⁹⁶ 洪哲政，〈陸軍新建案採購 50 套「戰術型近程無人飛行載具」〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020 年 8 月 31 日，<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4823151>。

⁹⁷ 朱明，〈「火紅雀」主攻灘岸殲敵，中科院「奇隼專案」研發小型自殺式無人機〉，《上報》，2020 年 6 月 26 日，https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=90328。

⁹⁸ 楊俊斌，〈外媒：納卡衝突 台借鏡無人機戰術〉，《yahoo 新聞》，

F-5 戰機，性能提升並朝向無人化發展，可有效節約研發成本，以供遠程建軍規劃參考。可納入近程建軍規劃。

表4：灘岸殲敵階段無人飛行載具作戰運用需求分析

| 類型 | 功能性 / 作戰需求考量 | 需求單位 |
|-----------|---|-----------------------------|
| 短程偵察型 | 體積小、飛行高度低、速度慢、隱蔽性好、成本低，營級以下作戰單位執行情監偵任務，提供戰術情報支援。 | 地面部隊營級以下單位 |
| 戰術型 / 匿蹤型 | 可垂直起降，設計用於從地面和海軍平台部署，以執行反潛 / 反水面艦 / 反水雷戰等情監偵和通信中繼的任務。 | 空軍主力部隊 陸軍聯合兵種營 海軍偵蒐大隊 |
| 小型自殺式 | 具有掃瞄定位，運用在灘岸殲敵作戰上，鎖定低空進犯的目標進行自殺式攻擊 | 防空部隊 |
| 誘餌機 | 可發展廉價的誘餌機編隊充當誘餌，攻擊目標，消耗解放軍防空飛彈。 | 防空部隊 |

本文製表。

伍、結語

近年因推行募兵制加上少子化，使得國軍兵員減少，如何在有限人力達成防衛作戰使命？如臺灣不能形成戰略嚇阻武力，就必須設法以本身的常規武力，反制、破壞與延遲敵人目標的達成；如攻方採取速決戰的方式，守方就必須採取持久戰的方式。如雙方兵力規模過於懸殊，守方則採不對稱作戰方式，阻敵達成目標。目前中共在不對稱作戰運用的無人機，具備偵察預警、精準攻擊、偵打一體、飽和攻擊、電戰干擾、通信中繼、甚至有人 / 無人協同作戰等能力。反觀國軍現役「紅雀」與「銳鳶」僅有偵察能力，後續「劍翔」用來壓制敵地對空飛彈而不用於對地攻擊，「騰雲」正由中科院研發中緩不濟急，轉向美方籌購的

2020年10月11日，<https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E5%A4%96%E5%AA%92-%E7%B4%8D%E5%8D%A1%E8%A1%9D%E7%AA%81-%E5%8F%B0%E5%80%9F%E9%8F%A1%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%A9%9F%E6%88%B0%E8%A1%93-201000166.html>。

MQ-9B 執行海洋監視與偵察任務。

面對解放軍無人飛行載具威脅，國防部雖發布反制無人機計畫，分別以無人防禦系統、地面短程防空飛彈、快砲等予以反制或擊落；然在發展軍用無人系統與反制作為上，須由上而下整體聯合作戰規劃、各軍聯合作戰運用規劃及整合、創新戰術戰法研究、納入作戰操演訓練、驗證基層部隊預警能力及應變反制能力等。就無人飛行載具未來建軍備戰之重點，從整體防衛構想「戰力防護、濱海決勝、灘岸殲敵」三階段作戰任務中所規劃需求項目，依建軍願景規劃期程，將需求項目依技術等級，由簡而複、由小而大，區分近、中、遠程階段性逐步籌獲三軍所需是項裝備，歸納出發展藍圖並依階段劃分（如表 5 所示）。

發展無人飛行載具對臺灣而言，勢在必行且刻不容緩，在國軍新作戰指導「多維防禦、重層阻殲、守勢持久、重點突破」下，無人飛行載具對於防衛作戰的重要性，除能有效建構出不對稱戰力，且能帶來持久戰力，期能達成有效嚇阻敵進犯之企圖。

表 5：臺灣無人系統發展藍圖階段與期程

| 階段 | 戰力保存 | 濱海決勝 | 灘岸殲敵 |
|----|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 項目 | 微 / 小型 戰術型 反輻射型 運輸型 | 隱形長航程攻擊型 大型自殺型 反輻射型 空中加油機 | 短程偵察 戰術型 小型自殺型 UAV 誘餌機 |
| 期程 | 近程（5 年） | 中程（15 年） | 遠程（25 年） |
| 項目 | 微 / 小型 短程偵察 反輻射型 誘餌機 | 戰術型 小型自殺型 | 空中加油機 隱形長航程攻擊型 大型自殺型 UAV 運輸型 |

本文製表。

參考書目

一、專書

郭勝偉，《無人化戰爭》，北京：國防大學出版社，2011年。

二、期刊論文

平可夫，〈我國面臨更大的空防壓力〉，《漢和防務評論》，第167期，2018年9月，頁26-27。

吳姝璇，〈中共無人飛行載具發展對我防衛作戰威脅之研究〉，《陸軍學術雙月刊》，第55卷第568期，2019年12月，頁81-99。

呂兆祥，〈中共對臺軍事武力發展對我防衛作戰之影響〉，《國防雜誌》，第30卷第4期，2015年7月，頁67-95。

李建鵬、翁翠蓮，〈中共無人飛行載具對我防空作戰〉，《空軍學術雙月刊》，第677期，2020年8月，頁68-83。

唐承平，〈中共無人飛行載具發展對我防衛作戰影響之研究〉，《砲兵季刊》，第188卷，2020年3月，頁13-31。

徐康榮、孫亦韜，〈中共運用無人載具對我海軍艦隊作戰影響〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第52卷5期，2018年10月，頁72-85。

許然博，〈中共無人飛行載具發展對我海軍威脅〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第51卷第5期，2017年10月，頁115-134。

蔡志銓，2020/4。〈共軍無人飛行載具發展現況與我海軍因應作為〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第54卷第2期，2020年4月，頁22-38。

錢尹鑫，〈共軍發展無人飛行載具之戰略意涵與對我海軍影響之研究〉，《海軍軍官》，第3卷第37期，2020年4月，頁42-55。

藍明華，〈無人飛行載具（UAV）遂行海峽情、監、偵任務之研究〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第44卷第2期，2010年4月，頁46-60。

三、學位論文

楊涪誠，《共軍無人飛行載具（UAV）發展之探討》，淡江大學國際事務與戰略研究所碩士論文（2019）。

四、官方文件

中華民國 108 年國防報告書編纂委員會，《中華民國 108 年國防報告書》，（臺北：國防部戰略規劃司，2019 年）。

Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,” September 1, 2020, <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF>.

五、網際網路

〈21 世紀戰場核心武器！美軍測試作戰機器人系統，固有模式被打破〉，《每日頭條》，2019 年 1 月 14 日，
<https://kknews.cc/zh-tw/military/b59m6mo.html>。

〈 RAYSUN MD1s Multicopter Defender 無人機干擾器〉，《駿安科技有限公司》，
http://www.jiunan.com.tw/tw/defense/MulticopterDefender_s.html。

〈小型紅雀無人機〉，《國家中山科學研究院》，
http://www.ncsist.org.tw/csistdup/products/product.aspx?product_Id=19&catalog=56。

〈中東地區戰雲密佈中共無人機異軍崛起〉，《BBCNEWS》，2019 年 9 月 24 日，
<https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-49800202>。

〈中型中翔無人機〉，《國家中山科學研究院》，
http://www.ncsist.org.tw/csistdup/products/product.aspx?product_Id=20&catalog=56。

〈以色列反輻射無人機〉，《南科航太關鍵系統技術升級推動計畫》，2018 年 8 月 13 日，
<http://www.acsc-stsp.org.tw/NewsView01.aspx?NewsID=50c95893-9e62-4b24-b609-6d9f82f7365e>。

〈東南海域，登島演練〉，《新浪財經》，2019 年 10 月 10 日，
<https://finance.sina.com.cn/wm/2020-10-10/doc-iiivhuipp8934762.shtml>。

〈美軍簽下 26 億元合約 升級刺針飛彈對抗無人機系統〉，《自由時報》，2021 年 4 月 17 日，

<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/3502639>。

〈偵蒐測向機動車與干擾機動車〉，《國家中山科學研究院》，

http://www.ncsist.org.tw/csistdup/products/product.aspx?product_Id=74&catalog=11。

〈無人化裝備正在對我軍戰鬥力提供巨大助力〉，《壹讀》，2020 年 10 月 11 日，

<https://read01.com/zyJz86B.html#.X5J4Z9AzY2w>。

〈精進技術與研發 反制無人機攻擊〉，《青年日報》，2019 年 9 月 19 日，

<https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1179549>。

Chase, S. Michael, Gunness, A. Kristen, Morris, J. Lyle, Berkowitz, K. Samuel and Purser S. Benjamin, “Emerging Trends in China’s Development of Unmanned Systems,” *RAND*, 2015,

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR990.html.

Dominguez, Gabriel, “Taiwan deploys Albatross UAV to South China Sea islands,” *Janes*, August 27, 2020,

<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/taiwan-deploys-albatross-uav-to-south-china-sea-islands>.

Trimble, Stephen, “US Forces Plot New Role for Unmanned Cargo Resupply,” *Flight Global*, August 13, 2020,

<https://www.flightglobal.com/us-forces-plot-new-role-for-unmanned-cargo-resupply/88392.article>.

王臻明，〈戰場上的 AlphaGo：人工智慧帶來的軍事革命已悄然展開〉，《鳴人堂》，2021 年 1 月 29 日，

<https://opinion.udn.com/opinion/story/120873/5213045>。

朱明，〈「火紅雀」主攻灘岸殲敵 中科院「奇隼專案」研發小型自殺式無人機〉，《上報》，2020 年 6 月 26 日，

https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=90328。

朱明，〈強化防禦能量 中科院以「雷護專案」進行雷射武器研發〉，《上報》，2020年2月16日，
<https://www.storm.mg/article/3161115>。

江飛宇，〈美國海軍 MQ-25 無人加油機 即將完成開發〉，《中時新聞網》，2021年3月17日，
<https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20210317006262-260417?chdtv>。

吳明杰，〈「劍翔」反輻射無人機通過作戰測評 國軍握有摧毀對岸雷達能力〉，《風傳媒》，2017年10月2日，
<https://www.storm.mg/article/338432?page=1>。

吳書緯，〈反制無人機斬首 蔡適應：注意干擾槍能否及時發揮功效〉，《風傳媒》，2020年7月26日，
<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3240571>。

吳書緯，〈臺灣無人機研發 經緯航太：中科院應帶頭加速〉，《自由時報》，2021年4月2日，
<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1440707>。

吳賜山，〈中共大閱兵 無偵 8、攻擊 11 無人機首次亮相〉，《壹讀》，2019年10月1日，
<https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2019-10-01/305636>。

宋兆文，〈兩個旅就拿下澎湖？共軍退將喊話犯了兵家大忌〉，《ETtoday 新聞雲》，2019年12月26日，
<https://forum.ettoday.net/news/1611070#ixzz6bJWxNpPI>。

李忠衛，〈共機衝著國軍西南空域操演？〉，《公民新聞》，2020年10月23日，
<http://news.dwnnews.com/china/big5/news/2017-12-11/60028960.html>。

周永秦，〈高加索衝突給臺灣的警示—無人機應用與反制是台海戰爭一大關鍵〉，《風傳媒》，2020年11月2日，
<https://www.storm.mg/article/3161115>。

林則宏，〈共軍展示無人機如何導引直升機 跨海精準打擊〉，《聯合

新聞網》，2020年11月7日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/7331/4996273>。

施怡妉，〈大陸研製「AR500C」高原型無人直升機 部署在印度邊界防衝突〉，《ETtoday新聞》，2020年5月25日，
<https://www.ettoday.net/news/20200525/1721956.htm#ixzz6slQxMXSc>。

洪哲政，〈各軍搶餘額！國軍聯兵營4月1日全編成 無人機「有編無裝」〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020年2月9日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4331789>。

洪哲政，〈陸軍司令部：「獵隼案」能反無人機與巡弋飛彈〉，《聯合報》，2018年10月11日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/5039299>。

洪哲政，〈陸軍採購無人機 立法院曝國軍無人機現況〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020年10月27日，
https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4967228?from=udn-referralnews_ch2artbottom。

洪哲政，〈陸軍接收鷹式飛彈搜索雷達 野戰防空預警延伸至百公里〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020年11月1日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4979785>。

洪哲政，〈陸軍新建案採購50套「戰術型近程無人飛行載具」〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020年8月31日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4823151>。

洪哲政，〈陸軍蜂眼雷達移防東沙 反制共軍無人機與直升機〉，《聯合新聞網》，2020年11月1日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/4979821>。

洪哲政，2021/3/11。〈國軍反無人機方案首曝光 短程飛彈快砲擊落中共無人機〉，《聯合報》，2021年3月11日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/5310796>。

洪嘉豪，〈中科院研發無人機防禦系統 維護營安〉，《經濟部工業局》，2016年12月7日，
<https://www.casid.org.tw/NewsView01.aspx?NewsID=1ad32a2d-1dbc->

46ae-a8bd-83b886a72ebc。

紀永添，〈軍用無人載具發展下的未來戰爭〉，《上報》，2020年3月20日，

https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=59259。

莊蕙嘉，〈重大對臺軍售案有譜？CNN：川普政府將批准〉，《EBC東森電視》，2020年9月18日，

<https://udn.com/news/story/6813/4865280>。

許智翔，〈國軍戰備不只應該納入無人機，更該學習如何防備無人機〉，《關鍵評論》，2020年7月13日，

<https://www.thenewslens.com/article/137463>。

陳亦偉，〈作戰無人機大對決 顛覆戰爭遊戲規則〉，《奇摩新聞》，2020年12月7日，

<https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E4%BD%9C%E6%88%B0%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%A9%9F%E5%A4%A7%E5%B0%8D%E6%B1%BA-%E9%A1%9B%E8%A6%86%E6%88%B0%E7%88%AD%E9%81%8A%E6%88%B2%E8%A6%8F%E5%89%87-034113332.html>。

游凱翔，〈跨軍種聯合運用 陸軍將設紅雀無人機訓練班隊〉，《中央社》，2019年4月19日，

http://www.ncsist.org.tw/csistdup/products/product.aspx?product_Id=19&catalog=56。

舒孝煌、許智翔，〈臺灣發展不對稱戰力的利基〉，《2018 國防科技趨勢評估報告》，2018年12月，頁101-113，《國防安全研究院》，

<https://indsr.org.tw/Download/%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E7%A7%91%E6%8A%80%E8%B6%A8%E5%8B%A2%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A.pdf>。

黃順祥，〈消磨臺灣戰力！不直接動武！中共採用「灰色地帶」戰術〉，《Newtalk 新聞》，2020年12月14日，

<https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2020-12-14/508465>。

新境界文教基金會國防政策諮詢小組，〈二〇二五年中國對臺軍事威脅評估〉，《國防政策藍皮書第五號報告》，2014年3月，《新境界文教基金會》，

http://www.dppnff.tw/uploads/20140305230307_2072.pdf。

楊俊斌，〈外媒：納卡衝突 台借鏡無人機戰術〉，《yahoo 新聞》，2020年10月11日，

<https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E5%A4%96%E5%AA%92-%E7%B4%8D%E5%8D%A1%E8%A1%9D%E7%AA%81-%E5%8F%B0%E5%80%9F%E9%8F%A1%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%A9%9F%E6%88%B0%E8%A1%93-201000166.html>。

楊俊斌，〈殲-6 改成無人機 70 架部署武夷山〉，《中時新聞網》，2019年5月15日，

<https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20190515000162-260301?chdtv>。

葉琪，〈解放軍陸軍實彈實兵演練 無人車及無人機登場〉，《香港01》，2019年8月20日，

<https://www.hk01.com/%E5%8D%B3%E6%99%82%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B/365837/%E9%82%81%E5%85%A5%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E5%8C%96%E6%99%82%E4%BB%A3-%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E9%99%B8%E8%BB%8D%E5%AF%A6%E5%BD%88%E5%AF%A6%E5%85%B5%E6%BC%94%E7%B7%B4-%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E8%BB%8A%E5%8F%8A%E7%84%A1%E4%BA%BA%E6%A9%9F%E7%99%BB%E5%A0%B4>。

蔡翼，〈科技將改變台海作戰型態〉，《臺北論壇》，2019年5月22日，
http://www.taipeiforum.org.tw/print/P_531.php。

羅添斌，〈反制無人機威脅 我獲邀觀摩美軍「黑鏢演習」〉，《自由時報》，2017年9月10日，

<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2188973>。

中共對臺現代政治作戰 與臺灣政戰體制之未來

廖哲偉

陸軍上尉政戰官

摘 要

「現代政治作戰」乃政治作戰之現代運用，本文以《現代政治作戰：目前的做法與可行的對策》一書中提出的政治作戰四大面向（外交、資訊、軍事、經濟），分析中共對臺政治工作之運用，從其對台影響檢視臺灣現行政戰體制，並提出提升戰略層級、專業化及擴編專業政戰部隊等未來改革建議。

關鍵詞：現代政治作戰、中共政戰、政戰制度、政戰改革

China's Modern Political Warfare to Taiwan and the Future of Taiwan's Political Warfare Institution

Zhe-Wei Liao

Political Warfare Officer, Captain

Army

Abstract

“Modern Political Warfare” is the modern application of political warfare. This article will analyze China's application of Modern Political Warfare to Taiwan from four major perspectives (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics) proposed in *Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses* which was published by the American think tank RAND Corporation in 2018, and put forward some reform suggestions to Taiwan's political warfare institution, such as upgrading the strategic level, professionalization and expanding field professional political warfare troops.

Keywords: *Modern Political Warfare, China's Political Warfare, Political Warfare Institution, Political Warfare Reformation*

壹、前言

「除直接以軍事和武力加諸敵人的戰鬥行為，皆可謂之政治作戰。」

「政治作戰一切重在『鬥智』，卻並不完全排斥『鬥力』，因為政治作戰是含有非武力的示威，準武力的暴動，或半武力的特種作戰」

—— 蔣中正¹

根據國防部 105 年頒行之《國軍政治作戰要綱》其特性之一在於不分平戰時、超越一切時空限制；自古以來，戰爭除直接以武力加諸對手外，其他非武力、半武力之手段亦常為國家在平時或戰時所使用，而其中一切非純軍事武力之手段皆可謂之政治作戰。² 因此，政治作戰是智慧與力量的結合。

「現代政治作戰」乃政治作戰之在現代戰爭的運用，本文先從定義開始談起，以外交、資訊、軍事、經濟等面向實際舉例分析中共如何對臺運用政治作戰手段企圖實現其戰略目標；最終反思因應之道，針對臺灣現行政戰體制提出未來改革建議。

貳、何謂現代政治作戰

一、政治作戰之定義

依照 105 年版《國軍政治作戰要綱》「政治作戰」定義為：「除直接以軍事和武力加諸敵人的戰鬥行為，皆可謂之政治作戰」。惟蔣中正前總統曾於民國 46 年在一篇題為「政治作戰的要領」講詞中補充說明道：「政治作戰一切重在『鬥智』，卻並不完全排斥『鬥力』，因為政治作戰含非武力的示威，準武力的暴動，或半武力的特種作戰」說明臺灣對政治作戰的定義除了非武力的一切手段外，亦不排斥其他準武力及半武力手段。尤其特性超越時空限制，於平戰時皆能適用。在《國軍政治作戰要綱》中亦提及臺灣政治作戰區分為國家階層之政治作戰與軍事

¹ 蔣中正，「政治作戰的要領」，《總統對本校訓詞集》（台北：政治作戰學校，1970 年），頁 18。

² 國防部，《國軍政治作戰要綱》（台北：中華民國國防部，2016 年），頁 1-3、1-5。

階層之政治作戰，其區別在於目的是為達成國家／軍事目標而分屬之。³簡言之，對政治作戰一詞之定義乃是：「國家不分平戰時，為達成國家目標（或軍事目標）對敵所採取之一切非純武力手段，皆屬於政治作戰」

國外亦有許多不同的名詞來指涉政治作戰，例如美國外交官凱南（George Frost Kennan）於 1948 年發表政策備忘錄中提出政治作戰（Political warfare）一詞，具體內容為：「政治作戰是克勞塞維茨的理論在和平時期的合理應用。廣義來說，政治作戰是指在國家指揮下，於平時為維護國家利益所採取的種種手段。政治作戰既公開又隱蔽。政治作戰的諸多手段包括政治聯盟、經濟措施和白色文宣等這類公開手段，隱密的行動則包括秘密協助友好國家、黑色心理戰，甚至金援敵對國家的地下反抗軍」等。⁴除將政治作戰限縮於平時外，其餘實質內容與臺灣定義幾乎一致。

灰色地帶衝突（Gray-zone conflict）是近年常用於描述此種非傳統作戰方式的名詞，有學者曾定義其為：「灰帶衝突的手段主要包含經濟、資訊攻擊、以及準軍事等手段，其本質是家園戰爭，藉由對手內部壓力改變政策現狀，更可轉為顛覆工具」。⁵側重於使用非軍事手段達成對手內部政治與政策改變。其他諸如「混合戰」（Hybrid warfare）、「非正規戰爭」（Irregular warfare）、「超限戰」、「三戰」雖側重與強調之處各有不同，惟本質與概念上仍不脫政治作戰之範疇。

二、現代政治作戰之範圍與四大面向

政治作戰並非新興名詞，事實上，人類有衝突歷史以來，便經常在戰爭與和平間使用各式非武力、半武力或準武力手段企圖達成國家目標或軍事目標。如就外交層面而言，戰國時期六國聯合抗秦之「合縱」策略即可視為一種以聯盟手段進行之外交戰；又例如楚漢相爭垓下之戰，楚軍四面被圍，漢軍高唱楚國歌曲致使楚軍士氣崩潰的「四面楚歌」亦是古代政治作戰心理戰術的經典運用。

³ 國防部，《國軍政治作戰要綱》，頁 1-4。

⁴ Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helms, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Katya Migacheva, *Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses* (California: RAND Corporation, 2018), p.1-2.

⁵ 國防安全研究院，《國防情勢特刊 - 灰色地帶衝突特輯》（台北：財團法人國防安全研究院，2020 年），頁 1-2。

而現代政治作戰概念乃是政治作戰在現代戰爭的運用。美國智庫蘭德公司於 2018 年出版的《現代政治作戰：目前的做法與可行的對策》一書中解釋現代政治作戰案例具體內容及分析，主要集中於 2005-2015 年之間。該書中亦提出了現代政治作戰的四大面向：分別為外交（Diplomatic）、資訊（Information）、軍事（Military）、經濟（Economic）等面向（以下簡稱 DIME 四大面向）⁶，並以此分析俄國、伊朗及伊斯蘭國（The Islamic State）在各面向上的運用情況。

要特別注意的是這四大面向並非完全獨立，而是經常互相關聯和重疊，例如二戰後美國為防止蘇聯赤化歐洲，因此在歐洲廣泛進行經濟援助、協助歐洲戰後復甦的馬歇爾計畫（The Marshall Plan）即重疊了經濟與外交兩個面向；而各面向更具體的關係則如圖 1。

即使如此，中共過去對台統戰作為，符合相關界定。因此本文所定義之中共對臺「現代政治作戰」範圍界定在 1979 年 1 月 1 日中共人大常委會發表《告臺灣同胞書》，⁷ 提出「和平統一」方針，將對臺政策由軍事對抗轉變為和平統一後迄今，⁸ 其對臺所實施之政治作戰作為。

⁶ Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helms, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Katya Migacheva, *Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses*, p6-7.

⁷ 中共第五屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會，《中華人民共和國全國人大常委會告臺灣同胞書》，1979 年 1 月 1 日，《中華人民共和國駐毛里求斯共和國大使館》，<http://mu.china-embassy.org/chn/ztlm/twwt/t151787.htm>。

⁸ 寇健文，〈中國大陸對臺工作組織體系與人事〉，《大陸委員會委託研究報告》，2019 年 3 月，頁 26，《大陸委員會》，<https://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/295/refile/7845/73953/dad82e36-96d1-43bc-a57e-47e3b777064b.pdf>。




圖 1 現代政治作戰四大面向關係圖

資料來源：筆者根據 Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Katya Migacheva, *Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses* (California : RAND Corporation, 2018) , p.7 之內容翻譯及部分修改。

從圖 1 可看出 DIME 四大面向經常彼此重疊；在常態性的外交、資訊、軍事或經濟行為外，若有涉及實踐國家戰略目標或軍事目標者，即可歸類為政治作戰，在各面向重疊處，則有若干手段涉及不同面向的同時運用；例如圖一正中央之「協助反對勢力」即可被認定為同時與 DIME 四面向皆有相關。另外就其他有關現代政治作戰之具體手段，筆者整理如表 1。

表 1 現代政治作戰之具體手段

| 面向 | 具體手段 |
|----|---|
| 外交 | 支援敵國執政黨的反對勢力或反對黨、協助有利我國之候選人進行選舉、建立同盟制衡敵國、鼓吹敵國殖民地獨立削弱敵國 ... 等。 |
| 資訊 | 建立電台、電視台用目標語言大量傳播有利我戰略意圖之資訊、空飄氣球與傳單、在敵國境內出版地下刊物、贊助敵國反對之文化或藝術活動、策動網軍滲透敵國重要民意論壇、製造虛假新聞、散佈恐慌、收買敵國媒體協助傳播不實資訊、情報蒐集 ⁹ ... 等。 |
| 軍事 | 除直接軍事作戰外的軍事運用；例如以演習、飛彈試射、機艦隊逼近敵國領域威嚇敵國人民、援助並扶持敵國境內的游擊隊及反叛份子、透過先期情報滲透、策反協助進行政變、大規模部署部隊和發展核子武器嚇阻敵人或是提供武器軍援盟邦 ... 等。 |
| 經濟 | 直接的禁止出口和經濟封鎖、貿易戰爭或是透過經濟援助和協助建設籠絡目標國 ... 等。 |

資料來源：根據蘭德公司出版之《現代政治作戰：目前的做法與可行的對策》內容整理。

說明：此表僅將各具體手段予以分類為四大面向，未考慮同手段多面向重疊部分。

綜整表 1 內容，可知現代政治作戰在 DIME 四大面向均有具體手段可供國家乃至非國家行為者運用。

參、中共對臺現代政治作戰之分析

不同於臺灣將「思想、組織、安全、服務」等平時部隊政戰工作與側重對敵行動之「思想戰、謀略戰、組織戰、心理戰、群眾戰、情報戰」等六大戰皆稱為政治作戰；¹⁰ 中共將相對於我國政戰工作稱為「政治工作」，而若特別指涉相對於我國戰時之政戰作為，共軍則稱為「戰時政

⁹ 傳統之情報蒐集（公開情報與諜員情報）及反制作為（反情報、反滲透）亦屬於政治作戰之範疇。

¹⁰ 本文所提政治作戰定義是指「國家不分平戰時，為達成國家目標（或軍事目標）對敵所採取之一切非純武力手段」。

治工作」¹¹。

2003年共軍才在「政工條例」修訂過程中，將其「政治工作」定義為：「指圍繞軍事目的，通過對各種資源的整合，從政治、外交、思想、精神、心理諸領域、諸層面展開對敵攻勢，以達成目的的非武力對抗形式。政治作戰是一種獨立的樣式。其更主要的是借助於輿論戰、心理戰、法律戰」¹²其定義與臺灣之差別在於僅限於軍事目的而不包含國家目的，並強調結合輿論戰、心理戰、法律戰之「三戰」進行運用。

共軍雖於2003年才探討跟提出政治工作之概念，且將之限縮在軍事階層；然而其具體作為卻從中共建黨迄今熟練地運用；例如毛澤東稱為「革命勝利的三大法寶」之一的「統一戰線」（以下簡稱統戰），內容實質是「聯合次要敵人，打擊主要敵人」¹³配合其針對不同對象之操作；例如於國共內戰時期拉攏地方軍閥勢力或民主黨派對抗國民政府、近年來拉攏臺商以影響臺灣選舉與社會輿論等，都可被認定是一種涵蓋軍事與非軍事階層乃至超軍事階層之政治作戰；¹⁴故本文所討論之中共對臺政治工作不限縮於軍事階層，而是包含非軍事階層以及國家戰略層次的分析與探討。

¹¹ 中共「戰時政治工作」之主要內容為：「加強黨委對作戰的統一領導，保證中共中央、中央軍委的軍事戰略方針、作戰原則和命令、指示的貫徹執行。進行作戰動員和戰場鼓動。健全組織，調整補充幹部。發揚軍事民主，開展立功創模活動。進行輿論戰、心理戰、法律戰，開展瓦解敵軍工作，開展反心戰、反策反工作，開展軍事司法和法律服務工作。做好參戰民兵、民工政治工作和戰區群眾工作。維護戰場紀律和群眾紀律。做好烈士善後工作。」參見：中共中央軍委，《中國人民解放軍政治工作條例》，2003年12月5日，第14條第18項，《軍隊思想政治工作宣講平臺》，

<https://dysw.cnki.net/jd/djzs/%E3%80%8A%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E5%86%9B%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%B%E5%B7%A5%E4%BD%9C%E6%9D%A1%E4%BE%8B%E3%80%8B.pdf>。

¹² 潘進章，〈共軍「政治作戰」發展初探〉，《國防雜誌》，第24卷第1期，2009年3月，頁32。

¹³ 毛澤東，《毛澤東選集第2卷》（北京：人民出版社，1972年），頁597。

¹⁴ 應特別注意「統戰」不等於「政治作戰」；統戰為「聯合次要敵人打擊主要敵人」之政治行動，此行動對於聯合對象、打擊目標會伴隨時空環境不同而產生不同意義，例如抗戰時期之「抗日民族統一戰線」其「名義上」的打擊目標是針對日本，就並非對身為聯合對象的國民政府實施政治作戰（這裡是就名義上而言，實質上中共於抗戰時期仍多次與國民政府發生衝突，並藉機發展根據地、擴大自身武裝力量）；到了國共內戰時期，為聯合民主黨派共同對抗國民政府而成立的「人民民主統一戰線」則轉變為對國民政府進行政治作戰，而對民主黨派則不然，區分統戰是否為政治作戰，主要判斷方式為其統戰之最終目的以及在此一過程中是被作為統戰

一、外交運用

中共對臺外交其主要戰略目標在消滅中華民國臺灣之國際人格，因而長期外交孤立與封鎖臺灣，企圖打壓臺灣生存空間與國際能見度，其具體手段主要有二：一是把中共版本「一個中國」原則全球化與法制化；二是消除臺灣國際能見度，阻止臺灣參與國際組織、降低臺灣邦交國數量。¹⁵ 以下分別論述：

(一) 「一個中國」原則全球化與法制化

中共國務院在 1993 年發表《臺灣問題與中國的統一白皮書》其中定義一個中國原則為：「世界上只有一個中國，臺灣是中國不可分割的一部分」。¹⁶ 實務上，中共堅持「一個中國」政策作為其外交建交的基本原則；凡與中共建交者不能與中華民國同時保持外交關係，致國際多數國家選擇與中共建交的同時，切斷與中華民國之外交關係；中共強硬採取「中華人民共和國為中國唯一合法代表」之政策，將一中原則全球化，企圖打壓中華民國在國際的生存空間。

中共於 2005 年制定《反分裂國家法》將一個中國原則法制化，該法第二條直言：「世界上只有一個中國，大陸和臺灣同屬一個中國，中國的主權和領土完整不容分割。維護國家主權和領土完整是包括臺灣同胞在內的全中國人民的共同義務。」並在第三條：「臺灣問題是中國內戰的遺留問題。解決臺灣問題，實現祖國統一，是中國的內部事務，不受任何外國勢力的干涉。」將臺灣問題內政化，最後在第八條：「臺獨分裂勢力以任何名義、任何方式造成臺灣從中國分裂出去的事實，或者發生將會導致臺灣從中國分裂出去的重大事變，或者和平統一的可能性完全喪失，國家得採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，捍衛國家主權和領土完整。」藉這項法律，以合法化將來對臺動武之行動。¹⁷

之打擊目標還是聯合對象；簡言之，本文認為「統戰」是一種政治手段，伴隨運用對象與方式不同決定其是否具備政治作戰性質及歸屬於何面向，而已成為統戰目標對象之一方，其反統戰作為亦是種政治作戰。

¹⁵ 許志嘉，〈從臺哥斷交論中共對臺外交孤立與兩岸關係〉，《展望與探索》，第 5 卷第 7 期，2007 年 7 月，頁 7。

¹⁶ 中共國務院新聞辦公室，《臺灣問題與中國的統一白皮書》，1993 年 8 月，《中華人民共和國外交部》，https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/ywzt_675099/wztt_675579/2296_675789/t10531.shtml。

¹⁷ 中共第十屆全國人民代表大會，《反分裂國家法》，中華人民共和國法律，

制定《反分裂國家法》不僅將一個中國法制化、臺海問題內政化，更從法律對臺灣發動打擊，構成中共「三戰」中法律戰的重要內涵。中共政治工作，側重以三戰為手段展開對敵攻勢；《反分裂國家法》的制定本身就是一種中共對臺加諸的政治作戰。

（二）消除臺灣國際能見度

中共為消除臺灣之國際能見度，持續打壓我國參與國際組織，最廣為人知者，莫過於阻擾臺灣參與世界衛生組織（World Health Organization, WHO）及出席世界衛生大會（World Health Assembly, WHA），例如 2020 年 11 月臺灣試圖參與世界衛生大會，雖有馬紹爾群島（Marshall Islands）及宏都拉斯（Republic of Honduras）等友邦為臺灣發聲，並提案「邀請臺灣作為觀察員參加 WHA」但中國堅持一中原則，以政治問題凌駕健康議題阻擾，最終未能列入大會議程。¹⁸

臺灣外交部從民國 91 年迄今每年均不斷蒐集「中國阻撓我國國際空間事例」並持續更新，放至外交部網站；單以民國 108 年為例，外交部就蒐集諸如「中國社科院、北京大學聯合發布《網絡法治藍皮書》，點名要求蘋果（APPLE）、耐吉（NIKE）、亞馬遜（AMAZON）、西門子（SIEMENS）等 66 家跨國企業網頁將「臺灣」標示為「中國臺灣」…」等 31 項事例。¹⁹

國家安全會議更在《中國升高對臺威脅與介選之綜合研析（摘要）》中明確指出「中國無所不用其極地打壓臺灣外交空間」旨在「消滅中華民國臺灣的國際人格」已採取之打壓手段包含：²⁰

1. 連續中斷臺邦交國，製造外交危機

2005 年 3 月 14 日。

¹⁸ 唐佩君、戴雅真，〈臺灣參與案未列 WHA 議程，中國打壓枉顧世人健康〉，《中央社》，2020 年 11 月 9 日，

<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202011090361.aspx>。

¹⁹ 中華民國外交部，〈108 年中國阻撓我國國際空間事例〉，2019 年 12 月 31 日，頁 1-7，《中華民國外交部》，

https://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/WebArchive/2655/108%E5%B9%B4%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%BB%E6%92%93%E6%88%91%E5%9C%8B%E9%9A%9B%E7%A9%BA%E9%96%93%E4%BA%8B%E4%BE%8B_1081231.pdf。

²⁰ 國家安全會議，《中國升高對臺威脅與介選之綜合研析（摘要）》，2019 年 9 月 23 日，頁 3-4，《中華民國總統府》，

<https://www.president.gov.tw/File/Doc/496a5b04-650c-421e-af44-41a3e1fdcdbb>。

2. 持續抵制臺灣參與國際組織或主辦國際活動
3. 施壓跨國公司、國際航空公司等矮化對臺之稱呼標示
4. 矮化臺灣民間組織參與國際非政府組織及國際交流合作名稱與權益
5. 要駐在國及兼轄國政府機關（含地方政府）所核發之各類證件更改臺灣名稱

顯見中共正有計畫、有目的地在外交領域對臺灣展開政治作戰；利用各式外交手段積極達成其「消滅中華民國臺灣國際人格」的目標。

二、資訊運用

中共明確以「三戰」為手段執行政治作戰，心理戰作為共軍對臺政治作戰的重要環節。近年來，在執行對臺心戰上最具代表性的手段莫過於「資訊戰」（又稱認知空間作戰），此種資訊戰有別於傳統戰時透過光纖、雷達、電腦、衛星、雷射等資訊技術及設備，爭奪資訊領域控制權及使用權的「科技層面的」資訊戰，其主要是「平時」透過諸如大外宣、官方媒體、內容農場、親中媒體、網軍、口耳相傳等方式，²¹ 散播虛假訊息，達成弱化臺灣心理防線的資訊戰。²²

惟應特別注意的是中共對臺實施心理戰，不僅只有透過資訊手段，其亦使用包含軍事、外交與經濟等其它面向在內的諸多方式對臺實施心戰。例如，在軍事上頻繁進行武力展示、在外交上創造中華民國孤立之處境以恐嚇並打擊臺灣民心士氣或是以經濟手段籠絡特定群眾，達成改變其政治認同之目的等，皆是中共直接或間接對臺灣實施心戰之實際例證。說明中共雖以「三戰」作為政治作戰之主要方式，但在具體執行上仍適用四大面向實施分析，當中以直接影響民眾心理認知為目的之資訊戰，是最為直接心戰手段。

²¹ 此種「心理層面的」資訊戰雖主要作用於平時，惟其在戰時亦能加以運用；透過製造謠言、散播恐懼以加速摧毀戰時心理防線、為軍事行動製造有利態勢及直接發動心戰攻勢等皆是。

²² 陳佳君，〈沈伯洋：解讀疫情之下的中國資訊戰〉，《新聞實驗室》，2020年6月19日，
<https://newslab.pts.org.tw/news/230-%E6%B2%88%E4%BC%AF%E6%B4%8B%E4%B9%8B%E7%96%AB%E6%83%85%E4%B9%8B%E7%9A%84%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E8%B3%87%E8%A8%8A%E6%88%B0>。

學者曾指出中共對臺的資訊戰共有 5 條線路：分別為中華人民共和國國家安全部（國安部）、中共中央統一戰線工作部（統戰部）、國務院臺灣事務辦公室（國臺辦）、中國人民解放軍（解放軍）所轄之戰略支援部隊網絡系統部及相關企業以及中國共產主義青年團（共青團），此外中共中央宣傳部（中宣部）在資訊戰方面亦擔負重要角色，其大致分工如表 2。

表 2 中共對臺資訊戰負責組織及分工

| 組織 | 資訊戰分工項目 |
|---------------------------|---|
| 國安部 | 主要利用駭客進行網路攻擊，目標為臺灣的健保、戶籍與監理處資料庫…等，同時與臺灣地方黑道對口。 |
| 統戰部 | 策辦各式兩岸交流協會及活動、舉辦低價旅行團以及滲透地方村里組織及宮廟系統，藉機開設 LINE 或微信群組，在群組內散播虛假訊息。 |
| 國臺辦 | 主要負責臺商方面，除了在臺商群組內散播假訊息外，更透過臺商將金流轉給臺灣的公關行銷公司及地方宮廟進行選舉操作；同時亦經營內容農場網站，並把自製假新聞投放到臉書社團、政治人物的後援會中。 |
| 解放軍 （戰略支援部隊網絡系統部及相關企業） | 解放軍於 2015 年底新成立的戰略支援部隊中的網絡系統部設有專職對臺實施資訊戰的網軍部隊，同時由解放軍退役將領投資的中國行銷公司亦會直接外包並承接各式專案對臺灣進行攻擊，這些網軍多活躍於臺灣重要的網路民意論壇批踢踢（PTT）與臉書。 |
| 共青團 | 指揮帝吧（中國社群網站「百度貼吧」的一個論壇版塊，以「愛國」、「戰狼」著稱）等網友，翻牆到臉書、YouTube 或 Twitter 等處大量留言、施加壓力，此舉稱為「帝吧出征」 |
| 中宣部 | 具體負責領導、執行與審核中共對內對外意識形態宣傳工作，而中共對臺宣傳工作雖主要由國臺辦負責組織，惟在業務指導及檢查上仍須受中宣部管理，而其餘對外國之宣傳機構（即俗稱之「大外宣」）則直接由中宣部領導。 ²³ |

資料來源：莊翊晨，〈臺灣已進入準戰爭狀態？專家揭秘中共對臺資訊戰背後秘密〉，《今周刊》，2019年9月19日。

²³ 郭瑞華，《中共對臺工作機制研究：政府過程的觀點》，國立政治大學東亞研究所博士論文（2009），頁 244-246。

由表 2 可知中共對臺發動資訊戰是由橫跨黨政軍的多部門分工執行，具體而言，戰略目標整理如表 3。

表 3 中共對臺資訊戰之戰略目標

| 項次 | 目標 |
|----|---|
| 1 | 警告臺灣若走向「臺獨」可能引發戰爭風險。 |
| 2 | 扶持親中勢力，影響臺灣選舉。 |
| 3 | 營造兩岸對立及緊張關係升高氛圍。 |
| 4 | 塑造中共強國強軍形像，醜化弱化國軍戰力。 ²⁴ |
| 5 | 攻擊政府及政策，操弄臺灣政治與族群對立，撕裂社會。 ²⁵ |

資料來源：國家安全會議，《中國升高對臺威脅與介選之綜合研析（摘要）》。²⁶

從表 2 與表 3 內容可發現，中共對臺在資訊方面的政治作戰不僅設定多個明確的戰略目標，並且從國家戰略階層開始向下分工執行，對臺灣國家安全構成嚴重威脅。

三、軍事運用

中共並未對臺灣在軍事直接實施攻擊，惟經常性利用武裝力量作為威嚇工具，企圖達成其戰略目標；如頻繁地使用軍機、艦隊巡弋臺海，繞行臺灣週邊海空域，進行針對性的軍事威嚇，意圖打擊臺灣軍民士氣；同時更企圖將臺灣海峽「內海化」，對美國、日本等國發出警告。²⁷

以 1995、1996 年的臺海危機為例；1995 年 6 月時任中華民國總統的李登輝先生訪問美國，在康乃爾大學（Cornell University）發表「民之所欲、常在我心」演講，²⁸ 首次提出「中華民國在臺灣」概念，直接

²⁴ 蕭長展，〈臺灣基進陳柏惟恐國人「槍口對向自己人」：國防部勿輕忽中共「認知作戰」〉，《沃草》，2020 年 10 月 23 日，<https://musou.watchout.tw/read/WLsZsJAbpobZk3oEeWrQ>。

²⁵ 蔡雨葳，《中共運用假訊息對我影響之研究》，國防大學政戰學院政治學系政治研究所碩士論文（2020），頁 56-57。

²⁶ 國家安全會議，《中國升高對臺威脅與介選之綜合研析（摘要）》，頁 6。

²⁷ 國家安全會議，《中國升高對臺威脅與介選之綜合研析（摘要）》，頁 7。

²⁸ 演講全文請見：中華民國總統府，〈總統在歐林講座演講〉，1995 年 6 月 10 日，《中華民國總統府》，<https://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/22622>。

觸及到中共的「一個中國」政治紅線。事後引發北京強烈反彈，遂有1995與1996年間的臺海危機：第一階段為1995年7月至11月23日，中共首次在基隆與高雄外海劃設彈著區發射飛彈，另在海上與東山島實施兩棲登陸等共4場軍演，為的是抗議李前總統訪美及演說內容。第二階段為1996年3月8日至3月25日，其戰略目的則是影響當年度3月23日臺灣首次舉行的總統直接選舉，軍演內容與第一階段相似，選在距離臺灣最近的平潭島進行兩棲登陸演習。²⁹

除了1995年與1996年的臺海危機外，中共對臺使用武力作為威嚇工具，還有2016年蔡英文總統就任後，開始一系列機艦隊繞臺和迫近臺灣海空域之舉動。以國防部網站公布之「中共解放軍進入西南空域活動情況」為例，單自109年9月17日至109年12月16日約3個月期間，共軍已進入臺灣西南空域達63次之多；³⁰國防部判斷中共頻繁繞臺及迫近臺灣海空域目的在於「對周邊國家具體展現戰略威懾意涵」。³¹解放軍東部戰區新聞發言人張春暉則強調：「（繞臺）完全是主權國家正當合法權利，有利於維護臺海和平穩定」³²不論其目的是戰略威懾、維護臺海穩定或是「警告臺獨分子」，³³皆可看出這是中共有計畫化地利用軍事武力作為政治工具，企圖達成其單一或多種戰略目標之舉動。

最後還有一類結合統戰、心戰運用與軍事層面之政治作戰值得吾人關注；即以參加「中山黃埔兩岸情」論壇，及「紀念孫中山先生誕辰一五〇週年大會」為名義，邀請大批退役將領赴陸出席活動，並聽取習近平講話。此種方式一方面以統戰手段攏絡退役將領，一方面使國人質疑國軍高層之忠誠度，進而對國軍防衛臺灣能力與意志產生動搖，是極為有效的政治運用；因其引發臺灣社會廣大爭議與批評，立法院更於後

²⁹ 林克倫，〈1996年臺海飛彈危機 李登輝奠定臺灣主體性〉，《中央社》，2020年7月30日，<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202007300339.aspx>。

³⁰ 中華民國國防部，〈即時軍事動態 - 中共解放軍進入我西南空域活動情況〉，2020年12月16日，《中華民國國防部》，<https://www.mnd.gov.tw/PublishTable.aspx?Types=%E5%8D%B3%E6%99%82%E8%BB%8D%E4%BA%8B%E5%8B%95%E6%85%8B&title=%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E6%B6%88%E6%81%AF&Page=1>。

³¹ 語出國防部發言人史順文少將，參見：〈疫情期間中國軍機連續繞臺灣飛行 對內對外政治「示警」〉，《BBC》，2020年2月12日，<https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-51471929>。

³² 崔明軒、範凌志，〈解放軍海空兵力繞台震動島內台媒：有警告台美意味〉，《環球網》，2019年4月16日，<https://taiwan.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKjNUd>。

³³ 〈我軍機遠航南海展示戰略威懾 返程繞台令島內憂心〉，《人民網》，2016年

續三讀通過「兩岸人民關係條例部分條文修正案」，³⁴ 明定曾任國防、外交、大陸事務或國安機關之政務副首長、少將以上人員或情報機關首長，終身不得參與中國黨政軍或具政治性機關團體舉辦的慶典或活動，做出「妨害國家尊嚴」行為者，最重將可剝奪其月退俸。³⁵

而從「退將赴中」案例亦能看出，中共對臺之現代政治手段已日趨成熟，除跨部門整合實施外，也多重面向與目標的結合更使其成效倍增。此一發展使得臺灣在對抗中共統戰時，將處於更為嚴峻的情況。

四、經濟運用

共產主義者信奉唯物主義史觀，認定經濟下層建築決定政治的上層建築；延伸到個人則代表：「一個人的經濟地位決定其政治地位」。³⁶ 若個人在經濟上依賴共產黨，在意識形態與政治支持必然偏向共產黨，這是中共對臺以經濟手段實施政治作戰（即俗稱之「經濟統戰」，以下均以此稱之）的理論基礎。

兩岸經貿交流作為一種政治作戰手段，自始就帶有明確而清晰的目標：1979年5月中共發表「關於開展對臺灣地區貿易的暫行規定」指出：「對臺灣貿易是臺灣回歸祖國過渡時期的一種特殊形式的貿易，是為了促進大陸和臺灣地區的經濟聯繫，團結爭取臺灣工商界人士是為祖國統一創造條件」。同年7月中共國務院公佈的「關於鼓勵臺灣同胞投資的規定」中提及：「（鼓勵臺灣同胞投資）旨在積極促進大陸與臺灣之間的經濟技術交流與合作，促進海峽兩岸經濟共同繁榮，實現兩岸通郵、通航、通商，以推動祖國和平統一進程」時任中共國家主席的楊尚昆亦在1993年「全國對臺工作會議」上談到：「要以發展兩岸經濟關係影響臺灣政治，以民間影響官方」。³⁷ 以上種種，皆說明中共開展對臺貿易之目標；短期是「以商逼政」以民間影響官方、以經濟影響政治；長期則是「促進統一」。

12月12日，<http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1212/c1011-28941499.html>。

³⁴ 黃欣柏，〈退將赴中終身管制〉，《自由時報》，2019年7月4日，<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1300588>。

³⁵ 臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例第9-3條、第91條，參見：中華民國立法院，《臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例》，2019年7月24日，《全國法規資料庫》，<https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=Q0010001>。

³⁶ 蕭衡鍾，〈從唯物史觀看馬克思主義方法論的途徑分析及其系統反饋〉，《展望與探索》，第13卷第7期，2015年7月，頁70-73。

³⁷ 黃益中，《1979年以來中共對臺統一戰線之研究》，國立政治大學東亞研究所碩

在具體作為上，由於赴陸臺商其經濟命脈與生計皆掌握在中共手裡，中共充分運用施壓、籠絡等手段，迫使臺商在政治立場向其靠攏，或使用各種伎倆脅迫政治表態，使臺灣內部產生分化效應。³⁸ 同時兩岸加深經濟依賴，也使中共在兩岸關係得以獲得更多政治籌碼。以觀光產業為例，過去（2016年以前）每年均有超過400萬陸客來臺，2016年以後由於政黨輪替政治因素，使得來臺陸客人數驟減，至2018年僅剩269萬人次。2019年8月中共更暫停核發47個城市中國居民赴臺個人遊的簽證³⁹，使得臺灣以接待陸客為主之相關觀光產業鏈遭受重創。⁴⁰

另外，除了將經濟手段用作籠絡與打擊外，中共更結合外交手段進行政治作戰；2020年11月15日中共完成簽署《區域全面經濟夥伴關係協定》（Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, RCEP）立即引發臺灣學者擔憂，認為中共此舉是「試圖藉經貿整合體，在經貿孤立臺灣，倘若中國、日本、東南亞各國深化經濟面，政治面將逐漸圍堵臺灣」。⁴¹ 顯示中共正以多重手段，達成在經濟與政治雙重孤立臺灣之戰略目的。

五、中共執行體制

中共負責對臺執行政治作戰之機構，其具體組織如圖2。

士論文（2003），頁84。

³⁸ 邱垂正，〈認清北京對臺「經濟吸納」的統戰手段〉，《中華民國行政院大陸委員會》，2007年12月7日，
https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=AD6908DFDDB62656&sms=161DEBC9EACEA333&s=DCAE6A0C2BD04F77。

³⁹ 徐子情，〈陸客不來，臺灣觀光的陣痛期：不靠中國市場還能發大財嗎？〉，《太報》，2019年8月15日，
https://www.taisounds.com/w/TaiSounds/society_19081514450109464。

⁴⁰ 周毓翔，〈陸客不來 衝擊逾200萬個家庭！減少100萬人次 重創觀光業生計〉，《中國時報》，2019年8月28日，
<https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20190828000557-260114?chdtv>。

⁴¹ 〈大陸推 RCEP 不是為經濟？台學者：進一步政治圍堵臺灣〉，《蘋果新聞》，2020年12月3日，
<https://hk.appledaily.com/china/20201203/TSI23GG7QRG6ZA44S2ERS4ILIM/>。




圖 2 中共對臺政治作戰機構組織圖

資料來源：筆者根據王立第二戰研所資料⁴²自行修改繪製。

由圖 2 之整理可發現目前中共對臺政治作戰主要機構計有國安部、國臺辦、解放軍體系、統戰部、中宣部、共青團等，其中對臺工作主要負責資訊戰方面之中宣部、解放軍戰略支援部隊網路系統部及指揮網軍操弄輿論風向之共青團，大致分工已在前文表 2 概述。此處則針對在該處未提及的國安部、國臺辦、統戰部之其它非關資訊戰涉臺面向以及解放軍政治工作部聯絡局、聯合參謀部情報局進行補充，其各部介紹與涉臺工作詳見表 4。

⁴² 王立第二戰研所，〈統戰路徑有 6 條！「滲透臺灣」被當專案執行，中國各部門爭搶專案經費〉，《報橘》，2019 年 12 月 4 日，
<https://buzzorange.com/2019/12/04/how-china-attack-tw-by-information-warfare/>。

表 4 中共對臺執行政治作戰機構功能與涉臺工作

| 機構 | 功能與涉臺工作 |
|-----|--|
| 國安部 | <p>國家安全部名義上隸屬國務院，但實際領導機關為政法委，惟在國家安全委員會（國安委）成立後，其領導工作一般研判已轉移至習近平主導之國安委負責；⁴³ 其主要職能為情蒐、情研、反間諜及政治保衛工作，其所轄機構中以負責主管港澳臺地區情報工作的第四局（港澳臺地區情報局）對臺最為重要，並經常藉「新華社」、「中國新聞通訊社」記者名義、「中國國際旅行社」導遊或司機身分及「中國人民對外友好協會」、「中國國際友誼促進會」參訪人員等掩護身分對臺進行工作。⁴⁴</p> |
| 國臺辦 | <p>與中共中央臺灣工作辦公室為一個機構兩塊牌子，主要負責研究擬訂對臺工作方針、貫徹執行黨中央及國務院確定的對臺工作政策並組織、指導、管理、協調黨中央、國務院各部門和各省、自治區、直轄市的對臺工作情況。⁴⁵ 而參見其網站所列之工作職責，其雖主要係處理兩岸交流與涉臺相關事務，惟在近年共諜案例中亦可發現臺辦系統至少涉及了兩起共諜案；如「新黨共諜案」⁴⁶ 及「中國暨南大學校友會共諜案」⁴⁷ 即有臺辦系統參與其中。</p> |

⁴³ 葉靖斯，〈中國設國家安全委員會「以對內為主」〉，《BBC 中文》，2013 年 11 月 13 日，
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/11/131113_ana_china_plenum_national_security。

⁴⁴ 翁衍慶，《中共情報組織與間諜活動》（臺北：新銳文創，2018 年），頁 109-111。

⁴⁵ 中共中央臺灣工作辦公室（國務院臺灣事務辦公室），〈機構設置〉，《中共中央臺灣工作辦公室（國務院臺灣事務辦公室）》，
<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/jgsz/>。

⁴⁶ 陳民峰，〈新黨幹部被控共諜案獲判無罪〉，《法國國際廣播電台（RFI）》，2021 年 4 月 29 日，
<https://www.rfi.fr/tw/%E6%B8%AF%E6%BE%B3%E5%8F%B0/20210429-%E6%96%B0%E9%BB%A8%E5%B9%B9%E9%83%A8%E8%A2%AB%E6%8E%A7%E5%85%B1%E8%AB%9C%E6%A1%88%E7%8D%B2%E5%88%A4%E7%84%A1%E7%BD%AA>。

⁴⁷ 張文川，〈中國暨大臺灣校友會秘書長涉共諜案 傅文齊棄保潛逃〉，《自由時報》，2019 年 9 月 10 日，
<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1316818>。

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| <p>統戰部</p> | <p>統戰部內部專責對臺工作的則是第三局（港澳臺、海外聯絡局），其業務範圍包括聯繫香港、澳門和海外有關社團及代表人士，做好臺胞、臺屬工作，對臺胞回大陸定居提出政策性意見並檢查落實情況，負責中華海外聯誼會的工作，聯繫、指導、協調各民主黨派中央、全國工商聯和統戰系統有關團體的對臺和海外統戰工作；⁴⁸此外政協和統戰部在執行統戰工作上相互合作，在「陸生共諜案」⁴⁹中即有「臺灣民主自治同盟」此一政協成員之政黨參與，顯示統戰部系統對臺亦兼有負責情蒐工作。</p> |
| <p>政治工作部 聯絡局</p> | <p>前身為總政治部聯絡部，於 2016 年軍改後改制；主要從事對臺情報活動並兼顧港澳、日本、韓國、朝鮮等；在其組織架構部分，其下設聯絡局、調查局、邊界局、宣傳局，並在上海及廣東設有分局；其中上海分局以臺灣國軍為主要工作對象，據傳該部對臺灣上校以上軍官均建檔管理，列有詳細之個人經歷乃至私人生活狀況；掩護機構則有「中國國際友好聯絡會」與「中華文化發展促進會」等。⁵⁰</p> |
| <p>聯合參謀部 情報局</p> | <p>前身為總參謀部第二部（總參二部、情報部），於 2016 年軍改後改制；相當於國防部軍事情報局，主要負責情報蒐集和分析以及對外軍事交流，其中情報局一處主要負責情報蒐集及諜報活動，下面有五個辦事處，分別為廣州、北京、南京、上海、瀋陽工作處，而廣州工作處主要負責臺灣與香港的情報工作。⁵¹</p> |

資料來源：根據陸委會委託研究報告及相關專書、論文、報導自行整理。

由圖 2 與表 4 中所列出之機構及本章所提之內容可看出，中共不論是從外交、資訊、軍事、經濟各面向上對臺實施政治作戰，皆有明確的戰略目標及指導，並且經常橫跨黨、政、軍、民各部門共同參與執行；

⁴⁸ 寇健文，〈中國大陸對臺工作組織體系與人事〉，頁 82。

⁴⁹ 〈「陸生共諜」周泓旭向《環時》喊冤：我是被陷害的，綠營想靠「共諜」掩蓋執政失敗〉，《風傳媒》，2019 年 3 月 29 日，
<https://www.storm.mg/article/1116729?page=1>。

⁵⁰ 翁衍慶，〈中共情報組織與間諜活動〉，頁 185-190。

⁵¹ 郭瑞華，〈中共對臺工作機制研究：政府過程的觀點〉，頁 215-216。

單以資訊政治作戰為例，參與部門就涉及了國安部、統戰部、國臺辦、戰略支援部隊及共青團等 5 個單位，而此計算還不包含負責宣傳業務指導的中宣部、各級地方政府及外包之國、民營企業；顯見中共對臺執行政治作戰之體制乃是在明確國家戰略指導下，統合全黨全國全軍之力共同實施之「總體戰」。

肆、臺灣政戰體制之未來

本章將按照前文分析之現代政治作戰趨勢及當面敵情威脅等內容，針對臺灣現行之政治作戰體制提出若干未來可能改革之建議。

一、提升戰略層級

中共之政治作戰是屬於國家戰略層次，能有效動員跨部門之力量共同執行；反觀臺灣雖將政治作戰區分為國家戰略與軍事戰略層次，並未建立國家階層政治作戰的具體機制，⁵² 專責實施對外政治作戰之機構，僅有政治作戰局之文宣心戰處及其所屬之心理作戰大隊，且被劃分在國防部下，為國防部之次級機關。根據《國防法》第 7 條我國之國防體制架構為：總統→國家安全會議→行政院→國防部，使得此舉無異於將政治作戰限縮於國防軍事階層。

為對抗並反制中共以國家戰略階層全面對臺實施政治作戰之嚴峻狀況，臺灣應將政治作戰之層級從國防軍事提升至國家戰略層次；此舉目的在於不論反制中共具備高度統合性之「總體戰」化現代政治作戰或是更進一步對中共實施政治作戰，其戰略目標之確立、具體任務之賦予、各部門相關資源之協調等，可賴國家戰略層級進行決策與提供指導。若繼續維持在國防軍事階層實施政治作戰，面對將其放置於國家戰略階層並具備豐沛資源之中共，臺灣將缺乏相應層級與可供動員能量與其對抗。

未來可以在決策層面宜提升至「國家安全會議」或「國防軍事會談」實施決策與指導；在執行層面可在行政院層級設立專司反制中共對臺政治作戰之跨部會小組，納編包括國防部（含未來新設立之全民防衛動員署）、外交部、經濟部、內政部、陸委會…等各部會在內之成員，

⁵² 趙建中，〈因應共軍加強對臺非武力「三戰」—我政治作戰應有之作為〉，《國防雜誌》，第 20 卷第 5 期，2005 年 5 月，頁 13。

在國家層級的中央戰略指導下，負責研擬方案，並形成政策，最終協調各部門機關從外交、資訊、軍事、經濟各面向上同樣進行「總體戰」化之政治作戰以反制中共，而此種政治作戰將不單是純粹的防守或進攻，亦可靈活運用於各面向上，諸如軍事外交、國家形象營造、戰略溝通（Strategic Communication）⁵³或參與區域安全與經濟事務等。

二、復編國防層級政治作戰部門

近年來國軍對中共之心戰能量日趨萎縮，例如立法院外交及國防委員會在審議 110 年度國防部政戰局之預算案時，就有立委質疑政戰局本務是對敵心戰，但運用在直接對敵心戰的預算卻不到 1%，並對政治作戰局提出諸如「對中共的心戰本務完全都沒作，遑論有任何心戰策略」及認為對中共之心戰作為「現在是零」的指責。⁵⁴

為強化反制能量，現行於國防軍事階層之政治作戰機構與組織，宜重新調整組織架構走向專業化；過去在「總政治作戰局」時代，總政戰局內曾有專司心戰工作之「心理作戰處」編制，惟在民國 102 年組織調整為「政治作戰局」後，心理作戰處遭裁撤並與文宣政教處合併為「文宣心戰處」。但究其根本，對內心防之文宣政教與對外進攻之心理作戰為兩種性質完全不同之工作，編於同一部門並非合宜之舉，亦容易因對內文宣相較平時必須隱晦，執行之對外心戰較有「績效」，導致預算與工作比重分配不均、專業人才流失及心戰能量萎縮等。

本文建議政治作戰局宜復編「心理作戰處」，給予足夠之預算與重視，置重點於對敵心戰、反心戰及戰略溝通的軍事運用等，以重新提振臺灣國防軍事階層的政治作戰心戰能量。

⁵³ 美國於《2006 年四年期國防檢討：戰略溝通執行規劃》（QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication 2006）中首次將戰略溝通定義為「集中美國政府處理與致力於瞭解及接觸關鍵受眾（key audiences），透過運用協調之資訊、溝通主題、計畫、方案及行動，結合綜合國力之運用使其同時發生，以創造、強化或維護美國國家利益及目標的有利條件之進程發展」本質上，戰略溝通是指國家為達成戰略目的或促進國家利益，統合政府組織之力，透過接觸、媒體管道，進而影響國內外受眾；其強調的是跨政府部門整合與「雙向」溝通機制，與傳統傳播單向模式有別。參見許世宗，〈當前兩岸戰略溝通策略比較研究〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第 51 卷第 1 期，2017 年 2 月，頁 8。

⁵⁴ 洪哲政，〈政戰局對中共心戰被砲零分 法輪功媒體作得比莒光日好〉，《聯合報》，2020 年 11 月 30 日，<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/5054329>。

三、專業政戰部隊的強化

在旅級以下政戰工作層面，基層營連輔導長平時業務職掌從莒光日教育、軍法紀教育、家屬聯繫、心輔轉介，甚至到新聞處理、狀況掌握…等，屬於部隊管理工作，並非專業職能或技術，相對可取代性高；⁵⁵且偏離前述政治作戰本務工作，宜重新檢討其定位與工作職掌，讓政戰回歸專業化。

同時現行之政治作戰專業部隊與單位，除負責軍事安全及反情報工作的軍事安全總隊，及負責心理與宣傳工作的心理作戰大隊（含漢聲廣播電台及藝工隊在內）外，僅剩軍事新聞通訊社及青年日報社等新聞單位。於戰時情況下，政治作戰僅能依賴心理作戰大隊所屬之心戰第三中隊下轄的3個分隊配屬至各主要作戰區，實施諸如心戰品投放及心戰喊話等工作。⁵⁶而負責作戰之第一線各營若未分配到心戰部隊支援，通常僅能依靠一位營輔導長與所屬之四位連輔導長實施旅營政治作戰，其專業性及能量明顯不足。在一個分隊支援一個作戰區及全國軍僅有一個中隊負責戰時戰術性心戰的情況下，多數部隊並無法得到適切之支援；是以在野戰階層之政治作戰，國軍宜強化與擴編現有的野戰專業政戰部隊；在作戰區至少編制一個戰術心戰中隊負責交戰情境下對敵實施戰術心戰，才能有效發揮專業能量以支援軍事任務達成。

伍、結語

從1979年以後中共對臺實施之現代政治作戰的研究發現：在外交上，中共透過將「一個中國」原則全球化與法制化、不斷阻止臺灣參與國際組織與交流，並施壓跨國企業等方式消除臺灣之國際能見度，以達成其「消滅中華民國臺灣國際人格」的戰略目標。

在資訊上，中共動員包含國安部、統戰部、國臺辦、戰略支援部隊網絡系統部（及解放軍相關企業）、中宣部以及共青團在內的多個部門，利用大外宣、官媒、內容農場、親中媒體、網軍、口耳相傳等方式，散播虛假訊息；一方面弱化臺灣心理防線，一方面達成諸如「警告臺灣若

⁵⁵ 賴世上，〈黃埔建軍與國軍政治作戰歷史發展〉，《國防雜誌》，第29卷第4期，2014年7月，頁15。

⁵⁶ 國防部，《國軍政治作戰參謀組織與作業教則》（台北：中華民國國防部，2016年），頁3-8、3-9。

走向臺獨可能引發戰爭風險」、「扶持親中勢力，影響選舉」、「營造兩岸對立及緊張關係升高氛圍」、「塑造中共強國強軍形像，醜化弱化國軍戰力」、「攻擊政府及政策，操弄臺灣政治與族群對立，撕裂社會」等事先設定之戰略目標。

在軍事上，中共除了近年頻繁以軍機、艦隊巡弋臺海並繞行臺灣週邊海空域實行軍事威嚇外，更有邀請退役將領赴中聆聽習近平演講，同時結合統戰手段、心戰運用與軍事層面的多面向、多目標政治作戰，意圖使國人質疑國軍之忠誠度；進而動搖國人對國軍防衛臺灣能力意志之信心。

在經濟上，中共更開宗明義地強調「對臺灣貿易是臺灣回歸祖國過渡時期的一種特殊形式的貿易，團結爭取臺灣工商界人士為祖國統一創造條件」，一開始就將其作為手段，其對臺貿易之戰略目標短期是「以商逼政」，以民間影響官方、以經濟影響政治，長期則是「促進統一」；近年來更動輒在國際之經濟優勢，及控管陸客來臺等方式實施對臺壓迫，將其經濟實力轉化為政治籌碼，意圖迫使臺灣屈從其意志。

中共對臺實施政治工作之體制，包含國安部、國臺辦、解放軍體系（政治工作部聯絡局、聯合參謀部情報局、戰略支援部隊）、統戰部、中宣部及共青團等多個單位，若將各級地方政府以及無數共同參與和協助之國、民營企業都包含在內，其組織範圍涵蓋黨、政、軍、民各大體系，幾乎集全國之力對臺進行政治工作。

現代政治作戰講求多面向打擊與跨部門共同執行，中共對臺政治作戰在這兩點尤其突出，不論是從外交、資訊、軍事與經濟等面向上，其戰略目標、組織架構與具體執行皆高度統合。面對中共以全黨政軍之力對臺灣進行政治作戰之情勢，有必要將現行政治作戰體制從國防戰略層級提升至國家戰略階層，成立跨部會小組負責策定與執行，同時復編專業化之國防層級政治作戰部門，擴編野戰政治作戰部隊，方能對抗日益嚴峻的中共現代政治作戰威脅。

參考書目

一、專書

- 毛澤東，《毛澤東選集第2卷》，北京：人民出版社，1972年。
- 翁衍慶，《中共情報組織與間諜活動》，臺北：新銳文創，2018年。
- 國防安全研究院，《國防情勢特刊 - 灰色地帶衝突特輯》，臺北：財團法人國防安全研究院，2020年。
- 國防部，《國軍政治作戰要綱》，臺北：中華民國國防部，2016年。
- 國防部，《國軍政治作戰參謀組織與作業教則》，臺北：中華民國國防部，2016年。
- 蔣中正，《總統對本校訓詞集》，臺北：政治作戰學校，1970年。
- Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Katya Migacheva, *Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses* (California: RAND Corporation, 2018) .

二、學術性期刊論文

- 許世宗，〈當前兩岸戰略溝通策略比較研究〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第51卷第1期，2017年2月，頁6-21。
- 許志嘉，〈從臺哥斷交論中共對臺外交孤立與兩岸關係〉，《展望與探索》，第5卷第7期，2007年7月，頁6-11。
- 趙建中，〈因應共軍加強對臺非武力「三戰」－我政治作戰應有之作為〉，《國防雜誌》，第20卷第5期，2005年5月，頁6-16。
- 潘進章，〈共軍「政治作戰」發展初探〉，《國防雜誌》，第24卷第1期，2009年3月，頁31-43。
- 蕭衡鍾，〈從唯物史觀看馬克思主義方法論的途徑分析及其系統反饋〉，《展望與探索》，第13卷第7期，2015年7月，頁70-73。
- 賴世上，〈黃埔建軍與國軍政治作戰歷史發展〉，《國防雜誌》，第29卷第4期，2014年7月，頁1-18。

三、學位論文

郭瑞華，《中共對臺工作機制研究：政府過程的觀點》，國立政治大學東亞研究所博士論文（2009）。

黃益中，《1979年以來中共對臺統一戰線之研究》，國立政治大學東亞研究所碩士論文（2003）。

蔡雨葳，《中共運用假訊息對我影響之研究》，國防大學政戰學院政治學系政治研究所碩士論文（2020）。

四、官方文件

中共第十屆全國人民代表大會，《反分裂國家法》，中華人民共和國法律，2005年3月14日。

五、網際網路資料

〈「陸生共諜」周泓旭向《環時》喊冤：我是被陷害的，綠營想靠「共諜」掩蓋執政失敗〉，《風傳媒》，2019年3月29日，
<https://www.storm.mg/article/1116729?page=1>。

〈大陸推 RCEP 不是為經濟？台學者：進一步政治圍堵臺灣〉，《蘋果新聞》，2020年12月3日，
<https://hk.appledaily.com/china/20201203/TSI23GG7QRG6ZA-44S2ERS4ILIM/>。

〈我軍機遠航南海展示戰略威懾 返程繞台令島內憂心〉，《人民網》，2016年12月12日，
<http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1212/c1011-28941499.html>。

〈疫情期間中國軍機連續繞臺灣飛行 對內對外政治「示警」〉，《BBC》，2020年2月12日，
<https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-51471929>。

中共中央軍委，《中國人民解放軍政治工作條例》，2003年12月5日，第14條第18項，《軍隊思想政治工作宣講平臺》，
<https://dysw.cnki.net/jd/djzs/%E3%80%8A%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E5%86%9B%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E5%B7%A5%E4%BD%9C%E6%>

9D%A1%E4%BE%8B%E3%80%8B.pdf。

中共中央臺灣工作辦公室（國務院臺灣事務辦公室），〈機構設置〉，
《中共中央臺灣工作辦公室（國務院臺灣事務辦公室）》，
<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/jgsz/>。

中共國務院新聞辦公室，《臺灣問題與中國的統一白皮書》，1993年8月，
《中華人民共和國外交部》，
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/ywzt_675099/wzzt_675579/2296_675789/t10531.shtml。

中共第五屆全國人民代表大會常務委員會，《中華人民共和國全國人大
常委會告臺灣同胞書》，1979年1月1日，《中華人民共和國駐
毛里求斯共和國大使館》，
<http://mu.china-embassy.org/chn/ztlm/twwt/t151787.htm>。

中華民國外交部，《108年中國阻撓我國際空間事例》，2019年12月
31日，頁1-7，《中華民國外交部》，
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/WebArchive/2655/108%E5%B9%B4%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%BB%E6%92%93%E6%88%91%E5%9C%8B%E9%9A%9B%E7%A9%BA%E9%96%93%E4%BA%8B%E4%BE%8B_1081231.pdf。

中華民國立法院，《臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例》，2019年7
月24日，《全國法規資料庫》，
<https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=Q0010001>。

中華民國國防部，〈即時軍事動態 - 中共解放軍進入我西南空域活動情
況〉，2020年12月16日，《中華民國國防部》，
<https://www.mnd.gov.tw/PublishTable.aspx?Types=%E5%8D%B3%E6%99%82%E8%BB%8D%E4%BA%8B%E5%8B%95%E6%85%8B&title=%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E6%B6%88%E6%81%AF&Page=1>。

中華民國總統府，〈總統在歐林講座演講〉，1995年6月10日，《中
華民國總統府》，
<https://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/22622>。

王立第二戰研所，〈統戰路徑有6條！「滲透臺灣」被當專案執行，中
國各部門爭搶專案經費〉，《報橘》，2019年12月4日，

<https://buzzorange.com/2019/12/04/how-china-attack-tw-by-information-warfare/>。

周毓翔，〈陸客不來 衝擊逾 200 萬個家庭！減少 100 萬人次 重創觀光業生計〉，《中國時報》，2019 年 8 月 28 日，
<https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20190828000557-260114?chdtv>。

林克倫，〈1996 年臺海飛彈危機 李登輝奠定臺灣主體性〉，《中央社》，2020 年 7 月 30 日，
<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202007300339.aspx>。

邱垂正，〈認清北京對臺「經濟吸納」的統戰手段〉，《中華民國行政院大陸委員會》，2007 年 12 月 7 日，
https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=AD6908DFDDB62656&sms=161DEBC9EACEA333&s=DCAE6A0C2BD04F77。

洪哲政，〈政戰局對中共心戰被砲零分 法輪功媒體作得比莒光日好〉，《聯合報》，2020 年 11 月 30 日，
<https://udn.com/news/story/10930/5054329>。

唐佩君、戴雅真，〈臺灣參與案未列 WHA 議程，中國打壓枉顧世人健康〉，《中央社》，2020 年 11 月 9 日，
<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202011090361.aspx>。

徐子情，〈陸客不來，臺灣觀光的陣痛期：不靠中國市場還能發大財嗎？〉，《太報》，2019 年 8 月 15 日，
https://www.taisounds.com/w/TaiSounds/society_19081514450109464。

國家安全會議，〈中國升高對臺威脅與介選之綜合研析（摘要）〉，2019 年 9 月 23 日，頁 3-4，《中華民國總統府》，
<https://www.president.gov.tw/File/Doc/496a5b04-650c-421e-af44-41a3e1fdcdbb>。

寇健文〈中國大陸對臺工作組織體系與人事〉，《大陸委員會委託研究報告》，2019 年 3 月，頁 26、82，《大陸委員會》，
<https://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/295/relfile/7845/73953/dad82e36-96d1-43bc-a57e-47e3b777064b.pdf>。

崔明軒、範凌志，〈解放軍海空兵力繞台震動島內台媒：有警告台美意味〉，《環球網》，2019年4月16日，

<https://taiwan.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKjNUd>。

張文川，〈中國暨大臺灣校友會秘書長涉共諜案 傅文齊棄保潛逃〉，《自由時報》，2019年9月10日，

<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1316818>。

莊翊晨，〈臺灣已進入準戰爭狀態？專家揭秘中共對臺資訊戰背後秘密〉，《今周刊》，2019年9月19日，

<https://www.businesstoday.com.tw/article/category/154769/post/201909190020/%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E5%B7%B2%E9%80%B2%E5%85%A5%E6%BA%96%E6%88%B0%E7%88%AD%E7%8B%80%E6%85%8B%EF%BC%9F%20%E5%B0%88%E5%AE%B6%E6%8F%AD%E7%A7%98%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E5%B0%8D%E5%8F%B0%E8%B3%87%E8%A8%8A%E6%88%B0%E8%83%8C%E5%BE%8C%E7%A7%98%E5%AF%86>。

陳民峰，〈新黨幹部被控共諜案獲判無罪〉，《法國國際廣播電台（RFI）》，2021年4月29日，

<https://www.rfi.fr/tw/%E6%B8%AF%E6%BE%B3%E5%8F%B0/20210429-%E6%96%B0%E9%BB%A8%E5%B9%B9%E9%83%A8%E8%A2%AB%E6%8E%A7%E5%85%B1%E8%AB%9C%E6%A1%88%E7%8D%B2%E5%88%A4%E7%84%A1%E7%BD%AA>。

陳佳君，〈沈伯洋：解讀疫情之下的中國資訊戰〉，《新聞實驗室》，2020年6月19日，

<https://newslab.pts.org.tw/news/230-%E6%B2%88%E4%BC%AF%E6%B4%8B%EF%BC%9A%E8%A7%A3%E8%AE%80%E7%96%AB%E6%83%85%E4%B9%8B%E4%B8%8B%E7%9A%84%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E8%B3%87%E8%A8%8A%E6%88%B0>。

黃欣柏，〈退將赴中終身管制〉，《自由時報》，2019年7月4日，

<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1300588>。

葉靖斯，〈中國設國家安全委員會「以對內為主」〉，《BBC 中文》，2013年11月13日，

https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/11/131113_ana_china_

plenum_national_security。

蕭長展，〈臺灣基進陳柏惟恐國人「槍口對向自己人」：國防部勿輕忽中共「認知作戰」〉，《沃草》，2020年10月23日，
<https://musou.watchout.tw/read/WLsZsJAbpobZk3oEeWrQ>。

撰稿規則

- 一、分節標題：文章之大小標題，
中文請以「壹、一、（一）、1.、(1)、a.、(a)」為序。
英文請以「I. A. (A) 1. (1) a. (a)」為序。
- 二、引語：原文直接引入文句者，於其前後附加引號；若引言過長，可前後縮排二字元獨立起段，不加引號。若為節錄整段文章，則每段起始空二字。
- 三、簡稱或縮寫：引用之簡稱或縮寫，可依約定俗成之用法；惟於第一次出現時必須使用全稱，並以括號註明欲使用之簡稱（寫）。
- 四、譯名：使用外來語之中文譯名，請盡量用通行之翻譯，並請於第一次出現時以括號附加原文全稱。
- 五、標點符號：中文標點符號一律以「全形」輸入。引用中文書籍、期刊、雜誌、報紙、網站等名稱，請以《》標記；文章名稱以〈〉標記；外文書籍、期刊、雜誌、報紙、網站等名稱請用斜體字，索引文章名稱加“”標記。
- 六、數字表示：
 - （一）年月日、卷期等數字及頁碼一律以中華民國年份（本國資料）或西元年份（中共資料）及阿拉伯數字表示。
 - （二）屆、次、項等採用國字表示，如：第一屆、第三次、五項決議。
 - （三）整的數字採用阿拉伯數字，如：50人；但百位以上整數之數字「可以」國字表示者，以國字表示，如：二億三千萬。
 - （四）不完整之餘數、約數以國字表示，如：七十餘件、約三千人。
- 七、附圖、附表：
 - （一）編號採用阿拉伯數字，寫法如：圖 1、圖 2、表 1、表 2，圖 1-1、圖 1-2 等類推。
 - （二）表之標題在該表上方（置中），圖之標題在該圖之下方。
 - （三）圖表的資料來源與說明，請置於圖表的下方（置左）。

註釋體例

- 一、所有引註均須詳註來源。如係轉引非原始資料來源，須予註明，不得逕行引錄。
- 二、簡、繁體字中文書籍，使用相同註釋體例。
- 三、所有注釋置於正文頁腳。
- 四、時間表示：中文註腳內日期，以民國○年○月○日或西元○年○月○日表示；英文以 **month day, year** 表示。
- 五、出版地的寫法
 - (一) 出版地若在美國，要分別列出城市名及州名，州名採縮寫且不加縮寫號。
 - (二) 若非美國，則寫出城市名和國名。
 - (三) 出版地若為下列主要城市，則不必寫出州名或國名，包括：
 - 臺灣／臺北 (Taipei)；
 - 美國／巴爾的摩 (Baltimore)、波士頓 (Boston)、芝加哥 (Chicago)、洛杉磯 (Los Angeles)、紐約 (New York)、費城 (Philadelphia)、舊金山 (San Francisco)；
 - 英國／倫敦 (London)；
 - 法國／巴黎 (Paris)；
 - 德國／柏林 (Berlin)、法蘭克福 (Frankfurt)、慕尼黑 (Munich)；
 - 荷蘭／阿姆斯特丹 (Amsterdam)；
 - 義大利／米蘭 (Milan)、羅馬 (Rome)；
 - 奧地利／維也納 (Vienna)；
 - 瑞士／日內瓦 (Geneva)；
 - 瑞典／斯德哥爾摩 (Stockholm)；
 - 俄羅斯／莫斯科 (Moscow)；
 - 中國／香港 (Hong Kong)、上海 (Shanghai)、北京 (Beijing)；
 - 日本／東京 (Tokyo)；
 - 韓國／首爾 (Seoul)；
 - 以色列／耶路撒冷 (Jerusalem)。
- 六、專書
 - (一) 中文書籍：作者姓名，《書名》（出版地：出版者，年），頁 x-x。

(初版無需註明版別)

- (二) 英文書籍：Author's full name, *Complete title of the book* (Place of publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.
- (三) 如引用全書時，可註明該書起迄頁數或省略頁數。

範例

陳鴻瑜，〈南海諸島之發現、開發與國際衝突〉，（臺北：國立編譯館，1997年），頁3。

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 2.

七、專書譯著

- (一) 中文：Author(s)' full name 著，譯者姓名譯，〈書名〉（書名原文）（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x。（初版無需註明版別）
- (二) 英文：Author(s)' full name, *Complete Title of the Book*, trans. Translator(s)' full Name (Place of publication: Publisher, year of publication), Volume number (if any), p. x or pp. x-x.

範例

布里辛斯基 (Zbigniew Brzezinski) 著，林添貴譯，〈大棋盤 - 全球戰略大思考〉（台北：立緒出版社，1999年），頁67。

Jhumpa Lahiri, *In Other Words*, trans. Ann Goldstein (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016), p. 146.

八、期刊譯著

- (一) 中文：Author's full name 著，譯者姓名譯，〈篇名〉（篇名原文），〈刊物名稱〉，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x。
- (二) 英文：Author's full name, "Title of the Article," trans. Translator(s)' full Name, *Title of the Journal*, Vol. x, No. x, Month Year, p. x or pp. x-x.

範例

Kelvin Fong 著，王玉麟譯，〈亞太區域潛艦概況〉 (Submarines in the Asia-Pacific)，〈國防譯粹〉，第33卷第7期，2006年，頁89-95。

九、專書論文或書籍專章

- (一) 中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，編者（群）姓名，〈書名〉（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁 x 或頁 x-x。（初版無需註明版別）
- (二) 英文：Author's full name, "Chapter Title," in Editor/Editors' full Name(s), ed(s)., *Complete Title of the Book*, (Place of publication: Publisher, Year of publication), p. x or pp. x-x.

範例

林正義、歐錫富，〈宏觀 2009 亞太和平觀察〉，林正義、歐錫富編，*《2009 亞太和平觀察》*（台北：中央研究院亞太區域研究專題中心，2011 年），頁 3。

Kaocheng Wang, “Bilateralism or Multilateralism? Assessment of Taiwan Status and Relations with South Pacific,” in Ming-Hsien Wong, ed., *Managing regional security agenda*, (New Taipei City: Tamkang University Press, 2013) , p. 29.

十、學術性期刊論文

（請依個別刊物實際出刊項目，完整臚列）

（一）中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《刊物名稱》（出版地），第 x 卷 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x。（臺灣出版之期刊無需註明出版地，但若與其他地區出版期刊名稱相同者，仍需註明出版地，以利識別）

（二）英文：Author’s full name, “Title of the article,” *Name of Periodical*, Vol. x, No. x, Month Year, p.x or pp. x-x.

範例

汪毓璋，〈美近公布「威脅評估報告」之評析〉，《展望與探索》，第 4 卷第 4 期，2005 年 4 月，頁 92-97。

Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bring the Revisionist State Back in,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, June 1994, pp. 72-107.

十一、學位論文

（一）中文：作者姓名，《學位論文名稱》，學校院或系所博士或碩士論文（畢業年份），頁 x 或頁 x-x。

（二）英文：Author’s full name, “Complete Title of Dissertation/ Thesis,” (Ph.D. Dissertation/Master’s Thesis, Name of the Department, Name of the Degree-granting University, year of graduation), p.x or pp. x-x.

範例

馬振坤，《從克勞塞維茲戰爭理論剖析中共三次對外戰爭》，國立臺灣大學政治學研究所所博士（2002），頁 1。

Stacia L. Stinnett, “*The Spratly Island Dispute: An Analysis*,” (Master’s Thesis, Florida Atlantic University, 2000), p.1

十二、研討會論文

（一）中文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，發表於○○○○研討會（地點：主

辦單位，舉辦年月日），頁 x 或頁 x-x。

- (二) 外文：Author's full name, "Paper Title," presented for Complete Title of the Conference (Place of conference: Conference organizer, Date of conference in month day, year), p. x or pp. x-x.

範例

許文堂，〈南沙與西沙 - 他者的觀點〉，發表於「七〇年代東亞風雲 - 臺灣與琉球、釣魚台、南海諸島的歸屬問題」學術研討會（臺北：臺灣教授學會，2013年10月27日），頁1。

Wen-cheng Lin, "Cross-strait Confidence Building Measures," presented for Comparing Different Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Management: Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait Conference (Stockholm: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, December 16-17, 2005), p. 1.

十三、官方文件

（請依個別刊物實際出刊項目，完整臚列）

- (一) 中文：官署機構，〈文件名稱〉（行政命令類）或《文件名稱》（法律類），卷期（案號），日期，頁 x 或頁 x-x。
- (二) 外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Date, Section or Page Numbers.

範例

中華民國總統府，〈總統令〉，《總統府公報》，第7426號，中華民國108年5月22日，頁3。

White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," December 18, 2017, p. 1.

十四、報刊、非學術性雜誌

（若為社論、短評、通訊稿或作者匿名，則可不列作者欄）

- (一) 中文報紙：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《報紙名稱》（出版地），年月日，版 x。（一般性新聞報導可省略作者和篇名，臺灣出版之報紙無須註明出版地。）
- (二) 中文雜誌：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《雜誌名稱》（出版地），年月日，頁 x 或頁 x-x。（無須註明第卷第 x 期。臺灣出版雜誌無須註明出版地）
- (三) 英文報紙：Author's full name, "Title of the Article," *Title of the Newspaper*, Date, Section or Page Numbers.
- (四) 英文雜誌：Author's full name, "Title of the Article," *Title of the*

Magazine, Date, Page x or pp.x-x.

範例

張晏彰，〈臺美夥伴關係 印太安定力量〉，《青年日報》，2019年6月19日，版3。

陳文樹，〈澎湖空軍基地的設立和演進〉，《中華民國的空軍》，2019年6月12日，頁21。

Jason Pan, “Defense think tank inaugurated,” *Taipei Times*, May 2, 2018, p. 3.

Office of Defense Studies, “Commentary: 2012 Pentagon Report on Mainland China’s Military Development,” *Defense Security Brief*, July 2012, p. 9.

十五、網際網路資料

- (一) 請依照個別線上網站實際資訊，詳細臚列。
- (二) 引用網路版報紙的一般報導，無須註明版次，但須附上網址，其餘體例不變。
- (三) 引用電子報紙雜誌評論文章，或電子學術期刊論文，在頁碼後面註明網址，其餘體例不變，無頁碼者得省略之。
- (四) 直接引用機構網站的內容，請註明文章標題、機構名稱，日期與網址。
- (五) 中文：
 1. 專書：作者姓名，《書名》（出版地：出版者，出版年），《網站名稱》，網址。
 2. 論文：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《刊物名稱》，第 x 卷第 x 期，年月，頁 x 或頁 x-x，《網站名稱》，網址。
 3. 官方文件：官署機構，〈文件名稱〉（行政命令類）或《文件名稱》（法律類），卷期（案號），日期，頁 x 或頁 x-x，《網站名稱》，網址。
 4. 報導：作者姓名，〈篇名〉，《媒體名稱》，日期，網址。

範例

王業立編，《臺灣民主之反思與前瞻》（臺北市：臺灣民主基金會，2016年），《臺灣民主基金會》，
<http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/download/book20160830.pdf>。

舒孝煌，〈美陸戰隊 F-35B 前進遠征與輕型航艦部署〉，《國防情勢月報》，143 期，2019 年 5 月，頁 36，《國防安全研究院》，

<https://indsr.org.tw/Download/%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E6%83%85%E5%8B%A2%E6%9C%88%E5%A0%B1-143.pdf>。

中華民國國防部，《106年國防報告書》，2017年12月，頁1，《中華民國國防部》，

<https://www.mnd.gov.tw/NewUpload/歷年國防報告書網頁專區/歷年國防報告書專區.files/國防報告書-106/國防報告書-106-中文.pdf>。

游凱翔，〈國防安全研究院掛牌 唯一國家級國防智庫〉，《中央社》，2018年5月1日，

<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/201805010122.aspx>。

(六) 外文：

1. 專書：Author(s)' full name, Complete title of the book (Place of publication: Publisher, Year) , p. x or pp. x-x, URL.
2. 論文：Author(s)' full name, "Title of the article," Name of the Periodical, Vol. x, No. x, Date, p.x or pp.x-x, URL.
3. 官方文件：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Date, Section or Page Numbers, URL.
4. 報導：Author's full name, "Title of the article," Name of the Media, Month Day, Year, URL.

範例

Robert D. Blackwill, Trump's Foreign Policies Are Better Than They Seem (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2019), p. 1, Council on Foreign Relations,

https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CSR%2084_Blackwill_Trump_0.pdf.

Ralph A. Cossa, "Regional Overview: CVID, WMD, and Elections Galore," Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1, April 2004, p.1, Pacific Forum, <http://cc.pacforum.org/2004/04/cvid-wmd-elections-galore>.

White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," December 18, 2017, p. 1, White House,

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

Colin Clark, "Mattis' Defense Strategy Raises China To Top Threat: Allies Feature Prominently," BreakingDefense, January 18, 2018,

<https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/mattis-military-strategy-raises-china-to-top-threat-allies-feature-prominently>.

十六、第二次引註之格式

首次引註須註明完整之資料來源（如前述各案例），第二次以後之引註可採以下任一格式：

- （一）作者姓名，《書刊名稱》或〈篇名〉，或特別註明之「簡稱」，頁 x-x。
- （二）如全文中僅引該作者單一作品，可簡略為——作者，前引書（或前引文），頁 x 或頁 x-x。
- （三）某一註解再次被引述，簡略為——同註 x，頁 x 或 x-x。
- （四）英文資料第二次引註原則相同：op. cit., p.x or pp.x-x（前引書，頁 x 或頁 x-x。）
- （五）Ibid. p.x or pp.x-x.（同前註，頁 x 或頁 x-x。）

十七、文末之參考文獻

- （一）參考文獻原則上與第一次引述的註釋體例格式相同，惟書籍、研討會論文及博碩士論文無須註明頁數。
- （二）所有文獻依前述註釋類別排列，並依中文、英文、其他語文先後排序。
- （三）中文著作依作者姓氏筆畫排序，英文著作依作者姓氏字母排序。
- （四）將書籍專章列為參考書日時，依專章作者排序。
- （五）翻譯作品依翻譯語文類別，中文譯作按譯者姓氏筆畫排序，英文譯作按原作者姓氏字母排列。
- （六）同一作者有多篇著作被引用時，按出版時間先後排序。
- （七）每一書日均採第一行凸排 2 字元。