

PART TWO

Responses and Actions of Major Nations in the Indo- Pacific Region

Chapter 6

Security Developments and Actions in Japan

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I. Introduction

The epidemic not only did not abate, but the variant of the virus also hit Japan hard, causing a record number of people to be infected in Japan just after hosting the summer Olympics and forcing the Suga cabinet to continue to extend the deadline of the Declaration of State of Emergency. The epidemic has once again plunged Japan into a paroxysmal quagmire.

On January 20, Joe Biden and Kamala Devi Harris were inaugurated as the 46th president and vice president of the U.S. On January 28, Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide congratulated Biden on his inauguration by telephone, in which the two sides agreed to strengthen U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation through close communication further. President Biden expressed his firm commitment to Japan's defense, including applying Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan to the Senkaku Islands (also known as the Diaoyutai Islands) and reaffirmed the U.S. determination to provide broader support to Japan. In addition, the two sides recognized the need to strengthen the importance of the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region and to implement a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy, in which the U.S. and Japan would cooperate on all fronts in the region.¹

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¹ “日米首脳電話会談,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, January 18, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/na1/us/page1_000925.html.

On February 1, China implemented the Maritime Police Law, and harassment of Japanese territorial waters has become normalized. China's maritime police's increased strength has placed a severe burden on Japan's maritime security. In response to the "visible" and "invisible" security threats and to strengthen the defense of the Southwest Islands, Japan's defense budget for the fiscal year 2022 is set at a record high of 5 trillion 400 billion yen (about \$49 billion). Japan's defense budget is expected to exceed the long-standing threshold of 1% of gross domestic product (GDP).² Therefore, Japan's overall preparedness for war is evident.

This chapter will discuss how U.S. President Biden and Japan will cooperate on security under the Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2021, how the Sino-Japanese relationship will evolve under the U.S.-China all-out confrontation, and whether there will be a new atmosphere in Taiwan-Japan relations.

II. Reaffirmation of U.S.-Japan Relations

On March 16, 2021, the U.S. and Japan hosted foreign and defense ministers (also known as the "2+2 talks") in Tokyo. The joint statement following the meeting stated that "China's threatening and destabilizing behavior in the Indo-Pacific region is incompatible with the existing international order and poses political, economic, military, and technological challenges to the U.S.-Japan alliance and the international community. The U.S. and Japan expressed deep concern over the passage of China's maritime police law, which would allow for the use of force. In the joint statement following the meeting, the U.S. and Japan made a rare reference to "the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" and asked China not to act rashly. The U.S. and Japan have reached a consensus on the peaceful resolution of regional disputes and advocate maintaining a "free and open Indo-Pacific" strategy. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that if China uses intimidation and aggression to achieve its goals, we will strike

² "防衛費要求、過去最大規模の5兆4000億円台に… 中国念頭に装備強化," *The Japan News Online* (読売新聞オンライン), August 19, 2021, <https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/20210819-OYT1T50281/>.

back if necessary.³ The U.S.-Japan alliance against China is quite clear.

1. The Rock-solid U.S.-Japan Alliance

On April 16, Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide traveled to Washington, D.C., to meet with U.S. President Joe Biden. The first Japanese Prime Minister to be invited to visit the United States since Biden's inauguration as Prime Minister Kan represents the high importance the United States attaches to Japan.⁴ In the face of China's military and economic expansion in the region, the United States will continue to strengthen its security configurations in the Indo-Pacific region, and the United States believes that the most critical response to the Chinese challenge is to strengthen the U.S.-Japan relationship and expand the scope of cooperation, with the U.S.-Japan alliance as the core mechanism. The U.S.-Japan summit, like the March 16 "2+2 talks," was followed by a joint statement that included a reference to Taiwan. This is the first time since 1969 that the joint statement of the U.S.-Japanese heads of state meeting has again focused on Taiwan, demonstrating the importance of Taiwan's strategic position and security in the Taiwan Strait.

Unlike the unilateralism adopted during the Trump era, Biden has actively returned to international organizations to form a perimeter around China through alliances or coalitions, making Japan, Vietnam, and Australia enemies of China and allies of the United States.⁵ However, given the long-term confrontation between the United States and China, the Biden regime believes that Japan will be the essential partner to win. From a geopolitical perspective, Japan is not adjacent to China, is in a vital position to block China's access to the first island chain, and is at a distance from China to monitor China from the Pacific.⁶ It is also essential for the United States to share important values with Japan. The joint statement

³ “日米安全保障協議委員会（日米 2+2）（結果）,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, March 16, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/st/page1_000942.html.

⁴ “菅内閣総理大臣の米国訪問（令和 3 年 4 月 15 日～18 日）,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 16, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/na1/us/page4_005298.html.

⁵ “Taiwan's Former Foreign Minister Tian Hongmao Mentioned at the Japan-US Summit: on Behalf of the US Attaching Great Importance to the Asia-Pacific Region,” *CNEWS*, April 19, 2021, <https://cnews.com.tw/202210419a01/>.

⁶ “日米首脳会談の戦略的意義—今後の課題は対中経済安全保障協力,” *Sasakawa Peace Foundation*（笹川平和財団）, April 4, 2021, https://www.spf.org/iina/articles/watanabe_14.html.

of the U.S.-Japanese heads of state talks listed the sharing of universal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, international law, multilateralism, and a free and fair economic order.⁷ Thus, Japan, a longtime U.S. ally, is undoubtedly expected to be a frontline country in the U.S. fight against China. Japanese domestic public opinion also supports the need to strengthen Japan-U.S. relations. According to a poll conducted by Japanese television station NHK, 70% of the respondents answered “yes” to the question “should the U.S.-Japan alliance be further strengthened as the U.S.-China conflict deepens.”⁸

In a joint statement following the U.S.-Japan summit, the two sides agreed to work together to improve economic competitiveness by activating a “U.S.-Japan partnership on competitiveness and resilience (CoRe: Competitiveness and Resilience),” such as a commitment to security and openness for 5th generation wireless networks (5G) and an agreement to cooperate on sensitive supply chains, including semiconductors.⁹ In other words, another purpose of U.S.-Japan cooperation is to contain China’s expansion on various fronts through the U.S.-Japan economic security cooperation model.

2. The U.S. and Japan to Strengthen Military Cooperation with Regional Countries

In addition, in the face of the threat from China, Japan has been actively adjusting its strategy, and the U.S. and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region have conducted several military exercises to keep China in check. For example, (1) from April 5 to 7, the U.S., Japan, India, Australia, and France conducted the La Perouse joint naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal;¹⁰ (2) from May 11 to 17, the U.S., Japan, Australia, and France held the Jeanne D’Arc 2021 (ARC21) military

⁷ “日米首脳会談,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 16, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/na1/us/page1_000951.html.

⁸ “日米同盟「さらに強化していくべき」7割 NHK 世論調査,” *NHK*, April 13, 2021, <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210413/k10012969861000.html>.

⁹ “U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 16, 2021, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100177722.pdf>.

¹⁰ “[Anti-China Together] US-Japan-India-Australia-French 3-day Naval Exercise Launches ‘Laperuz Cruiser’ into Bay of Bengal,” *The Report*, April 6, 2021, https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=110181.

exercise in southwestern Japan;¹¹ (3) The Orient Shield military exercise held from June 24 to July 11, in which the U.S. and Japan together sent more than 3,000 personnel to participate, the largest ever. The purpose of the exercise was not only to verify Japan's ongoing efforts to promote "cross-domain warfare," but also, and most importantly, to demonstrate the U.S. and Japan's joint response capability, coordination, and interoperability in the face of Chinese threats;¹² (4) The U.S. and Australia held their biennial Talisman Sabre 21 military exercise in Australia and surrounding waters from July 14 to 31.¹³

III. Disagreements between China and Japan

After China's Maritime Police Law came into effect on February 1, it posed a more serious security threat to Japan and raised tensions around the disputed Diaoyutai Islands. As a result, the Japanese domestic anti-China sentiment has risen, and Sino-Japanese relations face a severe test.

1. The Threat of Chinese Maritime Police to Japan

According to Article 22 of the Maritime Police Law, when China's rights at sea are "violated by foreign organizations and individuals or in imminent danger of being violated, Chinese maritime police agencies are authorized to use weapons."¹⁴ The vague definition of the scope of application of this law has caused concern among countries with which China has territorial disputes, such as Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. According to information released by the Japan Coast Guard, Chinese maritime police vessels entered the vicinity of the Diaoyu Islands on 471 days from November 2020 to August 2021, amounting to 1,009

¹¹ "日米豪仏共同訓練（ARC21）について," *Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force*, May 11, 2021, <https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/release/202105/20210511.pdf>.

¹² "岸防衛相 過去最大級の日米実動訓練を実施へ 日米同盟の強化に," *NHK*, June 22, 2021, <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210622/k10013097421000.html>.

¹³ "Talisman Sabre 21," *Australian Government Department of Defense*, <https://www1.defence.gov.au/exercises/talisman-sabre-21>.

¹⁴ "Coastal Law of the People's Republic of China," *China Coast Guard*, January 24, 2021, http://www.ccg.gov.cn/2021/zcfg_0124/295.html.

vessels. The number of days of entry into the territorial waters near the Diaoyutai Islands was 39, with 102 vessels. China’s provocative behavior toward Japan continues unabated (see Table 6-1).

Table 6-1 Chinese Coast Guard Vessels Cruising in Diaoyutai Waters (November 2020 to August 2021)

	Adjacent Area	Waters
Time	Times(Vessels)	Times(Vessels)
November 2020	30 (88)	2 (6)
December 2020	22 (70)	3 (8)
January 2021	25 (92)	3 (6)
February 2021	26 (96)	6 (14)
March 2021	31 (112)	2 (6)
April 2021	30 (106)	4 (10)
May 2021	31 (118)	5 (14)
June 2021	30 (118)	6 (16)
July 2021	23 (92)	4 (10)
August 2021	29 (117)	4 (12)

Source: “Trends of Chinese Public Vessels in the Waters around the Senkaku Islands and Japan’s Response,” Japanese Coast Guard, <https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html>.

2. China-Japan Relations are not Easy to Repair

On April 5, 2021, Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu held a telephone conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.¹⁵ The interactive atmosphere of this meeting differed from November 24, 2020, meeting between the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers in Tokyo. At that time, Wang invited Toshimitsu to visit China in 2021, and China and Japan sought to find the right time for Xi Jinping, who was unable to visit Japan as a state guest due to the delay. China and Japan hope to create a harmonious atmosphere because 2022 will be an essential

¹⁵ “日中外相電話会談,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, April 5, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press6_000787.html.

festival marking the 50th anniversary of normal relations between China and Japan.¹⁶ However, during the telephone conversation, Shigeki not only mentioned the Diaoyutai dispute and the South China Sea but also expressed “strong concern” about human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and expressed deep concern about hegemonic actions such as the Marine Police Act, which allows the Marine Police Bureau to use force, and strongly demanded that China take concrete action to improve the situation. Wang Yi warned Japan to “refrain from interfering in China’s affairs and asked Japan to abide by the basic norms of international relations, to maintain a minimum level of respect for China’s internal affairs as a close neighbor, and not to extend its hand too far.”¹⁷ Japan’s attitude toward China changed dramatically after Hampson and Biden came to power, and Biden’s April 16 U.S.-Japan summit placed great emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance, restoring Japan’s confidence in the United States and making Japan’s attitude toward China more assertive.¹⁸

In June 2021, an NHK poll of 2,131 people over the age of 18 asked, among other things, “To what extent does China’s increasing military power and expansion in the East China Sea and the South China Sea pose a security threat? Fifty-one percent answered “to a considerable extent,” 29% answered “to an average extent,” and 10% answered, “not at all.” About 80% of Japanese people answered the first two questions and felt China’s military threat.¹⁹ Another poll conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office shows that 81.8% of Japanese people think “Sino-Japanese relations are not good,” and 77.3% of Japanese people do not feel “close to China.”²⁰ The deterioration of Japanese people’s perceptions and

¹⁶ “中国、茂木外相に訪中要請,” *Reuters*, December 13, 2020, <https://jp.reuters.com/article/idJP2020121201002421>.

¹⁷ “Wang Yi’s telephone conversation with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China*, April 5, 2021, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjzbzhd/t1866937.shtml>.

¹⁸ “The Deterioration of Sino-US Relations: Japan’s Strategic Choice,” *Yahoo! News*, July 21, 2021, <https://tw.news.yahoo.com/Deteriorating-U.S.-China-Relations-Japan's-Strategic-Choice-230038713.html>.

¹⁹ “中国の安全保障面の脅威 8割が「感じる」 NHK 世論調査,” *NHK*, June 15, 2021, <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210615/k10013083981000.html>.

²⁰ “「外交に関する世論調査」の概要,” Cabinet Office of Japan, February 19, 2021, <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/r02/r02-gaiko/gairyaku.pdf>.

feelings toward China has caused Sino-Japanese relations to lose public support in Japan, and it is expected to be difficult to It is expected that the relationship will not move forward steadily.

With the U.S.-China confrontation, Japan will find be increasingly challenging to choose between the U.S. and China. In terms of security, Japan will use the U.S.-Japan alliance as the basis of its diplomacy and combine it with the Indo-Pacific strategy to form an encircling net for China. Economically, China and Japan will maintain a high degree of interdependence. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that China's economy will grow by 8.1 percent in 2021, even though the epidemic has hit the world hard.²¹ As Japan's largest trading partner, China's economic growth could help Japan recover from the epidemic. However, the U.S. wants its allies to be consistent in their security strategies toward China, especially in their economic supply chains, so if Japan wants to sever its ties with its largest trading partner, China, it will undoubtedly have difficulty gaining the support of Japan's domestic economic groups. Therefore, it will be a challenge and test Japan's wisdom to create maximum benefits between the U.S. and China.

IV. A Renewed Climate for Taiwan-Japan Relations

During the "U.S.-Japan 2+2 Talks" in March, the "U.S.-Japan Summit" in April, the "Japan-EU Meeting" in May, the "Japan-Australia 2+2 Meeting" in June, the "Joint Statement of the Organization of Seven Major Industrialized Countries" and the "Joint Statement of the Vice Foreign Ministers of the United States, Japan, and South Korea" in July, Taiwan Strait security became a topic of discussion among various countries and instantly became a global study. During this period, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Kan, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi, and Deputy Defense Minister Nakayama Yasuhide frequently spoke about security in the Taiwan Strait.

²¹ "World Economic Outlook Update," *IMF*, July 2021, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/07/27/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2021>.

1. Japan's Strategy towards Taiwan has Become More Explicit

The reason why Japan has made such a significant change in its strategy toward Taiwan is undoubtedly to restrain China from invading Taiwan by force and China's recent military and economic pressure on Taiwan, which has caused significant instability in regional security. However, one of the most important reasons is to complement the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. In a question before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Philip Davidson, former commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, stated that "China is the most significant strategic threat to the United States today and is accelerating the replacement of the U.S. in the international arena, and Taiwan is one of China's targets. Moreover, the threat of a PLA attack on Taiwan is likely to occur within the next six years."²² If Taiwan were to be invaded by China by force, the United States might be forced to intervene. Because of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan will not be able to stay away and will be involved. If the U.S. does not intervene in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan is seized by China, Japan will also be surrounded by China. In other words, Japan wants to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait to ensure its interests.

In 2021, Japan's policy toward Taiwan will take on a new dimension different from the past. For example, in February, the LDP Foreign Affairs Group established the "Taiwan Policy Review Task Force" and made its first policy recommendations to Prime Minister Kan on June 1. The group emphasized that Taiwan shares universal values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights for Japan. Taiwan is a significant partner for Japan because of the close economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges between Taiwan and Japan.²³ In mid-May, the epidemic in Taiwan was so severe that the national epidemic was raised to alert level 3. On June 4, Japan provided Taiwan with 1.24 million AstraZeneca (AZ) vaccine doses at no cost, based on

²² "Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In 'Next Six Years'," *USNI News*, March 9, 2021, <https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years>.

²³ "外交部会台湾政策検討プロジェクトチーム 第一次提言," *Liberal Democratic Party of Japan*, June 1, 2021, https://jimin.jp-east-2.storage.api.nifcloud.com/pdf/news/policy/201712_1.pdf.

Taiwan's long-standing friendship. In return for Taiwan's assistance on March 11, 2011, East Japan Earthquake.²⁴ At a time when vaccines, considered a strategic commodity, are challenging to obtain around the world, Japan's emergency gift of a large amount of vaccine to Taiwan was a timely rainfall, allowing Taiwan to solve the vaccine shortage problem temporarily. This is also the first time Japan has provided vaccines to overseas countries. So far, Japan has provided 3.9 million doses of AZ vaccine to Taiwan five times.²⁵ On June 11, the Japanese Senate voted unanimously for the World Health Organization (WHO) Resolution on Taiwan, calling on countries to agree to Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly (WHA) from 2022 onward and to provide the vaccine to the World Health Organization (WHO). The Japanese Senate voted for the "World Health Organization (WHO) Resolution on Taiwan," calling on countries to agree to Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly (WHA) from 2022, and requesting the Japanese government to cooperate with countries to ensure Taiwan's participation in the WHA.²⁶

2. Taiwan-Japan Cooperation will Move into New Territory

On July 13, Japan released the 2021 version of its defense white paper, which for the first time states that stability in Taiwan is essential to Japan's security and the international community.²⁷ On July 29, an online meeting of the Taiwan-U.S.-Japan Parliamentarians' Strategic Forum was held, and former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered a speech to open the forum. Abe said, "There is no guarantee that what happened in Hong Kong will not happen in Taiwan, and we attach great importance to Taiwan and hope that Taiwan will participate in the

²⁴ "台湾に対する新型コロナウイルス・ワクチンの追加供与," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, June 6, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press3_000518.html.

²⁵ "日本が台湾へ5回目のワクチン供与決定、今回は50万回分," *TAIWAN TODAY*, September 15, 2021, <https://jp.taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=149&post=207721&unitname=ニュース-政治&postname=日本が台湾へ5回目のワクチン供与決定、今回は50万回分>.

²⁶ "世界保健機関(WHO)の台湾への対応に関する決議," *House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan*, June 11, 2021, <https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/gianjoho/ketsugi/204/210611-1.html>; "WHO総会への台湾参加認めるよう求める決議可決参議院," *NHK*, June 11, 2021, <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210611/k10013079521000.html>.

²⁷ 日本防衛省・自衛隊, *日本の防衛—防衛白書—令和3年版* (日経印刷株式会社, 2021) p. 52.

World Health Assembly, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the World Health Organization.”²⁸ On August 27, Taiwan and Japan’s ruling parties held their first “Foreign Defense Policy Exchange Meeting” by video message. Taiwan was represented by DPP legislator Luo Chi-ching and legislator Tsai Shih Ying, while Japan was represented by LDP Senator Masahisa Sato and Representative Taku Otsuka. The first security dialogue between Taiwan and Japan was of great significance. The two sides mentioned during the meeting that China’s unilateral changes to the regional status quo have caused anxiety among countries and that it is necessary to have a continuous security dialogue during the daytime in Taiwan. The change in Japan’s attitude toward Taiwan is a sign of Japan’s growing sense of crisis on the Taiwan issue.²⁹

Japan’s executive and legislative branches have repeatedly and firmly supported Taiwan’s participation in international affairs, indicating that the Japanese government is taking Taiwan much more seriously than it did in the past.

V. Conclusion

After President Biden took office, he appointed Kurt Campbell, who has a strong attitude toward China, as the Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, arguing that the era of engagement with China is over and that the U.S. should strengthen relations with existing allies and draw closer to countries such as India and Indonesia in response to the rise of China. However, Washington sources also believe that China can no longer hide its authoritarian ambitions and realize that appeasement will allow China to advance further.

²⁸ “Mysterious guest Abe at Taiwan-US-Japan Congressional Forum participates in WHA and CPTPP,” *Central News Agency*, July 29, 2021, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202107290026.aspx>.

²⁹ “Taiwan and Japan’s Ruling Party Talks with Japan: China Threats Taiwan Strait and Japan’s Security Strengthens Exchanges with Taiwan,” *Liberty Times*, August 27, 2021, <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3652143>. Commissioner Luo Zhizheng is the current Director of the International Department of the DPP and a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan. Sato Masahisa is the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and a member of the Senate, and Takuma Otsuka is the current Minister of Defense of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and a member of the House of Representatives.

On the Taiwan Strait issue, Japan, with the explicit support of the U.S. on security, has broken with its past cautiousness and has been trying to test China's bottom line. For Japan, a war in the Taiwan Strait would directly affect the survival of the Japanese nation and meet the conditions for the Self-Defense Forces to send troops. Therefore, with the acquiescence of the United States, Japan has been adjusting its strategy to counteract China and gradually increasing its defense budget and military readiness.

However, Japan's attitude toward Taiwan is different from that of the past, and the Taiwan Strait issue is also receiving attention from the Japanese. There seems to be an opportunity for Taiwan and Japan to cooperate in certain areas. For example, Taiwan and Japan can follow the Taiwan-U.S. model of cooperation in maritime patrol by signing the Taiwan-Japan Maritime Patrol Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to jointly maintain the security of Taiwan and Japan's surrounding waters and Taiwan-U.S. and Japan's maritime patrols can also conduct joint training. Furthermore, Taiwan and Japan can cooperate with third countries; for example, Taiwan and Japan can provide public medical and economic assistance to South Pacific island countries. Japan is already planning to establish an embassy in Kiribati within a few years to counter China's growing influence in the South Pacific.

The international situation is changing, and the situation seems to be shaping up to support Taiwan and resist China. In particular, Taiwan's role in the Indo-Pacific strategy will become increasingly important. Not only do most liberal democracies support Taiwan, but even European countries have changed their attitude toward Taiwan. In the face of a robust Chinese threat, Taiwan cannot choose sides but actively engage in multi-disciplinary cooperation with neighboring countries.