

Chapter 2

Adjustments and Changes of Taiwan Policy of CCP in 2021

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I. Introduction

Reviewing the Taiwan policy of CCP in 2021, we could see that although the basic approach and rhetoric of Xi Jinping’s “Xi’s Five Points” remains largely consistent from the past; however, many of its actions toward Taiwan have become more and more hostile. While Xi Jinping’s approach to Taiwan is seriously disconnected to current global reality, CCP still focuses mainly on the concept of anti-secession and pro-unification for their Taiwan policy. They have been promoting relevant preferential policies on the one hand, while threatening Taiwan through political intimidation or military coercion on the other hand. CCP’s actions, in general, are not enhancing the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations but have instead become a troublemaker in cross-strait and international relations. In this chapter, we will analyze and discuss the key contents, adjustments, and changes of the CCP’s Taiwan policies and their united front work toward Taiwan from December 2020 to October 2021.

II. The Chinese Communist Party’s Discourse and Guidelines of Policies on Taiwan

In 2021, the CCP’s guidelines of policy and statements toward Taiwan have re-

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main much the same as their directions in the past, as we could see from the statements made by Wang Yang on January 17-18, 2021 during the Working Conference on Taiwan, the 2021 Governmental Work Report and the Taiwan-related remarks made by Li Ke-Qiang and Wang Yang during the Two Sessions. These statements toward Taiwan-related issues highlighted the following issues: the obedience to the One-China Principle and the 1992 Consensus, CCP's action on suppressing the forces of Taiwan independence, the "interference" toward China from external forces, and CCP authority's promotion on the peaceful development of cross-strait relations.¹ In Xi Jinping's speech at the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 2021 and the 110th Anniversary of Xinhai Revolution on October 9, his attitudes on Taiwan-related issues are more or less the same as in the past, and the context is constructed on two levels: peaceful reunification and the use of force to achieve unification. Several Taiwan-related statements, for example, emphasized the ideas such as "solving the Taiwan Question and realizing the complete reunification of the motherland is the historical mission of the Chinese Communist Party", "uphold the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, and work for the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations", "secession aimed at 'Taiwan independence' is the greatest obstacle to national reunification and a grave danger to national rejuvenation", "the Taiwan question is purely an internal matter for China, one which brooks no external interference" and "those who forget their heritage, betray their motherland, and seek to split the country will come to no good end", etc.² In short, the statements of CCP on Taiwan-related issues this year remain focused on the points they have repeated in the past. While they elaborate on peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait and identify with the 1992 Consensus, they have also given much more warnings on the issue of Taiwan indepen-

¹ "2021 Conference on Taiwan United Front Work Held in Beijing," *People's Daily Online*, January 19, 2021, <http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2021/0119/c1024-32003668.html>.

² "(Authorized) Xi Jinping: Talk on The 110th Anniversary of Xinhai Revolution," *People's Daily Online*, October 9, 2021, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2021/1009/c64094-32248619.html>; "Xi Jinping: 100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party," *Xinhua Net*, July 15, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2021-07/15/c_1127658385.htm; "(Authorized) Xi Jinping: Talk on The 110th Anniversary of Xinhai Revolution," *People's Daily Online*, October 9, 2021, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2021/1009/c64094-32248619.html>.

dence and threatens on possible consequences. Xi also showed his determination that the “Taiwan Question” will eventually be solved and that the status quo shall not remain forever.

While emphasizing the importance of One-China Principle, the 1992 Consensus, and the influence of Taiwan independence and interference from external forces, the Taiwan policy Xi Jinping announced this year focuses much on the policy of integrated development. Aside from highlighting the active participation of Taiwanese businessmen and Taiwan-funded enterprises in the 14th Five-Year Plan and Fujian province as an experimental area to promote cross-strait integrated development,³ Xi Jinping, during his visit to Fujian on March 25, 2021, suggested that “we should highlight the strategy of ‘promoting integration through communication, benefit, and affection’, exploring a new path of the cross-strait integrated development”.⁴ Through the strategy of “promoting integration through communication, benefit, and affection”, CCP has made bilateral exchanges more convenient between China and Taiwan by giving Taiwanese people equal treatments as people in China, attracting Taiwanese people and enterprises for work and investments. They are trying to increase mutual trust and recognition on the basis of the existing cross-strait non-governmental communication. On September 26, Wang Yang attended the commemorative meeting to mark the 40th anniversary of the founding of the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (ACFTC), in which he stressed the point of “continuously promoting the peaceful and integrated development of cross-strait relations”.⁵ CCP’s policy of integrated development with Taiwan reflects much of Xi’s Five Points of “deepening cross-strait integration and development, solidifying the foundation of peaceful reunification” and “realizing the spir-

³ “2021 Conference on Taiwan United Front Work Held in Beijing,” *People’s Daily Online*, January 19, 2021, <http://qh.people.com.cn/n2/2021/0119/c182753-34535523.html>.

⁴ “TAO: We Will Actively Promote Integration through Communication, Benefit, and Affection,” *Xinhua Net*, March 31, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/tw/2021-03/31/c_1127278434.htm; “Xi Jinping’s Visit to Fujian Mentions ‘Communication, Benefit and Affection’ to Promote Integration with Taiwan,” *Central News Agency*, March 25, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202103250347.aspx>.

⁵ “Wang Yang Attending the Commemorative Meeting to Mark the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (ACFTC),” *People’s Daily Online*, September 27, 2021, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2021/0927/c64094-32237934.html>.

itual connection of compatriots, increasing recognition of peaceful reunification”. In such policies, the government also cooperates with the 14th Five-Year Plan to attract Taiwanese businessmen and Taiwan-funded enterprises.

Aside from the actions mentioned above, CCP also amended the “Regulation on the United front of the Communist Party of China” on January 5, 2021. In the section on Taiwan-related issues, the articles have been expanded to enhance extensive solidarity with Taiwan compatriots at home and abroad, “developing and strengthening Taiwan’s patriotic unification force” and “continuously pushing forward the peaceful reunification process of the motherland.” The wording “consolidate and deepen the political, economic, cultural, social foundation for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations” has been deleted,⁶ yet the core of the united front work basically remains the same as that of the government’s previous united front work against Taiwan. In the future, however, the united front will focus more on cultivating the united front of overseas Taiwanese and the development of pro-Beijing camp in Taiwan after the pandemic.

III. CCP’s Front Work on Taiwan

1. Continuous Promotion on The Policy of Integrated Development

An important indicator of the CCP’s front work on Taiwan in 2021 appears to be the promotion of cross-strait integrated development which could be subdivided into three parts: “promoting integration through communication”, “promoting integration through benefits” and “promoting integration through affections”. In terms of “promoting integration through communication,” the CCP hopes to expand the passages and capacities of cross-strait economic and trading events, with actions such as building interconnection of infrastructure, energy resources, meanwhile set-

⁶ “Regulation on the United Front Work of the Communist Party of China,” *People’s Daily Online*, January 6, 2021, <http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2021/0106/c1001-31990197.html>; “Regulation on the United Front Work of the Communist Party of China,” *People’s Daily Online*, September 23, 2015, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0923/c64107-27622040.html>.

ting up regulations for various industries. They have also continued to promote the access to water, gas, electricity, and bridges in the coastal areas of Kinmen, Matsu, and Fujian.⁷ In terms of policies that have been put into practice, since the issue of the “New Four Links” in Kinmen and Matsu requires the agreement of the Taiwanese side and cannot be decided by the CCP alone, the CCP authority is thus building the infrastructure of Fujian as an alternative for the “New Four Links” project. Fujian announced the Implementation Plan for the Construction of the Pilot Zone for a Powerful Transportation Country in Fujian Province in August 2021, stating that it would help improve the development of the infrastructure through the “three vertical channels, six horizontal links and two connecting dots” for the structure of transportation along with the “211” transportation circle, completing the infrastructure by “promoting the integrated development of cross-strait traffic”.⁸

In fact, although such policy is promoted under the so-called “policy of integrated development”, such infrastructure plans in Fujian are actually more of a symbolic meaning than actual practice when it comes to the united front work of Taiwan. For the Fujian Province itself, such plan appears to be more like an instrument to compete for fundings from the Beijing central government.

The idea of “promoting integration with benefits” is a continuation of the “preferential policy” provided by the CCP to Taiwan which has been conducted for a long time. The core value of the “preferential policy” is not exactly to win Taiwan over but to give equal treatment to Taiwan people, boosting the economy of mainland China through economic attraction and to achieve the purpose of cross-strait integration. From the so-called “31 measures”, “26 measures”, “11 measures” in the past to the “22 measures on agriculture and forestry” announced by CCP this year, much focus has been given to attracting Taiwanese businessmen and Tai-

⁷ “Taiwan Affairs Office Press Conference Highlights (2021-03-31),” *Taiwan Affairs Office*, March 31, 2021, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202103/t20210331_12342228.htm.

⁸ The “211” transportation circle means 2-hour access between each city, 1-hour commute between Fuzhou and Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quan metropolitan areas, and 1-hour basic coverage of transportation between cities and counties and towns. For the references please see “Implementation Plan for the Construction of the Pilot Zone for a Powerful Transportation Country in Fujian Province,” *Fujian Daily*, August 3, 2021, http://www.fujian.gov.cn/xwdt/fjyw/202108/t20210803_5659170.htm.

wan-funded enterprises to enter the Mainland for employment and investment. Finally, in terms of “promoting integration through affection”, CCP hopes to bring the people of Taiwan and the Mainland Area closer together through cultural exchanges to achieve the goal of unification with Taiwan.

As for other related policies, the CCP authority has approved to construct seven Cross Strait Exchange bases in 2021, such as the Fujian Longyan Changting Tingzhou, Capital of Hakka, approved in January, the Anxi Quanzhou Quanzhou Water Rock, and The Cultural Corridor of Grand Canal, Huai'an, Jiangsu, Wen Chang Ancient Temple, Zitong County, Mianyang, Sichuan, the Xiandu Neighborhood of Jinyun County, Lishui, Zhejiang, and the Leizu Park, Yanting County, Mianyang Sichuan, approved in July and the September 18th Historical Museum, Shenyang Liaoning, which was approved in September, bringing the total number of Cross Strait Exchange bases up to 82.⁹ The purpose of these Cross Strait Exchange bases is to attract people from Taiwan to visit based on the purpose of cross-strait integration.¹⁰ Due to the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the actual cross-strait exchanges this year were therefore focused mostly on the online events, such as “virtual tours”, “cloud exhibitions”, accompanied by other face-to-face gatherings for Taiwanese people living in China. We can see from the number of visits to the “cloud exhibitions” in the relevant exchange bases, however, that the results are obviously not quite effective, which means the actual impact of the Cross Strait Exchange base may not perform as well as the CCP authority has expected. Aside

⁹ The categories of Cross Strait Exchange base are mainly divided into five categories: traditional Chinese culture, religious venues, venues of Taiwan's modern history, venues of the history of ROC (Sino-Japanese War) and new construction in recent years. For references please see “Taiwan Affairs Office Introduces Cross Strait Exchange Base to Launch Exchange Activities and the Establishment of 4 New Bases,” *Taiwan Affairs Office*, January 13, 2021, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202101/t20210113_12316801.htm; “Current Status on the Focus of Traditional Culture and Historical Relics of the ROC,” WeMedia01(HK) Limited, January 18, 2021, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-07/12/c_1127646947.htm](https://www.hk01.com/中國觀察/575703/重傳統文化與民國史遺跡-盤點兩岸交流基地(cross-strait exchange bases) 現狀 ; “New Cross Strait Exchange base in Lishui, Zhejiang and Mianyang, Sichuan,” <i>Xinhua Net</i>, July 12, 2021, <a href=); “Taiwan Affairs Office Introducing the Establishment of Cross Strait Exchange Base at the ‘September 18th Historical Museum,” *Taiwan Affairs Office*, September 15, 2021, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202109/t20210915_12378624.htm.

¹⁰ Wang, Chia-Chou. “Comments on the new Cross-strait Exchange Bases in Mainland China,” *Prospect & Exploration*, Vol. 16, No. 8, 2018, p. 10.

from the events mentioned above, CCP is still actively engaged in relevant exchange activities with young students in Taiwan in terms of online activities such as “Cloud Exchange”. For example, in early January, the “2020 Sunshine Cross-Strait Youth Art Exhibition” exchange program was held by 20 elementary schools in Fujian and 18 elementary schools in Taipei and Taoyuan, such as Dongyuan Elementary School and Xinjie Elementary School in Taoyuan City.¹¹ However, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of such online communication activities, and it is also doubtful whether these activities can be transformed into recognition of China and the CCP. Yet we can say with certainty that the CCP’s online efforts toward Taiwan will continue.

2. Promoting Cross-strait Integrated Development through Fujian as an Experimental Area

In CCP’s united front plan this year, their government has mentioned Fujian as an experimental area to promote the policy of integrated development with Taiwan. Since Fujian is the closest province to Taiwan and has been an important united front base for CCP, they have taken cities like Xiamen as the special economic zone after the 1980s, hoping to attract Taiwanese businessmen for investments.¹² The Cross Straits (Fuzhou) Agricultural Cooperation Pilot Zone and The Cross Straits (Zhangzhou) Agricultural Cooperation Pilot Zone were established one after another after 1996.¹³ The two pilot zones along with the recent planning of The Economic Zone on the West Side of the Straits has made Fujian an important role in the united front work toward Taiwan. Therefore, although CCP has proposed to

¹¹ “Lishui, Zhejiang and Mianyang, Sichuan Set up New Cross-strait Exchange Bases,” *Xinhua Net*, July 12, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-07/12/c_1127646947.htm.

¹² Huang Chao-Neng, “A Study of Fujian’s Role in Constructing Cross-Strait Relation,” *Prospects & Exploration*, Vol. 7, No. 10, 2009, p. 50.

¹³ After the “Cross-Straits (Zhangzhou) Agricultural Cooperation Pilot Zone,” the CCP has established cross-straits agricultural cooperation pilot zones consecutively in Fuzhou, Hainan Island, Pingdu Shandong, Heilong Jiang and Yangling in Shaanxi. During 1996 and 2001, more than 5,000 Taiwanese agricultural companies moved to the mainland, with investing amounts up to US\$4 billion. For the reference please see “Analysis of the Impact of the ‘Cross-Strait Agricultural Cooperation Pilot Zone’ in Mainland China on Taiwan’s Agricultural Development” by Liu, Hou-Lien, *Land Issues Research Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2006, pp. 39-44.

make Fujian an experimental area for cross-strait integrated development this year, such practice is just a repetition of policies in the past, instead of raising the status and importance of Fujian in terms of united front work to Taiwan. In early January, Fujian announced the “225 lists of equal treatment for Taiwanese and Taiwan-funded enterprises in Fujian”. The list of 225 articles is divided into four parts: economic field, cultural and educational field, social field, and facilitation measures. The main focus of the articles is to give equal treatment to Taiwanese in the local area or in the free-trade zone.¹⁴

At the end of April, the “Taiwan Compatriot Entry Quarantine ‘Convenient Channel’ Pilot Program” was announced. The program allowed Taiwanese to enter Fujian through the mini three links channel without quarantine as long as they have lived in Kinmen or Matsu for 28 consecutive days.¹⁵ In the future, other regions in mainland China will also promote relevant preferential treatment for Taiwanese people under the rules of the so-called “preferential policy” in different regions.

3. The Restriction against Imports of Specific Fruits from Taiwan and the 22 Measures on Agriculture and Forestry

Since the beginning of 2021, CCP has announced a political restriction against the import of certain agricultural products from Taiwan. For example, on January 27, 2021, the Taiwan Affairs Office announced the restriction against meat products which are produced or transshipped from Taiwan due to the fact of Taiwan lifting the ban of importing U.S. pork to the island.¹⁶ On February 26, 2021, the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China (GAC) an-

¹⁴ For the reference please see “225 Lists of Equal treatment for Taiwanese and Taiwanese Companies in Fujian,” *Taiwan Office of the Fujian Municipal Government*, January 2, 2021, http://www.fjtb.gov.cn/news/202101/t20210102_12314945.htm; “225 Lists of Equal Treatment for Taiwanese and Taiwanese Companies in Fujian,” *People's Daily Online*, January 2, 2021, <http://fj.people.com.cn/BIG5/n2/2021/0102/c181466-34507667.html>.

¹⁵ The “convenient access”, however, was later suspended due to the outbreak of pandemic in Taiwan during May. For the reference please see “Fujian Suspends the Convenient Channel for Taiwanese, Taiwan Affairs Office: A Dynamic Management of the Pandemic,” *Central News Agency*, May 12, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202105120117.aspx>.

¹⁶ “Taiwan Affairs Office: China Strictly Prohibits the Import of Meat Products Produced or Transshipped in Taiwan,” *Xinhua Net*, January 27, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-01/27/c_1127032549.htm.

nounced on its website about restricting the import of pineapples from Taiwan. Ma Xiaoguang, the spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office, said the import of pineapples from Taiwan has been restricted since March 1 because the customs has repeatedly “inspected pests that should be quarantined”. Although Taiwan did not export any fresh pork or processed meat to China, which thus would not raise much negative opinions, the case for Taiwan’s fresh pineapple exports is different. The exports of pineapples to China takes up 91% of the total amount in 2020, with an export value of US\$49,878,000, which then causes great disturbance. These restrictions conducted by CCP authority is considered as a political decision and an action of vengeance in cross-strait relations according to many Taiwanese media.¹⁷ Within a few days, however, CCP immediately proposed “Measures to support the development of compatriots and enterprises from Taiwan in agriculture and forestry on the mainland” (“22 measures”) on March 17 to promote the preferential policy and the policy of integrating development toward Taiwan.

Taking CCP’s policy of united front work into consideration, we could see that they are in fact creating panic among Taiwanese farmers, especially for those who have long relied on the mainland market for their products, then attract them to invest in the mainland by providing solutions for the difficulties CCP itself has created. On September 18, the Customs of PRC further announced that the wax apples (95.6% of export ratio to mainland China, with the value of US\$18,050,000; 3.5% to Hong Kong, with the value of US\$666,000) and sugar apples (94.8% of export ratio to mainland China, with the value of US\$42,453,000; 4% to Hong Kong, with the value of US\$1,779,000) had been detected to contain the pest *Planococcus citri*. These fruits thus have been restricted from China since September 20.¹⁸ Items such

¹⁷ “China Unilaterally Suspended the Import of Taiwan Pineapples, the County and City of Origin Dissatisfied,” *Central News Agency*, February 26, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202102260211.aspx>; Lu, Bo-Hua. “Headlines Reveal Taiwan Officials’ Incoherent Language and the Ban on Pineapples in China is More Shocking than Military Drills with Missiles,” *China Times*, March 2, 2021, <https://www.chinatimes.com/real-timenews/20210302000585-260407?chdtv>; “China Banned the Import of Taiwan Pineapples, Scholars: A Usual Cultivating, Trapping and Killing Technique,” *Liberty Times*, January 26, 2021, <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/breakingnews/3450803>.

¹⁸ The relevant data were compiled from the Trade Statistics Database of the Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan, <https://agrstat.coa.gov.tw/sdweb/public/trade/TradeReport.aspx>.

as pineapples, wax apples and sugar apples from Taiwan are all products listed in the “prohibited types of agricultural products for investment or technical cooperation in Mainland China” (hereinafter referred to as “prohibited items”) in the regulations of Taiwan. These actions would then not only “punish” the ruling party’s cross-strait policy to arouse farmers’ discontent, they could also create a certain extent of pressure to the Taiwanese government to make adjustments to the list of “prohibited projects”.

Aside from pineapples, wax apples and sugar apples, other long-term agricultural products which rely much upon the Chinese market include pomelo (export ratio of 69.9% in China, with the value of US\$4,892,000 in 2020; export ratio of 20% in Hong Kong, with the value of US\$1,398,000), mango (export ratio of 30.1% in China, with the value of US\$7,846,000; export ratio of 28.5% in Hong Kong, with the value of US\$7,440,000), and grouper (export ratio of 75.7% in China, with the value of US\$30,858,000; export ratio of 24.1% in Hong Kong, with the value of US\$9,800,000). These items along with other products may be banned to import based on political decisions of the CCP in the future. If so, the “22 measures” may further influence the Taiwanese government’s attitude towards the amendment of the list of “prohibited items”, reaching the goal of Mainland China to raise the reliance of Taiwan companies on the Chinese market. However, the concept of the “22 measures on agriculture and forestry” is not much different from that of the previous policies of cross-strait agricultural zones¹⁹, not to mention that the world is going through uncertainties since we are currently affected by the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Under so much uncertainty, it is expected that CCP may not be able to attract much Taiwanese to invest or work in China through the “22 measures on agriculture and forestry” in the short term.

4. The Chinese Communist Party Continues to Disturb the Security of Taiwan

In 2021, the CCP continues to manipulate and suppress Taiwan on issues such

¹⁹ Wu, Chia-Hsun. “Discussion on Mainland China’s ‘22 Measures on Agriculture and Forestry’ for Taiwan,” *Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Monthly*, Vol. 353, 2021, pp. 4-7.

as vaccines and the pandemic situation in Taiwan. Taiwan has continued to receive international support, such as on Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly (WHA) and vaccine donation by the United States and Japan. Facing such phenomenon, CCP strongly criticizes Taiwan for "gaining independence through vaccines" and continues to suppress Taiwan's participation in the WHA; they also successfully pressured Guyana, a South American country to compensate for the cancellation of its agreement to establish the office a day by providing 20,000 doses of vaccine a day after Taiwan's announcement of establishing the office in Guyana, on February 4, 2021.²⁰ Other political offenses and defenses also centered on issues related to the pandemic, such as providing vaccinations to Taiwanese living in China, hindering Taiwan authority from obtaining vaccines abroad, and suggesting donations of Chinese vaccines when the pandemic in Taiwan outbreaks in May.²¹

The CCP authority offered assistance to Taiwan through official statements while continuing to manipulate public opinion on the Internet to create internal confusion, generating public distrust toward Taiwanese government's handling of the situation, hence increasing internal conflicts on political situations in Taiwan. In addition, the Taiwan Affairs Office has further accused the statements of related speeches made by government officials as actions of "Taiwan independence" with both great frequency and strong wording. For example, Taiwan Affairs Office had made strong accusation of President Tsai's "Four Commitments" in the speech of

²⁰ "20,000 Vaccine Doses Taking Over the Taiwan Office? Former diplomat: It Would be Guyana's Misfortune to Trust China," *Liberty Times*, February 5, 2021, <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3433451>; "Update: Foreign Minister of Guyana Announces Accepting 20,000 Doses of COVID-19 Vaccines from China As Soon As They Terminate the Relationship with Taiwan Office," *Public News Network*, February 5, 2021, <https://news.pts.org.tw/article/512093>.

²¹ "Highlights of Taiwan Affairs Office Press Conference (2021-06-16)," *Taiwan Affairs Office*, June 16, 2021, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202106/t20210616_12359721.htm; Lu Chia-Hung, "COVID-19 Pandemic in Taiwan: Mainland China Says They are Willing to Provide Vaccines to Fight the Pandemic in while Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of Taiwan Responded by Calling it 'United Front Work'," *Liberty Times*, May 27, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-57264880>; Lin Yu-Li, "German Lawmaker Confirms China Hinders Taiwan From Buying BNT Vaccines, Putting Health of Taiwanese People at Risk," *Central News Agency*, July 15, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202107150301.aspx>.

National Day on October 10.²² Ma Xiaoguang, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office, also criticized President Tsai's insistence of Republic of China and the People's Republic of China being not subjugated to each other, considering it as "an evident propaganda of the 'two-state' theory."²³ From December 1, 2020, to October 29, 2021, Taiwan Affairs Office had published a total of 258 press releases on their official website. Apart from the 76 (29.5%) press releases on policy introduction and defense, condolences and the current political situation, the remaining 182 (70.5%) were negative criticisms and warnings against Taiwan. Among these negative statements, 105 (40.7%) were specifically targeted at the DPP, while 33 (12.8%) and 6 (2.3%) are warnings and urges toward the U.S. and Japan respectively.²⁴ The Taiwan Affairs Office's press releases have become the main channel for threats and warnings on Taiwan-related issues.

IV. Incursions by Chinese aircrafts that Enhance the Military Indications

The frequent incursions of PLA into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) have become a regular occurrence. Among these incursions, the aircrafts had flown in pair into Taiwan's southwestern ADIZ (see Table 2-1) for many times, which raised people's awareness. In the past two years, CCP often takes specific political events as excuses to send military aircraft into the surrounding waters of Taiwan to rationalize their entrance into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone

²² The four commitments include commitments that "were to liberal democracy and constitutional government; that the Republic of China (ROC) is not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China (PRC); to protect the nation's sovereignty; and that the future of the ROC must be decided in accordance with the will of Taiwanese." For the reference please see Yeh, Su-Ping, "Speech of President Tsai on National Day Includes Four Commitments that Sovereignities on Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait are Non-subordinated and Inviolable with Each Other," *Central News Agency*, October 10, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202110100210.aspx>.

²³ "Taiwan Affairs Office: The So-called 'ROC Being not Subject to Each Other' is an Evident Propaganda of the 'Two-state Theory,'" *Taiwan Affairs Office*, October 13, 2021, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202110/t20211013_12384230.htm.

²⁴ The statistics are collected by the author from the press releases on the official website of the Taiwan Affairs Office.

(ADIZ). They have also taken military drills as excuses to carry out military threats against Taiwan. In 2021, CCP continues to send warnings to Taiwan through specific political events, such as the 28 times of flights into ADIZ of Taiwan on June 15, which are believed to be related to the statement in which peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait were first mentioned in the G7 Leaders Communiqué Summit.²⁵ Although the political meaning of the incursions by the PLA from October 1 to 4 (with 149 flights in total) is more highlighted than its practical military purpose, other incursions of PLA aircrafts this year could still be regarded as a means of expanding regional influence and training of enhancing capability training, rather than as a military threat to Taiwan. Such manipulation of “actual combat training” disguised as military intimidation has become more evident than in previous actions of PLA.

The PLA’s incursions by Chinese aircrafts in 2021, aside from their regular attempts to expand their sphere of influence, does not convey the political intention as strong as it was in 2020 when they entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) several times. Rather, some of the incursions were associated with U.S. and ROC military activities and exercises in the surrounding areas, to which CCP responded through incursions to restrain the power of “Taiwan independence” and “external forces”. Wu Qian, spokesperson for the PLA, for instance, stated on Jan. 23 and 24 in response to the incursions that “the military activities carried out by the Chinese PLA in the Taiwan Strait are necessary actions in response to the current security situation across the Taiwan Strait and to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is also a solemn response to the interference of external forces and the provocations by ‘Taiwan independence’ forces. ...those who play with fire will set themselves on fire, and ‘Taiwan independence’ means

²⁵ Lu, Jia-Rong, “28 Chinese Aircrafts Enter Taiwan ADIZ After G7 Communiqué First Mentions the Cross-strait Issues, Beijing: A Suppressing Action of Taiwan Independence,” *Udn.com Co., Ltd.* June 16, 2021, <https://udn.com/news/story/7331/5536270>; Chung Yu-Chen, “A Highest Number of 28 Chinese Aircrafts Enter Taiwan ADIZ After G7 Communiqué First Mentions the Cross-strait Issues, Scholar: Appeasement to Hawks,” *Central News Agency*, June 15, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202106150307.aspx>.

nothing but war.”²⁶

As for the 25 flights into Taiwan's southwestern ADIZ on April 12, Ma Xiaoguang, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office, indicated that the PLA's actions are signals to hinder Taiwan independence.²⁷ Ren Guo-Qiang, spokesperson of PLA also stated about the June 24 entry into Taiwan's ADIZ that “Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. ... The PLA's deployment of multiple types of aircraft to organize training activities in the Taiwan Strait is a necessary action in response to the current cross-strait security and the need to safeguard national sovereignty. The PLA will resolutely fulfill its sacred duty of guarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, securing the safety of the nation.”²⁸ In fact, these three incursions into Taiwan's southwestern ADIZ are considered by many experts as provocative actions against the U.S. naval ships' entering the South China Sea, or as exercises simulating possible conflicts with the U.S. military.²⁹

The PLA has been testing and interfering Taiwan authorities through different types of aircrafts and different types of incursions. There were even rumors in April and May that drones or armed helicopters were sent to “sea-skimming flying” to test the range of surveillance of Taiwan's radar.³⁰ Furthermore, 11 PLA flights has flown 11 times into Taiwan's Southwest Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on

²⁶ “Transcript of the Press Conference for the Ministry of National Defense in January 2021,” *Ministry of National Defense of People's Republic of China*, January 28, 2021, http://www.mod.gov.cn/big5/jzhzt/2021-01/28/content_4878227.htm.

²⁷ “Highlights of Taiwan Affairs Office Press Conference (2021-04-14),” *Taiwan Affairs Office*, April 14, 2021, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/xwfbh/202104/t20210414_12345433.htm.

²⁸ “Transcript of the Press Conference for the Ministry of National Defense in June 2021,” *Ministry of National Defense of People's Republic of China*, June 24, 2021, http://www.mod.gov.cn/info/2021-06/24/content_4888067.htm.

²⁹ Lin Yen-Chen, “Incursions by 28 Chinese Aircrafts are Followed by ‘3 Warships’ Behind! Experts analyze the real purpose,” *ETtoday News*, June 15, 2021, <https://www.ettoday.net/news/20210617/2008483.htm>; Yu, Kai-Shiang, “The Number of Incursions by Chinese Jets Reaching Its Highest, Scholars: A Simulation of Attack on U.S. Fleet,” *Central News Agency*, April 12, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202104120316.aspx>; Yang, Ming-Chu, “Japanese Media: Incursions by Chinese Jets are Intended to Intimidate the U.S. Fleet off Taiwan,” *Central News Agency*, January 30, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202101300004.aspx>.

³⁰ Tsai, Tsung-Hsien, “The Altitude of the Chinese Aircraft during the Incursions Hit the Lowest Level of ‘30 Meters’ and May Target the Southwest Airspace to Find Dead Ends of Radar,” *Liberty Times*, April 26, 2021, <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3511664>.

August 17. Shi Yi, spokesperson for the PLA Eastern Theater Command, said the exercise was designed to test the capability of military integration of the army and to further give warnings to the U.S.-Taiwan collusion and give provocation on possible forces of Taiwan independence.³¹ Yet there are also information revealing that the Yun-8s (Y-8) had flown into Taiwan's declared "R-12 target area", attempting to interfere with Taiwan's National Army training exercises. In addition, PLA is also routinely entering Taiwan's southwestern ADIZ, making progress in testing, combat-oriented military training, and surveillance of military activities in this region. The PLA has extended its sphere of influence into Taiwan's southwestern ADIZ in just one year.

On September 23, 24 aircrafts of PLA entered Taiwan's southwestern ADIZ. From October 1 to 4, there had been a high intensiveness of 149 PLA aircraft incursions happening in surrounding areas of Taiwan. CCP is raising tensions to gain possible concessions from the U.S. side.³² Yet despite their intensions, their actions could also be considered as military training and combat preparation, for instance, scholars believe that the incursion on September 23 may be related to the Jiadong military drill, which means CCP is not only targeting airports, but also national highways and provincial highways of Taiwan.³³ The 149 aircraft over four days in October were considered to be an exercise of day and night combat capabilities. They are also considered as practices of integrated joint operations between different forces such as bomber (B: bomber) and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C). The aircrafts are formed to be capable of attacking Taiwan as well as

³¹ Miao, Tsung-Han and Peng-Da Shen, "PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) Performing Exercises of Navy and Air Force, Ministry of National Defense, PRC: the Situation is Well Handled," *Central News Agency*, August 17, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202108170121.aspx>; Wang, Jiong-Hua, "Serious Provocations by Chinese Jets! The First Time of the Yun-8 Aircraft Crossing Our Announced Target Area, with 11 Aircrafts in Total Interfering with Military Drills of Our Army," *Apple Daily*, August 17, 2021, <https://tw.apledaily.com/politics/20210817/O35E3BJGOVE6FPFRURJBQQ3HJA/>.

³² For Relative Content Please see Hung, Tzu-Chieh, "CCP's Strategy for Handling Recent Cross-strait Relations," *Defense Security Bi-weekly*, Vol. 40, October 2020, pp. 11-15.

³³ Yu, Kai-Hsiang, "19 Incursions by Chinese Jets, Scholar: Incursions of Southeast Airspace are Aiming to Block U.S. Military Activities in the Bashi Channel," *Central News Agency*, September 23, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202109230265.aspx>.

fight against the United States through different types of formations.³⁴

After CCP explicitly put forward the goal of “ensuring the achievement of the military’s centenary goal by 2027” in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee in 2020, PLA mentioned that they will “accelerate the integrated development of a mechanized, informationized and intelligent military”, “accelerate the modernization of our military in terms of theory, organizational structure, service personnel, and weaponry”, and that “it is required to put quality and efficiency first” while promoting “the simultaneous growth of defense and economy.”³⁵ Therefore, whether in combat-oriented military training, developing technology, or practicing new tactics, the goal of PLA is to strengthen its army and bridge the gap with the U.S. military. CCP’s frequent intimidation of Taiwan through exercise in the past two years has resulted in decreases in the effectiveness of these intimidations. Moreover, PLA has intensified its training and military activities around the Taiwan Strait in recent years, making the military threat against Taiwan more like a preparation for the expansion of military power and for possible military conflicts in the future.³⁶

³⁴ Yu, Kai-Hsiang, “Incursions of Chinese Jets Reaches Its Peak in Two Consecutive Days, Scholars: A Demonstration of Capability to Suppress Taiwan-U.S. Relations,” *Central News Agency*, October 3, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202110030079.aspx>.

³⁵ “Ministry of Defense: Striving to Advance the Cause of A Strong Military to Ensure the Achievement of the Military’s Centenary Goal,” *Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China*, November 26, 2020, http://www.mod.gov.cn/big5/info/2020-11/26/content_4874680.htm.

³⁶ For a detailed analysis of incursions by Chinese jets, please refer to Chapter 5 of this report, “Evolution of China’s Military Departure Patterns,” of *2021 Annual Assessment of Trends of Defense Technology*, edited by Li, Guan-Cheng and Ming-Te Hung (Taipei: Institute for National Defense and Security Research, 2021).

Table 2-1 Incursions of PLA Aircrafts (Double Digits) Entering Taiwan's Southwestern ADIZ, 2021

Date	Numbers	Types of Aircrafts
January 23	13 aircrafts	ASW: anti-submarine warfare, One Y-8 ASW, Eight H-6K, Four J-16
January 24	15 aircrafts	Two Y-8 ASW, Two SU-30, Four J-16, J-10, Six J-10, One Y-8 RECCE
March 26	20 aircrafts	Two Y-8 ASW, One KJ-500 AEW&C, Four H-6K, Ten J-16, J-10, Two J-10, One Y-8 RECCE
March 29	10 aircrafts	One KJ-500 AEW&C, One Y-8 ASW, Four J-16, Four J-10
April 5	10 aircrafts	One Y-8 ASW, One KJ-500 AEW&C, Four J-16, Four J-10
April 7	15 aircrafts	Eight J-10, Four J-16, One Y-8 ASW, Two KJ-500 AEW&C
April 12	25 aircrafts	Two Y-8 ASW, One KJ-500 AEW&C, Four J-10, Fourteen J-16, Four H-6K
June 15	28 aircrafts	One Y-8 ASW, Four H-6, One Y-8 EW, Two KJ-500 AEW&C, Fourteen J-16, Six J-11
August 17	11 aircrafts	One Y-8 ASW, One Y-8 EW, One KJ-500 AEW&C, Six J-16, Two H-6K
September 5	19 aircrafts	One Y-8 ASW, Four H-6, Ten J-16, Four SU-30
September 17	10 aircrafts	One Y-8 ASW, One Y-8 RECCE, Two J-11, Six J-16
September 23	24 aircrafts	Two times a day. First time: Twelve J-16, Two Y-8 ASW, Two H-6, One Y-8 EW, Two J-11. Second time: Two J-16, One KJ-500 AEW&C, Two J-11
October 1	38 sorties	Two times in one day. First time: ten J-16, two H-6, one KJ-500. Second time: eighteen J-16, four SU-30, two H-6, one Y-8 ASW
October 2	39 sorties	Two times in one day. First time: twelve J-16, six SU-30, one KJ-500. Second time: fourteen J-16, four SU-30, two Y-8 ASW
October 3	16 sorties	Eight J-16, four SU-30, two Y-8 ASW, two KJ-500 AEW&C
October 4	56 sorties	Two times in one day. First time: four J-16. Second time: thirty four J-16, two SU-30, two Y-8 ASW, two KJ-500 AEW&C, twelve H-6

Note: Only data for 10 or more flights at a time are listed as of October 29, 2021.

Source: Collected by the author from the Ministry of National Defense (MND) website.

V. Conclusion

One important feature of the CCP's Taiwan policy in recent years since President Tsai Ing-wen took office is that the CCP's united front work toward Taiwan have become more unilateral, such as its "preferential policy" and accusatory warnings, without regarding the bilateral relations and interactions. Considering the CCP's diplomatic speeches in recent years in the wolf warrior diplomatic style, the proportion of the CCP's foreign-related speeches and their statements of internal propaganda has increased significantly compared to the past. In other words, the CCP authority are trying to support their internal propaganda by making tough statements to the external world.³⁷ China has adopted similar approach to Taiwan. Whether it is the unilateral policies on Taiwan that ignore the actual situation on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, or the frequency of strong statements toward Taiwan by the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CCP's work on Taiwan issues has become more dominated by internal propaganda and manipulation of nationalism than in the past.³⁸

To sum up, although the main theme of the CCP's Taiwan policy and united front work remains unchanged in 2021, they have continued to promote the policy of integrated development and enhance cross-strait online exchanges. Meanwhile, the CCP authority continues their manipulation through information warfare, disinformation and cognitive warfare on issues such as vaccines, internal government affairs and the pandemic issues, aiming to create distrust in the government's actions and increasing internal political conflicts. As for the political perspective, the CCP hindered Taiwan from obtaining vaccines, restricted the import of pineapples,

³⁷ Such an approach now seems to be the subject of discussion in different units within the CCP, such as the Ministry of National Defense showing dissatisfaction with the style of the discourse of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For more details please see Chan, Minnie, "Wolf vs Panda: is China at a Crossroads Over How to Spread its Global Message?," *South China Morning Post*, August 8, 2021, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3144269/wolf-vs-panda-china-crossroads-over-how-spread-its-global>.

³⁸ For more details on the discussions between the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Chapter 3 of this report, "The Division of Labor and Strategy of CCP Authority Toward Taiwan: Taking the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as Examples," written by Kung Shan-Son, of *2021 Annual Assessment of Trends of Defense Technology*, edited by Li, Guan-Cheng and Ming-Te Hung (Taipei: Institute for National Defense and Security Research, 2021).

wax apples and sugar apples, while engaging in diplomatic suppression to disrupt the administration of the ROC government, at the same time increasing the intensity of its defamation and criticism. On the military front, while the PLA's military threat against Taiwan continues, it is more important for the PLA to expand its sphere of influence and strengthen its own combat capabilities through its military activities around the Taiwan Strait. There is an increase of military threats in the name of "actual combat training". This makes the results of the CCP's policy and actions toward Taiwan this year even more aggressive and hostile, erasing the possibility that the integrated development of CCP is trying to achieve.

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