

PART ONE

Strategic Developments and Actions of Major Powers in the Indo-Pacific Region

Chapter 1

The Biden Administration's Policies and Actions in the Indo-Pacific Region in 2021

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I. Introduction

The U.S. activities in the Indo-Pacific region in 2021 are themselves influenced by a change in U.S. domestic factors—namely, the U.S. presidential election in November 2020. In the event that Donald Trump wins the election, the United States is expected to increase its checks and balances on Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific and across the globe; in the event that Joe Biden wins the election, the United States is expected to continue to strengthen its international confrontation with China, but the Biden administration's strategy for dealing with the Chinese challenge is likely to diverge from that of the Trump administration.¹ In other words, a complete reversal of the Trump administration's China policy should not happen. The development of U.S.-China relations in 2021 is a testament to a structural factor in the international system—the “great power competition” between established and rising powers, the United States and China. In contrast, domestic political variables in the U.S. have become a non-deterministic influence.

Nevertheless, comparing Biden's Indo-Pacific Strategy with Trump's Indo-Pacific Strategy is still informative: First, if the two Indo-Pacific Strategies share a high degree of similarity and continuity, it may prove that competition

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¹ Brahma Chellaney, “Biden Follows Trump's Footsteps in The Indo-Pacific,” *The Hill*, March 25, 2021, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/544860-biden-follows-trumps-footsteps-in-the-indo-pacific>.

with China is a consensus between the U.S. Democratic and Republican parties and an inevitable result of the “great power competition” structural environment. Secondly, suppose there are differences between the two Indo-Pacific wars, particularly in terms of strategy rather than in terms of underlying nature or goals. In that case, the significance for Washington is whether the Biden administration’s strategy will be more effective in containing the Chinese threat. In the Biden administration’s initial national security strategy, it emphasizes that the distinction between foreign policy and domestic politics has been narrowed and that the reestablishment of an American democratic political system to counter threats to the United States and democracies from authoritarian dictatorships is critical to Washington’s international reputation and leadership, as well as to its ability and that of its democratic alliance to resist the Chinese and Russian revisionist powers.² In this regard, U.S. domestic affairs remain an indispensable variable in exploring its national security strategy and Indo-Pacific strategy.

In terms of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the Biden administration has fundamentally subsumed the Trump administration’s defensive approach while emphasizing the United States’ international leadership role and cooperation with its allied partners. In terms of strategy, the Biden administration’s approach differs noticeably from that of the Trump administration—on the one hand, it emphasizes the importance of rebuilding domestic governance, while on the other hand, it actively navigates diplomacy and strengthens ties with allies and partners to combat China in concert. In addition, on the geo-economic level, the Biden administration and Japan have proposed a U.S.-Japanese democratic version of the Indo-Pacific regional infrastructure plan to counter China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative. Overall, the strategic competition between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific region is expected to escalate in 2021, as the Biden administration continues to expand and consolidate its efforts to counteract China.

² Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, *The White House*, March 3, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>, pp. 6-9. Also see Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again>.

II. The Biden Administration's Strategic Approach to the Indo-Pacific

The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy epitomizes the current U.S. national security strategy and policies on foreign affairs, defense, economy, science and technology, and culture, as it does for the Trump and Biden administrations. As the rise of China poses significant threats to U.S. international leadership, global democracy, and the international order since the end of World War II, in geopolitical and economic terms, the United States must strengthen its efforts to counter China's expansion in the Indo-Pacific region, where Beijing's political, economic, military, and cultural power is directly exerted. Therefore, observing the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy provides an overview of the overall U.S. national strategy and policy, reflecting a significant portion of the U.S. national strategy and policy in the Indo-Pacific strategy. Regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, the Biden administration has drawn the most attention to whether Biden will continue (or transform) Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy. A review of public opinion before and after the Democratic Party's victory³ and the Biden administration's performance since taking office indicates that it has not shifted or abandoned the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy but has instead continued to intensify its strategic competition with China. The Biden administration, however, has taken a different strategic approach.⁴

The Biden administration has not yet released its Indo-Pacific strategy report,⁵

³ During this period, public opinion generally believed that Biden would not give up or change Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy. See "Joe Biden 'Unlikely To Replace' Trump's Indo-Pacific Strategy Vs China," *NDTV*, October 29, 2020, <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/joe-biden-may-continue-trumps-india-focused-strategy-to-help-offset-china-2317322>; Derek Grossman, "US Election Won't Dramatically Alter Indo-Pacific Strategy," *Nikkei Asia*, November 1, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/US-election-won-t-dramatically-alter-Indo-Pacific-strategy>; Eric Feinberg, "China Policy from Trump to Biden: More Continuity than Change," *Pacific Forum*, March 5, 2021, <https://pacforum.org/publication/pacnet-12-china-policy-from-trump-to-biden-more-continuity-than-change>.

⁴ Yogesh Joshi and Archana Atmakuri, *Biden's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Expectations and Challenges* (Singapore and Tokyo: Institute of South Asian Studies and Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2021), pp. 10-12.

⁵ During the Trump Administration, the Pentagon released the *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report* on June 1, 2019, the State Council released the *Indo-Pacific Vision Report (A Free and Open Indo-Pacific)* on November 4 of the same year.

but public conversations between President Biden and critical officials on his national security staff⁶ and the White House's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released on March 3, 2021, reveal that the Biden administration's overall national security strategy and diplomacy are generally evident. From these remarks and documents, it is clear that Biden continues Trump's view of China as a significant strategic competitor. Nevertheless, Biden emphasized the importance of revitalizing U.S. international prestige and leadership while strengthening coordination and cooperation with allies and partners to form a solid anti-China alliance.

To begin with, the Biden administration has challenged the divide between "domestic" and "foreign" policy, seeking instead to integrate foreign policy with domestic policy. Some of the Democratic Party's political elite has recognized that the U.S. diplomatic retreat in recent years stems from domestic political concerns, including a fragmented society and polarization, political populism and extremism, bottlenecks in economic development as a result of globalization, racism, and social equity, weak government governance, mismanagement of COVID-19, and infrastructure incompetence. Such domestic problems have impacted the U.S. competitive advantage in the international context and affected its international image, reputation, and leadership status. In addition, the U.S. has decided to withdraw from international institutions and agreements (for example, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Paris Climate Agreement, and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC)). These actions have undoubtedly ceded many important international arenas to China. Therefore, rebuilding U.S. foreign policy and international influence requires rebuilding U.S. domestic politics.⁷

Secondly, another priority in rebuilding U.S. domestic politics is to strengthen

⁶ These officials include Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.

⁷ Jeff Seldin, "Biden's National Security Approach Sees Merge of Foreign, Domestic Policy," *Voice of America*, January 29, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/usa/bidens-national-security-approach-sees-merger-foreign-domestic-policy>; Joseph J. Collins, "Biden's Task Is Building a Better National Security Policy," *The Hill*, February 1, 2021, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/536177-bidens-task-is-building-a-better-national-security-policy>.

U.S. liberal democracy as it relates to the United States and other democracies. The Biden administration recognizes that the current challenges and threats posed by the PRC to the United States are not just in the material aspects of geopolitics and geo-economics but also in the political institutions of values and lifestyles relevant to humanity which Beijing is eager to challenge if not replace. To add to the seriousness of the situation, the rising authoritarian regime is challenging the very democracy that has been considered a model of universal values since the end of the Cold War; China is challenging not just the United States but all liberal democracies in the world. If the United States, as a democratic leader, is weakened, not only will it be unable to attend to its own domestic and foreign affairs, but Washington will also be unable to lead a robust democratic alliance against China.⁸

Furthermore, in contrast to the Trump administration's strategy, the Biden administration has emphasized that the United States cannot accomplish its strategic goals against the rising power of China on its own and that Washington must abandon its past unilateralist actions and neglect of relations with allied countries, and revive its collaborative efforts with allies and partners, as well as return to key international arenas and international establishment. The Biden administration seeks to restore the U.S. to its position of international leadership and reestablish its international prestige and credibility and its former international presence and influence through the enhancement of bilateral and multilateral relations.⁹ In doing so, the Biden administration engages in a series of diplomatic maneuvers to gradually lead and build a democratic coalition against China and implement the U.S. national security strategy and its Indo-Pacific strategy.

⁸ Biden, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, p. 7; Antony J. Blinken, "A Foreign Policy for the American People," *U.S. Department of State*, March 3, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/>.

⁹ Biden, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, pp. 8, 10.

III. The Biden Administration’s “Collaborative” Diplomatic Approach to the Indo-Pacific Region¹⁰

The most significant difference between the Biden administration and the Trump administration in their approach to the Indo-Pacific strategy is the promotion of cooperative relations with allies and partner countries. By doing so, Washington is restoring its leadership legitimacy among allies and partners while gradually establishing an international democratic alliance against the Chinese threat through a diplomatic shuttle. The U.S. diplomatic strategy is a simultaneous development of bilateral and multilateral approaches, both within and outside the Indo-Pacific region.

In terms of bilateral diplomatic relations, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made their first overseas trip to Asia since taking office, with Japan as the first stop, demonstrating the Biden administration’s importance on Asia, the allied nation of Japan.¹¹ On March 16-17, 2021, the U.S. and Japan held its Foreign Minister and Defense Secretary’s “U.S.-Japan Security Agreement Committee Meeting” (also known as the “2+2 Talks”). It issued a joint statement addressing the Chinese threat to the security of the Indo-Pacific, highlighting the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, reaffirming that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands (also known as the Diaoyu Islands), not allowing China’s Maritime Police Act to undermine Japan’s national interests, advocating a free and open Indo-Pacific and peaceful resolution of disputes, and countering Chinese threats and aggression when necessary. Later in mid-April, these shared propositions were reaffirmed

¹⁰ The concept of “collaborative diplomacy” is drawn from the historical experience of the Warring States Periods in ancient China. Since the “collaborative” is a multi-state alliance (six countries, located in the east, north and south) to strengthen one thing (Qin, located in the west), its geographical distribution and alliance competition are very similar to today’s Indo-Pacific strategic situation, that is, the United States is united Multi-country (located in the east) to fight against a strong China (located in the west).

¹¹ Jason Strother, “Top US Officials in Asia on First Overseas Visit,” *Voice of America*, March 16, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/top-us-officials-asia-first-overseas-visit-0>.

when Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide visited the United States.¹² Notably, the references to the “importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” were mentioned by both sides for the first time since 1969.

On March 17-18, the U.S. and South Korea also held a “2+2 meeting” between foreign and defense ministers, in which both sides stated that the U.S.-South Korea alliance serves as an imperative for peace, security, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region. Nevertheless, there was a clear divergence in threat perceptions - Washington pointed to China and North Korea as the source of the security threat, while Seoul saw North Korea and the North Korean nuclear issue as critical.¹³ During South Korean President Moon Jae-in's visit to the United States in late May, the U.S. and South Korea issued a joint statement stating that they were committed to maintaining an inclusive, accessible, and open Indo-Pacific region and emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.¹⁴

The U.S. has been instrumental in bringing South Korea (U.S.-Korea) and Japan (U.S.-Japan) together on the Indo-Pacific security and Taiwan Strait issues. Although there are discrepancies between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea in their perceptions of the Chinese threat, the matter illustrates the U.S.'s strong influence on Japan and South Korea in the fight against China.

As evidenced by Washington's bilateral diplomatic efforts to urge allies and partners to respond to its Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan and South Korea, India, Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan have also been intensively engaged by the United States. For example, the U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris visited Singapore and Vietnam from August 22 to 26, intending to strengthen the U.S. partnership with Singapore and Vietnam towards the

¹² “US-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement: ‘US-JAPAN GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW ERA’,” *The White House*, April 16, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/us-japan-joint-leaders-statement-us-japan-global-partnership-for-a-new-era/>.

¹³ “Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea–United States Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”),” *The White House*, April 18, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-2021-republic-of-korea-united-states-foreign-and-defense-ministerial-meeting-22/>.

¹⁴ “U.S.-ROK Leaders' Joint Statement,” *The White House*, May 21, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/>.

safeguarding of a free and open Indo-Pacific region.¹⁵

In terms of multilateral diplomatic relations, the U.S. also actively participates in the multilateral Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the Group of Seven (G7), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On March 12, 2021, the leaders of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India held a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) video conference to discuss responses to crises such as global climate change and COVID-19 while advocating for a free and open Indo-Pacific and a focus on peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. On August 12, the Quadripartite Security Dialogue reconvened with senior officials to discuss efforts to strengthen cooperation on Indo-Pacific strategies, disinformation, human rights, and democracy and promote UN functionality. Although the post-meeting joint statement made no mention of the China threat, it was apparent that China was targeted, and although there was no mention of Taiwan Strait stability, it was clear that the Taiwan Strait was included.¹⁶

In mid-June 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden attended the G7 summit and signed a new version of the Atlantic Charter with Prime Minister Boris Johnson to strengthen the U.S.-UK “special relationship” and bring together Western allies to confront China’s threats. For the first time, the G7 has shown that it values peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and opposes China’s unilateral changes to the status quo in the South China Sea.¹⁷ After the G7 summit, President Biden attended the NATO summit. After the meeting, NATO, for the first time, identified China as a security threat, arguing that its rapid nuclear expansion, military opacity, and military cooperation with Russia have posed a systemic challenge to the international order and NATO’s security. NATO agreed to intensify cooperation with the Indo-Pacific Democracy Partnership to address regional

¹⁵ “Remarks by Vice President Harris on the Indo-Pacific Region,” *The White House*, August 24, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/24/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-indo-pacific-region/>.

¹⁶ Steve Holland, David Brunnstrom, Nandita Bose, and Michael Martina, “Quad Leaders Press for Free Indo-Pacific, with Wary Eye on China,” *Reuters*, September 25, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/quad-leaders-meet-white-house-amid-shared-china-concerns-2021-09-24/>.

¹⁷ “CARBIS BAY G7 SUMMIT COMMUNIQUÉ,” *The White House*, June 13, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/13/carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique/>.

security challenges.¹⁸ On September 16, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia announced the establishment of the Australia-UK-U.S. Security Partnership (AUKUS) mechanism, which anticipates cooperation in artificial intelligence, the Internet, and long-range warfare capabilities, particularly as the United States and the United Kingdom are prepared to provide Australia with nuclear submarine technology to assist Australia in the establishment of a nuclear submarine force.¹⁹

In this development, the Biden administration's multilateral diplomacy reinforces the aforementioned bilateral cooperation to counter Chinese threats and extends its "cooperation" efforts beyond the geography of the Indo-Pacific to Europe and North America. Washington's vigorous efforts to revive and strengthen relations with allies and partners have undoubtedly put more significant diplomatic pressure on Beijing, reflecting the stark disparity between the U.S. and China regarding the foundation and potential of their international alliances.

IV. The Biden Administration's Promotion of an Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Investment Program

In addition to diplomatic efforts, the 2021 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy also proposes a U.S. version of the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Investment Program based on geo-economic strategies, intending to facilitate regional economic development. The other is to counteract the political and economic influence projected by China's Belt and Road Initiative. Strategically, the U.S. infrastructure investment program in the Indo-Pacific region is both a "geo-economic" and a "geopolitical" consideration.

As the overall economic scale of the Indo-Pacific region continues to expand,

¹⁸ "Brussels Summit Communiqué," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹⁹ "Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS," *The White House*, September 15, 2021, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210916023441/https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/>.

and regional economic integration develops, China's ambition to establish itself as the "world's factory and world market," complemented by the "Belt and Road" initiative, is gradually bringing the "inside" and "outside" of the Indo-Pacific region into the scope of its economic power and influence, which results in a severe challenge to the global political and economic power of the United States and other advanced Western industrial countries. In response to this change in the strategic environment, the U.S. and some of its economically advantaged allies (Japan) began to promote an alternative regional economic strategy of "democracies" or a "U.S.-Japan Indo-Pacific version" of the Belt and Road economic strategy, which is also a crucial part of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.²⁰ It is worth noting that Washington is not only promoting conventional projects related to airports, ports, roads, power, and water resources. In response to technological developments and advances, the U.S. and Democracies' Indo-Pacific infrastructure plan focuses on building high-quality infrastructures, such as high-speed 5G Internet and clean, renewable energy. The U.S. and Western countries still have a competitive advantage.²¹

On April 16, 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden and visiting Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga announced that the United States and Japan would jointly invest and develop in high-tech competitiveness and innovation, the COVID-19 epidemic, world health, and green energy. In early April, it was announced that the U.S. and Japan would sign a "U.S.-Japan Indo-Pacific version of the Belt and Road" initiative to promote infrastructure cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region

²⁰ Jeffery Wilson, "Infrastructure Choices and the Future of the Indo-Pacific," *Security Challenges*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Special Issue: The Indo-Pacific: From Concept to Contest (2020), pp. 64-65 and pp. 67- 68; Ritika Passi, "Competing Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Enter the B3W," *Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)*, August 6, 2021, <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publicazione/competing-infrastructure-indo-pacific-enter-b3w-31343>.

²¹ In July 2018, the then U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo proposed the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategic economic vision, announcing that the U.S. plans to invest \$113 million in the Indo-Pacific region to support the digital economy, energy and infrastructure. and other construction projects, including "Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership" and "Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy." See Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle, "Opening the Aperture: Advancing US Strategic Priorities in the Indo-Pacific Region," *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 3-13; "A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision," *US Department of State*, November 4, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf>, pp. 13-28.

in order to secure the trust of regional countries and gain an advantage in strategic competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. The guiding principles are designed to create an alternative model of development assistance based on transparency and legitimacy, as opposed to the “debt trap” created by China’s Belt and Road initiative, by detailing the prerequisites for evaluating investments, setting out the parameters for implementing projects, focusing on the development of local human resources, and standardizing and preventing the breach of secrets.²²

Washington has sought bilateral cooperation not only with Japan but also on multiple fronts. Kurt Campbell, the White House Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs, has stated that the U.S. is also seeking to engage members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to expand each other’s implementation of infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region.²³ At the G7 Summit, the U.S. also successfully engaged the G7 in proposing a Build Back Better World (B3W) partnership to assist underdeveloped countries in building infrastructure so as to counter China’s “Belt and Road” initiative.²⁴

Notably, in early June, the U.S. Senate passed the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), which is expected to commit \$250 billion over the next five years to expand U.S. investment in high-tech industries. As Washington is actively seeking cooperation with its allies to counter China’s global influence, the passage of the Act and future investments in high-technology fields such as communications, health, and green energy will echo the development of rebuilding and strengthening U.S. domestic strength on the one hand, and the development of U.S. economic integration with Western countries and the Indo-Pacific region in line with the infrastructure investment plan of the Indo-Pacific strategy on the

²² Rieko Miki, “US and Japan plan ‘Belt and Road’ alternative for Indo-Pacific,” *Nikkei Asia*, April 6, 2021, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/US-and-Japan-plan-Belt-and-Road-alternative-for-Indo-Pacific>.

²³ David Brunnstrom and Michael Martina, “U.S. Says Looking at Quad Meeting in Fall Focused on Infrastructure,” *Reuters*, May 26, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-looking-quad-meeting-fall-focused-in-frastructure-2021-05-26/>.

²⁴ “FACT SHEET: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership,” *The White House*, June 12, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/>.

other, and counteract China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative.²⁵ This is a concrete implementation of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.

V. Conclusion

In addition to the diplomatic and geo-economic actions described above, the Biden Administration's Indo-Pacific strategy for 2021 incorporates military actions, including domestic legislation and policy initiatives. This includes domestic legislation and policy initiatives such as the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (NDAA) and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), as well as the demonstration of U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific region, such as the continuation of its Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, in keeping with its "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" mission and leading joint military exercises between two or more countries to counter China's expansion of force in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, in response to the impact of COVID-19, the U.S. and Japan have launched countermeasures and responses to China in terms of international public opinion and vaccine diplomacy. The U.S., under the Biden administration, has indeed been highly aggressive and assertive in its Indo-Pacific strategy, attempting to return to international leadership.

The Biden administration's Indo-Pacific policy and actions in 2021 have negated previous doubts about whether the Democratic administration would continue the Republican administration's Indo-Pacific strategy; the Biden administration has not only continued to intensify its efforts to counter the Chinese threat but also its approach of integrating domestic and foreign affairs, its strategy of returning to the international establishment and rebuilding of its alliances, its use of diplomacy before military affairs and its emphasis on domestic research and development in science and technology and investment in Indo-Pacific infrastructure. The

²⁵ Nina Palmer, "The Innovation and Competition Act Is Progressing Policy," *The Hill*, June 25, 2021, <https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/560198-the-innovation-and-competition-act-is-progressive-policy>.

Biden administration's strategic competition with China is evident in all aspects of its intentions. While the Biden administration continues to advocate seeking cooperation with Beijing in several areas (for example, global climate change), the rivalry and confrontation between the U.S. and China in various areas and regions continue to intensify.

