

VOLUME 7 ISSUE 1

DEFENSE SECURITY BRIEF

October 2018



Institute for National Defense and
Security Research



Institute for National Defense and
Security Research

Taiwan in Asia-Africa Growth
Corridor (AAGC): Why and How? 1

Jagannath Panda

China's Cyber Corps and
Strategies 12

Si-Fu Ou

The Civil-Military Paradox of
National Security Policies 25

Wilfried von Bredow

Regional Strategic Impact of
China's Belt and Road Initiative 36



ISSN 2225360-2

INDSR

The Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) is dedicated to fueling knowledge-based policy analyses and strategic assessments on Taiwan's security. Our mission is to safeguard Taiwan's democracy and prosperity by strengthening mutual understanding and advancing common interests in the defense and security community both globally and at home. INDSR was formally inaugurated on May 1, 2018, and is headquartered in Taipei, Taiwan. We are an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization.

To bring together great minds in policymaking, industry and research, we convene international forums, network civil societies, engage in Track Two dialogue and conduct wargame simulations. INDSR's dynamic research agenda and activities are used to develop pragmatic policy recommendations for the Taiwan government.

LEADERSHIP

Kent Feng (Chairman) Cheng-Yi Lin (President) Chyungly Lee (Vice President)

DEFENSE SECURITY BRIEF

Defense Security Brief (DSB) is an English-language publication aimed at strengthening research exchanges with security-related experts both domestically and abroad. Established in 2011, DSB was originally founded and compiled by the Office of Defense Studies, Ministry of National Defense. INDSR continues the publication in 2018.

EDITORS

Si-Fu Ou (Editor in Chief)

Chih-Sion Sheu J.R. Wu Catherine K.P. Lin Po-Chou Lin Ruo-Min Chou
(Assistant Editor)

OFFICE

Institute for National Defense and Security Research

No.172, Bo-Ai Road, Chongcheng Dist., Taipei City, Taiwan (R.O.C.)

Tel: 886-2-2331-2360 Fax: 886-2-2331-2361

Printed in Taiwan

ISSN 2225360-2

Copyright © 2018 The Institute for National Defense and Security Research

Cover photo: ROC Air Force five IDF aircrafts. (Source: Hsiao-Huang Shu/INDSR)

Taiwan in Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC): Why and How?

By Jagannath Panda

The official acknowledgement of the concept of “Indo-Pacific” is gaining momentum across the world, including in Taiwan. With a more concentrated foreign policy outreach, Taiwan’s Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched an Indo-Pacific Affairs Section to expand its overseas activities on May 11, 2018. The intent behind this initiative is to explore a new medium of decisive engagement with the key countries across the region.

Officially, this initiative is primarily aimed at expanding Taiwan’s cooperation with key countries in the Indo-Pacific, in areas such as culture, education, tourism, business and agriculture, so as to enhance Taiwan’s “New Southbound Policy” (NSP). But given Taiwan’s constrained international space and China’s growing assertiveness, how far can Taiwan actualize its Indo-Pacific engagement?


This article argues that Taiwan needs to have a more intense collaborative effort with the regional value chain networks, be it through infrastructural investment or by furthering cooperation with corridors and connectivity projects in the region. One medium to enhance this cooperation is by factoring on how to cooperate with

India-Japan envisioned Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which focuses on a “people-centric” approach by linking Asia and Africa. In addition, Taiwan must envision a way to establish a soft-strategic network more intently with the “Quad” countries – Australia, India, Japan and the United States – without annoying or confronting mainland China.

The Indo-Pacific Complementarities

The launch of the Indo-Pacific Affairs Council is a welcome initiative. It complements President Tsai Ing-wen’s foreign policy of deepening “relationships with friendly democracies” in the region. It also complements Japan’s “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, India’s “Act East” policy, the United States’ “Indo-Pacific” strategy and Australia’s open maritime foreign policy framework.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s FOIP strategy factors ASEAN as a prime focus of economic and strategic cooperation. Japan’s trade contacts with ASEAN is much higher than that of India and Taiwan (See Chart 1).



Source: International Trade statistics

Greater economic cooperation, enhancing physical and digital connectivity, securing a stronger strategic cooperation are the prime aspects of India's Indo-Pacific outlook in which ASEAN factors prominently. Again, President Donald Trump's thrust on Indo-Pacific is very much ASEAN-centric even though US foreign policy has taken a back seat when it comes to multilateral trade negotiations. Australia's current foreign policy equally concentrates on its relationship with ASEAN. Given these foreign policies focus on the Quad countries and NSP's focus on the ASEAN, this is an opportune period for Taiwan to envision greater economic and strategic compatibility in Indo-Pacific.

India is a key economic partner for Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan-India scientific and economic cooperation has been stable even though there is scope to further these contacts.

A highlight of the NSP is to “engage in a wide range of negotiations and dialogue” with the 18 countries that cover ASEAN and the South Asian region. Based on the principle of “multi-faceted cooperation”, NSP targets the 10 ASEAN member countries and the South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka along with Australia and New Zealand. NSP's main target is not to seek or advance Taiwan's “geopolitical stature or influence” but rather to enhance a more purposeful cooperation through economic and trade cooperation while focusing on people-to-people exchanges, resource sharing and promoting institutional linkages. In order to actualize this ambition, Taiwan must advance a more purposeful engagement with India and Japan in the AAGC framework, while factoring itself as a key component.

NSP and Taiwan-Japan-India “Soft Tripartite”

NSP is a makeover of Taiwan’s “Go South policy”, which focused on free trade, open investment and infrastructure development. NSP emphasizes a “people-centered” approach, focusing on integrating Taiwan’s economy with the regional economies. It also targets enhancing resource-sharing platforms for a more enterprising engagement with the ASEAN and India. This drive is certainly an encouraging aspect of DPP’s foreign policy - working without pursuing a provocative “pro-independence” policy, which was pursued by the erstwhile DPP-led governments. Moreover, the AAGC could help Taiwan have a more economy-oriented engagement in the Indo-Pacific. In the face of the current geopolitical scenario, Taiwan needs to establish a much more deliberate strategic convergence with other major countries, their initiatives and their institutional mechanisms in Indo-Pacific.

What should not be overlooked is that Taiwan’s distinction as an island in Indo-Pacific is unique. Being positioned at the confluence of the South China Sea and East Asia, Taiwan makes an important maritime island across international shipping lanes. Thus, it would be beneficial for it to actualize this geographic advantage with greater cooperation with likeminded countries such as Japan and India.

For Taiwan, having a greater convergence with the FOIP construct will exemplify its distinction as a relevant actor in the Indo-Pacific. In fact, a stronger soft-strategic understanding involving Japan, India, and Taiwan is advantageous to all the countries involved. For long, Taiwan-Japan foreign policy coordination has been evolving to facilitate better understanding. Japan needs Taiwan as much as Taiwan needs Japan. In the 16 Pacific islands, Taiwan has diplomatic

contacts with six whereas China has eight diplomatic contacts. New Caledonia and French Polynesia are French territories and have no diplomatic ties with either China or Taiwan.

Xi Jinping's intensive policy towards the Pacific islands is changing the diplomatic tug-of-war between China and Taiwan more in Beijing's favor. Panama, Dominican Republic and Sao Tome and Principe have recently cut off diplomatic contacts with Taiwan, and have established formal diplomatic contacts with China. Tokyo wants to offer indirect support to Taiwan even though Japan does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Besides, Taiwan is key to Japan's maritime safeguard, acting as a bulwark against possible Chinese maritime misadventure in future. Concerned about the rising Chinese outreach in the Pacific, Taiwan continues to float its own outreach through the support of likeminded partners such as Japan, the US and Australia - the three key countries in the FOIP construct.

India is a key economic partner for Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan-India scientific and economic cooperation has been stable even though there is scope to further these contacts. The rise of the FOIP construct must encourage the two countries to have a deeper regional understanding. They need to have a greater purpose of cooperation. Given India's central positioning in the Indian Ocean and its rising commercial ambitions in the South China Sea zone, India's maritime planning must board Taiwan as a stronger maritime link. India, however, is not a party to the South China Sea dispute.

What puts India and Taiwan on a common platform is China's rise as a stronger and assertive power in the region. Though the two sides may find it difficult to pursue an anti-China foreign policy, a

cooperative context of understanding in the maritime domain on China's rise in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) can be a bonding factor. For Taiwan, aligning with the Japanese and Indian FOIP framework will protect its economic and foreign policy interests. A soft FOIP tripartite construct will in fact strengthen it. At a time when the regional order is in flux, Taiwan's NSP finds complementarities with the foreign policies of many countries in Indo-Pacific, especially with that of Japan and India. This calls for a soft-tripartite involving Taiwan, Japan and India.


Capitalizing on the Essence of AAGC

AAGC is currently only a proposed growth model (see Map 1). But this should not discourage Taiwan from exploring and establishing new mediums of specific institutional or methodological cooperation with this proposed model. AAGC factors the ASEAN as a key value-chain zone in an inter-continental cooperative framework. That should find strategic consonance with Taiwan's NSP. In fact, the AAGC Vision Document, released in May 2017, proposes four key areas of intercontinental cooperation: (a) development; (b) quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity; (c) enhancing capacities and skills; and (d) people-to-people partnership. AAGC is based on a broad intercontinental framework to establish growth and developmental cooperation between Asia and Africa; "people-centric" heterogeneity and homogeneity are the distinct features of AAGC which Taiwan must capitalize on.

NSP not only emphasizes a "people-centric" approach of cooperation with ASEAN and India, but also thrusts on areas which are AAGC's focus. To Taiwan, this would be an expedient opportunity. Taiwan could foresee the AAGC as a soft network to its foreign policy campaigning. The AAGC is a people's proposition which emphasizes

universalism in growth and development, factoring Africa. This serves Taiwan's political purpose.

Map-1



(Note: This is not an official Map of AAGC. This Map is prepared by the author with the cooperation of Mr. Vivek Dhankar of the IDSA GIS Lab in order to understand the scope and volume of the AAGC. Source: IDSA)

Partnering with the AAGC will help the Taiwanese people to be better represented through a consultative framework across Indo-Pacific. The scope to cooperate better in regional mechanisms and multilateral institutions will amplify Taiwan's international image as a distinct territory, if not an independent territory. Notably, AAGC and NSP are complementary because both are long-term policy propositions, based on multi-pronged developmental plans. Unlike the NSP, the AAGC might be an international co-envisioned

multilateral proposition. But there is no doubt that the policy focuses of the NSP and AAGC are almost in similar line, complementing each other. Greater convergence among resources, markets, talents, companies and organizations will only strengthen chain of growth and developmental networks in Indo-Pacific.

AAGC aims to promote a consultative but meaningful participation in a value-chain growth network between Asia and Africa, in which Taiwan must aim to participate. It also establishes a commercial and strategic consonance with the NSP. Notably, NSP's core target is to promote a more intensive economic collaboration thrusting on three key aspects: supply chains, taking advantage of different domestic markets of the countries in the region, and establishing or promoting infrastructure development across Indo-Pacific.



Taiwan-ASEAN-India Strategic Investment Partnership Forum hold by Ministry of Economic Affairs in Taipei on July 17, 2018. (Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs)

Under the NSP, Taiwan can aim to export quality infrastructure-construction-related materials and establish strategic alliances with countries in the region. Above all, Taipei must aim to bring a structural change in its global and regional supply chain at a time when the US-China trade conflict is intensifying. Though many estimates in Taiwan currently suggest that the US-China tit-for-tat tariff and trade war would hardly affect Taiwan's economy, still Taipei needs a greater contingency plan by aligning more intently with the regional value chain for its future economic growth and stability.

AAGC factors the Indian Ocean as the fulcrum of intercontinental cooperation.

Taking advantage of NSP, Taiwan must aim to have more constructive cooperation with Japan and India under the AAGC framework. The fishing industry and foreign

AAGC and BRI have overlapping objectives: to promote trade and economic cooperation, connectivity and infrastructure promotion, among many other things.

trade are critical components of Taiwan's economy. Taiwan's business community has already invested in and has been trading with ASEAN countries for many years. Taiwan's ASEAN contact must be furthered to IOR. It must have greater contact with the sea-trade routes and ports and maritime policies in IOR. It can aim to expedite cooperation with the India-proposed S-A-G-A-R, "project Mausam", "Cotton Route" and "Spice Route". This will only strengthen cooperation between Taiwan and India, within and outside the broader AAGC framework. Japan as a third country can contribute to this maritime chain of networks.

Taiwan also needs to note that the AAGC promotes the notion of free-trade architecture, which is to Taiwan's advantage. For long, it has been searching for free and open trade architecture in Indo-Pacific. In this regard, its alignment with AAGC more intently will help all, including Taiwan, to balance out China's Belt and Road (BRI) proposition. AAGC and BRI have overlapping objectives: to promote trade and economic cooperation, connectivity and infrastructure promotion, among many other things. AAGC and BRI are competing growth models. BRI is based on China's unilateral approach and is China's international economic engagement strategy, having priority for China's national interests. AAGC is consultative and endorses liberal values and the democratic spirit, which Taiwan must be closely associated with. The AAGC in particular aims to embrace universal values concerning human resource development while prioritizing infrastructure investment, connectivity and growth corridors. NSP must take note of this and start having closer coordination with Japan and India.

Internationally, Taiwan has lost a number of diplomatic allies in recent years. Donald Trump's "Taiwan Travel Act" is the only major successful achievement for Taiwan in recent times. The "Taiwan Travel Act" strongly encourages "visits between officials of the United States and Taiwan at all levels". New and innovative ways of collaboration must be the arc of Taiwan's foreign policy, especially of its NSP. Diplomatic constraints should not be a barrier for innovative thinking. Taiwan's objective should be not only to enhance country-specific cooperation but also to plan and aim to have an institutional cooperation with mechanisms that factor some of these countries. Greater participation in mechanisms and institutions has been one of Taiwan's main pillars of its international identity over the years. This has been possible with the stronger backing of likeminded countries. Taiwan must continue to expand

its network with this set of countries further. Both Japan and India must accord priority to this endeavor.

∞

Dr. Jagannath Panda is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi and heads the East Asia Centre at IDSA. Dr. Panda is the Series Editor for “Routledge Studies on Think Asia”. He is the author of India-China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order (Routledge: London and New York, 2017). The primary idea of this paper was based on the author’s earlier presentation in an international symposium titled The New Southbound Policy and Regional Response held at the National Defense University (NDU) in Taiwan on December 6, 2017.

∞

China's Cyber Corps and Strategies

By Si-Fu Ou

Today's fight in cyberspace occurs in the gray zone between war and peace. Chinese state-sponsored hackers have focused largely on the theft of intellectual property, trade secrets, and other sensitive commercial information. Its chief aim has been to boost Chinese economic competition. More recently, however, China shifts its hackers from industrial spies to cyber warriors. The Chinese seem focused on gleaning intelligence on military capabilities and on government officials who interact with defense contractors. China has emphasized the importance of cyberspace as a new domain of national security and an arena for strategic competition. China's leadership continues to direct the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be capable of fighting and winning local wars under informationized conditions. China has taken a leadership role among the top cyber powers, now openly declaring its place with the US, Russia and other countries. In order to understand the Chinese cyber threats, one has to explore the PLA cyber forces and its related strategies.

China's Cyber Corps

It is first important to understand gulfs in how China and the US define cybersecurity/network security and other related terminology. In Chinese literature there currently exists no formal, authoritative terminology for "cyber," "cybersecurity," or other terms stemming from the word "cyber," though the Chinese

government and scholars have adapted to its usage in English-language media. Instead, China uses “information security” and “network security” to refer to similar concepts. Western scholars should recognize the differences and implications for each of the terms to include or infer cyber connotations.

The Chinese government, academic, and military literature relevant to the “cyber” domain often refer to “network”-related terminology (網絡). Parallels to English-language terminology include the use of the term “network space” (網絡空間) to refer to “cyberspace” (賽博空間) and the term “cyber operations” parallels the PLA term “network warfare” (網絡戰). The PLA literature currently positions “cyber” concepts within the “information operations” domain (信息作戰), although “information operations” also encompasses a broad range of other concepts in computing, psychological operations, and the electromagnetic spectrum.¹

The Strategic Support Force’s cyber mission has been given to the Network Systems Department (網絡系統部, or NSD), a deputy theater command leader grade (副戰區級)

organization that acts as the headquarters for the SSF’s cyber operations forces, sometimes referred to as a cyber corps or cyberspace operations forces (網軍或網絡空間作戰部隊). Despite

To foster cyber professionals, China seeks to establish several cybersecurity schools in Chinese universities as training grounds for cyber-warriors.

¹ Amy Chang, “Warring State: China’s Cybersecurity Strategy,” Center for New American Security, December 2014, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_WarringState_Chang_report_010615.pdf?mtime=20160906082142

its name, the Network Systems Department and its subordinate forces are responsible for information warfare more broadly, with a mission set that includes cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare (311 Base, which conducts information warfare—disinformation and influence activities). At first glance, the Network Systems Department appears to represent a renaming, notional reorganization, and grade promotion of the former Third Department (總參三部, or 3PLA) of the PLA GSD (General Staff Department), which appears to have moved in its entirety. Much as the institutions of the former GSD provided the partial foundation for the creation of the Space Systems Department, but they also form the organizational core of the NSD. The Network Systems Department maintains the former Third Department's headquarters, location, and internal bureau-centric structure. In at least one instance, the NSD has been referred to as the "SSF Third Department" (戰略支援部隊第三部), mirroring its former appellation.²

The cyber responsibilities lie with the GSD's Third and Fourth Departments that conduct advanced research on information security. The 3rd Department is responsible for signals intelligence and focuses on collection, analysis and exploitation of electronic information. The 4th Department oversees electronic counter-measures and research institutes developing information warfare

² John Costello, "China's Strategic Support Force: Testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission," February 15, 2018, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Costello_Written%20Testimony.pdf

technologies. The military also maintains ties with research universities and others in the public sector.³

To foster cyber professionals, China seeks to establish several cybersecurity schools in Chinese universities as training grounds for cyber-warriors. These schools are Xidian University, Southeast University, Beihang University, Wuhan University, Sichuan University, the University of Science and Technology of China, and the SSF Information Engineering University. One quickly notices two trends. First, the seven schools encompass all regions of China, meaning the search for talent will cover the entire nation of 1.37 billion. Second, the batch is a mixture of civilian and military-affiliated universities. Such a model of civil-military fusion (軍民融合) will help schools complement one another's limitations.⁴

The SSF may represent the PLA's first step in developing a cyber force that combines cyber reconnaissance, attack and defense capabilities under one hat. Importantly, it appears the PLA has taken note of US Cyber Command's structure that consolidated cyber functions under a single entity.⁵ The China's Cyber Corps is believed to employ 100,000 hackers, language specialists and analysts at its headquarters in the Haidian District in Beijing. Branch units are located in Shanghai, Qingdao, Sanya, Chengdu and Guangzhou. In

³ Elizabeth Van Wie David, "China's Cyberwarfare Finds New Targets," *Fair Observer*, October 27, 2017, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/china-cyberwarfare-cybersecurity-asia-pacific-news-analysis-04253

⁴ Zi Yang, "China Is Massively Expanding Its Cyber Capabilities," *National Interest*, October 3, 2017, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-massively-expanding-its-cyber-capabilities-22577>

⁵ Mark Pomerleau, "DoD's Assessment of China's Information Capabilities," *C4ISRNET*, June 7, 2017, <https://www.c4isrnet.com/articles/dods-assessment-of-chinas-information-capabilities>

May 2014, the US government indicted five midlevel PLA hackers who were part of a Shanghai-based group known as Unit 61398. An NSA document made public by renegade former contractor Edward Snowden revealed that 3PLA's Technical Department is one of the Chinese government's most aggressive cybertheft actors, with 19 confirmed and nine other possible cyberunits under its command. The other major cyberspying organization is the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), which runs six known and 22 suspected cyberspying units.⁶ The use of 3PLA for economic cyber espionage is part of the policy of civil-military fusion programs that involve China sharing resources between science and technology entities and the PLA.⁷



This white building on Shanghai is the headquarters of Unit 61398 of the PLA. (Source: Google map)

China shifted its hackers from industrial spies to cyber warriors in late 2015. Most countries engage in some sort of espionage of each other's governments. From 2006 to 2014, China was very active in

⁶ Bill Gertz, "China Cyber Spy Chief Revealed," *Washington Times*, March 28, 2018, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/mar/28/liu-xiaobei-heads-china-us-hacking-operations>

⁷ Bill Gertz, "US Trade Report Lays Bare Chinese Government Cyber-Espionage," *Asia Times*, March 26, 2018, <https://www.atimes.com/article/us-trade-report-lays-bare-chinese-government-cyber-espionage>

cyberespionage of commercial interests as opposed to government secrets. Some scholars argue that commercial espionage was as necessary to build the Chinese economy. A massive commercial cyberespionage campaign was made possible, in large part, through direct government support from the military's Unit 61398. However, by 2017, Unit 61398 was mostly disbanded, as Chinese cyber strategy completed its shift from commercial to government objectives, and from volume to sophistication.⁸

Assessing the strength of the Chinese cyber force, a Rand paper concluded that China's cyber activities have become a major source of concern in the US and allied countries. There is strong evidence that many of the hostile cyber espionage activities emanating from China are tied to the PLA. The PLA has maintained organized cyber units since at least the late-1990s, while the US Cyber Command was only formed in 2009. Nevertheless, under wartime conditions, the US might not fare as poorly in the cyber domain as many assume. Moreover, in evaluating the likely relative impact of cyber attacks, the target user's skills, network management, and general resiliency are at least as important as the attacker's capabilities. In all of these areas, the US enjoys substantial advantages, though Chinese performance is improving. Chinese cyber security is suspect, and its civilian computers suffer from the world's highest rate of infection by malware. Both sides might nevertheless face significant surprises in the cyber domain during a conflict, and US logistical efforts are

⁸ Elizabeth Van Wie David, "China's Cyberwarfare Finds New Targets," *Fair Observer*, October 27, 2017, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/china-cyberwarfare-cybersecurity-asia-pacific-news-analysis-04253

particularly vulnerable, since they rely on unclassified networks that are connected to the Internet.⁹

China's Cyber Warfare Strategies

China's cyber strategies are evolving in parallel with the PLA ongoing military reforms and modernization drives. Dean Cheng, senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, said that "before horses and troops move," China wants to have information dominance (制信息權) over its rivals. To China, cyber is a distinct subset of information operation.¹⁰ On informationization, Cheng argued further that Chinese leadership views the world as having entered an information age, in which the very nature of international power, the currency of international power, has shifted from traditional industry toward the ability to gather information, analyze information and exploit information. As a result, China believes that, in a sense, the global balance of power has been reset to zero, where everyone is starting from the same starting point, and China can therefore catch up much more easily. On the Chinese perspective on conflict within the context of informationization, Cheng wrote: "the focus of informationized warfare is establishing information dominance. This is the ability to

⁹ Eric Heginbotham et al., *The U.S.—China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017* (California: Santa Monica, 2015), pp. xxii-xxiii.

¹⁰ John Grady, "Panel: China Seeking Dominance over Rivals in Information, Cyber Operations," *USNI News*, March 20, 2017, <https://news.usni.org/2017/03/20/panel-china-seeking-dominance-rivals-information-cyber-operations>

establish control of information and information flow at a particular time and within a particular space.”¹¹

China discusses its own emphasis on cyberwar strategies in several official documents. In the 2015 China’s Military Strategy white paper, it declared that “Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new domain of national security ... As cyberspace weighs more in military security, China will expedite the development of a cyber force, and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defense, support for the country’s endeavors in cyberspace and participation in international cyber cooperation, so as to stem major cyber crises, ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security and social stability.”¹²

The 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy — a study of the PLA’s strategic thinking, published by China’s Academy of Military Sciences—outlines different types of military operations in cyberspace: network reconnaissance, network defense, network attack and network deterrence. The insights it reveals in what appears to be a comprehensive Chinese “whole nation” approach to conducting cyber war. The paper acknowledges that the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Public Security have also been authorized by the military to carry out network warfare operations.

¹¹ Brad D. Williams, “Expert Details Centrality of Information to China’s Cyber Ops, Security Strategy,” *Fifth Domain Cyber*, April 27, 2017, <https://www.fifthdomain.com/home/2017>

/04/27/expert-details-centrality-of-information-to-chinas-cyber-ops-security-strategy

¹² The Information Office of the State Council, “Full Text: China’s Military Strategy,” *China Daily*, May 26, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm

The document also mentions “external entities” outside the public sector that can be organized and mobilized for network warfare operations—a euphemism for the private sector and patriotic hackers. The PLA has opted for a comprehensive whole nation approach when mobilizing for cyber war. This approach may, perhaps more effectively than in western countries, put civilian and non-state actor capabilities in the hands of senior military decision-makers who can more effectively channel and direct these resources for a variety of operations in cyberspace.¹³

Secondly, this highly integrated approach extends to the PLA’s conceptualization of the forces that would participate in cyber operations, which would further blur the conventional distinction between military and civilian domains. Beyond the longstanding linkage of information warfare to the traditional concept of people’s warfare, the Chinese also allude to the participation of civilians in information warfare, observing that the boundaries between military personnel and common people and between civilian-use

The PLA has opted for a comprehensive whole nation approach when mobilizing for cyber war.

and military-use technologies have all become indistinct. They directly support the participation of civilian cyber forces in a conflict scenario and argue since military and civilian attacks are hard to distinguish, the PLA should persist in the integration of the military and civilians, such that “in

peacetime, civilians hide the military, while in wartime, the military

¹³ Franz-Stefan Gady, “Why the PLA Revealed Its Secret Plans for Cyber War,” *The Diplomat*, May 24, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-the-pla-revealed-its-secret-plans-for-cyber-war>

and the people, hands joined, attack together... This intended participation of civilian forces is often linked to the expansive concept of civil-military fusion. Such mobilization of civilian forces is unorthodox relative to most western militaries and could complicate attribution efforts in a crisis through enabling plausible deniability to engage in proscribed cyber activities.¹⁴

Thirdly, the PLA's approach to information warfare has been characterized by the concept of "the integration of peace and warfare" (平戰結合) and a corresponding lack of differentiation between civilian and military targets. Cyber attack and defense countermeasures are an everyday occurrence, such that cyber military struggle is underway at all times, including anticipated attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure, such as power, transportation, and communications systems. Similarly, the strategic game in cyberspace is not limited by space and time, does not differentiate between peacetime and wartime, and does not have a front line and home-front.

Finally, the PLA's approach to cyber warfare could translate into a focus on extensive peacetime cyber preparation of the battlefield, which could undermine strategic stability. The PLA appears to take a highly integrated conceptual and likely operational approach to "cyber reconnaissance" (網絡偵查) and cyber attack. That is, for the PLA peacetime cyber reconnaissance (often characterized as cyber espionage) is considered generally just the preparation for probable future cyber attack operations, since cyber reconnaissance very easily transforms into cyberspace attack, if one only presses a

¹⁴ Elsa Kania, "A Force for Cyber Anarchy or Cyber Order? —PLA Perspectives on Cyber Rules," *China Brief*, July 6, 2016 (Volume: 16, Issue: 11), <https://jamestown.org/program/a-force-for-cyber-anarchy-or-cyber-order-pla-perspectives-on-cyber-rules>

button. For instance, the code for Chinese cyber weapons used in espionage and offensive operations doesn't differentiate clearly between reconnaissance and offensive functions; rather, those functions often tend to be integrated within a single cyber tool. The PLA presents the concept of integrated reconnaissance, attack, and defense (偵攻防一體), implying that the operational activities of Chinese cyber forces would likely take a less differentiated approach to these activities, which are inherently interrelated at the technical level. Such operational integration, even if not directly proscribed by existing and nascent legal and normative frameworks, could raise the risks of misperception or misattribution of intent in a crisis scenario, given the lack of technical differentiation between ordinary cyber espionage and cyber preparation of the battlefield.

Focused on Supporting Conventional Operations

The PLA elevated cyber operations under the SSF in December 2015, placing the virtual domain on par with other branches of the military. Chinese cyber warfare will be focused on supporting conventional military operations as opposed to assuming an independent role in strategic warfare, as US Cyber Command seems to be doing, or to bolster information operations, as Russia seems to be doing. The US may use its cyber capabilities for “left-of-launch” missile defense against North Korea—meaning, sabotaging planned missile launches before they happen—and to disrupt IS (Islamic State) communications. By contrast, China is consumed by fears of a massive US military intervention in Asia. Beijing is building up its anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) military strategy in the Taiwan Strait and its near seas (Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea) by adding cyber and electronic warfare capabilities mesh into what is referred to as “Integrated Network-Electronic Warfare” (網

電一體戰). A report published by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, a Tallinn, Estonia-based think tank, maintains that the PLA units responsible for electronic warfare are taking on the role of running computer network operations as well.¹⁵

China's strategy consists of neutralizing the logistics and communications infrastructure that permits US forces to operate far from home and is pursuing the ability to corrupt US information systems—notably, those for military logistics—and disrupt the information links associated with command and control. Such network and electronic attacks could target the US military or regional allies' early warning radar systems and could cause blind spots in US command and control systems. The PLA could use these blind spots to deploy sorties or launch ballistic missile strike. To accomplish effective cyber attacks on US Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) platforms or any advanced systems, the PLA would have to conduct cyber reconnaissance ahead of time. These concepts have also been reflected in the PLA's recent writings on "network swarming warfare" that envisions future campaigns as "multi-directional maneuvering attacks" conducted in all domains simultaneously: ground, air, sea, space, and cyberspace.

In a potential conflict with Taiwan, for example, the PLA may put a strategic premium on denying, disrupting, deceiving, or destroying Taiwan's C4ISR systems. This would be followed by the deployment of the PLA's conventional air wings, precision ballistic missile

¹⁵ Levi Maxey, "China's Pivots Its Hackers from Industrial Spies to Cyber Warriors," *The Cipher Brief*, April 2, 2017, <http://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/china-pivots-its-hackers-industrial-spies-cyber-warriors-1092>

strikes, and sea power projection platforms—all within the first hours of the conflict. A key target for the PLA, for example, would be the highly-advanced US-made ultra-high frequency (UHF) early warning radar system located on top of Leshan Mountain near the city of Hsinchu. Activated in February 2013, the radar is reportedly capable of detecting flying objects up to 5,000 km away, and provide a six-minute warning in preparation for any surprise missile attack from the Chinese mainland. The radar essentially tracks nearly every sortie of the PLA Air Force flying across Taiwan Strait.¹⁶

In sum, if a war broke out in the Taiwan Strait, cyber warfare is the PLA's first attack spear.

∞

Dr. Si-Fu Ou is director of the Division of Advanced Technology and Warfighting Concepts at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan. He was secretary of Mainland Affairs Council, a cabinet-level administrative agency and office of the Deputy Minister of National Defense. He was an Adjunct Assistant Professor of the Graduate Institute of Futures Studies at Tamkang University. Dr. Ou earned his Ph. D. in international relations from University of Miami.

∞

¹⁶ Michael Raska, "China's Evolving Cyber Warfare Strategies," *Asia Times*, March 8, 2017, <http://www.atimes.com/article/chinas-evolving-cyber-warfare-strategies>

The Civil-Military Paradox of National Security Policies

By Wilfried von Bredow

We are currently observing a paradoxical development of civil-military relations in Western democracies. Civil-military relations appear to be characterized by a widening gap between civil society and governments on the one hand, and the armed forces on the other. At the same time, when engaging in crisis stabilization around the globe, security policies of Western governments are forced to come to terms with the dynamic process of overlapping, even with the fusing of the political and military spheres.

This civil-military paradox makes itself noticeable in all Western societies, but not always in the same way. Despite the politico-military cultures and traditions varying considerably among Western societies, they all substantially influence their national security policies and strategic outlooks. In other words, these societies are confronted with the same kind of security challenges, which compel their government and their military leadership to adapt, transform and refine their mental and their material instruments in order to protect the security of their nation. The process of adaptation, transformation and refinement is difficult, often painful and expensive, and furthermore, follows a different script in each society.

Tripartite Relationship

It makes sense to conceptualize civil-military relations as a tripartite relationship – involving (1) civil society, (2) the political system (government) and (3) the military.

The argument of a widening civil-military gap is based on the observation that Western societies today are what some observers call post-heroic societies. Post-heroic societies have no or not enough understanding for the needs of an organization that has as its most important mission the use of physical violence in order to defend the territory and the democratic order against external threats and aggressions. There are at least four dimensions of this gap which they call cultural gap, demographic gap, policy preference gap, and institutional gap.

Most authors share the conviction that the armed forces and, more general, the military way are currently not in the focus of attention of democratic societies, despite of some very visible and dangerous violent threats of their security. In Europe after 1990, military budgets suffered considerable decreases.

This alone may be a reason for reconsidering “healthy” civil-military relations in our societies. It is, however, only one aspect of a more complex development. The phenomenon I call the civil-military paradox results from the strange juxtaposition of a somehow widening civil-military gap on all three levels of analysis and an opposite trend within the realms of security policy, military strategy and the utility of force. In short, traditional security policy becomes more civilized and military missions include more and more civil activities.

Whether we speak of “war amongst the people”, of “soldiers drawn into politics” or of a “revolution in strategic affairs” – at the heart of

these semantics lies the analytic finding that there is a kind of overlapping, of fusion even, of the military and the civil spheres. This is also one of the basic features of what has been baptized as “new” or “asymmetric” war.

It is puzzling to see both new gaps and new bridges emerge at the same time, hand in hand so to speak. These two developments do not neutralize one another, but in fact together they shape the features of modern security policies as well as of stabilization missions and warfare. Unfortunately, the paradoxical nature of this phenomenon all too often opens the door for misunderstandings and serious misjudgements on the side of political and military leaders. In many European countries, the public uneasiness with the “expeditionary security policies” of governments and, to a lesser degree, with the performance of the armed forces in missions like the intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan is both an expression and a consequence of these misunderstandings.

The Political Context

The armed forces are the masters of organized physical violence and must be contained by normative, institutionalized mechanisms of control in order to internalize the role of “armed servants” of society. The gap literature reverses this view direction. Here, it is not the military which might overwhelm civil society. On the contrary, civil society and its political institutions are building a wall of benign indifference around the armed forces. Whether in political, cultural or demographic terms, the armed forces are put at the margins of national identity. Security is becoming a concept with more civil than military aspects. Even if there are military threats a growing part of the public seems convinced that the root causes of these threats could only be cured by overcoming poverty and deficits of economic development.

The concept of post-heroic societies in the West implies that military values are to a certain extent devaluated nationwide. The warrior ethos appears as mostly anachronistic and, even if not completely obsolete, only useful in a few exceptional cases of incomprehensible violence. Post-heroic societies prefer to use their armed forces in missions other than war, e. g. rescue missions, peacekeeping, reconstruction missions. They like to restrict military expenditure to

The triangle of political leadership - military establishment-civil society came under pressure when, after the end of the East-West conflict, the Bundeswehr was no longer an element of the deterrence-defence-posture of NATO.

narrow limits, and some of them make extensive use of private security companies. The details vary, of course, from country to country due to different politico-military cultures.

The Military Context

At this point it is necessary to mention an issue that is often overlooked when public discourse is absorbed by discussion of a certain mission like the war in Iraq or in Afghanistan. These are certainly very important events, but they must be regarded as special

cases within a much broader range of missions which Western armed forces are called upon over the past two and a half decades. The long list of names which are or were in use for such post East-West conflict missions indicates the variety of activities which the soldiers have to perform. To mention just a few: peacekeeping (traditional and robust), peace enforcement, peace building, peace support operations, military missions other than war, crisis response operations, stabilization missions, humanitarian intervention, and so on. Other missions are military training

missions, observer missions, various kinds of supervision missions in and for the containment of non-military threats and dangers. Not all of these missions include fighting, but many do. Sometimes the “real conflict” starts only after the more traditional war fighting seems to have come to an end. On May 1, 2003, US President George W. Bush, when looking back to the combat operations in Iraq over the past months stated proudly “mission accomplished”. In fact, it was most certainly far from it. On the contrary, for more than ten years now, insurgency is regarded as “the most widespread form of warfare today”. Therefore, Western armed forces are now shaped in such a way that they are fit for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. COIN soldiers are warriors and homini politici at the same time.

The Confluence of the Political and the Military Spheres

The idea of the confluence of the political and military spheres in counterinsurgency operations but also in other kinds of modern military missions is convincingly illustrated in case studies about the war in Afghanistan.

On the ground, soldiers in missions like ISAF are required to be military experts and diplomats, convincing communicators and mediators. Since they are deeply immersed in an often completely different cultural environment, they are obliged to respect the local culture which may go against the official political program of the intervening countries. The balance between the respect of the local culture and the Western political and humanitarian values can be extremely difficult. Mistakes are made public by the local, but also by international media. The latitude of professional requirements puts an enormous stress on the soldiers in such missions.

This situation is further exacerbated by the variety of missions. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union has launched, since 2003, a bit more than 30 civilian and military missions. In spite of this distinction, most of the civilian missions are embedded in a military context and vice versa.

Case Study: Germany

In the decades after the foundation of the Bundeswehr (1955/56) the political authorities in the country as well as in the supervising Western alliances emphasized the necessity of a basic compatibility of the armed forces with the norms and values of democracy. This implied a tight and institutionalized democratic control of the Bundeswehr and various attempts to integrate it as much as possible into the democratic society. Before the background of Germany's politico-military past in the 19th and 20th century, this was surprisingly successful.



Belgium, Canada and Germany take up air policing duties. Ceremony at Estonia, making handover of Baltic Air Policing mission from the French to the German. (Source: NATO)

The triangle of political leadership – military establishment – civil society came under pressure when, after the end of the East-West conflict, the Bundeswehr was no longer an element of the deterrence-defence-posture of NATO, but instead was called upon to

take part in out-of-area missions of different dimensions. This demanded deep-cutting reforms of the Bundeswehr (including the introduction of an all-volunteer-force in 2011) which could only be realized in a step-by-step process.

In 1990, neither the German politicians nor the soldiers of the Bundeswehr disposed of any practical experiences with intervention in out-of-area conflicts. Over the following two decades, a certain pattern emerged in the public debates and perceptions of the German participation in multinational peace, stabilization and crisis management missions of the Bundeswehr. This pattern was and still is dominated by the overwhelming conviction that military instruments in such missions are secondary (for some even evil) and should better be used only for limited and tightly defined tasks.

The civil-military paradox has, therefore, a quite unique shape. A Swiss journalist remarked some years ago that Germany is the only power in the world which keeps armed forces in order not to make use of them. This is certainly a sarcastic exaggeration, despite having a true core. Opinion polls in Germany about civil-military relations usually reveal that the Bundeswehr is regarded with high respect. Non-military missions on a small scale are gladly supported. Military missions like the Afghanistan mission are, however, quite unpopular. The government and the military establishment often regard this discrepancy as a product of insufficient communication (also as a consequence of a non-military bias in the media). This is only partly correct.

For some authors this civil-military paradox is a typical ingredient of post-heroic societies. Other Western societies also display features of post-heroism but remain not so deeply guided by mistrust against the military aspects of what soldiers in modern armed forces are expected to do. Is Germany then a kind of advanced post-heroic

society? The last seven or eight years of the Afghanistan engagement of the Bundeswehr amplified the public rejection of this kind of mission, but in turn deepened the disappointment of the German ISAF soldiers with the military leadership. Their anger is expressed in a wave of books and articles by Afghanistan veterans. It is

The new military must be effective warriors, but at the same time also a kind of social worker in the jungles of weak states.

noteworthy that the grievances of the soldiers are mainly put forward by the rank and file. On the ground in Afghanistan, the German soldiers had to struggle with many professional problems, deficits of the military equipment and list of instructions which curtailed their scope of actions (“caveats”) being the most visible one. In retrospect,

it has become evident that the political and military leadership had no clear idea about the nature of the Afghanistan mission. The reason for this deplorable fact is not recklessness or strategic over-ambition but, on the contrary, a preference for what was thought to be politically correct – a preference for civil conflict management, possibly even conflict prevention and a complex, but mostly rhetoric “multidisciplinary” strategic approach. This approach was impressively put forward (albeit in vain) in the following passage of the White Paper on German Security Policy of 2006: “In the future, national preventive security measures will be premised on even closer integration of political, military, development policy, economic, humanitarian, policing and intelligence instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management. Operations at the international level will require a comprehensive, networked approach that effectively combines civilian and military instruments.”

The notorious “Kunduz shock” of September 4, 2009 served as one of two crystallizers for an urgent reform of the Bundeswehr in order to make its soldiers more combat-ready. Because the public debate was centred around the Kunduz air strike, this reform did not stir much opposition in the public. Still, the predominant attitude of the German public when confronted with the question of a possible intervention of the Bundeswehr in conflicts like the ones in the Near East or the Ukraine is Bartleby-esque: better not. The second crystallizer was the Russian occupation of the Crimea and the politically sophisticated hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine. These events generated a reform of NATO’s strategic priorities which implied, among other, the increase of Germany’s military expenditure and a re-formulation of the Bundeswehr’s role within NATO. This is again a difficult and cumbersome change which will need not months, but years.

Conclusion

The German case is special, but some of its features can be found in other European countries. Do these considerations lead to a clear conclusion about the current state and the future development of civil-military relations in Western societies? A positive answer would be presumptuous. The differences in the politico-military cultures of the nations are serious and it is unwise to overlook them. On the other hand, globalization and the recent developments in the direction of war are equal challenges for all Western democracies.

These democracies can be described as post-heroic societies, some more so (like Germany), some less (like Great Britain and, less so, France). All of them have problems to convince the electorate to provide a bigger portion of the budget for the armed forces. The new many-faceted professionalism of the armed forces after the end of

the mass army format is markedly different from the mainstream lifestyles in post-heroic societies.

This is, indeed, an indication for a widening gap between civil society and the military. So it may come as a surprise to learn from opinion polls, again and again, that the public has much respect for the armed forces. Evidently, the professional values of the soldiers, though clearly different from those in the civil world, are regarded as functional and acceptable.

In many of their new missions the armed forces have to increase both their military skills as soldiers and their non-military skills as diplomats on a local scale, mediators and communicators. War “among the people” implies best possible relations with the people under the circumstances of conflict and violence. The new military must be effective warriors, but at the same time also a kind of social worker in the jungles of weak states. Here, they cannot afford a broad civil-military gap.

The most acute aspect of this inquiry is what might be called (certainly a bit exaggerated) the out-of-sync situation with regards to the military and the political leadership. The loss of weight and influence of the military leadership within the governmental system, which decries the former French general Jean Cot, is probably not so much the consequence of a willful neglect of military advices on the part of civil government. It is primarily, I suppose, an expression of the new entanglement of military and civil aspects which currently dominate the security policies of Western democracies. Today, military advice at the top must be, like military practice on the ground, more so than in former times, substantially enriched by civil considerations. And the political leadership today must have, more than in former times, substantial expertise of military strategy. This is a challenge for both.

∞

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wilfried Freiherr von Bredow (ret.) was a professor of political science at the University of Marburg from 1972 to 2009. He was research fellow and guest professor at Oxford, Toronto, Saskatchewan, Toulouse, Lille and Chiayi, Taiwan. From 2011 to 2018 he was a Faculty-Member of the Geneva Graduate School of Governance. Prof. von Bredow focuses on German foreign/security policy, military-society relations, transatlantic security policy and the international roles of Canada.

∞

Regional Strategic Impact of China's Belt and Road Initiative

By Hsu Hui Yi

For a long time, the “western model” has become the example to emulate in the world. The “western system” established as an indestructible model for nearly a hundred years has guided global progress more than we can imagine. Japan, adopting the “western model” and “western system”, is one of Asia’s advanced and prosperous countries. Concerning for all countries in the world, China has tried to reverse such norms and values in an attempt to end the so-called “western model” and create its own “eastern successful model” to replace it. China’s “The Belt and Road” initiative is the best symbol for attempting to achieve the “eastern successful model.” It can be seen that the will and intention of China to become a world power is very strong and positive, though more aggressive.

Regional Strategic Objectives

Flip the “western model” and use “The Belt and Road” to draw in the surrounding countries, thereby extending the forces— Since 2013, China has officially organized and systemized “The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” into “The Belt and Road (Abbreviation B&R or BRI)” and regarded it as its most important initiative in recent years. It promotes a strategic policy of creating a transnational economic belt. “The Belt and Road” physically covers a wide area, through central, north and west Asia, the Indian ocean coast, and the Mediterranean countries. Through the principle of “communication, co-construction and sharing”, China will realize more perfect, safe and efficient infrastructure

along the route to form a higher level of land, sea and air exchange network. At the same time, it will effectively improve the convenience of investment and trade. The vision is to build a high-quality and high-standard free trade regional network, so that the economic ties between countries along the route are closer, political mutual trust is deeper, and humanities exchanges are more extensive. It will also further achieve China's strategic goal of seeking to dominate the world. For China's domestic politics, "The Belt and Road" has become a "national top-level strategy" and can be regarded as the general program for China's future opening to the world. In fact, "The Belt and Road" flaunts the great vision of "leading shared development, increasing economic density, shortening economic distance, breaking barriers and creating new development space" and, instead, raises the suspicious of Asia-Pacific and Western countries over China's economic imperialism. The development of China's "The Belt and Road" has indeed evolved from the "peer-to-peer" trade pattern of the past to the "strip" or even "blocky" concept of comprehensive development. It is a kind of "block-like path" sweep, China's intention to "replace the United States" is very obvious.

If "The Belt and Road" can be successful, China will not only enjoy economic and fruitful achievements, but also extend its military strength to Europe and Southeast Asia.

The ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides had an argument: "A newly emerging power must challenge the existing powers, and the existing powers will inevitably respond to such threats, so that war becomes inevitable." This is the so-called "Thucydides' trap". Since ancient times, there have been 16 times when battles were fought

between the first empire and the second empire. There have been 12 bloody wars, and only 4 of the battles have ended peacefully. The current battle between the United States and China, even if bloodless, has already produced serious confrontation at all levels.


Let countries along “The Belt and Road” create “necessary dependence” on China— From the strategic meaning of “The Belt and Road”, China wants to create a “necessary dependence” of the countries along the line, and divide the world into the concept of a central country, a border country and a half-border country. The center is composed of industrial countries, while the border countries export raw materials to the central countries and are mainly engaged in labor-intensive industries. Therefore, the dependence causes the backwardness and inequality of the border countries, and the central countries rely on this relationship to maintain higher wages and trade interests and weaken the class contradictions in the country. China has attempted to break away from the economic and trade system that has long been dominated by Europe and the United States, and establish its own European, Asian and African economic and trade roads, linking the eastern hemisphere and the western hemisphere. If “The Belt and Road” can be successful, China will not only enjoy economic and fruitful achievements, but also extend its military strength to Europe and Southeast Asia. At that time, the center of the politics and economics in the world will be controlled by China, and the geopolitical advantage will also tilt towards to China. However, after five years of seeing “The Belt and Road” take shape, more and more countries are now waking up to and fearful of China’s intentions. Frankly, “The Belt and Road” isn’t a mistake, what is wrong is China’s aggressive intentions and means.

The Operating Mode

Adopting backward policies to resolve China's domestic problems with little certainty the strategy will lead to domestic economic improvement— China's "The Belt and Road" policy is mainly to eliminate some of China's large-scale, overcapacity in its manufacturing sector, including steel, coal, glass manufacturing, cement, metallurgy and other traditional manufacturing industries; accelerate the overseas expansion of Chinese enterprises; and push them to develop high-end products to allow, countries along the belt and road to digest China's overcapacity. At the same time, China wants the countries along the route to advance and develop, too. In this mode of operation, "State-owned enterprise first and private enterprise later" is the way that China first promotes and extends the strategy. Such a way has also triggered criticism from all walks of life in China. It is believed that "The Belt and Road" policy is currently driven by state-owned enterprises without meaningful participation by private enterprises. Although the national enterprises have a clear "national strategic" and "public welfare" goal to make it easy for China to achieve its goal of world economy and trade in China, this strategy will also cause China to fall into the "Middle Income Trap", which will inevitably affect the overall economic growth momentum of China. In addition, whether such a strategic goal can bring benefits back to China is still unknown. In fact, some scholars believe that "The Belt and Road" is not a progressive and effective policy, but a rather backward one. China's non-commercial packaging of its infrastructure support for the host country, its naked means of aggression, and then taking control of the rights and exploiting Chinese interests – all this has increased the negative effects and impression of "The Belt and Road". Therefore, the operation of "The Belt and Road" policy is wrong.

Aggressive propaganda is fearful— The Western countries' view of China is a kind of governance and aggression model of

“authoritarianist”, “controlling” and “expansion planning”. Some Chinese scholars believe that the propaganda methods of relevant departments in China supporting “The Belt and Road” and “Made in China 2025” are ironclad evidence that China intends to challenge the world order, especially China is a communist authoritarian state able to effectively nationalize and militarize the economy.



Belt and Road Initiative, Members of the AIIB in orange, the six corridors in black. (Source: LOMMES/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS)

Counter-Attacks in Countries Around the World

“Indo-Pacific strategic policy” attempts to counter “The Belt and Road”— China's “The Belt and Road” policy is constantly being adjusted following the changes of world's situation. “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, published by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in January 2013, called for the establishment of security mechanisms among the United States, Japan, Australia and India. The “Indo-Pacific strategy” proposed by US President Donald

Trump in Asia in November 2017 was regarded by the outside world as an endorsement and enhanced version of the policy proposed by Prime Minister Abe. The deeper strategic implications are to counter the strategic goals of China's "The Belt and Road" policy. The United States and Japan have established a substantive alliance strategic goal, and inevitably, the US-Japan alliance model will be established.

Further countering "The Belt and Road", US Congressman Ted Yoho, Chairman of House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific said the United States International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC), which provides financing of US\$ 60 billion, will join with other development financial organizations in the world to become a counterweight to China's "The Belt and Road". This also means that the United States hopes to find a way to provide a clear option and an alternative to Chinese ambitions.

European countries' counter-forces are getting bigger and louder— At the 2018 Munich Security Conference, former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel strongly attacked China's "The Belt and Road". He believes that 'The Belt and Road Initiative' is not only an economic aggression, but also the Communist Party of China is promoting a set of values system that is different from the West. The CCP's system is not based on freedom, democracy and human rights, but on the basis of its own interests, to reshape the world completely. He also proposed that "the EU should launch a new initiative to use the EU's funds and standards to develop infrastructure in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Africa". During his visit to China, French President Emmanuel Macron also stated that "'The Belt and Road' should not be a new hegemonic road, so that the countries that pass through become vassals." British Prime Minister Theresa May has also indicated in her writings rejecting China's policy of removing the transparency and international

standards of “The Belt and Road.” This is China’s crisis. Western countries have been unable to endure China’s repeated rejection of its willingness to move toward reform and opening up, particularly after the CCP abolished presidential term limits. What is even more unacceptable is that China has exerted tremendous efforts to undermine the international order of democracy, freedom and the rule of law that countries have established.

Using trade wars to fight against China, winning Republican midterm elections and re-election—

Since the US-China trade war, US President Trump’s domestic support at home has risen sharply, improving his image. His tactics against China have given

The launch of “The Belt and Road” means China wants to go from a “big country” to a “the world’s number one power”.

him a rare broad base of support in the United States. But the fact is, there is no absolute winner in the US-China trade war. At best, it is only a winner or loser in a relative sense. In other words, in this trade war, both China and the United States will inevitably suffer losses, although China may be worse off. Judging from the domestic politics of the United States, since Trump took office, a

series of diplomatic and internal affairs incidents have caused his popularity and poll numbers to fall. Dramatic and unconventional methods have made it difficult for the average American population to adapt. Until this year, Trump gradually realized the campaign policy of “great tax reduction” before the election, vowed to find the employment peak in the United States and re-create the US manufacturing glory: “America First”, and successfully promoted the US unemployment rate to 4%. This brilliant figure is a miracle for such a large and mature economy in the United States. Now,

president Trump began to attack on the issue of trade deficit with China. It is actually a rigorously calculated political strategy that in fact it is a rigorously calculated political strategy. The main purpose is this year's US midterm elections and the next presidential re-election.

The United States fosters South American countries in an attempt to transfer the existing Chinese market to South America— For a long time, South American countries have been called the backyard of the United States. The United States not only regards it as a territoriality, but also does not allow other countries to invade nor interfere. Since China snatched three of Taiwan's diplomatic allies in South America, the United States has awakened to the crisis in its own backyard. The United States has imposed trade sanctions on China and at the same time actively repaired relations and fostered South America in trade and support to offset the loss of the Chinese market. China's "The Belt and Road" policy, undemocratic system and actions that do not respect human rights have given countries around the world a strong reason to "enclose China". Although there are many historical factors between the United States and South American countries, this doesn't prevent the intention of the United States to re-operate in South America.

Vigilance and Backlash from Countries Along the "The Belt and Road"

Authoritarian management, low profit, black box process, the pushback from countries along "The Belt and Road"— In fact, China's "The Belt and Road" policy has not been considered a success. In Pakistan, Tanzania, Hungary, Nepal, Myanmar, Thailand, etc., "The Belt and Road" related projects have been cancelled, renegotiated, shelved, etc. According to media reports, local authorities have complained that the cost of "The Belt and Road"

project was too high. After the Chinese companies took over, the profits of the countries along “The Belt and Road Initiative” were too low and they had to repay the loans to China. And the opacity of the relevant tendering process was also unacceptable for these countries.



Russian President Vladimir Putin make a speech at Belt and Road Forum at May 2017 in Beijing. (Source: President of Russia)

Malaysia was the first to counter attack. New Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has repeatedly threatened to stop “The Belt and Road” implementation project between the US\$20 billion East Coast Railway project and the US\$ 2.3 billion Sabah Gas Pipeline after the election. On the one hand, it has shelved “The Belt and Road” project with China, on the other hand, it has proposed to expand investment with China in the trade and high-tech fields. Malaysia is fully aware of China’s “The Belt and Road” intention, so it is not only trying to maintain a harmonious relationship with China,

but also using China's energy to make up for its shortcomings, while at the same time not to let China easily achieve its geopolitical goals.

Adjustment of China's "The Belt and Road" Policy— China's "The Belt and Road" has been in operation for five years. Chinese government has felt pressure from the pushback of countries along "The Belt and Road". China is well aware that if the policy is not adjusted, "The Belt and Road" policy is likely to be "dead", prompting. So Chinese President Xi Jinping to immediately adjusted the policy. He has stressed that, "The Belt and Road" is an economic cooperation initiative, not a geopolitical alliance or a military alliance, it is an open and inclusive process, not a closed-door small circle or "Chinese clubs". As long as countries have the will, China welcomes them to join the initiative. However, China's adjustment of the policy and whether countries along the route can accept it are still open to question.

"The Belt and Road" transition period is ahead of schedule? — From the macroeconomic level, the Chinese government hopes that "The Belt and Road" will help solve the problem of China's capital and overcapacity and bring a new round of economic growth to China. Chinese scholars predict, the entire implementation process of "the Belt and Road" will be long-term, spanning at least 30 to 40 years. However, going at its current rate and given the rising confrontation between the United States and China, will "The Belt and Road" need to be "transformed" in its second five years? Judging from the fact that China has already begun to adjust the policy, the probability of early transformation is very high.

Conclusion

No one will deny that China is a "big country". But it is doubtful if there is agreement on China being a "powerful country." In fact,

since the reform and opening up of China from 1978, the improvement and strengthening of its overall comprehensive national strength has resulted in China becoming the world's second largest economy. The launch of "The Belt and Road" means China wants to go from a "big country" to a "the world's number one power". The United States is concerned about China's strong intentions and has begun to hammer at China on strategy and trade. The United States not only wants to repel China's intention to replace the first power, but also attempts to rebuild the world system and order by trade war. In the current US-China trade war, China can only delay the tactics, delay the change, and strengthen institutional construction as soon as possible and then adjust the implementation strategy of "The Belt and Road" . China faces the distrust of Europe and the United States and the awakening of Asian countries. How China, a kind of hegemonic state, changes its own pace without complete "coordination capabilities" is indeed worthy of attention. After the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the next goal of China is the ASEAN National Cooperation Project. However, after the initial boycott of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, how should China's "ASEAN Road" develop? All countries in the world are paying close attention.

∞

Hsu Hui Yi received a Master's degree from Taiwan and is a student at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in National University of Singapore. She served in the National Security Council, the Mainland Affairs Council and the Legislative Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan) She mainly studies in international relations, cross-straits relations, public administration and national defense.

∞

Submission

The journal of *Defense Security Brief* is the official publication of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR). Articles express the authors' views only and are not necessarily the official policy of INDSR or the editors of the journal.

Defense Security Brief accepts original articles, review, comments and case studies. Contemporary international affairs, defense, security, Indo-Pacific issues and policy reviews are welcomed. The editorial review process can take up to three months. The editorial reserves the right to accept, reject or alter all editorial and advertising material submitted for publication. Manuscripts should address to min.chou@indsr.org.tw, in Microsoft Word format. Hard copies will not be accepted by *Defense Security Brief*.

To submit an article, authors are advised to follow these guidelines:

- Manuscript are around 1500-4500 words long including footnotes.
- Any tables or charts should be supplied in separate files, ideally not linked to text around it.
- Footnote references should be complete and include first and last names of authors, titles of articles (even from newspapers), place of publication, publisher, exact publication dates, volume and issue number (if from a journal) and page numbers. Web sources should include complete URLs and DOIs if available.
- A short author's biography of four or five lines should also be included. This information will appear at the last page of the article.

Note: *Defense Security Brief* are available for download from INDSR's website, indsr.org.tw.

