

INDSR Newsletter



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Debates on US Long-Range Weapon Deployments in Indo-Pacific Region

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In response to the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats posed by China and Russia, all US military services are developing weapons with long-range strike capability. However, in April 2021, a US Air Force general criticized the development of the Army's long-range strike weapons¹, prompting a debate on the deployment of such weapons.

US military reasserts long-range strike superiority

As the US shifts its national strategy toward Great Power Competition, the Indo-Pacific Command has warned of a possible China invasion into Taiwan.

NATO is also concerned about Russian incursions into Poland or the eastern front of NATO in the Baltic Sea. To address this, the US military must be able to engage the enemy quickly and deter the hostile forces with adequate long-range firepower.²

All US military services are investing in the development of long-range strike capabilities. For instance, the Air Force is developing the B-21 bomber and next-generation cruise missiles, along with air-launched hypersonic missiles. The Navy and Marine Corps are deploying ship- and shore-based weapons, hypersonic boost-glide weapons, and truck-mounted anti-shiping missiles for engaging surface

1. "Service Chiefs Confer After Air Force General Calls Army Hypersonic Missile Plan 'Stupid'," *Military.com*, April 6, 2021, <https://bit.ly/3rTcXhA>.

2. "Cost-Effective Long-Range Strike," *Air Force Magazine*, June 30, 2021, <https://bit.ly/3Ab6odh>.

targets in coastal areas, and also enhanced Kill Chain to detect, track and hit targets at longer distances.

The US Army is also planning on the deployment of long-range weapons. The *2018 Army Modernization Strategy* (AMS) set six priorities, and promoted the Multi-Domain Operation (MDO) concept; the six priorities are long-range precision firepower, next-generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift aircraft, Army network modernization, anti-air and missile defense as well as soldier lethality,³ in which long-range precision firepower is the first priority. The long-range weapons include the next-generation artillery and missiles with a range of over 1,000 miles, and the development budget of the items between 2020 and 2024 is expected to reach US\$5.7 billion.⁴

Problems faced by US Army long-range weapons

While the US Army has an urgent need for the deployment of land-based long-range weapons, a number of problems emerged:

1. Cost-effectiveness

Long-range precision weapons currently planned for development by the US Army include:

(1) Precision Strike Missile (PrSM): developed to replace the current Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). With a range of over 500 km and a 200-pound warhead, the PrSM is suitable for attacking stationary targets through inertial and GPS navigation. Each PrSM costs about US\$1.2 million and can be carried by the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) vehicles in pairs.

(2) Mid-Range Capability (MRC) that covers the range between 500 and 1,500 km: the Army first procured Standard 6

3. "2019 Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future," *US Army*, 2019, <https://bit.ly/37kxSAC>.

4. "Army 'Big Six' Ramp Up in 2021: Learning From FCS," *Breakingdefense*, March 14, 2019, <https://bit.ly/2WWEeV8>.

Block 1/1A missiles with dual air-to-air and air-to-ground modes;⁵ this missile has a range of 420 km and costs about US\$4.3 million each. The Tomahawk missile has a range of 1,600 km and costs US\$1.5 million for a combo of a launch vehicle and missiles. In addition, the US Army is planning to double the range of PrSM, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) develops a medium-range hypersonic gliding weapon at a higher cost.

(3) Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): a rocket-propelled Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) jointly developed by the US Navy and the Army with a range of 2,775 km. Dubbed “Conventional Prompt Strike”, the Navy version of LRHW can be launched from both submarines and surface ships and shares launch containers with the Army version.⁶ However, the cost of the LRHW is extremely high — at over US\$40 million apiece.

Short-range weapons cost less but must be forward deployed; long-range weapons are safer from enemy attacks and have fewer political concerns, but they are too expensive for volume procurement and the effectiveness is limited against mobile or reinforced targets. In contrast, air-launched weapons used by Navy and Air Force aircrafts can be quickly reloaded for multiple engagements. These air-launched weapons are more affordable.

2. Evaluation of effective ranges

Since long-range weapons require larger boost rockets and more fuel to reach the designated altitude and range, the weight and power of their warheads are limited as a trade-off; longer effective ranges also call for more complex navigation systems, and hence the higher cost. As the front line bases are located in Japan, the Philippines or other countries on the “first island chain” are at least 800 km from the Chinese coastline, their ground forces need weapons with even

5. “The U.S. Navy’s Standard Missile 6 Is Coming to the U.S. Army,” *The National Interest*, November 11, 2020, <https://bit.ly/3yu6MTC>.

6. “Army Discloses Hypersonic LRHW Range Of 1,725 Miles; Watch Out China,” *Breaking Defense*, May 12, 2021, <https://bit.ly/3lzlq8C>.

longer ranges to attack targets such as anti-aircraft missiles in China's coastal areas. Hypersonic weapons deployed in Guam or the continental US may be able to reach inland targets in China, but they are still prohibitively expensive.

On the other hand, the US Navy is facing a similar dilemma: the Chinese A2/AD threat has forced its aircraft carriers to stay behind the first island chain, which limits their strike range. However, bombers from the continental US, Guam, Diego Garcia or northern Australia with the help of air refueling can still launch long-range precision weapons, such as the 1,000 km-range AGM-158B JASSM-ER (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range) missiles, from outside the Chinese air defense circle. Strategic missile submarines (SSGN) can also launch submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles from underwater with better stealth than surface ships or land bases.

3. Command and guidance

For long-range weapons, target acquisition is another challenge. The longer the range and the flight time, the less accurate it is to hit moving targets.⁷ Strike aircraft can engage targets at shorter distances with their own sensors for shorter delays; and aircraft with advanced sensing systems can relay target information for long-range weapons to hit moving targets with better accuracy.

In order to improve target intelligence acquisition capability, the US Army has undertaken efforts such as the Airborne Reconnaissance Target Exploitation Multirole Intelligence System (ARTEMIS), which uses a modified commercial jet as a platform capable of detecting targets from hundreds of miles away at 40,000 feet altitude,⁸ the vehicle-mounted Terrestrial Layer System-Large (TLSL-Large) electronic intelligence and warfare system, the MQ-1 Gray Eagle drone, and the Future Tactical Unmanned

7. "Cost-Effective Long-Range Strike," *Air Force Magazine*, Ibid.

8. "A New Spy Plane Could Spot Targets for The U.S. Army's Thousand-Mile Weapons," *Forbes*, August 13, 2020, <https://bit.ly/3Ab3SUd>.

Aerial System (FTUAS) that replaces RQ-7 to support brigade- or higher-level intelligence units. In addition, space reconnaissance systems utilizing low-orbit commercial and military satellites as well as the Project Convergence system integrated into the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) infrastructure are also developed for all military services to share intelligence collected by the cross-unit joint network.⁹

4. Political limitations

From the political perspective, it would be difficult to convince the countries on the first island chain to deploy weapons aiming at China. In March 2017, the US deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea and caused a domestic backlash in South

Korea as well as protests from China. As a result, South Korea's Moon Jae-in administration has become cautious about the deployment. In November 2020, the US Army delivered THAAD systems to South Korea's Seongju County several times and has again provoked civilian protests.¹⁰

In 2018, the US withdrew from the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (INF), the treaty it signed with the former Soviet Union in 1987. In 2019, the treaty expired and Russia announced its suspension of the treaty obligations.¹¹ Mark Esper, then-US Secretary of Defense, said the US would deploy intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region and consult with allies about designating Japan and South Korea as possible deployment sites.¹²

9. "U.S. Army, Air Force Sign Collaboration Agreement for CJADC2 Development," *DefPost*, October 2, 2020, <https://bit.ly/2VEsGoO>.

10. "From Korean media: South Korea's Defense Ministry sent supplies to the THAAD base today and drew protest from the opposition", *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, November 27, 2020. <https://bit.ly/3imNSso>. "The US military in Korea delivered supplies to the THAAD base five times in a month, the demonstrating opposition expelled from the gate", *NewTalk*, May 25, 2021. <https://bit.ly/3fy9e41>.

11. "US withdraws from missile treaty, Russia announces suspension today", *Apple Daily News*, Feb. 2, 2019. <https://bit.ly/2VqL0lp>.

12. "US Considers Midrange Missile Deployment in Asia to Counter China," *Nikkei Asia*, August 15, 2020, <https://s.nikkei.com/3CkDIR2>.

Debates on US Long-Range Weapon Deployments in Indo-Pacific Region

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a US think tank, reported in May 2019 that Japan's Kyushu and Okinawa, as well as the Philippines' Luzon Island, Mindanao and Palawan are also suitable locations.¹³

China should first restrain its military deployments.¹⁵ In a related statement, Russia also warned that the countries allowing US missile deployments were potential nuclear strike targets for Russia as well.¹⁶

In 2019, China warned Asia-Pacific countries of possible sanctions if they allowed the US to deploy land-based missiles.¹⁴ Wang Yi, China's Foreign Minister, warned Japan and South Korea at the August 2019 meeting of Chinese, Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers that the deployment of US intermediate-range weapons in the respective countries would seriously affect their relations with China. In response, the Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Taro countered that since the Chinese missile range also covers Japanese soil,

In contrast, the deployments of Air Force units are more flexible. In addition to the bases in South Korea and Japan, facilities in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Diego Garcia, and bases scattered under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), such as Tinian Island, Saipan and Wake Island, can be utilized as well. In several Dynamic Force Employment evaluations, the US Air Force has conducted bombers sorties that took off from Guam or the continental US for Western Pacific or the South China Sea through aerial refueling to demonstrate its "strategically

13. "Tightening the Chain: Implementing a Strategy of Maritime Pressure in the Western Pacific," *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, May 23, 2019, p.88, <https://bit.ly/2WYXdyj>.

14. "China Warns of Countermeasures if U.S. Puts Missiles on its 'Doorstep'," *Reuters*, August 6, 2019, <https://reut.rs/2TWbXNj>.

15. "China Warned Japan and South Korea not to Deploy US Intermediate-range Missiles, Rebutted by Both Countries on the Spot," *DW News*, November 19, 2019, <https://bit.ly/3ipfDAr>.

16. "U.S. Deploys Intermediate-Range Missiles to Stir Chinese and Russian Nerves. Russian Senior Official: Who Deploys are Subject to Attacks," *DW News*, July 21, 2019, <https://bit.ly/3johaWS>.

predictable but tactically unpredictable” capability,¹⁷ which involves precision strikes on land targets and air-to-ship attacks on surface vessels.¹⁸

US urgently needs to counter China's A2/AD warfare

In April 2021, General Timothy M. Rey of the US Air Force Global Strike Command criticized the Army’s plans to develop land-based hypersonic weapons as “foolish,” arguing that Air Force bombers are adequate for the same task and have in fact proven their deployment flexibility.

However, Eric Sayers, an expert at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), said long-range strikes should be a coordinated mission, and redundant deployments of strike forces across the services is a strategy to improve flexibility

and to make it more difficult for the PLA to counter effectively. Tom Karako, director of the missile defense program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), also contends that the services should explore ways to coordinate combat actions.¹⁹ Army Chief of Staff Gen. James C. McConville also argued that the US needs long-range strike capabilities to provide combat commanders with multiple options, if they need to use them.²⁰ As Chinese A2/AD capabilities threaten first island chain countries and US Navy/Air Force bases, the Army’s long-range weapons will allow for effective countermeasures, while other short- and medium-range weapons could be deployed in Europe to counter the Russian threats.

Given the high cost of long-range weapons, command and guidance systems, and supporting facilities, the US must conduct a comprehensive effectiveness

17. “U.S. Air Force sends B-1 Bombers Back to Guam on Temporary Deployment,” *CNN*, May 3, 2020, <https://cnn.it/2TWGfQ3>.

18. David A. Deptula, “Maritime Strike,” *Air Force Magazine*, September 1, 2019, <https://bit.ly/3fyQXno>.

19. “Service Chiefs Confer After Air Force General Calls Army Hypersonic Missile Plan 'Stupid',” *Military.com*, April 6, 2021, <https://bit.ly/3rTcXhA>.

20. “Army Chief Defends Long-Range Missile Effort After Air Force General's Public Attack,” *Military.com*, April 13, 2021, <https://bit.ly/2WYijNl>.



Debates on US Long-Range Weapon Deployments in Indo-Pacific Region

assessment of each service's long-range strike capabilities to integrate the sea-control capabilities of the Army and Marine Corps, to develop collaborative combat doctrines as well as to support Navy and Air Force actions. Finally, land-based weapons must secure reliable deployment sites and take possible political issues of forward deployments in Asia-Pacific countries into consideration.

Recent Development of Japan's Security Relations with Southeast Asia

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1. News Highlights

This year, Japan, which touts the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” policy, has interacted frequently with Southeast Asian countries on regional security issues. For instance, Japan’s Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi initiated conversations with defense ministers of those countries and explored possibilities of defense equipment transfer (i.e., arms exports). The conversations involved Nobuo Kishi and the defense ministers (or deputy ministers) of Indonesia (March 29), Malaysia (April 15), Brunei (May 20), Thailand (May 25),

the Philippines (June 2), Vietnam (June 3), Laos (June 23) and Cambodia (June 25). Nobuo Kishi also participated in the expanded ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM-Plus).¹

In terms of military exercises, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the Philippine Air Force conducted their first joint exercise in the Philippines on July 5.² Regarding equipment transfer, it has been reported this year that Japan is planning to export radar or naval ships to the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

1. “About Minister of Defense Kishi's Attendance at the 8th Expanded ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (Summary),” Ministry of Defense, Japan, June 16, 2021.

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/dialogue/j-asean/admm/08/admmplus_8.html

2. “Japan's Air Self-Defense Force Held Joint Exercises with the Philippines Near the Capital for the First Time,” *Jiji Press*, July 5, 2021.

<https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2021070500675&g=int>

2. Security Implications

2-1. Japan helps “Maritime Southeast Asia” to counter China

Japan has always regarded Southeast Asia as its “lifeline,” and is very concerned about China’s inclination to engage in low-intensity conflicts with neighboring countries to enforce its control over the South China Sea. The implementation of China’s *Coast Guard Law* in February 2021 has deepened the worries of Japan’s Suga administration. That is also the reason why the Japanese government is still actively building security relations with Southeast Asian countries despite the rampant epidemic.

As observed from the conversations between Nobuo Kishi and the defense ministers of Southeast Asian countries, Kishi kept reiterating that the countries in this region should “respect international laws and regulations such as *United*

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and “act against any attempt to change the status quo by force”. To countries having disputes with China over sovereignty in the South China Sea, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand, Kishi additionally stressed his worries on China’s implementation of its *Coast Guard Law*.

Japan’s concern about China’s expansion in the South China Sea also reinforces its motivation to transfer weapons and military equipment to countries in the region. According to Japanese media, Japan is scheduled to sell frigates to Indonesia through a joint production project.³ Following the sale of anti-aircraft radars to the Philippines in August 2020, Japan will also participate in a similar radar procurement tender of Malaysia soon.⁴

Today, the disputes over sovereignty or maritime rights with China concern

3. “Joint Production of Naval Vessels with Indonesia Using JMSDF Ships as Prototype to Strengthen Regional Security Cooperation” , *SankeiBiz*, May 14, 2021. <https://www.sankeibiz.jp/macro/news/210514/mca2105140605003-n1.htm>.

4. “[Exclusive] The Government to Export Air Defense Radar to Malaysia, Participating in Bidding from Next Month” , *Sankei News*, June 19, 2021. <https://www.sankei.com/article/20210619-2K2ZJ72KANOJHADMVVBUE7ITE/>.

those countries regarded being “Maritime Southeast Asia” such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, or countries facing the disputed sea (Vietnam, for instance). Although recently there have been fewer incidents of China seizing islands and reefs, there still are reports about “gray-zone conflicts” between China and regional countries, and the memory of a Chinese Coast Guard ship ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat in April 2020 is still fresh.⁵ In this situation, Japan’s transfer of defense equipment to such countries should enhance their ability and confidence to respond to China’s intrusions. Even though the previous Japan-Philippines joint exercise was aiming at disaster relief training, the airdrop of supplies and other exercises are still tactically meaningful.

2-2. Japan extends defense influence on “Mainland Southeast Asia”

In addition to the conversations with defense ministers of the “Maritime Southeast Asian” countries, Japan

also held dialogues with Laos and Cambodia, which have been considered to have close relations with China and are geographically part of “Mainland Southeast Asia”, on non-military issues such as infrastructure development support, disaster relief and epidemic prevention exchanges. The conversations also involved criticisms toward China (but not explicitly named) by stressing the compliance with international laws and Japan’s opposition to changing the status quo by force.

As Japan promotes the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision, Laos and Cambodia have been considered since day one. Laos is China’s land neighbor, and the two countries, considered relatively pro-China in the region, are also included in China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative. Because of their relationship with China, the two countries may have concerns about China’s feelings when they interact with Japan, which is probably why Kishi did not mention China’s *Coast Guard*

5. “China on Collision Course! Chinese Ships Hit Taiwanese and Japanese Ones and Sank Vietnamese Fishing Boat on Thursday,” *The Liberty Times*, April 4, 2020. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/3122781> ; Khanh Vu, “Vietnam Protests Beijing's Sinking of South China Sea Boat,” *Reuters*, April 4, 2020, <https://reurl.cc/2rq2vr>.

Law during his meetings with Laotian and Cambodian defense ministers. Due to the pro-China nature of the two countries, Japan's interaction with them in the security field may be perceived by Beijing as an attempt to "invade" China's turf.

3. Trend Forecast

3-1. Japan will further increase efforts on security relationship with Southeast Asian countries

As COVID-19 continues to spread, China's "vaccine diplomacy" in Southeast Asia has somehow eased the tensions over the South China Sea sovereignty dispute. However, China has still made a habit of resorting to intimidation against

the neighboring countries concerned. In March 2021, for example, the Philippine government alleged that more than 200 Chinese fishing boats, suspected of carrying maritime militia, invaded its territorial waters or exclusive economic zone.⁶ On May 31, 2021, as many as 16 Chinese military transport planes (including IL-76 and Y-20 strategic transporters) invaded Malaysia's flight information region, forcing the Malaysian air force to scramble to respond.⁷

Due to the impact of COVID-19, countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand have curbed their defense spending.⁸ As an extraterritorial power, Japan's willingness to pay more attention to the security of Southeast Asia and even to check against

6. "South China Sea Dispute: Philippines Claims More Than 200 Chinese 'Fishing Boats' Invaded its Waters", *BBC*, March 22, 2021.

<https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world-56480429>

7. "Malaysia Claims 16 Chinese Military Aircraft Intruded its Airspace, Chinese Ambassador Summoned to Explain", *Central News Agency*, June 2, 2021.

<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202106020006.aspx>.

8. "Section 7: Southeast Asia, Part I: The Security Measures Surrounding Japan" of 2021 *Defense White Paper*, p. 99, Japan Ministry of Defense.

<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2021/pdf/R03010207.pdf>.

"Southeast Asia's Defense Spending Slashed due to Covid-19, Causing Defense Gap Against China," *The Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 19, 2020, <https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO60556930Z10C20A6FF8000/>

China in the area is certainly welcomed. Under the consideration of their respective national interests, Japan is expected to continue the defense exchanges with Southeast Asian countries.

3-2. Laos and Cambodia will become major targets of Japan's Southeast Asian policy

The strategic relationship between Laos and Cambodia and Beijing has always been close; and the introduction of Belt and Road-related construction projects has led the debt to China to a new height for the two countries and exposed them even more to Chinese influence.

Japan has initiated the “New Tokyo Strategy 2015” and the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision, and spared no effort in supporting Laos and Cambodia’s infrastructure development in the Mekong River basin. Now the Japanese Defense Ministry is stepping up dialogue with the two countries in the security field with Laos and Cambodia not rejecting Japan’s talk of China, showing that Japan’s influence on the two countries is emerging.

It is speculated that this may be due

to the “demonstration effect” on Laos and Cambodia from Japan’s assistance to Vietnam in many areas. If this is true, Japan may further promote security cooperation with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the future to dilute China’s long-standing influence over the two countries, and Beijing will get more wary and responsive to this possible development. The competition between Japan and China on Southeast Asia security issues and the possible interaction between the two powers in the East China Sea and South China Sea will be worthy of further observation and analysis.

Why is China Cracking Down the Private Sectors?

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1. News Highlights

During Xi Jinping's tenure, it's not uncommon to hear the CCP oppressing private enterprises that had close ties with old party cadres and second-generation officials. Since the second half of 2020, the CCP began to take a series of obvious political actions against private

entrepreneurs in different sectors through judicial and administrative supervision, as well as leveraging media against them with political implications.¹ The context behind the tightened control over private enterprises and its causes are explained in this article to better understand the logic of how the CCP selects its "targets".

1. In November 2020, Sun Dawu (孫大午) and Yang Zongyi (楊宗義) (founders of Zhejiang Fuzhong Group) were taken away by the law enforcement agencies, while Li Huaiqing (李懷慶) (with the Chongqing Fuhua Pawn Company) was sentenced to 20 years for "inciting subversion of state authority". Since December 2020, the Ant Group, Tencent, Didi and other largest tech companies have been subject to new regulations (e.g. antitrust or data use) imposed by the authorities. Recently, private tutoring industry, online games industry and dairy industry have been under pressure. In its "Opinions on Further Reducing the Burden of Compulsory Education Students' Homework and Off-Campus Training" (known as "Double Reduction"), China's State Council instructed the tutoring industry to be registered as "non-profit" and are prohibited from public financing. At the same time, the online game industry was criticized by name through the *Economic Reference News* (owned by Xinhua News Agency) for harming young people physically and mentally, consumers were also alerted by the Xinhua News Agency of the over-marketing problem of formula milk that affected people's acceptance to breastfeeding. The opinions from official media caused the stock prices of the tutoring, game and dairy industries to take substantial impact for some time.

2. Security Implications

2-1. Beijing's response to the US “distinguishing CCP and Chinese people” policy

During the Donald Trump presidency, the Republican administration's China policy began to take on a “distinction between the CCP and the Chinese people” principle, which prompted Xi Jinping to criticize publicly in response.² The new iteration of this policy began to develop in the first half of 2019 and was culminated in Michael Pompeo's “Communist China and the Free World's Future” speech at the Nixon Presidential Library. Pompeo stated that “the Chinese people are very different from the Chinese Communist Party, and we (the free world) must also engage and empower the Chinese people.”³

After 1978, the CCP regime moved from totalitarian to authoritarian. However, in comparison with the previous planned economy era, the CCP's power to control society and ideology has weakened with the development of economic and social diversity. The US assertion of distinction between “the CCP” and “the Chinese (people)” and even the implication of “supporting the Chinese people” not only exposes the jeopardy in the CCP's hold on power — the aforementioned weakness, but also reminds the CCP of the attempts to “advance China peacefully”. Therefore, the CCP will inevitably become more suspicious of the possibility of “collusion” between the people and external forces.

2. After the US publicized its 2019 policy of distinction between CCP and the Chinese people, it initially elicited reactions from China's diplomatic system, and in 2020 it escalated to a personal response from Xi Jinping, “Anyone or any power that attempts to divide and antagonize the CCP and the Chinese people is absolutely not allowed.” — Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Symposium Commemorating the 75th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People's Wars Against Japanese Aggression and the Fascist Powers,” *Xinhua Net*; September 3, 2020.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-09/03/c_1126449917.htm.

3. “We must also engage and empower the Chinese people – a dynamic, freedom-loving people who are completely distinct from the Chinese Communist Party” . Michael R. Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World's Future,” US Department of State, July 30, 2020, <https://2017-2021.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future-2/index.html>.

Why is China Cracking Down the Private Sectors?

Since the reform and opening of China, private enterprises have played an important role in bridging China and the world. Through enterprises, China has been able to import a steady stream of both tangible and intangible assets such as technology, capital, institutional frameworks and industrial standards from outside. However, with the unveiling of new US policy toward China, the “bridge” function performed by private enterprises has become a potential danger to the CCP. Even though mainstream academia has found no evidence that the Chinese bourgeoisie pose a real challenge to the CCP, it’s argued that their ties to the CCP are too intertwined and “embedded” from the political perspective.⁴ As a result, the CCP has further heightened its defense against the economic elites and emphasized the importance of the relationship and trust between the Party

and private enterprises.

In the “Opinions on strengthening the United Front in the private economic sector for the new age” (Sept. 2020), the CCP Central Committee for the first time explicitly pointed out that the diverse values and interests epitomized by private entrepreneurs are an issue that need addressing. In addition to strengthening the ideological guidance for private entrepreneurs, the CCP has also included “trust” for the first time in the policy of the United Front for Private Enterprises as the top priority.⁵ Although the guidance continues, the CCP keeps stressing that private entrepreneurs must be “trustworthy to the Party”. Under China’s party-state political system, private companies, no matter how well they maintain political or business relations with the CCP, can never be as powerful or well-protected as the state-owned enterprises. Therefore,

4. See the following sources for more details: Kellee S. Tsai, “Capitalists without a Class: Political Diversity Among Private Entrepreneurs in China,” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 9 (November 2005), pp. 1130-1158. McNally, Christopher A, and Teresa Wright, “Source of Social Support for China’s Current Political Order: The ‘Thick Embeddedness’ of Private Capital Holders,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 189~198. Perry, Elizabeth J., “Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell or Revolution?” *The China Journal*, Vol. 57 (January 2007), pp. 1~22.

5. “The Guidance Outline for Starting a New Era in the United Front on Private Economy — the Central United Front Department Answers Reporters on ‘Opinions on Strengthening the United Front in the Private Economy Sector for the New Age’”, *People’s Daily Online*, September 16, 2020, <http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0916/c1001-31862713.html>.

the author believes that the key to distinguishing private entrepreneurs as “one of our own” or “an outsider” is whether they can be trusted by the CCP for what they “would do for the Party”.⁶

2-2. CCP's weaken private entrepreneurs to prevent “collusion”

As a result, we can observe from the recent news stories that the CCP is “assaulting” private enterprises in various industries on all fronts in every possible way. However, why does the CCP assault certain private entrepreneurs or industries through the bureaucratic systems across the judiciary, regulatory and official propaganda outlets? What is the political logic behind it?

This article offers two key observations:

1. Did private entrepreneurs develop their own value system different from the CCP's based on their self-interest (instead

of the government's)?

2. Do private entrepreneurs have the potential to establish a platform for “collusion”?

For instance, in case private enterprises take advantage of their capital as a tool to connect citizens, external forces and the influential veteran cadres to develop their own value systems or even political power outside the central government, they may become a threat beyond the grasp of the CCP. This might be the reason CCP uses its authoritarian power to cut off the potential collusion among private entrepreneurs while deepening their one-way reliance on the Party. On the other hand, the CCP also release a message that calls for private entrepreneurs to be “trusted by the Party”. In the following sections, the author will briefly explain the current situation by using the “Sun Dawu case” of different industries and the Internet leaders interrogated by the authorities as examples.

6. In November 2018, Xi Jinping said at the “Private Enterprise Symposium” that “the private economy is an intrinsic element of our economic system, and private enterprises as well as entrepreneurs are our own people.” Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Private Enterprise Symposium”, *Xinhua Net*, 1 November 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-11/01/c_1123649488.htm.

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1.The “Sun Dawu case”:

Sun Dawu, the founder of Hebei Dawu Farming Group, was sentenced to 18 years in prison by the Hebei Gaobeidian City People’s Court in July 2021 after being taken away by the public security authority last November (2020) for several “crimes”.⁷ Sun’s case involves his alleged “collusion” with private entrepreneurs and civic movements as a capitalist support to such movements with political ideas different from the government, which has become the biggest worry for the CCP. In addition to his public image as a grassroots entrepreneur, Sun is also widely known for his outspokenness. As the founder of one of China’s Top 500 companies, Sun has not shied away from dealing with liberal intellectuals and his willingness to support them. For example, Sun not only publicly mourned liberal intellectual Li Shenzhi in 2003, but also spoke out

on behalf of the human rights lawyers arrested by the CCP in July 2015 (known as the “709 Incident”). He also had a commission-representation relationship with one of the arrested lawyers, Xu Zhiyong, in a judicial case.⁸

2.To suppress emerging Internet startups:

In addition to strengthening the regulation of emerging Internet companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, Didi, Meituan and Kuaishou, the CCP suppressed them with two more considerations in mind:

First, to restrain their ability to collaborate with domestic and foreign private capital. Since these enterprises thrived during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era, they had benefited from considerable political and capital support from powerful leaders of that time; and thanks to the enormous potential of the Chinese market, they also received substantial investment from foreign

7. Sun Dawu was charged with crowd assault to state-owned institutions, obstructing public affairs, provoking public order, disrupting public production and operations, forced trade, illegal mining, illegal occupation of agricultural land and illegal solicitation of personal properties. “Sun Dawu sentenced to 18 years in prison and fined 3.11 million RMB in the first trial” , *People’s Daily Online*, July 29, 2021. <http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0729/c1008-32173871.html>.

8. Sun’s voicing out on behalf of human rights lawyers may be due to the fact that Xu Zhiyong, the lawyer wanted by the CCP, was Sun’s defense lawyer in 2003. “Chinese Entrepreneur Sun Dawu Sentenced to 18 Years for Eight Counts of Obstructing Public Affairs” . *BBC Chinese*, July 28, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-57085524>.

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capitalists. For instance, SoftBank held over 20% of both Alibaba and Didi by 2021. It is worth noting that Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu have also invested in Silicon Valley since 2013. In this way, Chinese tech companies have not only benefited from private capital but have become part of the international capital circle as well. The capital, political, technological and human resources behind such “international alliances” could undermine the influence of the government if they are not brought under control.

Secondly, the CCP’s actions prevent the “new generation of non-public economists” in the emerging industries from becoming advocates of diverse values. China’s Internet giants have not only employed the country’s top university graduates, but also a large number of “returnees from abroad”.⁹

The social networks formed by the new generation nourish innovation of China’s tech industry, but they are also deemed to slip away from the Party’s control. They not only have the intellectual power and the potential to attract capital, but are also highly interconnected with the world’s tech networks. Once out of the Party’s control, the networks will continue to develop their own value preferences to easily become a “counterweight” for those in power and even a factor of political instability.

3. Trend Forecast

3-1. Private capital guided by the CCP to support designated industries

In mid-November 2020, Xi Jinping visited Nantong, Jiangsu Province, and pointed out that “since the reform and opening up of China, the Party and the

9. For more details on the brain drain in China's high-tech industries (mainly IT industry and semiconductor), see: Yu Zhou and Jinn-yuh Hsu, “Divergent Engagement: Roles and Strategies of Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese Returnee Entrepreneurs in the IT Industry,” *Global Networks*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July 2011), pp. 398-419. Rui-Mei Hsiung, Guan-Rong Chen, and Yi-Ren Kuan, “Mechanisms of China's Cross-Border Innovation Networks: An example of the Patent Inventor Network of Semiconductor Companies in Mainland China,” in Lee, Tsung-Wing, and Lin, Tsung-Hung, eds, “*Unfinished Miracles: Taiwan's Economy and Society in Transition*” (Taipei: Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, 2017), pp. 496-539.

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State have created favorable conditions for the development of private enterprises and the growth of entrepreneurs,” and urged that “private enterprises should learn from the best to support the country, assume social responsibility and help others to grow once they’ve become rich.”¹⁰ It is clear that the CCP is consciously sending the message that private enterprises must cooperate with the state to “invest wherever the Party tells them to”.

In April this year, Tencent announced that the group will promote the “Innovation for Sustainable Social Value” initiative not only by investing RMB 50 billion, but also by coordinating various products departments to support the development of basic science, education innovation, rural revitalization, carbon neutrality, elderly care, and digitalization

of public welfare projects.¹¹ Later, the partnership between Tencent and the GAC Group was also announced on the media day of the Shanghai Auto Show on April 19, 2021. The cooperation range from the establishment of a data platform spanning from production, manufacturing, sales to management as well as the acceleration of upgrades on the ecological and technological perspective of online taxi services.¹² According to Tencent, the investment strategy is in line with the two policy pillars included in “The 14th Five-Year Plan and Vision 2035”: first, to further develop the offline economy and promote the integration of advanced manufacturing and service industries; second, to fine-tune the current economic development model of “let some people get rich first” and to pursue “quality development” in the next phase to narrow

10. “Xi Jinping Stressed, During his Visit to Jiangsu, to Implement the New Development Concept and Construct a New Development Model to Promote High-quality, Sustainable Growth of the Economy and Society” , *Xinhua*, November 14, 2020.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-11/14/c_1126740143.htm

11. “Tencent Invests NT\$200 Billion to Promote ‘Innovation for Sustainable Social Value’. Ma Huateng: “It’s Just the Beginning” , *The Liberty Times*, April 19, 2021

<https://ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/3504567>

12. “The GAC Group and Tencent Escalated Strategic Cooperation to Promote Platform Digitization and Ecological Development” , *Sina.com*, April 19, 2021.

<https://finance.sina.com.cn/tech/2021-04-19/doc-ikmxzfmk7696153.shtml>.

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the gap between people's livelihoods and wellbeing.

Then another question emerged: apart from the fear of the CCP's autocratic power, why do private enterprises continue to follow the government's industrial policy? First, private enterprises must not only be ideologically aligned with the government, but more importantly, they must be able to earn the trust of the Party to ensure their long-term survival. Therefore, private enterprises that need to "demonstrate their loyalty" are expected to invest in "new strategic industries" as defined in "The 14th Five-Year Plan and Vision 2035" as well as on the revitalization of rural areas. Second, as the CCP still occupies the high ground in terms of domination of political power and state capital even after the economic transformation, private entrepreneurs are eager to seek political patronage in order

to maximize their own interests.¹³ Taking advantage of this motivation, the CCP released the following message in the "Opinions on strengthening the United Front in the private economic sector for the new age" (Sept. 2020):

"Optimize the structure of the private economic representative team via an appropriate inclination towards strategic emerging industries, advanced manufacturing industries, modern service industries and modern agriculture, etc." It shows that people in these industries are the talents the CCP expects to absorb in the future, and they will be given the right to represent private enterprises. That is, they may enjoy special political status in the future. It's understandable that it is economically rational for private enterprises to intentionally include these "strategic" industries in their investment plans in order to ensure political protection.

13. Although Wank believes that as market reforms deepen, the relationship between private entrepreneurs and the CCP is gradually moving toward a two-way dependency. But even though it is a symbiotic relationship, the private entrepreneurs still have an incentive to seek political protection for their own business development while they provide the resources the government might need as well. David L. Wank, "Bureaucratic Patronage and Private Business: Changing Networks of Power in Urban China," in Andrew G. Walder (eds.), *The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origin of Political Decline in China and Hungary* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), pp. 153~183.

3-2. Conglomeration of private enterprises will be limited

According to the results of another round of conversations between financial regulators and Ant Group plus 13 other Internet platform companies in April this year, it was officially confirmed that financial services wrapped in the guise of tech innovation are prohibited as an act of “disorderly capital expansion”, and the next stage of administrative supervision will focus on divesting such companies from “illegal” financial services.¹⁴ Since 2019, the substantive controllers of large private enterprises, including Ma Huateng of Tencent and Zhong Shanshan, the founder of Nongfu Spring

Beverages, have stepped down from roles outside their main industries.¹⁵ This article suggests that the CCP financial bureaucrats may take the next step to prevent large private enterprises from becoming “conglomerates”.

In the process of capitalization, enterprises tend to form “conglomerates” to achieve economic scale and maximize profits. When a parent company combines several subsidiaries across different industries or the spectrum of a supply chain through cross-shareholding, a conglomerate is born. In East Asia, the most notable examples are the large enterprise groups found in Japan and South Korea.¹⁶ By minimizing internal

14. “Pan Gongsheng, VP of People's Bank of China, Answers Reporters' Questions on the Financial Authorities' Second Interview with Ant Group,” *Xinhua Net*, April 12, 2021.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2021-04/12/c_1127321490.htm.

“Financial Authorities Jointly Interviews Some Enterprises Engaged in Financial Businesses on Online Platforms,” *Xinhua Net*, April 29, 2021.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2021-04/29/c_1127393316.htm.

15. “Zhong Shanshan, China's Richest, Suddenly Resigned From Board Position, Wantai Biological Stock Price Plunged” , *Central News Agency*, January 14, 2021.

<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202101140351.aspx>.

16. Japanese plutocrats are called “keiretsu” , represented by large enterprises such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Fuji and Sanwa; Korean plutocrats are called “chaebol” and are best known by Samsung, Hyundai and Lotte. The major difference between the two is that although a Japanese “keiretsu” is centered on the main bank for capital allocation, it's actually a “coreless” network, in which no single company can dominate the other group members. However, both have developed internal horizontal networks across companies in different industries and vertical supply chain networks within industries.

James R. Lincoln and Michael L. Gerlach, *Japan's Network Economy: Structure Persistence and Change* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1~50.

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transaction costs and allocating capital efficiently, these groups quickly gain ground in the market while obtaining enormous political and economic influence. In South Korea, for instance, the “chaebols” (plutocrats) have an unparalleled position in the country’s economic development, but they have also become a problem: they are crowding out the country’s smaller enterprises and causing South Korea to be overly dependent on a handful of conglomerates for its economic growth.

In order to prevent large private enterprises from becoming conglomerates and gaining political and economic influence, the CCP is expected to limit the expansion of private enterprises. To move toward the objectives of “common prosperity” and “expanding the mid-level income group,”¹⁷ the CCP will not only invest in building a comprehensive social welfare and education system, but also force large private enterprises to yield more market space to small- and

medium-sized businesses. Moreover, in order to prevent from falling into the situation that the CCP must support the development of private enterprises, the extent of “disorderly capital expansion” of private enterprises must be limited. Lastly, to increase the reliance on the state and the need for political protection, it’s also necessary for the CCP to weaken the motivation and ability of private enterprises to expand their power.

17. “Promoting Common Wealth with High-Quality Development and Coordinating the Works of Preventing and Resolving Major Financial Risks,” *People’s Daily Online*, August 18, 2021.

<http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0818/c1024-32197312.html>.

Taiwan Strait Security under Japan's Strategic Defense Thinking

Yen-hung Lin

Division of Defense Strategy and Resources

1. News Highlights

In an interview on August 2, 2021, Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi told the Financial Times, “The international community should be concerned about the survival of Taiwan.” He warned that China has been making various moves to envelop Taiwan. For example, Chinese PLA aircraft have been entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) on a regular basis and have also flown around the southern tip of the island to enter Taiwan’s southeast airspace. Moreover, an increasing number of PLA ships are appearing off the east coast of Taiwan as well. Kishi also pointed out that peace in

the Taiwan Strait can only be based on strong demands from the international community. Instead of speculating when the direct military conflict between Taiwan and China will happen, the international community should concern more about Taiwan’s survival.¹

Japan broke a longtime precedent by linking the security of Taiwan and Japan together in its 2021 Defense White Paper. Kishi’s remarks show Japan’s willingness to pay more attention to the Taiwan Strait and explicitly stress the necessity for Japan to become more aware of its own crisis.

1. “Japan Calls for Greater Attention to ‘Survival of Taiwan’,” *Financial Times*, August 2, 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/e82fe924-ba9b-4325-b8a4-0d5482ee1d24>.

2. Security Implications

2-1. Japan allies with Western and Indo-Pacific countries to address Taiwan Strait security issues

Japan has been paying more attention to Taiwan Strait issues, and its attitude toward Taiwan's security is becoming even more clear. From the "US-Japan 2+2 Meeting" in March, the "US-Japan Summit" in April, the "Japan-EU Meeting" in May, the "Japan-Australia 2+2 Meeting" in June, the "G7 Joint Statement" to the "US-Japan-South Korea Deputy Foreign Ministers Joint Statement" in July, all have raised concerns and appeals on Taiwan Strait security. Extended from the US-Japan alliance, the recent military cooperation between Japan and the UK is also noteworthy. On July 20, Kishi and his counterpart UK Defense Minister Ben Wallace held a meeting

to emphasize that the two countries are global strategic partners and share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy and the rule of law.² Although Japan and the UK are not formally allied, both oppose China's intention to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas by force, and have stressed the importance of maintaining a free and open maritime order based on the international laws. Wallace also revealed that the Royal Navy's HMS Queen Elizabeth carrier strike group would proceed to the Indo-Pacific region in September this year and berth at the JMSDF bases such as Yokosuka, Maizuru and Kure as well as US Navy bases in Japan's Sasebo, Yokosuka and the White Beach Area in Okinawa Prefecture (FAC6048).³ Wallace also stressed that he plans to permanently deploy two Royal Navy vessels to the Indo-Pacific region by the end of this year.

2. "Minister of Defense Press Conference on July 20, 2021 (Tue), 11:09-11:21", Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces, July 20, 2021.

<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2021/0720a.html>

3. "Minister of Defense Press Conference on July 30, 2021 (Fri), 11:09-11:21", Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces, July 30, 2021.

<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2021/0730a.html>

In the new national security strategy announced in 2015, the UK decided to expand defense-related relationships with more countries other than the US, especially with Japan. As a result, Japan and the UK have started to expand their exchanges in the areas of defense, politics and diplomacy.⁴ The last Japan-UK alliance was formed in 1902 when Russia was a common threat to both countries, and Japan won the Russo-Japanese War with support from the UK. Today, although the new Japan-UK cooperation has a common goal toward China, it doesn't need to be totally militaristic like a century ago. Instead, Japan and the UK may actively cooperate systematically in all security aspects, including defense. In this way, the Japan-US alliance, together with the prospective Japan-UK cooperation, will become a solid front facing the potential threats from China.

2-2. Escalation of US-China confrontation calls for Japan's new defense strategy

On April 5, 2021, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi held a telephone conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi,⁵ in which Motegi expressed his strong concern to China over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute, the South China Sea conflicts as well as Xinjiang and Hong Kong human rights issues. In response, Wang criticized Japan for “reaching its hands too far” and opposed Japan's involvement in China's internal affairs since it would create a “strange atmosphere” between Japan and China. On April 6, Japanese Prime Minister Suga visited the US and held a summit with President Biden. After the summit, a joint statement was released, and the statement mentioned Taiwan again, 52 years after the last one that

4. “2015 National Security and Defense Strategy of UK, and the Strategic Framework” , British Embassy in Japan, November 27, 2015.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/313995.ja>

5. “The Telephone Conversation Between Japanese and Chinese Foreign Ministers” , Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 5, 2021.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press6_000787.html

did. With support from the US, Suga's diplomatic policy will see a change from the "balance between China and the US" one he inherited from Abe, his predecessor, to lean towards the US again in terms of security and restore Tokyo's confidence in the US.

Japan believes that China's military expansion has become a threat and caused an imbalance of power in the region. During the Cold War era, Japan was convinced that its security would only be protected if there was an ongoing crisis in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula. However, recent actions of China in the East China Sea, particularly the implementation of its Maritime Police Law, have created strong security pressures on Japan and forced Japan to return to the protective umbrella of the US.

In the meantime, public opinion in Japan also support Suga's "pro-US, anti-China" approach. According to a survey, 80% of Japanese people feel threatened by China,⁶ and 74% agree that Japan should participate in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait.⁷ That is, both Japan's government officials and the general public are concerned about the security of Taiwan Strait more than ever; Japan is worried that it would be affected if the Taiwan Strait situation gets out of control. Therefore, based on the US-Japan alliance, Japan is actively conducting joint military exercises and is growing its military power under US consent. In addition, Japan's military exercises with Indo-Pacific countries and an increasing number of troops deployed to its southwest islands are also part of Japan's strategic changes.

6. "China's Threats on Security: 80% 'Feel it' in NHK Poll," *NHK NEWS WEB*, June 15, 2021. <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210615/k10013083981000.html>

7. "Nikkei Poll: 74% in Favor of Involvement in Stability of Taiwan Strait," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 26, 2021. <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210615/k10013083981000.html>

3. Trend Forecast

3-1. Strategic value of Taiwan Strait security becoming clearer to Japan

On February 10, 2021, the Foreign Affairs Division of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) established the "Taiwan project team" for the first time, and on June 1, the team made its first policy recommendations. The team clearly stated that Taiwan shares common democracy and the rule of law values with Japan, and the two countries have close economic and friendship ties, making Taiwan a very important partner for Japan.⁸

On July 7, former Japanese Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Takeo Akiba replaced Shigeru Kitamura as the head of Japan's National Security Secretariat, which heads Japan's National Security Council. Akiba is known as an outstanding diplomat and was appointed by Prime Minister Abe to head the China Division of the Foreign Ministry. In fact, the ideas

for a free and open Indo-Pacific, promoted by the Abe administration, were Akiba's works. As the new national security advisor, Akiba may continue to offer suggestions in diplomacy for the Suga cabinet to consider.

At the end of September, Japan may hold an election for the House of Representatives or for the LDP president. Given the current political situation, there seems to be no younger, suitable candidate to succeed Suga as the next LDP president while LDP Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai also supports Suga's reappointment. If Suga is re-elected as prime minister, Japan's policy toward Taiwan may become clearer and more visible.

3-2. Sharing of defense resources between US-Japan alliance and Taiwan is urgent

According to a July 1, 2021, report in the Financial Times, the US and Japanese military forces have been conducting military exercises for the prevention of the Taiwan Strait crises, and some officials pointed out that the US, Japan and

8. "First Proposal from Taiwan Policy Review Team of Foreign Affairs Council," LDP, June 1, 2021.

https://jimin.jp-east-2.storage.api.nifcloud.com/pdf/news/policy/201712_1.pdf

Taiwan militaries must share important intelligence, especially related to the PLA.⁹ According to Taiwan's Defense Ministry, the PLA has harassed southwestern Taiwan airspace for 129 days with 378 sorties as of August 15, 2021, putting a lot of pressure on the air defense system. In addition, the PLA air and naval forces also have been harassing the Japanese side of East China Sea, Miyako Strait and all the way to the eastern coast of Taiwan to add pressure onto Japanese defense.

In terms of air defense, if a military plane does not respond to the ground broadcast warning to steer away from foreign airspace, it can be forced to land or shot down by missiles according to international law. Since PLA aircrafts approach the Taiwanese and Japanese ADIZ frequently, and there may be planes from China, Taiwan, Japan and the US in the airspace at the same time, the four countries should establish an air communication protocol to prevent military misjudgment or accidental conflicts.

9. "US and Japan Conduct War Games Amid Rising China-Taiwan Tensions," *Financial Times*, July 1, 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/54b0db59-a403-493e-b715-7b63c9c39093>.



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