

INDSR Newsletter



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On 2022 CCP “No.1 Central Document”

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Topic: CCP Politics

1. News Highlights

On February 22, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released the “No. 1 Central Document: Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on the Key Work of Comprehensively Advancing the Rural Revitalization in 2022” (hereinafter “No. 1 Document”), which is the document that has focused on “the three rural issues” of farmers, rural areas and agriculture for 19 consecutive years since 2004 (See Appendix). This shows that the three issues have been a major concern of the Chinese government for a long time. In addition to the continuation of the “Advancing Rural Revitalization” theme in last year’s No. 1 Document,

the 2022 version, which weighs in with nearly 10,000 words, clearly points out that “ensuring national food security” and “not returning to poverty on a large scale” are the two bottomlines that must be kept, and it also gives strict instructions on issues such as food production, agricultural product supply, arable land protection, raising farmers’ income, rural industry development, environmental improvement, infrastructure construction, village governance, farmland development, and modern agricultural technology. This policy document sets out primary goals for the CCP’s work regarding “the three rural issues” in 2022 while stabilizing the “agricultural fundamentals” and achieving the stability of such rural issues.¹

1. “Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on the Key Work of Comprehensively Promoting Rural Revitalization in 2022,” *Xinhua*, February 22, 2022, http://www.news.cn/politics/2022-02/22/c_1128406721.htm.

2. Security Implications

2-1. Food security is China's national strategy

Ensuring food security has become a key national strategy for China in recent years. Since food supply is regarded as the foundation of China's economic stability, the 14th Five-Year Plan proposed in late 2020 included a series of binding targets related to food security for the first time, specifying that China's combined production capacity for food and energy must reach 650 million tons and 4.6 billion tons respectively by 2025. The 2022 “No. 1 Document” also makes it clear that “all efforts should be made to ensure food production and supply of major agricultural products”, and every region in China must fulfill the food production and transaction responsibilities to “secure farmland areas” and “secure food production volume”. According to the directives given by the Central Rural Work Conference in late 2021, the

food production volume should reach 650 billion kg and 100 million Chinese acres of high-standard farmland should be developed by 2022. Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the CCP, has repeatedly mentioned in public that “Chinese people's rice bowls must always be held firmly in our own hands, and should be full mainly of Chinese grain”² to emphasize his concern for food security and hope to improve China's declining food self-sufficiency rate.³

2-2. Avoid a “return to poverty on a large scale”

After Xi Jinping announced in February 2021 that China would “end poverty in all aspects”, avoiding “return to poverty on a large scale” became the top priority of the CCP's governance and a key task of the 2022 “No. 1 Document”. Xi hailed the “eradication of all poverty” as “a miracle on earth,” saying that “98.99 million poor rural people from 832 poor counties, or 128,000 poor villages, have

2. “Xi Jinping: Rice Bowl should be in Your Own Hands,” *Xinhua Net*, August 25, 2015; “Xi Jinping: Fill China's Bowl with Chinese Food,” *UDN Online*, December 27, 2021, <https://udn.com/news/story/7331/5989987>.

3. Wu Hong-Hsun, “China Food Imports Hit New High Again, Food Self-sufficiency Rate Continues to Decline,” *China Times News Network*, January 18, 2022, <https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20220118003878-260409?chdtv>.

been lifted out of poverty as the overall regional poverty has been resolved.”⁴ However, in order to avoid “return to poverty on a large scale”, an effective “help” mechanism from the Chinese government is essential along with the creation of an remarkable economic performance that sustainably boosts the income of those who have left poverty.

2-3. Gap between urban and rural areas remains

From the perspective of farmers’ income, the uneven development between urban and rural areas is still a problem that the Chinese government tries to tackle. According to official statistics, the income gap between urban and rural residents in China is still wide. The per capita disposable income of rural residents grew from RMB 10,489 in 2014 to RMB 18,931


in 2021, while the disposable income of urban residents grew from RMB 28,844 to RMB 47,412, widening the income gap between the two groups of residents from RMB 18,355 to RMB 28,481 (see Figure 1). Although the income gap is slightly narrowing as urban income decreases from 2.75 times to 2.5 times that of rural residents, the income structure shows that the increase in rural residents’ income mainly comes from the wage income and net transfer income of industrial workers from rural areas,⁵ which is unrelated to agriculture development and local industries.⁶ Therefore, “No. 1 Document” of 2022 proposed to “reasonably protect farmers’ income from grain cultivation”, “vigorously develop industries that enrich the people” and “promote the development of rural industries”, and other policy plans to improve the income of farmers.

4. “Nearly 100 Million People Lifted out of Poverty in China, Xi Jinping Calls it a ‘Miracle on Earth’,” *BBC Chinese*, February 25, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-56194835>.

5. According to the key statistical indicators of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, net transfer income is transfer income minus transfer expenditure. Transferred income is a variety of recurrent transfer payments from the state, departments, social organizations to the households, or recurrent income transfers between households, including pensions or retirement benefits, social relief and subsidies, policy production subsidies, policy living subsidies, disaster relief payments, recurrent donations and compensation, reimbursement of medical expenses, income from maintenance between households, and income from non-resident family members send back to bring back. The transfer expenditure includes tax payment, social security expenditure, maintenance expenditure, recurrent donation and compensation expenditure, and other recurrent transfer expenditures.

6. Fan Shengtao, “Wei Houkai: Farmers’ Income Increase is the Key to Promoting Common Prosperity in Urban and Rural Areas,” *ThePaper.cn*, December 21, 2021, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_15938346.

Figure 1 Changes in per capita disposable income of urban and rural residents in China over the years



Source: compiled by the author from the statistical releases on national economic and social development for the past years by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (<http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/>).

3. Trend Observation

3-1. “Social stability” and “avoiding return to poverty” are primary goals before the 20th National Congress

With the 20th National Congress just around the corner, the CCP’s top priority in 2022 is to maintain social stability, which is reflected in “the three rural issues”: to maintain “stable and increased food production”, “stable income for farmers” as well as “stable and peaceful rural areas”, and, more importantly, to ensure that the results of poverty eradication in rural areas, which hailed by Xi as “a miracle on earth”, can be effectively sustained. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the many “helping” social assistance and health care policies proposed in “No. 1 Document” of 2022 will depend heavily on the government’s financial investment; with China’s

economy facing the triple pressure of “shrinking demand”, “supply impact” and “weakening expectations” as well as the continuation of substantial tax cuts and fee reductions,⁷ it remains to be seen whether the limited fiscal income can achieve the goal of avoiding “return to poverty on a large scale”.

3-2. Farmland conservation and better food self-sufficiency are long-term issues

In terms of food security, the acute problems China is facing are farmland protection and insufficient self-sufficiency of major agricultural products (such as soybeans and oil crops). According to Chinese agricultural experts, China’s farmland decreased by an average of 11 million Chinese acres per year from 2009 to 2019, leading to the difficulty in effectively achieving the goal of increasing production due to the low

7. “Central Economic Work Conference Held in Beijing: Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang Deliver Important Speech; Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, Han Zheng Attends the Conference,” *Xinhua Net*, December 10, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2021-12/10/c_1128152219.htm. Press Office of the Ministry of Finance, “Comrades in Charge of the Ministry of Finance Attended the State Council Press Conference to Introduce the Work on Fiscal Reform and Development,” *Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China*, February 22, 2022, http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/202202/t20220222_3789386.htm.

quality of the existing farmland.⁸ The “Third National Soil Census”⁹ recently announced by the State Council of China will be launched in order to grasp the real situation of land use in each province. In terms of the supply of major agricultural products, take soybeans as an example, according to statistics, China’s soybean production in 2021 is only 16.4 million tons, while imports are as high as 96.518 million tons, showing an extremely high degree of dependence to foreign sources.¹⁰

However, it’s difficult to achieve farmland conservation only through short-

term policies, and the food supply system cannot be changed overnight. With the US-China trade confrontation unresolved, and the COVID-19 is still spreading around the world, coupled with the recent impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the global food supply chain is facing great uncertainty. How to ensure national food security is still a long-term issue that the Chinese government has to deal with cautiously.

8. Luo Yinchong, “China is Having Difficulty Maintaining the ‘Red Line’ of 1.8 Billion Chinese Acres of Farmland. Official Media Investigation: Quality of Farmland Deteriorates,” *UDN Online*, February 14, 2022, <https://udn.com/news/story/7333/6096844>.

9. State Council of China, “Notice of the State Council on launching the Third National Soil Census,” *China Government Website*, February 16, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2022-02/16/content_5673906.htm.

10. Liu Hui, “Production-demand Gap Widens, External Dependence High — How Soybeans Can Improve Self-sufficient Rate,” *Economic Daily*, February 12, 2022, http://www.news.cn/fortune/2022-02/12/c_1128360127.htm.

Appendix

Table: CCP's “No. 1 Document” related to the “Three Agricultural Issues” in the past years

Year	Name of “No. 1 Document”
1982	“Minutes of the National Rural Work Conference”
1983	“Some Issues of Current Rural Economic Policy”
1984	“Notice on 1984 Rural Work”
1985	“Ten Policies for the Further Revitalization of the Rural Economy”
1986	“The Arrangements of Rural Work in 1986”
2004	“Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Several Policies to Increase Farmer Incomes”
2005	Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Several Policies for Further Strengthening Rural Work and Improving Overall Agricultural Productivity”
2006	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Promoting the Construction of New Socialist Rural Villages”
2007	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Actively Developing Modern Agriculture and Effectively Promoting the Construction of New Socialist Rural Villages”
2008	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Practically Strengthening Agricultural Infrastructure to Advance Agricultural Development and Increase Farmer Incomes”
2009	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Promoting Sustainable Development of Agriculture and Increased Farmer Incomes in 2009”

2010	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Increasing the Efforts to Coordinate Urban and Rural Development that Further Strengthen the Foundation of Agricultural and Rural Development”
2011	“Decision of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Accelerating the Reform and Development of Water Resources”
2012	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Accelerating the Promotion of Agricultural Technology Innovation to Continuously Enhance the Ability to Guarantee the Supply of Agricultural Products”
2013	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Accelerating the Development of Modern Agriculture and Further Enhancing the Vitality of Rural Development”
2014	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Comprehensively Deepening Rural Reform and Accelerating the Agricultural Modernization”
2015	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Increasing Reform and Innovation Efforts to Accelerate the Construction of Modernized Agriculture”
2016	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Implementing the New Concept of Development and Accelerating the Modernization of Agriculture to Achieve the Goal of Moderate Prosperity”
2017	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Deepening the Supply-Side Structural Reform of Agriculture and Accelerating the Cultivation of New Dynamics for Agricultural and Rural Development”
2018	“Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on the Implementation of the Strategy for Rural Revitalization”
2019	“Several Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Insisting on the Priority Development of Agriculture and Rural Areas and Perform well on ‘The Three Rural Issues’”

2020	“Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Excelling on the Key ‘Three Rural Issues’ to Ensure the Realization of Moderate Prosperity on Schedule”
2021	“Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Comprehensively Promoting the Rural Revitalization and Accelerating the Modernization of Agriculture and Rural Areas”
2022	“Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on the Key Work of Comprehensively Advancing the Rural Revitalization in 2022”

Source: Compiled by the author from the *Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China* (<http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztl/jj2022zyyhwj/>), *China Farmer Network* (<http://www.farmer.com.cn/xbpd/zc/wj/list.shtml>), and other public sources.

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(The contents and advice in the assessments are the personal opinions of the authors, and do not represent the position of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research)



How To Get Public Behind Taiwan's New Military Reservist Training Program: A Polling View

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Topic: National Defense Strategy

1. News Highlights

Taiwan implemented a 14-day “New Training Call-up System” (“New System”) for the military for the first time on March 5, 2022. Compared to the older system, the New System not only increases the training frequency and duration, but also significantly raises training intensity. In addition to requiring the reservists to report directly to their tactical positions to familiarize themselves with the battlefield environment, the course also includes

tactical marching, camping, more live-fire shots, and more combat maneuver training hours, making it the “toughest call-up ever”.¹ Although the Ministry of Defense adjusted the compensation and allowances of enterprises and personnel in line with the New System, the call-up is, after all, a recall of discharged soldiers to the military. The impact on their daily work and life is still inevitable.² In view of this, this article attempts to understand the people's views on the New System through polling and analyzing the key

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1. For related reports, see “The First Batch of the 14-day New System Call-up Entered the Camp on 5th. 10-hour Training Day for Two Weeks Non-stop,” *CNA News*, March 2, 2022, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202203020091.aspx>. Lin Yirong, “The Toughest Military Call-up in History! Started on 5th and Lasted for 14 Days without Leave. See what's in Their Training and Must-have Items,” *UDN Online*, March 4, 2022, <https://udn.com/news/story/6839/6139581>.
 2. Hou Li'an, “In the 14-day New System Call-up, Awards Given to Volunteers and Reservists Answering the Call-up for the Fifth Time,” *UDN Online*, January 20, 2022, <https://udn.com/news/story/10930/6047020>. “Pregnant Women with 1-year-old Child Sent Husband to the Call-up. Husband: Just Doing My Job,” *UDN Online*, March 6, 2022, <https://udn.com/news/story/10930/6144146>.

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factors that influence their opinion of the New System to explore possible ways to promote public support for the New System.³

2.Security Implications

2-1. Over 60% of respondents support New System


To measure the public's support for the New System, the poll asked respondents, "Do you support the military to increase the frequency and duration

of the call-up?" The findings: 28.6% of respondents said they are strongly supportive of the new system; 32.3% said they are somewhat supportive; 28.4% said they are not very supportive; 9.2% said they are definitely not supportive; and 1.5% did not know what a call-up was (see Figure 1).

Overall, more than 60% of the respondents supported the military's promotion of the New System. Please refer to the Appendix for more details on the distribution and cross-tabulation analysis.

3. The data used in this article are taken from the "Online Survey on Taiwanese People's Views on National Defense Policy". The survey was conducted by the Center for Election Studies of National Chengchi University, commissioned by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, from November 15 to 30, 2021, on Taiwanese adults aged 20 and above. With a total of 1,520 successful samples, excluding those with short response time (less than 3 minutes) and illegitimate answers for validation questions, the actual number of cases analyzed was 1,498. Although the interviewees came from the database of respondents in the past phone interviews collected by the Center for Election Studies of National Chengchi University, since the samples are conceptually "similar probability samples", the overall bias is smaller than that of all voluntary samples. See Chen-Hua Yu, "Theory and Practice of Online Public Opinion Surveys," *New Theory of Public Opinion Surveys*, edited by Lu-Hui Chen (Wunan Publishing, Taipei, 2013), pp. 31-64. However, whether or not to participate in online surveys is still voluntary, so there is still a gap between the characteristics of the sample and the population.

Figure 1: Distribution of people's support for the New System



Note: Decimal points are rounded to the nearest whole number.

Source: Compiled by Lee Kuan-chen from "Online Survey on Taiwanese People's Views on National Defense Policy".

2-2. Age doesn't matter in supporting New System


The target of the call-up is determined based on when full discharge is set according to the rank of the reservists. In the case of voluntary, professional service men and women, the age of discharge is 45; but generally, most candidates for the call-up are younger people who recently left the military, so it is understandable that this group may be the most opposed to the New System. However, the survey

found that although respondents from different backgrounds had different attitudes towards the New System, the overall difference was minimal (see Figure 2). For example, 65% of the male respondents supported the New System, while the percentage of female supporters dropped to 57%. Of the respondents aged between 20 and 39, 59% supported the New System, only 5% lower than those aged 40 or above. The difference in support for the New System between

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respondents with or without a college degree was even smaller, only about 2%. The results show that the demographic difference of the respondents are not the main factor affecting their support of the New System.

Figure 2: Respondents of different genders, ages and education levels support the New System



Note:

1. Decimal points are rounded to the nearest whole number.
2. "Support" includes "Strongly supportive" and "somewhat supportive", and "unsupportive" includes "not very supportive" and "definitely not supportive". The answer to "what's a call-up?" was categorized as "no response" and excluded from the analysis.

Source: Compiled by Lee Kuan-chen from "Online Survey on Taiwanese People's Views on National Defense Policy".

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2-3. “Threat awareness” , “impression of military” and “confidence in training” are key factors


The survey further revealed that respondents’ threat awareness, the impression of the military, and confidence in the call-up training were the key factors affecting their support for the New System. For example, Figure 3 shows that 66% of respondents who perceived the CCP’s military threat to Taiwan to be serious supported increasing the frequency and duration of call-ups by the military, while only 37% of respondents who did not consider the threat serious supported it. This means that the public’s awareness of threats from China is the first factor in galvanizing the will to resist and strengthen the defense readiness. Moreover, in the cross-tabulation analysis of the impression of the military and support for the New System, the poll results showed that among those who had a better impression of the military, a higher percentage, about 67%, of respondents supported the New System; on the other hand, those who had a poor impression of the military showed less support at 47%. Finally, respondents’ confidence in the training also significantly affected

their support for the New System. 76% of those who were confident in the training supported the New System, but only 55% of those who were less confident showed their support. This means that besides the threat awareness, people’s impression of the armed forces and the effectiveness of the training were also key factors affecting the support for the New System.

Figure 3: how “threat awareness” , “impression of the military” , “confidence in training” affect support for the New System

Do you support the Army to increase the frequency and duration of the call-up?

■ Not supportive ■ Supportive



Note:

1. Decimal points are rounded to the nearest whole number.
2. “Support” includes “Strongly supportive” and “somewhat supportive”, and “unsupportive” includes “not very supportive” and “definitely not supportive”. The answer to “what’s a call-up?” was categorized as “no response” and excluded from the analysis.

Source: Compiled by Lee Kuan-chen from “Online Survey on Taiwanese People’s Views on National Defense Policy”.

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3. Trend Observation

3-1. Russia's invasion of Ukraine boosts public support for New System

The New System call-up coincided with the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Although Ukraine and Taiwan are geographically apart in Europe and the Western Pacific respectively, they are similar in terms of their geostrategic and domestic political situations; that's why Russia's invasion of Ukraine is often associated to whether China will invade Taiwan.⁴ Although the situation in Ukraine may not be directly analogous to that of Taiwan, the conflict in Ukraine has sparked much discussion in Taiwan about the possibility of a Chinese invasion and the level of Taiwan's military readiness. Since the poll found that threat awareness

is a factor influencing Taiwanese people's support for the New System, it cannot be ruled out that since the war between Russia and Ukraine, there has been an increase of people's support for Taiwan's new reservist training program.

3-2. Better image and training of military to strengthen support for call-up

One of the most criticized problems of the military is its perceived superficiality. For the general public, the perception of the call-up was often just a "show" not much more than gathering the reservists and finishing the days safely.⁵ After decades, the call-up has been seen as a just a waste of time. This kind of "superficial readiness" certainly cannot win people's support. If the call-up training can familiarize the reservists

4. Professor Wu Yushan, a member of Academia Sinica, believes that there are similarities between Ukraine and Taiwan. See Wu Yushan, "How Far are we From War? The Strategy of Small States between Superpowers," *Researchyowu*, August 5, 2020, <https://research.sinica.edu.tw/global-strategies-pivot-hedger-partner>. Yang Cheng-yu, "Both are Most Dangerous: Experts Say Taiwan and Ukraine are Surprisingly Similar," *The Liberty Times*, January 14, 2022, <https://udn.com/news/story/10930/6047020>.

5. Liu Yiyou pointed out that in the past, there were problems such as "afraid of accidents, afraid of being sued, easy training, and pass everything by" in the Army's annual call-ups, see Liu Yiyou, "Changes in the Military Training of the Chinese PLA's 'Reserve Forces' and Discussion of the Taiwanese Army Reserve's Policies in Response to the Recruitment System," *National Defense Magazine*, Vol. 25, No. 1, February 2010, p. 120. For a related report, see "Double Pay for Call-ups is Great? Man Says, 'Just Killing Time'. A Reservist: 'the System is Doomed'," *NOWnews*, February 4, 2021, <https://www.nownews.com/news/5181980>.

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with the battlefield environment, weapons, and survival skills, they will know how to protect themselves and survive when a war unfortunately breaks out. Even if they are not going to the frontline, the call-up will be more meaningful to the public. Since people showed their support for the

New System in the poll when they have a better impression of the military and more confidence in the training, it is necessary to improve the image and training of the armed forces in the long run to further increase public support for the call-ups.

Appendix Table: Distribution and cross-tabulation of attitudes in support of the New System

Do you support the Army to increase the frequency and duration of the call-up?					
Strongly supportive	Somewhat supportive	Not Supportive	Definitely not supportive	“What’s a call-up?”	Samples
28.6%	32.3%	28.4%	9.2%	1.5%	1498

Do you support the Army to increase the frequency and duration of the call-up?			
	Supportive	Not supportive	Samples
Gender:			
Male	65%	35%	878
Female	57.1%	42.9%	597
Age:			
20-39	58.8%	41.2%	529
40 or above	63.5%	36.5%	946


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Education:			
With	62.9%	37.1%	367
University and above	61.5%.	38.5%.	1108
PLA military threat:			
Serious	65.9%	34.1%	1266
Not Serious	37.3%	62.7%	209
Impression of ROC Armed Forces:			
Good	67.3%	32.7%	1073
Bad	47.3%	52.7%	402
ROC Armed Forces training:			
Confident	75.6%	24.4%	495
Not Confident	54.9%	45.1%	980

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(The contents and advice in the assessments are the personal opinions of the authors, and do not represent the position of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research)

How To Get Public Behind Taiwan's New Military Reservist Training Program: A Polling View



Impact of Russia-Ukraine War on China's Food Security

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Topic: International Situation

1. News Highlights

On February 23, 2022, the General Administration of Customs of China released the Announcement Regarding the Approval of Wheat Import from All Regions of Russia (hereafter as the Announcement), allowing the import of wheat from all regions of Russia, except regions where dwarf bunt of wheat has occurred, and only limited to spring wheat used for processing. With the war going on in Russia and Ukraine, the breadbasket of the world, food supply shortfalls in the world may intensify and even lead to

a food crisis.¹ Coinciding with the 20th National Congress of the CCP, China as the net importer of food sees food security as one of the foremost priorities in maintaining social stability, hence this article will elaborate on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on food security in China.

2. Security Implications

1. China allows wheat from Russia to ensure stability of its grain supply

China is a large producer and

1. "Announcement No. 21 [2022] of the General Administration of Customs (Regarding the Approval of Wheat Import from All Regions of Russia)," *General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China*, February 23, 2022, <https://pse.is/429v7s>; "Russia-Ukraine War Adds Pressure to Already High Food Prices, Threatening Food Security for Millions," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 19, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/nE34q2>.

consumer nation of wheat and has basically been able to self-sustaining. However, the annual wheat import began increasing greatly in 2020, compared to the mere 3 million tons prior to 2019. The import volumes in 2020 and 2021 were 8.38 million and 9.77 million tons, respectively. Of the imports, over 80% came from Australia, the United States, and Canada, comprising 28%, 27.9%, and 26%, respectively.² Meanwhile, the share of wheat from Russia to China, merely 0.5% in 2021, has been limited by three conditions: an import quota, the difference in Chinese and Russian quarantine standards, and impediments in logistics and delivery.

In addition, China is also seeing an increase in demand for corn imports due to the impact of plant disease and insect pests, climate change, and a boost in pig farming. Prior to 2019, corn import in China came mainly from Ukraine, comprising 80%, but since the China–United States trade war, China committed to importing US agricultural products,

leading to the United States as the main source of corn imports for China in 2021, comprising 73%, and leaving less than 30% of import quota for Ukraine.³ With the current war going on, corn in Ukraine can no longer be exported via shipping. This could cause a serious deficiency in animal feed, and in turn impacting the development of animal husbandry.

During supply chain adjustments due to COVID-19, increasing inventory and diversifying supply sources have been the way to strengthen supply chain resilience. However, the excessive dependency of China on wheat and corn imports from potentially hostile Western countries being subject to possible sanctions in the future, therefore, a modest increase in the imports of wheat from Russia will help strengthen food security in China.

2. Stable supply of vegetable oil in China may be impacted

Since Russia and Ukraine are both major producers of vegetable oils, the outbreak of war not only posed an impact

2. “Wheat Import in China is Record High: 80% From Australia, the U.S., and Canada, Less than 1% From Russia,” *news.sina.com*, March 3, 2022, <https://news.sina.com.tw/article/20220303/41309340.htm>.

3. “Ukraine Corn Percentage Lowered in Total Corn Import Volume to China in 2021,” *finance.sina.com*, February 24, 2022, <https://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/agri/2022-02-24/doc-imcwipih5137568.shtml>.

on their exports but could also very well implicate the stability of the vegetable oil supply in China. Take sunflower oil, for example, the import volume from Ukraine to China in 2021 was 878,500 tons, 69.39% of its total import volume; followed by 358,500 tons from Russia, 28.32% of its total import volume.⁴ As for soybean, the total soybean production in China in 2021 was 16.4 million tons versus the import volume of 96.518 million tons, demonstrating a high dependency on soybean imports by China. According to Bloomberg, China is panic-buying soybean from the United States, a clear indication of China's concern for soybean supply, hoping thus to lower the effect and impact of war.⁵

In the meantime, according to the 2021 Annual Reports on Global Ecosystem and Environment Observation, the annual increase rate of major cereal and oil crop production in China was

0.5%. With the current war impacting the export of cereal and oil from the two countries,⁶ the stability of the vegetable oil supply in China may also be impacted.

3. Fertilizer embargo could lead to decreased production of food in China

Russia is the largest exporter of nitrogen, the second largest exporter of potash, and comprises 20% of world phosphorous export. In 2020, China imported 1.85 million tons of potash from Russia, accounting for 20.38% of the total import volume in China, a small amount of nitrogen, and no import of phosphorous. Furthermore, since Belarus is also facing sanctions, its exports will also be constrained. In 2020, China imported from Belarus 1.71 million tons, accounting for 18.86% of the total potash import volume in China. Together, the two countries make up 40% of potash imports in China.⁷

4. "The Sunflower Oil Market Overcast by the Russia-Ukraine Situation," *finance.sina.com*, March 7, 2022, <https://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/agri/2022-03-07/doc-imcwipih7061451.shtml>.

5. "Food Stocking while War Continues! China Buying U.S. Corn and Soybean," *Liberty Times*, March 4, 2022, <https://ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/3848542>; "Increased Gap in Production Demand and Dependency on Export, How to Increase Soybean Self-sufficiency Rate," *People's Daily Online*, February 12, 2022, <http://finance.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2022/0212/c1004-32350588.html>.

6. "Major Oil Crop Yield Increase Rate 0.5% in Recent Decade in China," *People's Daily Online*, December 21, 2021, <http://finance.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2021/1221/c1004-32313278.html>.

7. Fertilizer import data in China from Trade Map database: <https://www.trademap.org>.

With concerns of hindered import, the price of potash in China continues to spike, with an increase of 0.66% in just four days from March 11-14. The current price of imported muriate of potash is RMB 5,000 to RMB 5,500 per ton, which is more than a 22% increase compared to the price of RMB 4,166 per ton early this year, and an 80% year-on-year increase.⁸

The lack of potash can cause lower turgor pressure in plants, making plants less durable against drought and cold, and more sensitive to fungi infection. Therefore, insufficient import of potash could lead to decreased agricultural product yield in China this year.

3. Trend Observation

1. Dwarf bunt of wheat may thus be brought into China

According to the Catalogue of Quarantine Pests for Import Plants to the

People's Republic of China announced in 2021, the dwarf bunt fungus of wheat is listed as quarantine pests No. 278. It is one of the most hazardous quarantine pest diseases in the common bunt of wheat and is extremely difficult to prevent, can be transmitted via seeds and soil, and can survive for 10 years in the soil.⁹ In the past, to prevent this fungus from entering China, China imported only a small amount of wheat from Russia, with a mere 48,800 tons of imports in 2021. Now, to cope with the hike in grain price and the tension of food security strain, China is allowing wheat import from all regions of Russia, excluding areas where “dwarf bunt of wheat” has occurred and limited to only spring wheat used for processing, and the Announcement clearly stated that Russia should provide the results of monitoring and that the exported wheat must not be mixed with wheat produced from areas of dwarf bunt of wheat. However, this will

8. “Russia-Ukraine Conflict Leads to Price Hike in Fertilizer,” *news.sina.com*, March 14, 2022, <https://finance.sina.com.cn/wm/2022-03-14/doc-imcwiwss6028902.shtml>.

9. “Catalogue of Quarantine Pests for Import Plants to the People's Republic of China,” *General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China*, April 9, 2021, <http://www.customs.gov.cn/dzs/2746776/3699554/2021060516253673681.pdf>; “What is the dwarf bunt of wheat mentioned in the Announcement of the General Administration of Customs?,” *eastday.com*, February 24, 2022, <https://j.eastday.com/p/1645696609042834>.

10. China has previously discovered dwarf bunt disease in wheat imported from the U.S., Canada, and Romania, for details, refer to Cui Lianggang & Cheng Yimei, “The Occurrence and Prevention of the Dwarf Bunt of Wheat,” *Jilin Agriculture*, Vol. 2, 2003, P. 22-23.

not eliminate the possibility of such plant disease entering China,¹⁰ since there is the potential problem of falsifying monitoring reports and inadequate quarantine measures. China must therefore be more stringent in quarantine measures, so as to end all possible ways of the disease entering.

2. China to continue to expand soybean farming

According to statistics, compared to 2020, the soybean production in China in 2021 is 16.40 million tons versus 96.51 million tons in imports, a decrease of 3.2 million tons and 3.81 million tons respectively.¹¹ To supplement the gap in soybean demand and increase self-sufficiency, in addition to the CCP emphasizing in its 2021 Central Rural Work Conference to “greatly increase soybean and oil crop production”, the Meeting of Directors of the National Agriculture and Rural Affairs Department

held in December of the same year again emphasized the need to increase soybean and oil crop farming, naming it the major political mission to be completed the following year. Also, policies include restoring the soybean farming areas in the four northeast provinces, promoting corn-soybean intercropping, and accelerating the promotion of the new model and technology are adopted to assist the increase of soybean farming.¹²

Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine war will no doubt implicate the import of oil crops including soybean, sunflower seed, and vegetable seed. Therefore the 2022 No. 1 Central Document clearly pointed out the need for “vigorous implementation of soybean and oil crop yield improvement”. Therefore, to solve the structural problem of “lower self-sufficiency rate in soybean and oil crop”, Minister Tang Renjian of Agriculture and Rural Affairs stated in the press conference on February 23, 2022, that

11. “Increased Gap in Production Demand and Dependency on Export, How to Increase Soybean Self-sufficiency Rate,” *People's Daily Online*, February 12, 2022, <http://finance.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2022/0212/c1004-32350588.html>.

12. Corn-soybean intercropping refers to growing corn and soybean at appropriate proximity, allowing the harvest of an additional season of soybean without loss in corn yield. See “The Meeting of Directors of the National Agriculture and Rural Affairs Department Held in Beijing,” *Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, December 27, 2021, http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztl/zyncgzh2021/zxdt/202112/t20211227_6385698.htm.

China must expand the soybean and oil crop farming, emphasizing that “every little bit helps, expand and harvest as much as possible, we should have China-produced oil in China-produced oil bottle.”¹³ Hence to lower the dependency on soybean import in China and increase the soybean self-sufficiency rate, according to the “14th Five-Year” Plan on National Crop Farming Industry Development, China shall attempt to expand the soybean farming area by expanding the corn-soybean intercropping area to 50 million acres, expand the scale of crop rotation, and hope to increase the soybean farming area to 0.16 billion acres and up to 23 million tons of crop yield.¹⁴

3. China will continue to adopt policies and measures toward reinforcing "food security"

Even though China continues to

claim that its food supply is secure, with the Russia-Ukraine war leading to the shortage of grain supply, and strong rain last autumn delaying the sowing of wheat, and this being the year of the 20th National Congress, it is essential to reinforce their food security and avoid impacting the livelihoods, and social and political stability. Therefore, leaders in China and concerning official documents repeatedly emphasized the importance of “food security”. For example, the 2022 No. 1 Central Document pointed out the need to stabilize the year-round food farming area and yield, ensure the stability of the food farming area, and maintain the yield at above 1.3 trillion jin (650 million metric tons). In the meantime, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang pointed out respectively in the 2022 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and Report on the Work of the Government that

13. “SCIO Press Conference on Key Tasks in Comprehensively Promoting Rural Revitalization in 2022,” *State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China*, February 23, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/Rjlm0g>.

14. “Central Rural Work Conference Held in Beijing,” *People's Daily Online*, December 27, 2021, <http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2021/1227/c1024-32317329.html>; “The Meeting of Directors of the National Agriculture and Rural Affairs Department Held in Beijing,” *Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, December 27, 2021, http://www.moa.gov.cn/xw/zwdt/202112/t20211227_6385696.htm; “Notification from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on Printing and Circulating the ‘14th Five-Year’ Plan on National Crop farming Industry Development,” *Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, December 29, 2021, http://www.moa.gov.cn/govpublic/ZZYGLS/202201/t20220113_6386808.htm.

“protecting *food security* is the foundation to realizing economic development, protecting social stability, and maintaining national security”, and to “fill *the rice bag* and fill the vegetable basket, hold steadily in our hands the food of the 1.4 billion Chinese people.”¹⁵

Hence, in order to lower the effect and impact brought about by concerns internally and externally, China shall continue to adopt policies and measures related to reinforcing “food security”. The first is to ensure the area of arable lands. In addition to issuing in 2020 the Implementation Program to Prevent the Non-grain Use of Arable Lands and Secure Food Production, China further adopted in 2021 the Regulation on the Implementation of the Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (draft amendment) to

effectively contain the “non-agricultural use of arable land”, and prevent “non-grain use of arable land”. Meanwhile, the third national soil survey was launched this year, hoping to “hold fast the red line for arable land”.¹⁶ Second, to ensure a sufficient supply of crop seeds, China is adopting measures including dispatch and storage of seeds to ensure successful sowing in spring and summer.¹⁷

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(The contents and advice in the assessments are the personal opinions of the authors, and do not represent the position of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research)

15. “Xi Jinping Visits the Social Welfare and Social Guarantee Commissioners of the Agriculture Sector Attending the CPPCC,” *People’s Daily Online*, March 7, 2022, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2022/0307/c435113-32368302.html>; “Li Keqiang Mentions in the Report on the Work of the Government to Make a Good Effort on Agricultural Production and Comprehensively Promote Rural Revitalization,” *Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China*, March 5, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/Rjlm0x>.

16. “Notice of the State Council on Launching the Third National Soil Survey,” *Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China*, February 16, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2022-02/16/content_5673906.htm.

17. “Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs: Guarantee for Planting Crops in Spring and Summer This Year,” *Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China*, March 2, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-03/02/content_5676493.htm.



Impact of Russia-Ukraine Conflict on United States National Defense Strategy

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The Biden Administration originally planned to announce the new National Defense Strategy (NDS) in February 2022 but was postponed due to the Russian military invasion in Ukraine on February 24. The previous NDS was announced in January 2018 by the Trump Administration. As a routine, the newly elected president will announce the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy one year after taking office. The current Secretary of Defense began working on the 2022 NDS since the Biden Administration took office, and had the content largely ready by the end of 2021. But with the Russia-Ukraine conflict escalating to war, the US Department of Defense had to reevaluate and revise the original content of the national defense

strategy in response to the changes in the strategic and security situation in Europe.¹

The US National Defense Strategy pivots from regional terrorist threats to major power conflicts

With conflicts easing in the Middle East, the 2018 US National Defense Strategy shifted focus from the Middle East to major powers including China and Russia. The 2018 US NDS clearly stated that China was the main strategic threat to the United States. The Biden Administration also confirmed that China is a pacing threat growing ever more acute to the United States. The 2022 US National Defense Authorization Act reinforced the resources invested in military power toward the Indo-Pacific

1. Connor O'Brien, Paul Mcleary And Lee Hudson, "Russia Crisis Forces Pentagon to Rework Defense Strategy on the Fly," *POLITICO*, March 3, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/qObKE0>.

region, and pointed out that actions must be taken to restore the competitive edge of the US military in the region to deter China, and win a war when inevitable conflict arises.

The concept of integrated deterrence has been the cornerstone of the US national defense strategy since 2021

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, Mara E. Karlin, said, “the cornerstone of the new National Defense Strategy will be the secretary of defense’s concept of integrated deterrence ... The idea of integrated deterrence means that you are integrating across your domains ... [we won’t] just go to our traditional thinking of air, maritime and ground ... how do you integrate across domains? How do you integrate across the whole of government? ... we’re thinking about diplomacy, which also means integrating with our partners and allies.”² Most senior executives of

DOD have been pushing for the concept of integrated deterrence domestically and internationally since early 2021, laying the foundation for the essence of 2022 NDS.

The impact of Russia-Ukraine war on the 2022 national defense strategy

Thanks to internet communication technology and social media, not only has the world experienced almost firsthand the Russia-Ukraine war since the invasion by Russia began, but strategic research experts worldwide have also reviewed and debated the strategic thinking and operations adopted by Russia. Among these, as former Assistant Secretary of DOD Elbridge A. Colby strongly emphasized, the US should place its strategic focus foremost on the Indo-Pacific region, taking seriously the threat posed by China.³ Furthermore, as John G. Ferrari, senior fellow of the American Enterprise Institute argues, the US should abandon its one-war strategy, review

2. Refer to Terri Moon Cronk, “DOD Official Outlines 2022 National Defense Strategy in CNAS Forum,” *DOD News*, December 10, 2021, <https://reurl.cc/02baNk>; Tzuli Wu, “Integrated Deterrence’ -- the Transition in the Concept of the US National Defense Strategy,” *National Defense and Security Real-time Assessment, Institute for National Defense and Security Research*, December 9, 2021, <https://reurl.cc/VjZmG5>.

3. Refer to Peter Tasker, “Books: A Potential Sino-American Conflict Can be Avoided,” *NIKKEI Asia*, March 12, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/e6bpnb>; Elbridge A. Colby, “The Strategy of Denial - American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict,” *Yale University Press*, 2021.

its capabilities globally, and resume the deployment of armed forces in the frontier of these regions.⁴ A research report from the Atlantic Council highlights that the responding strategy must also address challenges from China and Russia.⁵ DOD states that it will continue to reinforce the concept of integrated deterrence. Although regimes in other regions such as Russia prove to be an obvious threat, the Indo-Pacific region continues to be the priority war zone with China being the pacing challenge for the United States.⁶ To the question asked by the moderator in an online seminar hosted by Project 2049 regarding whether the United States can cope with two wars at the same time, Elaine Luria, a Navy veteran serving as the US representative from Virginia, pointed out that the upcoming US 2022 NDS may be planning for deterring

another potential conflict while facing one war.⁷

The US national defense strategy with integrated deterrence as cornerstone and prepared to win a war

The Russian invasion of Ukraine clearly showed that the threat posed by Russia to the stability of regional and world peace remains strong. However, with the United States using integrated deterrence to integrate capabilities across domains globally to address the Russian invasion, the comprehensive capability of Russia may face a profound impact and in turn, lower the short and mid-term traditional threats to the United States. Whereas China experienced no obvious, significant impact in this Russia-Ukraine conflict but instead benefitted politically and economically, shows that the Chinese

4. John G. Ferrari, "Tear up the National Defense Strategy and Start Again, Recognizing Reality," *AEI*, March 8, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/Lpx2o4>.

5. Clementine G. Starling, Christian Trotti, and Tyson Wetzel, "The Next National Defense Strategy Must Get Russia Right," *Atlantic Council*, February 24, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/Zrd2pV>.

6. Refer to the press release by the US Department of Defense, Jim Garamone, "Austin Says Current Operations Give Hints of New National Defense Strategy," *DOD News*, February 18, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/AKW9Oe>; Jim Garamone, "National Defense Strategy Includes Lessons Learned From Past 6 Months," *DOD News*, March 4, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/GoqGGx>.

7. "Taiwan's Global Gravity: The Push and Pull of Coercive and Annihilative Cross-Strait Scenarios," *The Project 2049 Institute and the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA)*, February 14, 2022, <https://reurl.cc/WkYgAe>.

military power will continue to grow in the foreseeable future. The challenge and threat of China is without a doubt the first priority of the US national defense strategy. The US 2022 NDS will probably be addressing capabilities that will be required should military conflicts occur simultaneously in the Taiwan Strait and other regions such as Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or Northeast Asia. A reasonable conclusion is that the United States will prioritize and concentrate its resources to face the pacing challenge and competition from China, while following the solidarity currently demonstrated by the western countries in view of the Russia-Ukraine war, and maintain the deterring capability to support and actively campaign the boosting of national defense resource investment by European countries, and increase the overall self-defense capability of Europe to cope with future challenges to regional safety.

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