

INDSR Newsletter



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Patriots-Only Legislative Poll Signals Change of ‘One Country Two Systems’ in Hong Kong

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1. News Highlights

In the absence of a pan-democratic camp, the pro-China establishment of course won the 2021 Hong Kong Legislative Council election. There are two very different reports and interpretations, each with its own bias, of this result that formed two completely different political theories signifying different anticipations for the future development of Hong Kong politics.

Following the implementation of the “Hong Kong National Security Law,” critics argue that the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPCSC) has “improved” the Hong Kong Legislative Council election system by not only reducing the number of directly

elected seats, but also establishing a new political vetting process for candidates, making it impossible for candidates with different political views or positions to run for office in Hong Kong. As a result, the one-person-one-vote “district-based direct election” reached a record low turnout of only 30%. The Legislative Council is now almost a place of only one voice reigns supreme; it’s not only unable to represent the diverse interests of Hong Kong society, but has also become a rubber stamp for the executive branch. Freedom of speech and assembly in Hong Kong is deteriorating rapidly as non-governmental organizations, human rights organizations, industrial unions and even the media that do not support the government have been forced to disband or liquidate, leaving

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almost no room for their survival.¹

As the so-called defendant of the system, Beijing released a white paper entitled “The Development of Democracy in Hong Kong under One Country, Two Systems”² the day after the Legislative Council election, pointing out that before this election, Hong Kong’s “blind pursuit of Western-style democracy” had led to “divisive struggles, social disorder, economic imbalance, and governance failure”. Therefore, the change in the Legislative Council election is to reaffirm that the CCP has full authority over Hong Kong and that the “primary and subsidiary relationship” between China and Hong

Kong cannot be reversed.³ In addition, the white paper emphasized the principle of “patriots ruling Hong Kong” and that the ultimate goal of “dual universal suffrage” for the SAR Chief Executive and the Legislative Council has not wavered.⁴

If the original “one country, two systems” was a move towards Western-style democracy, is it now a move towards “Chinese-style democracy”? Is the Hong Kong Legislative Council really becoming a “mini-NPCSC” and completely deprived of its representative function? Or does Beijing have other intentions? The following is a comprehensive review of these issues.

1. The G7, the EU, and the Five Eyes Coalition, all of which have their own official positions, held similar views and criticized the results of the Hong Kong Legislative Council election. See also: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-foreign-ministers-issue-joint-statement-on-hong-kong-elections>; <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-issues-joint-statement-with-international-partners-on-hong-kong-elections-20-december-2021>; <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/07/01/declaration-of-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-adoption-by-china-s-national-people-s-congress-of-a-national-security-legislation-on-hong-kong/>.
2. For the original *White Paper* released by the Information Office of the State Council of China, see *White Paper*, “The Development of Democracy in Hong Kong under ‘One Country, Two Systems’,” December 20, 2021, <http://www.scio.gov.cn/m/zfbps/32832/Document/1717821/1717821.htm>. Also for the full text in Chinese and English, see the website of *China Daily*, the official media.
3. As quoted by Note 2, the *White Paper* uses the phrase “The facts fully prove that the CCP and the Chinese Government are the designers, founders, maintainers and promoters of the democratic system of the Hong Kong SAR”, “The socialist system practiced by the central government and the capitalist system practiced by the Hong Kong SAR do not contradict each other, but the relationship between the primary and the subsidiary order should not be reversed”.
4. As quoted by Note 2, the *White Paper* spent great lengths reviewing how Beijing has promoted dual universal suffrage in a gradual and orderly manner over the past 24 years, detailing three attempts: amending the methods for selecting the Chief Executive and forming the Legislative Council in 2004, setting a timetable for universal suffrage in 2007, and proposing a roadmap for universal suffrage for the Chief Executive in 2014, only to be met with an umbrella revolution in 2014 that put the blame for all the delays in reform on the Hong Kong opposition.

2. Security Implications

Since the handover of Hong Kong, Beijing's primary concern has probably been the legitimacy of its rule, while at the same time struggling against interfering demands for democratization from international and Hong Kong communities. In the face of the changes that have taken place since the "anti-China" social movement, China's strategy of governing Hong Kong has clearly shifted from a strategy of "divide and rule" to the current "binding strategy" that epitomizes the total centralization of power.⁵

2-1. "Divide and rule" strategy no longer effective

Since its takeover of Hong Kong in 1997, Beijing has allowed different political factions and local elites representing different interests to enter the political system to internally "balance" each other, such as the pro-China

establishment camp and the grassroots pan-democratic camp. Through the proportional representation system for the Legislative Council elections, Beijing further divided the political parties over the past two decades to reduce the chances of the factions uniting and cooperating with each other to act against the central Beijing government. As a result, there are a dozen parties in a tiny city like Hong Kong as the business elites develop their own channels to deal with Beijing for their own influence.

As long as political parties are still working within the "one China" framework, Beijing will still delegate some authority and let the "two systems" operate on their own; only when political disputes are deadlocked will Beijing step in and become the final arbiter to decide who is right. Under the "balancing strategy," Beijing is the ruler watching gladiators fighting in the area below to emphasize the absolute authority and legitimacy of the CCP regime.⁶

5. The author has published a similarly brief commentary in the Voice of America, see Huang Liling, "China's National People's Congress Passes High Vote to Transform Hong Kong's Electoral System. Observer: Beijing 'Brokers' Rule," *Voice of America*, March 11, 2021, <https://www.voacantonese.com/a/China-NPC-approves-nine-changes-to-Hong-Kong-electoral-system-20210311/5810489.html>.

6. For a more detailed description and discussion of the Hong Kong business community's dealings with Beijing in the "Balancing Strategy", see Brian CH Fong, "The Partnership Between Chinese Government and Hong Kong's Capitalist Class: Implications for HKSAR Governance, 1997 – 2012," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 217 March 2014, pp.195-220.

In fact, after the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the pan-democratic camp's demand for “genuine universal suffrage” by removing the nomination threshold for the Chief Executive had already made balancing the social elites through the “divide and rule” strategy difficult to manifest the legitimacy of Beijing's rule over Hong Kong. The reason behind this is that since the CCP itself cannot be democratized, it cannot allow the election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and Legislative Council to go unrestricted, that is allow fair universal suffrage. The consequence of democratizing universal suffrage in Hong Kong is that the CCP could lose its legitimacy and authority to govern Hong Kong. Beijing, of course, understands that it is difficult for a government of centralized power to justify governing a fully democratized local government in Hong Kong.

2-2. The binding strategy through “patriots rule Hong Kong”

According to the “Decision of the National People's Congress on Improving the Electoral System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”⁷ adopted by the National People's Congress and the amendments made by the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Congress to Appendix I and Appendix II of the Hong Kong Basic Law concerning the methods for electing the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council,⁸ there are three major changes to the elections of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council in Hong Kong:

1. The Election Committee for the election and nomination of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and Legislative Council members, originally numbering 1,200, is now expanded to 1,500 members by including 300 seats from the Hong

7. “Decision of the National People's Congress on Improving the Electoral System of the Hong Kong SAR”, National People's Congress of China, March 11, 2021, https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr20-21/chinese/hc/sub_com/hs102/papers/hs10220210326cb4-679-2-c.pdf.

8. Appendix I “Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR” and Appendix II “Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong SAR and Its Voting Procedures” to the Newly Amended Hong Kong Basic Law, Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 30 March 2021, https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr20-21/chinese/hc/sub_com/hs102/papers/hs10220210331cb4-703-1-c.pdf.

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Kong National People’s Congress and the Standing Committee.

2. The original number of Legislative Council members was 70, with 35 seats for “functional constituency” and 35 seats for “regional direct elections”. The number of seats is now expanded to 90, with three types of seats: 40 seats for the “Election Committee”, 30 for the “functional constituency”, and 20 for the “district-based direct election”.
3. Establishment of the Candidate Qualifications Committee. Under the new election system, all candidates and finalists will be “patriots” who have been qualified and approved.

In other words, Beijing has the final call for the elections, and the elites with different political positions are completely excluded from the system. Whether they are elected by the small circle of “election committees” and “functional constituency” or by the one-person-one-vote “district-based direct election”, all of them are now “CCP’s own”.

Most of the “patriots” are puppets

with little autonomy and at best given some opportunity to exchange views and communicate with Beijing. As Beijing binds its own interests with Hong Kong’s “patriots”, they would demand the latter to thoroughly implement Beijing’s policies. Although those who are able to become candidates and elected are all “patriots” who serve the central Beijing government, they can be divided into three levels according to their functions:

1. Members (or underground members) of the ruling CCP.
2. “Agents” who have been given special tasks and functions.
3. “Brokers” or two-way collaborators.

They are responsible for governing, indoctrinating, or communicating with groups and communities in Hong Kong that have not yet fully subordinated to CCP rule or established a Chinese national identity.

However, there are still some “yielded” seats in the Legislative Council that Beijing uses to enlist the business community, local interest groups, and screened political dissidents in Hong Kong, giving them a chance to reflect

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their different perceptions and needs. For example, the “first past the post”⁹ system used in the “district-based direct elections” divides Hong Kong into ten constituency districts, each can have two elected seats. In Beijing’s design, such a system would facilitate “competition” between established and non-established forces, allowing the “political dissidents” to gain at least ten seats and act as a so-called “puppet opposition”, so they can work with certain “functional constituency” legislators as agents or brokers.

2-3. Beijing's “imaginary” Hong Kong Legislative Council

Xia Baolong, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative

Conference (CPPCC) and Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, spoke about “patriots ruling Hong Kong” on a public occasion two weeks before the Legislative Council election. He defined the “patriots” as “those who are good at solving the conflicts and problems faced by Hong Kong’s development, doing practical work for the people, uniting the strengths of all sides, and performing their duties and responsibilities, can be the ones who govern Hong Kong”. The “patriots” are from all corners of the society and diverse, and they can belong to any position of the entire political spectrum as long as they identify with the leadership of China and the CCP.¹⁰ In other words, Xia expects that

9. In the two Legislative Council elections in 1991 and 1995 under the British Hong Kong colonial government, the majority voting system was adopted, which favored the large parties to win the most seats. These two elections, in which the democrats won by a large margin, caused great discontent among the Chinese government at the time, which believed that the British Hong Kong government was deliberately provocative. After the Chinese takeover in 1997, there were two types of seats in the Hong Kong Legislative Council: functional constituencies and geographical direct elections. The proportional representation system and the maximum remainder method were used to allocate seats in the direct elections, which of course favored the smaller parties and fulfilled the CCP’s intention to divide and rule. However, the 2021 Legislative Council election was divided into ten regional constituencies, with two seats elected in each, meaning that if some pan-democratic candidates can pass Beijing’s political vetting, they should be able to win ten seats in the Legislative Council based on the 40:60 vote share between the pro-establishment camp and the pan-democratic camp in the past.

10. The original text reads: “This diversity is reflected in the variety of identities, people from no matter what class, sector, occupation or ethnicity all have the opportunity to participate. This diversity is reflected in the plurality of values, people with no matter what ideology, political attitude, religious belief, interest all have the opportunity to participate.” For a verbatim transcript of the full speech, please see Baolong Xia, “Writing a New Chapter of Democracy in Hong Kong with Reference to History,” *Wen Wei Po*, December 6, 2021, <https://www.wenweipo.com/a/202112/06/AP61adc1aee4b07b4059d6999f.html>.

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the new legislators, or even the new Chief Executive to be inaugurated two months later, should not only have political loyalty, but also the drive and ability to solve the deep-rooted problems of Hong Kong society.

The problem is that Beijing’s unrealistic expectations became apparent immediately after this Legislative Council election. First, the pan-democrats in Hong Kong completely boycotted the election and did not go along with Beijing’s performance with yielding seats.¹¹ The “loyal opposition” non-establishment faction, which the CCP has reluctantly mobilized to stand for election, is a group of out-of-touch politicians who have been expelled by the pan-democratic party or have withdrawn of their own accord; and they have no popular base at all. In the end, the overall voter turnout was so low that it barely exceeded 30%. Secondly, most Hong Kong politicians have a “passive bureaucrat” mentality. In the

course of this election, they tried to boost the turnout rate by offering “free buses on the polling day” and “delaying the closing time” of 11 polling stations; on the other hand, they threatened anyone who “calls for and incites people not to vote or to vote blank” and sent armed police officers to guard the polling stations on the polling day, claiming that there might be a “lone wolf” terrorist attack.¹² Thirdly, the pro-establishment camp did not want to increase the turnout at all because their past election strategy was to protect their own turf. Other candidates with close ties to various interest groups, of course, are also strongly committed to their own district. It was impossible for them to actively encourage and raise the turnout, otherwise they would surely self-destruct by giving up their seats to the non-establishment camp.

The propaganda of the CCP keeps imagining the Legislative Council election in which “virtuous loyalists”

11. *The People’s Daily*, in anticipation of the defeat in the election, has already started to directly accuse the Hong Kong Democratic Party of not actively running in the election in its editorial, see “Allowing the ones like Lo Kin Hei to act irresponsibly, the Hong Kong Democratic Party will be very dangerous,” *Beijing Sina.com*, December 16, 2021 <https://iview.sina.com.tw/post/27526006>.

12. Chien-yu Shih, “Hong Kong Legislative Council election: The Hong Kong government contradictory actions causing record low Legislative Council election turnout is not a surprise,” *Liberty Times*, December 21, 2021, <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/3775118>.

can stand out, however this totally contradicts modern liberal democracy, party politics and the principle of bottom-up representation. The elected members must first declare their “allegiance” to the CCP, but in reality, they are likely to work for their own benefit or in the interest of small groups rather than the interests of the public at all. How can we call them “virtuous”?

3. Trend Observation

Beijing’s wishful thinking of regaining the legitimacy of governance over Hong Kong in the short term by changing the electoral system should be completely destroyed after the current Legislative Council election. But as the CCP wants to establish submission and allegiance of Hong Kong’s elites to the Party, there are two possible developments:

3-1. “Loosening” and “tightening” of “binding strategy”

Beijing has the extravagant hope of creating a legislature that is obedient, but also capable of making positive proposals. If it works well, it will promote “dual universal suffrage” for the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council to rewrite Hong Kong society’s understanding and definition of democracy, and to promote the “Chinese-style democracy”. As Anthony Cheung said, after the 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement, the tacit agreement between Beijing and the former pan-democratic camp has completely broken down, and no more room will be given to independent or radical democrats to express their views.¹³ Despite the low voter turnout for the “directly elected” district seats in the Legislative Council, Beijing will continue to promote the political participation of the “puppet or loyalist democrats” in

13. Anthony Cheung is a former Secretary for Transport and Housing of the Hong Kong SAR Government and President of the Hong Kong Institute of Education. Currently a Research Chair Professor at the Hong Kong University of Education, Cheung, a typical scholar-turn-technocrat, is familiar with the logic of political operation in China and Hong Kong. Anthony Cheung, “‘Post-2020 Hong Kong Series’ Opposition Politics Can’t Go Back: Leave or Transform on the Downfall?” *Ming Pao*, November 9, 2021, <https://reurl.cc/AKqyxY>.

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Hong Kong and reshape a new “non-establishment” force.

Anyone who holds a democratic political position is left with only two choices: first, they can choose to be a “political puppet” (but in the current Legislative Council election, such a path has failed since such candidates have all been defeated), and second, they can choose to play the “agent” or “broker” role to help the CCP communicate with the Hong Kong community and reflect livelihood issues, so that a certain degree of public opinions can be effectively conveyed. In such a situation, Beijing can somewhat relax the room for these political elites to function.

But such thinking and design are in fact self-contradictory. For example, how can “functional constituency” members representing specific business interests “remind” the CCP to keep paying attention to the poverty problem in Hong Kong society, to fully suppress the housing market inflation, or to promote social justice and fairness? Whether it is the pro-establishment camp or the future

democrats in disguise, they will only speculate and act according to the needs of the CCP and cannot consistently speak for the general public. In other words, if someone dares to provoke the authority of the CCP regime with public opinion, this political freedom will be tightened at any time.

3-2. Swinging between “Chief Executive system” and “party committee system”

After two years of social movements, the current Hong Kong Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, has failed to live up to the expectations of the public, and her administrative ability is hardly recognized. If she was re-elected in 2022, it would be expected that the Hong Kong government could become the “South Shenzhen City”,¹⁴ a kind of “party committee system” under the direct governance of the CCP, or under the total control of the Director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong SAR.

In fact, important positions in Hong

14. The term “South Shenzhen City” is used by veteran investment banker Alex Xiao, see Lin Yuan, “Bank Investors: ‘being Pointed at by Guns’ Hong Kong’s Four Major Landowners Dare not Surrender?,” *The Epoch Times*, October 20, 2021, <https://hk.epochtimes.com/news/2021-10-20/34015626>.

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Kong's informal governing system have been taken over directly by CCP cadres, and the original underground “local communists” have been removed or demoted. For example, in January 2021, Mao Chaofeng, the former vice governor of Hainan Province, was appointed to manage the Bauhinia Cultural Group, a so-called “cultural enterprise controlled by CCP central”¹⁵ set up by the propaganda system of the CCP in Hong Kong; and Wen Hongwu, formerly of the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in Hong Kong, was appointed as its general manager.¹⁶ The Bauhinia Cultural Group has also reorganized the Hong Kong United Publishing Group,¹⁷ Bauhinia Magazine, Yindu Organization, China Culture City, Hong Kong United Arts Organization Limited, and Phoenix Satellite Television,¹⁸ which have total

assets of over HK\$100 billion. The CCP's full presence in Hong Kong from the Chinese mainland will give Beijing full control over the key positions in Hong Kong in various fields and control the overall situation.

If the CCP still wants to retain the Chief Executive as a white glove to buffer and indirectly govern under the “one country, two systems” doctrine in Hong Kong, it is likely that Carrie Lam cannot be re-elected and must be replaced by someone else, but there should still be some competition in the election to increase the sense of community participation. If Beijing still wants to test the Hong Kong government's social satisfaction over the past few years, the best “competitive combination” would be a candidate from the top civil service and another reputable person from the

15. Bauhinia Culture Group, China Tourism Group, China Merchants Group and China Resources Group are now known as the four major central enterprises in Hong Kong.

16. “Exclusive: Mao Chaofeng, Former Vice Governor of Hainan Province, Takes Charge of Hong Kong's ‘Cultural Central Enterprise’,” *Sing Tao Daily*, February 21, 2021, <https://reurl.cc/GoV60G>.

17. United Publishing Group is currently the largest publishing enterprise in Hong Kong, including a number of well-known publishers such as the Joint Publishing Group, the Chinese Bookstore and the Commercial Press, the Miles Organization, and the New Era Culture, accounting for about one-fifth of the annual Chinese book publishing volume in Hong Kong, as well as holding the exclusive right to print HKSAR passports and owning high real estate assets. Please refer to the official website of United Publishing Group at <http://www.sup.com.hk> for more information.

18. “Bauhinia to Take Ownership of Phoenix Satellite Television, the ‘Cultural Central Enterprise’ to Find Land in Hong Kong for Its New Headquarters,” *Toutiao Times*, April 19, 2021, <https://reurl.cc/8WGaM7>.

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community,¹⁹ with the former defending the government and the latter challenging it.

The senior civil servants who are now likely to run in the election include the current Hong Kong Government Financial Secretary Paul Chan, Chief Secretary for Administration Lee Ka-chiu, Secretary for Security Tang Ping-keung, and Executive Council Convenor Bernard Chan. Among the community leaders are the former Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx), Li Xiaojia, the former Director of Health of the Hong Kong Government and former Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Margaret Chan, the former Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), Norman Chan, and even the ones with government experience like former Secretary for Education and Manpower of the Hong Kong Government and former Vice-Chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Arthur Li. Such a pretentious competition for the new Chief Executive may still give Hong Kong society some hope and indirectly

increase the legitimacy of the CCP's rule over Hong Kong.

But whether Hong Kong's political system shifts to a “party committee system” or retains the current “Chief Executive system,” Beijing has already fully bound itself to Hong Kong politics. However, the structural logic of the “patriot” Hong Kong Legislative Council is self-contradictory: Beijing wants a legislature that is loyal to the CCP, but the Council is also expected to look after people rather than just playing the decorative “rubber stamp” role like the Chinese National People's Congress. So there is no way to expect these legislators to tie their own hands for providing solutions to the deep-rooted problems of Hong Kong's social development, such as employment, income, housing, and welfare problems caused by the wide wealth gap. This Legislative Council election in Hong Kong is just the beginning of Beijing's effort to turn Hong Kong's original Western-style politics into the “one country, two systems” framework, and to bind the interests of Hong Kong's elite with the CCP regime

19. Sha Banshan, “The CE Election Has Changed from the ‘Macau Model’ to the Election Committee Members ‘Have to Choose’?,” *Hong Kong 01*, January 3, 20221 <https://reurl.cc/GorENp>.

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through the remnants of democracy. The incompatible, contradictory political structure has led to a chaotic, unstable situation. The only sure thing is that if there is no concrete performance of governance, all future political responsibilities will be destined to be borne by the CCP.

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U.S. Develops Countermeasure Capability Vs Hypersonic Weapons

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1. News Highlights

The development of hypersonic missiles in some countries has become an urgent threat. As China and Russia have begun to deploy such weapons while North Korea is also test-launching such missiles, they will pose a significant threat to the US and its allies.¹ With their high speed and unpredictable trajectory, hypersonic missiles pose a great challenge to the existing missile interception and detection systems. As a countermeasure, the US and its allies are developing warning systems and a new generation of intercepting weapons such as the

Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) as well as related network and electronic warfare mechanisms.

2. Security Implications

“Hypersonic” refers to the flight in the atmosphere at a speed of Mach 5 or more.² The current development includes weapon-type missiles and drones as well as vehicles and aircraft capable of carrying personnel or equipment for specific missions. Hypersonic missiles are developed in two types: “hypersonic gliders” with a “wave-rider

1. “Defense Spending Act Makes Hypersonic A Top Priority, Calling For Billions In Investment,” *CNBC*, December 29, 2021, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/29/defense-act-makes-hypersonic-top-priority-calls-for-investing-billions.html>.

2. Yasmin Tadjdeh, “SPECIAL REPORT: Defense Department Accelerates Hypersonic Weapons Development,” *National Defense Magazine*, July 11, 2019, <https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/7/11/defense-department-accelerates-hypersonic-weapons-development>.

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body” warhead lifted by rocket engines; they glide to hit the target. Meanwhile “hypersonic cruise missiles” are propelled by air-breathing ramjet engines. Since the speed of conventional ballistic missiles re-entering the atmosphere in parabolic trajectories can exceed Mach 8, they can be categorized as hypersonic as well. Because the trajectories of the new-generation hypersonic missiles cannot be predicted by calculation, it makes it tough to effectively intercept them currently. As a result, the 2022 US National Defense Authorization Act listed hypersonic research among other first-priority items to accelerate the development of various hypersonic weapons as well as methods to counter the missiles, such as the new GPI and space surveillance technologies.

2-1. Existing missile defense can't counter hypersonic weapons

The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is concerned that the current capability in detecting and intercepting hypersonic missiles in their glide phase is still inadequate. Since the

parabolic trajectories of conventional ballistic missiles are mostly in the outer atmosphere, they can be predicted by the geosynchronous satellites deployed in the Earth orbit. On the other hand, with shorter flight paths in space and can be further maneuvered, the altitude of hypersonic missiles is just outside the coverage of missile detection satellites and land-based long-range early warning radars. Although the existing US ship-based Aegis and X-band radars are capable of tracking hypersonic missiles, they must be deployed at the right locations to function; and neither the Navy Standard 3/Standard 6 missiles nor land-based THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) systems have sufficient range to intercept hypersonic missiles, that's why the US is desperate to develop dedicated sensors and intercepting system.³

2-2. MDA develops GPI to intercept hypersonic weapons

On November 19, 2021, the MDA announced that it commissioned three companies, Lockheed Martin, Northrop

3. “Raytheon, Northrop, Lockheed to Compete For Hypersonic Interceptor,” *Breaking Defense*, November 19, 2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/raytheon-northrop-lockheed-to-compete-for-hypersonic-interceptor/>.

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Grumman, and Raytheon, to develop a GPI dedicated to neutralizing hypersonic weapons in their gliding phase.⁴ The systems are scheduled to be tested in 2023.⁵ The new GPI must be suitable for deployment aboard current US Navy destroyers to be launched with a vertical launch system in collaboration with the existing SPY-1 “Baseline 9” radars capable of detecting, tracking, and engaging hypersonic weapons. All three companies have experience in the development of hypersonic weapons: Lockheed Martin developed the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) for the Air Force and worked with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC). In addition, it’s the system integrator for the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike missile and the Army’s long-range hypersonic missile while competing with Raytheon

for the ramjet-propelled hypersonic missile program. Northrop Grumman is a developer of hypersonic vehicle thrusters.⁶

The MDA had stopped developing hypersonic missile defense capabilities in 2020 but restarted the program in 2021. In addition to evaluating the solutions currently under development, the agency is upgrading the ship-based Aegis phased-array radar with the capability to intercept hypersonic missiles at the final phase of their flight path, and the future SPY-6 radar will further improve the ability to track hypersonic missiles as well. The MDA believes that intercepting hypersonic missiles in their unpropelled glide phase will be most effective, but “hard kills” with kinetic energy or high explosive munitions are also under assessment.

The GPI paired with the ship-based Aegis system with missile defense capability will provide an additional layer of defense against hypersonic missiles to expand the defense capability of Aegis.

4. See Note 2.

5. “MDA: Hypersonic Missile Tracking Prototypes On Point For 2023 Launch,” *Breaking Defense*, November 11, 2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/mda-hypersonic-missile-tracking-prototypes-on-point-for-2023-launch/>.

6. “Here Are the Three Companies Selected to Design Hypersonic Missile Interceptors For MDA,” *Defense News*, November 20, 2021, <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2021/11/20/heres-the-three-companies-selected-to-design-hypersonic-missile-interceptors-for-md/>.

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And the MDA also mentioned that the “airborne, boost-phase interceptor” may also be the choice of future countermeasure system deployments.⁷

2-3. US DoD to develop hypersonic missile detection technology

The Space Development Agency (SDA) under the US Department of Defense is also working with the MDA and launched a Prototype Infrared Payload (PIRPL) in August 2021. PIRPL is a multi-spectral infrared camera carried by the International Space Station as an experimental payload; it was originally used to study the background infrared generated by the Earth but can also be used to detect and track fast-flying hypersonic missiles. The low Earth orbit (approximately 100 km to 2,000 km in altitude) “tracking layer” of small satellites planned by SDA is aimed at detecting and tracking fast-moving hypersonic missiles with a new wide-range infrared sensor and a medium-range Hypersonic and Ballistic Space Sensor (HBTSS). The US DoD has

approved the launch of 10 “tracking layer” satellites and 20 “transmission layer” data communications relay satellites in 2022. Although not designed for tracking hypersonic missiles, the PIRPL still provides a demonstration of the ability to track weak infrared signals and how this capability can be taken advantage of.⁸

3. Trend Observation

Hypersonic missiles not only pose a new threat to the US but may also become a game-changer in future warfare. Matured hypersonic technology could significantly reduce the time of long-range flight; this has not only commercial potential, but also great military value. Today, both China and Russia are attempting to counter the leading ballistic missile defense system of the US and develop their own “counter-intervention” capabilities; the US, on the other hand, has not prioritized the development of hypersonic missiles and focused on

7. “MDA Sees EW, Cyber For Future Missile Defense,” *Breaking Defense*, June 22, 2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/mda-sees-ew-cyber-for-future-missile-defense/>.

8. “DoD Launching Experiment For Space-Based Hypersonic Missile Detection,” *Breaking Defense*, August 10, 2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/dod-launching-experiment-for-space-based-hypersonic-missile-detection/>.

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developing traditional precision strike missiles instead. As the US failed multiple times when they tried to speed up the development and deployment of hypersonic weapons, they should re-examine the development process and pay more attention to the threat of hypersonic missiles.

3-1. Hypersonic missiles have become imminent threat

The proliferation of hypersonic missiles may evolve into an arms race. Following the successful launch or deployment of hypersonic missiles by China and Russia, North Korea has also claimed success in its tests. In January 2022, North Korea tested twice in one week, tallying three successful launches since the liftoff of the Hwasong-8 missile in September 2021.⁹ In China, the DF-

17 missile is already in service and may also be testing another hypersonic vehicle capable of orbiting in space or at the edge of the atmosphere.¹⁰ Russia intensively tested the Mach 9 Zircon hypersonic missile in 2021,¹¹ and successfully launched that missile from the vertical launch system on the Admiral Gorshkov cruiser, which hit the target 350 kilometers away at Mach 7.¹² In contrast, the US is lagging behind in the development of hypersonic weapons and has yet to begin deployment.

3-2. Proliferation of hypersonic weapons disturbs regional stability

As the US, Russia, China, and maybe some other countries are working hard on related development, hypersonic weapons are not only a factor of increased regional tension but may also reshape strategic

9. "North Korea Test-fires Mach 10 Hypersonic Missiles", *UDN News*, January 12, 2022. <https://udn.com/news/story/6809/6026632>

10. "China's Mysterious Hypersonic Test May Take a Page From DARPA's Past," *Breaking Defense*, November 24, 2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/chinas-mysterious-hypersonic-test-may-take-a-page-from-darpas-past/>.

11. "Russia Test-fired Multiple "Zircon" Hypersonic Missiles, Can Reach Ukraine in 5 Minutes," *UDN News*, December 26, 2021. <https://udn.com/news/story/6809/5988964>

12. "Russia Says It Successfully Tested Hypersonic Missile Praised by Putin," *Reuters*, July 19, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-conducts-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test-ifax-cites-defence-ministry-2021-07-19/>.

stability under the situation where countries are competing to deploy them. While the US is currently disadvantaged, China and Russia have gone all out to develop hypersonic missiles to counter the successful development and deployment of US missile defense systems for “balancing” the disadvantages of their inferior defensive capabilities. In contrast to the Russian hypersonic missiles equipped with both nuclear and conventional warheads, the US mainly uses conventional warheads for precision strikes. Some experts believe that even if Russia and China take the lead in hypersonic weapons, it would have little impact on the strategic balance between the powers; however, the hypersonic weapons deployed in some specific areas may increase the risk of regional conflicts due to the revolutionary changes in warfare patterns, and this must be taken into consideration by national strategy

planners.¹³

3-3. US needs to reconsider progress for developing hypersonic weapons

In order to catch up in the development of hypersonic weapons, the US has accelerated the process; between 2015 and 2020, the US increased hypersonic research funding by 740 percent. The technology is not just for missiles, but also for transportation and sensors on vehicles such as hypersonic reconnaissance aircraft. According to the 2022 US National Defense Authorization Act, billions of dollars are granted for the development of hypersonic weapons.¹⁴ In contrast to the mature ballistic missile defense system, the aggressive weapon development schedule of the US has led to a series of failures, and successes have been achieved only after the learned lessons and re-engineering. The US Government Accountability Office

13. “Hypersonic Missiles: Why the New “Arms Race” Is Going Nowhere Fast,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 13, 2020, <https://thebulletin.org/2020/01/hypersonic-missiles-new-arms-race-going-nowhere-fast/>.

14. “Defense Spending Act Makes Hypersonic A Top Priority, Calling For Billions In Investment,” *CNBC*, December 21, 2021, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/29/defense-act-makes-hypersonic-top-priority-calls-for-investing-billions.html>.

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(GAO) pointed out that the US uses new acquisition policies and processes when developing these weapons in the hope to develop prototypes within six months and begin deployment within a few years; and, similarly, hypersonic weapons are still facing immature technologies and overly aggressive timelines. If the development of hypersonic weapons is deemed necessary, the US Congress should review the development program and get it back on track.¹⁵ The current development of measures countering hypersonic weapons should in part take advantage of ballistic missile defense and matured hypersonic propulsion technology to avoid repeated mistakes.

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¹⁵ “Why Do US Hypersonic Missile Tests Keep Failing? They’re Going Too Fast,” *Defense One*, January 3, 2022, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/01/why-do-us-hypersonic-missile-tests-keep-failing-theyre-going-too-fast/360276/>.

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A Dangerous, Winding Road - A Look at the Ukraine Crisis in 2022

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Since October of 2021, the situation in Ukraine was tense with the parliament members of the concerned countries, media and celebrities fanning the flames, while bilateral diplomatic and military efforts staked out respective positions. US President Joseph Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin met twice in December 2021 to prevent developments from getting out of hand. With both sides trying to de-escalate the situation, diplomatic solutions prevailed before the end of January.

Since the three rounds of talks in early 2022 between Russia and the West (January 10, between Russia and the US; January 12, Russia and NATO; and January 13, Russia and OSCE),

tensions in Ukraine have been building, almost reaching the point of military confrontation. However, both sides have not given up on diplomatic channels as there had already been over a hundred diplomatic conversation between Russia and Western countries as well as with others.¹ The US submitted its response to Russia's demand for security guarantees on January 21 in Geneva, Switzerland; while the Russians believe that the West did not respond to their primary requests, they are still willing to engage in further negotiations on cooperation between the two sides on secondary requests. Therefore, diplomacy is still the main approach at this stage, and military actions, if any, should only happen after the political negotiations have been

1. "Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba at a Joint Press Availability," U.S. Department of State, January 19, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-ukrainian-foreign-minister-dmytro-kuleba-at-a-joint-press-availability/>.

completely broken.

The US adopted three defensive approaches: the first is to seek dialogue for diplomatic solutions; the second is warning Russia not to take military actions and elevating the level of possible sanctions if Russia chooses to use force, such as economic and financial measures that include cutting Russia from the SWIFT financial payment system and sanctions similar to which have been used against Huawei. The third is to increase defensive military funding and technology supplies to Ukraine. Although Russia disagreed strongly with the US, from the president down to the media, claiming that Russia is about to attack Ukraine, but it still goes along with it and continues the talks.

Since the beginning, Russia has been using military exercises to press Ukraine to open negotiation with the West on security issues. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko said on December 18 last year that the negotiations were an attempt to turn a potential military confrontation into a political conversation.² Although Russia

has not explicitly stated what measures it will take if the West does not agree to its terms, the fact that Russia continues its exercises with no intention to stand down suggests that it will still use military pressure as a bargaining chip in future negotiations.

The EU's approach is rather more hesitant. First, Germany has never supported Ukraine's accession to NATO, nor does it support supplying Ukraine with weapons. When visiting Ukraine and Russia on January 17-18, 2022, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated in Kiev that Germany supports, in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, to discuss the security issues of European countries via open dialogues and the proposed solution is to return to the Normandy Format to implement the Minsk Agreement. However, if Russia escalates military actions, Germany will respond firmly. But while in Moscow, Baerbock said that the new German government wishes to establish a substantial and stable relationship with Russia, and there is a long list of cooperative plans in trade and investment, cooperation in science and

2. "Russia: Security Proposals are Aimed at Avoiding Military Scenario," *Reuters*, December 19, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-russia-ukraine-idUSL8N2T30CO>.

culture, renewable energy, and responding to the climate crisis and more between the two countries. Although Joe Biden mentioned again that he would use Nord Stream 2 as a means of sanctions after his meeting with Olaf Scholz, the new German Prime Minister, on February 7, 2022, Scholz did not agree to the inclusion of Nord Stream 2. It means that as both sides share the same position on the severe sanctions if Russia advances into Ukraine, their attitudes are subtly different: Germany will play the “dove” role since it’s still constrained by the economic, trade and energy interests with Russia.

Second, French President Emmanuel Macron warned on January 19 that the Ukraine crisis could eventually lead to war, but also said the EU must start its own talks with Russia instead of relying on Washington; it seemed like a disgruntled response to the fact that the EU was excluded from the three above-mentioned talks between January 10 and 13. As the first major Western leader to meet with Putin since the crisis broke out

last December, Macron’s main objective was to reduce military tensions. After the meeting, Putin said he was ready to compromise and would study the proposals made by Macron during the talks.

Ukraine, at the center stage but curiously excluded from most of the negotiations, appears quite helpless. Although Ukraine is depending on the West to resist Russia’s military and non-military attacks, the domestic situation is fragile and Ukraine has become the poorest European country even behind Moldova,³ while its high level of corruption has led the Biden administration to demand judicial reform from President Volodymyr Zelensky even as Russian troops are now approaching Kiev. Although Ukraine’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 3% in 2021 based on a 4% recession in 2020, the higher prices of goods boosted the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to reach 10% in 2021.

Facing internal and external pressure, Zelensky sought to stabilize the situation from the inside. In his speech on January

3. Anders Aslund, “What Ukraine Needs to Do about Economic Policy in 2022,” *Kyivpost*, January 12, 2022, <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/what-ukraine-needs-to-do-about-economic-policy-in-2022.html>.

19, he stressed that the danger of a Russian invasion is just a “hype” rather than a real threat, and he urged his people to stay calm.⁴ But he also stressed that Russia’s attack would not be to go after Ukraine’s land, but its economy and “nerve”.⁵ On the diplomacy front, he tries to ensure Ukraine’s interests will not be betrayed in talks; this mentality has led to several assurances from the US and Germany that “no decisions about Ukraine without Ukraine”. According to the Russian medium Kommersant, Ukraine has privately proposed 10 steps to Russia for reduced tensions, such as an immediate ceasefire, release or exchange of prisoners of war, the holding of the “Normandy” quadrilateral talks and more.

In the coming week, German Chancellor Scholz will visit Moscow to meet with Putin to continue the diplomatic efforts of European leaders on the Ukraine issue after the French Prime Minister. It will be critical to observe whether they can come up with a solution that can ease the Ukraine crisis and also be acceptable to both Russia and the West.

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4. “‘Big Hype’: Zelenskyy Urges Restraint Amid Risk of Russian Invasion,” *Daily Sabah*, January 20, 2022, <https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/big-hype-zelenskyy-urges-restraint-amid-risk-of-russian-invasion>.
 5. “Nerve” was the original word used by Volodymyr Zelensky.
 6. “No Decisions about Ukraine without Ukraine,” *Голос України*, December 10, 2021, <http://www.golos.com.ua/article/354358>.
 7. Andrew Kramer, “As Russia and U.S. Debate Ukraine, Ukraine Would Like a Say,” *New York Times*, January 9, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/09/world/europe/ukraine-russia-negotiations.html>.

US-Japan 2+2 Resolution - Strategic Moves of Mageshima

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In a joint statement by the US-Japan Security Council (2+2) on January 7, 2022, Japan told the US that funding for construction on Mageshima Island had been included in the 2022 fiscal year budget, settling a long-debated issue. The US agreed and welcomed this resolution.¹ This time, Japan took the initiative to allow Mageshima Island to be directly budgeted for renovation. It was originally only one of the alternatives for the replacement Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) base for the US carrier-based aircraft stationed in Japan. This was not only a big surprise to the residents of the Nishinoomote City, even the governor of Kagoshima Prefecture,

Kōichi Shioda, protested directly to the central government, saying that the entire decision-making process was too hasty and did not respect the opinion of the local government.

Japan likely moved to quickly compromise on the issue because of continuing pressure from the US and a rapidly changing international situation. For Japan, the construction on Mageshima will not only help improve the training environment for the US military in Japan but also strengthen the US-Japan security system; giving it great significance. The project is expected to cost 318.3 billion yen (US\$2.797 billion) and take about four years to complete (see Figure 2).²

1. <日米安全保障協議委員会（「2 + 2」）>，日本防衛省・自衛隊，2022 年 1 月 7 日，https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/2022/0107a_usa-j.html。
2. <馬毛島基地整備費に 3183 億円 予算案に初めて本体工事費盛り込む 防衛相「早期運用開始に必要」>，南日本新聞，2021 年 12 月 25 日，https://373news.com/_news/storyid/148795/。

There are three advantages of Mageshima: first, it is located in the northeast of the Nansei Shotō (Ryūkyū Islands); second, it is essentially an uninhabited island, so the impact from the base on the surrounding area, such as the noise or safety concerns of aircraft landing and taking off, are relatively small; third, the terrain is flat and large, so construction should be easier. Since one of the main strategic objectives of the Japanese Ministry of Defense is to strengthen the defense of the Nansei Shotō and to establish an appropriate and fast supply system in the region, Mageshima is suitable for playing this important role. Nansei Shotō is spread over a distance of 1,200 kilometers from north to south, about the same length as Honshu (largest of the four main islands of Japan). The Japanese SDF has only a limited number of bases in the area. With Mageshima prepared, the SDF and the US Forces in Japan will be able to take advantage of it to increase the depth of defense and keep China's activities in the area in check.

Construction of Mageshima helps US and Japanese forces conduct all-weather exercises

Under the administrative jurisdiction of Nishinoomote City, Kagoshima Prefecture, Mageshima is located 12 km west of Tanegashima Island, with a flat area of 8.17 km², 3.03 km east to west, and 4.5 km north to south. The highest point on the island, Takenokoshi, is in the center of the island at a height of about 71.7 meters. There is no regular ferry or resident on the island, but there are abundant fishery resources in the surrounding ocean.³ The Japanese government bought the island in 2019 at a cost of 16 billion yen (about US\$120 million) mainly to make the island an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”.⁴ The Japanese government is rebuilding Mageshima to add a new training ground for the SDF and US Forces in Japan in both peacetime and in emergencies. The decision has two implications:

3. 〈馬毛島活用に係る報告書〉，西之表市役所，2017年12月，<https://www.city.nishinoomote.lg.jp/material/files/group/9/mageshimakatuyoukeikakugaiyou.pdf>。

4. 〈45億円が160億円に 国購入予定の島、価格を上積み〉，朝日新聞，2019年1月9日，<https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASM194K4XM19UTFK00H.html>。

1. For SDF to conduct variety of exercises

According to Japan's Ministry of Defense, a prepared Mageshima allows the SDF to conduct the following training on the island: first, fighter aircraft maneuvers such as F-35, F-15, F-2 emergency takeoff; second, normal terrain landing and takeoff training for C-130 transporters; third, water landing training for the Maritime Self-Defense Force US-2 amphibious planes; fourth, paratroop training for the Ground Self-Defense Force; fifth, helicopter tactical operations with airborne JGSDF troops; sixth, airdrop training for C-2, C-130, P-1, and P-3C. In addition, many new facilities will be added to the island, such as seaports, airports, hangars, fuel depots, ammunition depots, officer and soldier quarters, gymnasiums, supply depots, fire truck depots, control towers, officer quarters, and communication centers. This is all beneficial to strengthen Nansei Shotō defense by giving the SDF an additional base for supplies and support.⁵

Reducing flight distance and noise for US carrier-based aircraft in Japan

Since February 1982, the US carrier-based aircraft takeoff/landing training was mainly conducted from the Atsugi Base to the USS Midway outside Yokosuka Port. The training was carried out at night, making the noise quite disturbing for civilians. In 1993, the training was moved to Iwo Jima (1,200 km from the Atsugi base, see Figure 1), and the runways on Iwo Jima were modified to simulate the deck of an aircraft carrier for the pilots to conduct takeoff and landing training. In 2006, the US and Japanese governments agreed to move the US carrier-based aircraft from the Atsugi Base in Kanagawa Prefecture, which is a densely populated area, to the Iwakuni base in Yamaguchi Prefecture by March 2018.⁶

One of the most important reasons for the US-Japan 2+2 Security Council to build the Mageshima base is to allow the US carrier-based aircraft in Japan to conduct all-weather landing and takeoff

5. <【説明資料】鹿児島県へのご説明資料（2020年）11月25日>，日本防衛省・自衛隊，2020年11月25日，https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/mage/pdf/mage_201125.pdf。

6. <厚木基地周辺での航空機騒音>，神奈川県，<https://www.pref.kanagawa.jp/docs/bz3/cnt/f417272/index.html>。

training, and to reduce the training risks and restrictions from the long flight distance from the Iwakuni base to Iwo Jima (about 1,400 km, please see Figure 1). The flight distance from Iwakuni to Mageshima Island is about 400 km (see Figure 1), which also meets the requirements of the US. Moreover, since the island is uninhabited, the landing and takeoff noise during the training sessions will not affect the life of the civilians.

Unease and expectations of Nishinoomote City residents

As soon as the US-Japan 2+2 Security Council decided to build an SDF base on Mageshima, residents of Nishinoomote City, including Kagoshima Prefectural Governor Kōichi Shioda, criticized the Japanese government for ignoring local opinions and the safety of residents. When Ministry of Defense officials went to Kagoshima Prefectural Office to explain the situation on January 13, about 30 residents protested outside

the office to express their discontent.⁷ Mr. Yaita, mayor of Nishinoomote City, said that from January 17, about 40 groups from both sides will be invited to attend closed-door meetings, and he will explain to the public after gathering information from all sides.⁸ Proponents believe that since the government has already decided to build Mageshima, they will do their best to help the government with the construction. The only condition is that the government must first propose how the grant will be used to avoid local interests being compromised. As of now, the Japanese government has not specified the amount and duration of its annual subsidy to the local community; but on December 18, 2021, Japanese media revealed that the Ministry of Defense expects to subsidize the local community about 1 billion yen in the first year, but if the people do not accept the government's decision, no subsidy will be given.⁹ It's rather like the government is bound to complete the plan. On the other hand,

7. 〈馬毛島自衛隊基地計画 「地元の意見、安全を無視するな」 防衛省の「整備地決定」に市民団体が抗議〉, 南日本新聞, 2022年1月13日, https://373news.com/_news/storyid/149749/。

8. 〈米軍訓練移転など計画の鹿児島・馬毛島巡り 西之表市長が各団体と意見交換〉, 《FNN プライム オンライン》, 2022年1月17日, <https://www.fnn.jp/articles/-/300607>。

9. 〈馬毛島の交付金、10億円規模調整 初年度分〉, 朝日新聞デジタル, 2021年12月18日, <https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S15146716.html>。

opponents stressed that the assessment of the overall environmental impact of the base construction is still in progress and has yet to have a clear result; it's still too early to finalize the case.

The joint statement of the US-Japan 2+2 Security Council stated that the Mageshima base will be built. The implementation of the national policy requires the support and cooperation

of the local government, so further communication between the central and local governments is necessary to achieve a win-win situation.

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


Fig. 1: The landing and takeoff training site of the US carrier-based aircraft in Japan
(Note: Training is currently conducted from Iwakuni Base to Iwo Jima)

Source/diagram: 〈馬毛島（まげしま）における施設整備について〉，日本防衛省・自衛隊，<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/mage/index.html>.

Layout plan for facilities on Mageshima




Figure 2: Construction plan for the Mageshima base

Source/diagram: 〈【説明資料】馬毛島基地の施設配置案、種子島の施設整備、環境保全措置の検討状況について（2021年12月20日）〉，日本防衛省・自衛隊，<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/mage/pdf/siryou-10.pdf>.



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