

# INDSR Newsletter



**Institute for  
National Defense and  
Security Research**

## CCP At 100

### **1.Propaganda Campaigns and Online Censorships**

**Tzu-Chieh Hung**

### **2.Tibet Is Ultimate Experiment in Control**

**Ying-Hsuan Chen**

### **3.Its Fear and Unease**

**Che-chuan Lee**

### **4.Xi Jinping's Hidden Political Message**

**Cheng Jung Lin**



**No.1 August 2021**

# About Us

The Institute for National Defense and Security Research (財團法人國防安全研究院) is dedicated to fueling knowledge-based policy analyses and strategic assessments on Taiwan's security.

INDSR was formally inaugurated on May 1, 2018, and is headquartered in Taipei, Taiwan. We are an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization.

INDSR aims to shape innovative ideas and lead constructive debates on issues pertaining to international security and national defense, Chinese politics and military affairs, non-traditional security, hybrid and cognitive warfare, and cybersecurity, among other security areas.

To bring together great minds in policymaking, industry and research, we convene international forums, network civil societies, engage in Track Two dialogue and conduct wargame simulations. INDSR's dynamic research agenda and activities are used to develop pragmatic policy recommendations for the Taiwan government.

INDSR was listed among the "best new think tanks" in 2020 in the latest Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, for the second year in a row. INDSR's English-language podcast collaboration with Ghost Island Media called "The Taiwan Take" was nominated in the podcast category for the Excellent Journalism Award (第 19 屆卓越新聞獎) in 2020.

**Institute for National**

**Defense and Security Research**

No. 172, Bo'ai Rd.,

Zhongzheng Dist., Taipei City-100057

Taiwan (R.O.C.)

<https://indsr.org.tw/en>

## CCP At 100: Propaganda Campaigns and Online Censorships<sup>1</sup>

Tzu-Chieh Hung

Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts

On January 3 2021, the “National” Propaganda Ministers' Meeting was held in Beijing, where Wang Huning, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and a member of the Central Secretariat of the CCP delivered a speech, and Ding Xuexiang, a member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee as well as Huang Kunming, Head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP were also present. The Propaganda Ministers' Meeting is held regularly every year, but it received much attention because this year marks the centenary of the founding of CCP, and Wang Huning attended this event. In the Meeting, regarding the propaganda campaigns for 2021, Wang Huning stated that “we must do publicity work well this year, and regard it as a major political mission to study, publicize, and carry through the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era...we must mobilize efforts on all fronts to organize and launch the propaganda and educational campaigns in celebration of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the CCP, be vivid and animated in the story-telling for the CCP, record the feats and exhibit the magnificence

---

<sup>1</sup> The original Chinese version of this article was published on March 5, 2021 .

for the grand centenary of the Party.”<sup>2</sup> Although there is still a period of time before July 1, the actual centenary of the founding of the CCP, it is worth noting the CCP has already begun to gradually step up its efforts in the related propaganda campaigns and information control measures.

## **CCP Continues to Ramp up Publicity Work for Xi Jinping Individually**

Although the CCP’s propaganda for 2021 should put extra emphasis on “the launch of ‘the 14th Five Year Plan’, embarking on a new quest, and holding a grand celebration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP”,<sup>3</sup> the main focus has so far remained on the individual Xi Jinping, himself, this year. Of late, the CCP has enhanced its propaganda work on the image of Xi being close to the people. For example, Xi went to check on the poverty alleviation development projects in Fuping County, Hebei Province; a project in a lighter tone would be the publicity work on “the menu for the Chinese Spring Festival”.<sup>4</sup> The second season of the TV show series “Ping “Yu” Near People-Allusions Xi Jinping Likes” produced by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP and China Central Television is arguably one of the main pillars for the current propaganda for Xi Jinping, which was aired on 18 February and involved content of personal worship that use historical allusions to propagate Xi Jinping’s personal “great” feats and “unselfish dedication” to the country, while imparting Xi Jinping’s ideologies such as CCP’s socialist core values and the Chinese Dream.

<sup>2</sup> 〈全國宣傳部長會議在京召開 王滬寧出席並講話〉，《新華網》，2021 年 1 月 6 日，[http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-01/06/c\\_1126953137.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-01/06/c_1126953137.htm)。

<sup>3</sup> 同上。

<sup>4</sup> 〈總書記關心百姓的「春節菜單」〉，《新華網》，2021 年 2 月 4 日，[http://www.xinhuanet.com/video/sjxw/2021-02/04/c\\_1211012051.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/video/sjxw/2021-02/04/c_1211012051.htm)。

In addition, although the publicity work related to the CCP history for the centenary of the founding of the CCP is actually reasonable, it is worth noting that even the historical accounts about the CCP also specifically highlight Xi Jinping. A case in point is the book *On the History of the Communist Party of China* published on February 21, which compiles Xi Jinping's past 40 articles about the history of the CCP. Multiple news articles were published on the Chinese state-run media were carried about the book.<sup>5</sup> In contrast, another book compiled by the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CCP Central Committee, *Compilations of the Historical Accounts of the Communist Party of China by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao*, that combined all the past leaders' historical accounts of the CCP into a single volume, was taken lightly and saw limited news coverage.<sup>6</sup> This all the more demonstrates the CCP's recent propaganda focus only on "resolutely upholding General Secretary Xi Jinping as the core of the party center, [and as holding] the core position of the entire party" of the "Two Upholds", aiming to enhance Xi Jinping's status and de facto personal worship.

## **CCP Tightens Control over Information on The Internet Platforms**

To reach the CCP's goal of "imprinting the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era onto hearts and minds", another key lies in the control over information. The control over information on the Internet has become the priority of control measures at the beginning of this year. Through preventing leaks of

---

<sup>5</sup> 〈習近平同志《論中國共產黨歷史》出版發行〉，《新華網》，2021年2月21日，  
[http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-02/21/c\\_1127121673.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-02/21/c_1127121673.htm)。

<sup>6</sup> 〈《毛澤東鄧小平江澤民胡錦濤關於中國共產黨歷史論述摘編》出版發行〉，《新華網》，2021年2月24日，  
[http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-02/24/c\\_1127133381.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-02/24/c_1127133381.htm)。



information related to freedom of speech and social injustice, the CCP continues to tighten its grip on public opinions on the web and in media commentaries to further the CCP's cause of generating "positive energy". To begin with, on January 19 2021, China's National Press and Publication Administration issued A Notice from the National Press and Publication Administration regarding the Certification of Press Cards for the Reporters in the Year 2020. One of the highlights was to put restrictions on Chinese reporters for publishing work-related information through "we media" like Weibo and WeChat.<sup>7</sup> Next, on January 29 2021, the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CAC) convened a "Video Conference on Regulating the Orders of Internet Communications for the 'National' Networking System" and focused on rectifying the "clear problems that disrupt the order of Internet communications" on we media, short-clip platforms, and "hot searches" on Weibo.<sup>8</sup> Since the pandemic broke out in 2020, the CCP has been arresting and detaining citizens and independent reporters, while at least 10 reporters and commentators were arrested last year, seven of whom remain in custody.<sup>9</sup> Recently, aside from an independent reporter Kcriss Li being unaccounted for due to detention for covering the Covid-19 pandemic, a blogger called "Labixiaoqiu" with 2.4 million fans on Weibo was considered to be defaming

<sup>7</sup> 〈新聞記者證年度核驗工作開始 擅自開設自媒體將被重點核査〉,《人民網》,2021年1月20日, <http://media.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0120/c120837-32005436.html>。

<sup>8</sup> As Zhuang Rongwen (Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department, Director of the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, and Director of the Cyberspace Administration of China) stated, "This year marks the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the CCP as well as the inception of the '14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan'". It is necessary to maintain the order of internet communications and "it is of special and crucial significance to ensure the exuberance of positive energy and vibrancy of the tone in the cyberspace". For more information, refer to 〈中央網信辦部署加強全平臺網路傳播秩序管理〉,《中國網信網》,2021年1月31日, [http://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-01/31/c\\_1613688664594335.htm](http://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-01/31/c_1613688664594335.htm)。

<sup>9</sup> "China: One year after the Covid-19 outbreak, seven journalists still detained for reporting on the issue," Reporters Without Borders (RSF), February 8, 2021, <https://rsf.org/en/news/china-one-year-after-covid-19-outbreak-seven-journalists-still-detained-reporting-issue>





People's Liberation Army (PLA) and thus detained, with his account closed. This illustrates the CCP has been stepping up efforts to clamp down on scenarios that may potentially lead to dissemination of negative information in the name of the “two sessions” and the centenary of the CPC centennial

## **Propaganda About The Positive Image will Gradually Increase**

Judging from related propaganda on the priority topic of “full victory in the fight against poverty”, it will continue to be a norm to highlight Xi Jinping’s achievements by window-dressing the numbers. Going forward, the CCP will not only continue to ramp up the propaganda on Xi Jinping as an individual, and Xi’s thought on socialism for a new era, but also it will give prominence to Xi Jinping by publicizing other key projects under his administration, like emphasizing “the 14th Five-Year Plan”, the development of China’s national prowess, technological capabilities, the connection between Xi and PLA’s military might and its ongoing modernization, coupled with various stories of human interest that exude positive energy<sup>10</sup> to fully flesh out the personal achievements of Xi as the leader. With the approaching centenary of the founding of the CCP on July 1, there will also be an increasing amount of related propaganda campaigns on the history and image of the CCP, including films, drama series, news and feature stories. For instance, at least more than 10 movies that publicize the CCP are scheduled to be screened this year. On top of that, the publicity work for the centennial also means that the CCP will tighten its grip on related speech

---

<sup>10</sup> A case in point is that China’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission issued in February the *Notice of Strengthening Publicity Work for the Political and Legal Systems’ Advanced and Exemplary Cases to Legally Contain Pandemic and Ensure Stability*, demanding to publish “more ‘news stories of human interest’ that exude warmth, jerk tears, and have human touch”. For more information, refer to 〈中央政法委印發通知要求發掘戰「疫」典型 激發社會正能量〉,《法制網》, 2021 年 2 月 18 日, [http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2020-02/18/content\\_8119710.htm](http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2020-02/18/content_8119710.htm)。



and activities by taking a tougher approach on tackling the issues of public opinion control and stability maintenance so as to create and maintain the “good” atmosphere.

## **Eradicating Dissent in Chinese Cyberspace is Major Task**

Although currently the CCP has yet to repeat its approach in 2018 to go all out to close down we media accounts,<sup>11</sup> it will still continue to tighten control over Internet video clips and commentaries from the source (author) and content. Despite the fact that the US-based real-time social audio application Clubhouse enjoyed a short-lived smashing success in China because it once escaped government censorship,<sup>12</sup> this accident also made the CCP take a more stringent and conservative stance in the control over social platforms in the future. The timing is sensitive with the approach of the two sessions and the centennial. The CPC will keep up its pressure and censorship on speech, audio/video content, and short clips on the Internet.

---

<sup>11</sup> Over 9,800 accounts were suspended back then. For more information, refer to 〈自媒體得規矩起來〉，中央網絡安全和信息化委員會辦公室網站，2018年12月14日，[http://www.cac.gov.cn/2018-11/14/c\\_1123713065.htm](http://www.cac.gov.cn/2018-11/14/c_1123713065.htm)。

<sup>12</sup> Clubhouse, a US-based social audio platform that features real-time audio chats, went viral because it enjoyed a certain level of privacy while Chinese users could once speak freely in public or private chat rooms, which accidentally made Clubhouse a platform for cross-strait netizens to freely discuss sensitive issues on politics, cross-strait affairs, Xinjiang, and the June Fourth Incident. However, as Clubhouse might become a gap in China's control over thoughts, public discourses, and even mass events, it was blocked by China's Great Firewall after enjoying just days of short-lived success.



## CCP At 100: Tibet Is Ultimate Experiment in Control

Ying-Hsuan Chen

Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts

As 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2021 marked the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Communist Party of China's (CCP) "liberation of Tibet", State Council issued a whitepaper titled *Tibet Since 1951: Liberation, Development and Prosperity* (hereinafter to be referred to as *the Whitepaper*) on May 21<sup>st</sup>, claiming a "complete victory" over poverty, with Tibet enjoying a stable social environment and Tibetans now leading better lives and living in contentment. *The Whitepaper* also condemned the 14th Dalai Lama's proposal of "'the middle way' to resolve the Tibet question" in 1988 as incongruent with historical development and violating people's fundamental interests, thus firmly resisting "infiltration and sabotage" by the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, the British pro-Tibet organization Tibet Watch accused in a post that the CCP recently dispatched a large number of cadres to the villages and towns of Yushu City, the Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, to publicize the party history and the glory of the centenary of the founding of the CCP, demanding Tibetans express their allegiance and gratitude to the CCP and PRC.<sup>2</sup> *Voice of America*, quoting the statement of Free Tibet, believed that the Chinese government is taking a series of

<sup>1</sup> 〈白皮書：反華勢力和達賴製造事端 危害西藏安定團結〉，香港《文匯報》，2021年5月22日，<http://paper.wenweipo.com/2021/05/22/CH2105220005.htm>。

<sup>2</sup> "Xi Jinping's Party history campaign continues in Tibet to cement CCP's centenary anniversary," Tibet Watch, May 5, 2021, <https://bit.ly/3p7susQ>.



actions to warn the Tibetans against staging any protest during the Communist Party's centenary.<sup>3</sup> This paper compiles Beijing authorities' recent measures to tighten control over Tibet, and analyzes the future development of the CCP's policies on religions and minority ethnic groups.

## **Tighter Control Over Tibet and “Patriotic Education”**

According to human rights organization Tibet Watch, Tibet has seen multiple restrictions imposed by the CCP since March. A case in point is Tenzin Nyima, a Tibetan monk who was suspected of being tortured to death during detention in early January. The government later deployed the troops to the monk's village to search for the source of information, and specifically warned that households receiving the government's subsidies for poverty alleviation must return all the funds should they keep the portrait of the 14th Dalai Lama in their homes. In addition, six Tibetan dissenters, including the Tibetan writer Gangkye Drubpa Kyab were secretly arrested, while some Tibetans were even put behind bars for contacting family members in exile via WeChat. On top of that, the CCP has long viewed Tibetan Buddhism as the breeding ground of Tibetan nationalism and has thus sought to control the temples and religious organizations in Tibet, to ensure their allegiance to China governed by the CCP. Reporters from *Agence France-Presse* (AFP) observed during their news coverage at the Tibetan Buddhist College that the monks were actually studying political education, instead of Tibetan Buddhism.<sup>4</sup> The local government of Tibet recently issued a

<sup>3</sup> 〈中共百年大慶強化對藏控制藏人領袖呼籲警惕文化滅絕〉，《美國之音》，2021年5月26日，<https://bit.ly/34ztNax>。

<sup>4</sup> 〈西藏僧侶研究習近平而非達賴喇嘛〉，《法廣》，2021年6月1日，<https://bit.ly/3uXfvuZ>。

directive to ban people from carrying items that signify Buddhism, such as prayer wheels and rosaries. Sera Monastery, one of the three great monasteries in Lhasa, hosted a calligraphy contest, demanding contestants to first comply with “the four standards” (political reliability, religious achievements, moral integrity capable of impressing the public, and willingness to play an active role at critical moments) to qualify for a prize. Beijing authorities continue to propagate the official propaganda and control all aspects of the monks’ daily existence to weaken the influence of Tibetan Buddhism.

## **Dominating Discourse Power on Tibet Question**

In *the Whitepaper*, the CCP emphasized that the government not only totally abolished the feudal serfdom under Dalai Lama’s theocracy and established a real ethnic autonomous region, but also pooled manpower and funding to support construction projects in Tibet. In the press conference hosted by the State Council on May 22<sup>nd</sup>, Chinese Communist Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Wu Yingjie stated that, in recent years, the Central Government as well as provinces and municipalities in support of Tibet have contributed RMB 1.7 trillion in total to finish major construction projects, such as Sichuan-Tibet Highway and Zangmu Hydropower Station; 74 poor county-level areas have been delisted from the poverty list; the completion rate for compulsory education has reached 95.03%, like “a totally different world.”<sup>5</sup> Beijing authorities attempted to use political and economic achievements during their rule over Tibet to cover up the ethnic complexities and historical issues

---

<sup>5</sup> 〈和平解放 70 年西藏「換了人間」〉，《中國財經報》，2021 年 5 月 25 日，<https://bit.ly/3vEEsMR>。



that Tibetans attach importance to. In fact, in addition to Taiwan, Tibet is also a laboratory of cognitive warfare for the CCP. On May 23<sup>rd</sup>, *Xinhua News Agency* published a news story claiming “Tibet makes great strides in 70 years after peaceful liberation,” whereas *Voice of America* contradicted in an article on May 31<sup>st</sup>, stressing that the agreement of the so-called “peaceful liberation” was actually signed under the oppression by force. *Asia Times* also believed that, due to the outcry from the international community against Beijing’s violation of human rights in Tibet, the CCP has since the 1990s churned out propaganda, and massively published Tibet-related whitepapers, while *the Whitepaper* is in fact one of the CCP’s attempts to whitewash reality through propaganda.<sup>6</sup> The content of *the Whitepaper* and the concept of “peaceful liberation” are actually aligned and pitched by the state-run media to be “manufactured” into news content and disseminated in Chinese, Tibetan and English on social media like Weibo and Twitter, so as to influence the narratives on the history and culture of Tibet home and abroad.

## **Autonomous Regions Have Become CCP’s Experimental Subjects for The Efforts to Maintain Stability**

According to an investigation by Jamestown Foundation, the CCP has repeated its crackdown on Tibet during the 2012-2016 period and monitored the autonomous regions of minority ethnic groups like Tibet and Xinjiang with deployment of “Convenience Police Stations” and “Village-based Work Teams” while every city block has been incorporated into the “grid management” system that combines digital

---

<sup>6</sup> “Propaganda: Beijing’s weapon of mass deception,” *Asia Times*, May 29, 2021, <https://bit.ly/34Dfba2> .



surveillance and manned checkpoints. Meanwhile, the vocational training in the “re-education camps” in Xinjiang has also been applied in Tibet, as the Tibetans are forced to leave their villages for the “training centers”, where they are managed in military style and forced to undertake cheap labor, which is referred to as a “feedback loop of forcible assimilation” in the aforementioned investigation.<sup>7</sup>

During the seventh Central Symposium on Tibet Work in July 2020, Xi Jinping firmly stressed the importance of school education on political thoughts so that patriotism may be the guiding principle cutting across all levels and types of school education. Meanwhile, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Department of Education also promulgated on August 26<sup>th</sup> a directive titled *the Implementation of Nationally-unified Textbook Series on ‘Language and Literature’ in Ethnic schools across Inner Mongolia starting from First and Seventh Grade* to propagate patriotic education to the youth of minority ethnic groups and cement nationalistic identity, which manifests the CCP’s policy on minority ethnic groups to be marked as “experiment by region”, “repeated trial and verification”, and “large-scale implementation”.

At the end of 2020, the Chinese cyberspace was swept over by the sensation of a “sweet wild boy,” a Tibetan young man called Ding Zhen, who was catapulted into fame with his kind and rustic image, while the CCP’s state-run media seized this opportunity to “elaborate on the story of a simple, unadorned Tibetan young man and

---

<sup>7</sup> Adrian Zenz, “Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet,” *China Brief* Volume: 20 Issue: 17, Jamestown Foundation, September 22, 2020, <https://bit.ly/3uIWgFj> °

the CCP”. China Central Television (CCTV) interviewed Ding Zhen about what he wished to see in Beijing, to which he replied “the raising of the national flag”, and People’s Daily immediately began its propaganda with the hashtag “Ding Zhen said that he wished to come to Beijing to see the raising of the national flag”. It remains to be seen whether the CCP will repeat the success story and launch propaganda campaigns for the party with “Mongolian young lady” or “Granny from Taiwan”.

## **Tibet Policies Incorporate Anti-corruption Measures**

The CCP’s plans of aiding Tibet and infrastructure development involve massive funds from other Tibet-aiding provinces, central ministries and agencies, and state-owned enterprises, while the local government expropriates Tibetan farmers’ lands with excuses like mining exploration and exploitation, and establishing natural reserves. Since the third Central Symposium on Tibet Work in 1994, the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee and province/municipality-level (first-level) Organization Departments of the Party Committees have dispatched up to thousands of mid-level cadres from other provinces of China to hold important positions in all levels of the party departments of the Tibet Autonomous Region. These enterprises and “Tibet-aiding” cadres have formed an intricate community of common interests, while Tibet-aiding projects have become tools for the cadres to facilitate promotion and amass wealth. In April 2021, China Judgments Online announced that Hu Zhijun, former Manager of Risk Management Section, Marketing Management Department, Aluminum Corporation of China, was convicted of bribery amounting to RMB 2 million during his service as part of Tibet-aiding projects. In addition, *the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range*





*Objectives for 2035*, which was issued in March, declared that a series of strategic construction projects were about to be initiated, including hydropower projects on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo river and “strategic backbone corridors”, which means that relevant infrastructure projects still hold great potential of considerable gains.

Xi Jinping’s efforts to tighten religious control, intensify political construction and consolidate the southwest borders as well as the strategy of “adhering to the strategic thinking of governing the country and governing the border, and stabilizing Tibet first”, as emphasized among the “Ten musts”, all the more demonstrate the focus on border security and the intent of cementing and consolidating power in the affairs about ethnic groups and borders. Therefore, the Central Government may further replicate the experience of combating corruption in Inner Mongolia and rectifying the cadres who have influenced ethnic unity and poorly executed the Party’s construction as well as political construction because of corruption, so as to ensure the stability of Tibet and the southwest national border.



Institute for National Defense and Security Research

Foreign Interference: A Case Study From Australia <i>Nasir Khan</i>	1
In the Light of a China Clouding Era: A Glance at Australia's Strategic Landscapes in the South Pacific <i>Osaka Tsui</i>	17
Current Problems of Germany's Armed Forces <i>Wolfgang von Bredow</i>	25
China's Next-Generation Missile: The DF-17 in Pacific Conflict and Great Power Competition <i>Cameron Freeman</i>	35

ISSN 2225360-2

[Defense Security Brief](#) (DSB) is an English-language publication aimed at strengthening research exchanges with security-related experts both domestically and abroad. Established in 2011, DSB was originally founded and compiled by the Office of Defense Studies, Ministry of National Defense. INDSR continued the publication in 2018.

## CCP At 100: Its Fear and Unease

Che-chuan Lee

Institute for National Defense and Security Research

On July 1, 2021, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated its 100-year anniversary at Tiananmen Square. In his address, President Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese people have achieved the transformation from “standing up, and growing prosperous to becoming strong”; will not “accept sanctimonious preaching from those self-appointed mentors” and will never “allow any bullying, oppression and subjugation from foreign powers” in addition to boasting about the achievements of the CCP. He also pointed out that the people must be able to understand the contradictions within the Chinese society as well as challenges from the international community. “But we shall prevail,” stressed Xi. <sup>1</sup>

Since mid-June 2021, a rumour circulating on social networks revealed that Dong Jingwei, vice minister of China’s Ministry of State Security, had defected to the United States. However the WeChat account owned by the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the CCP and the website of the Ministry of Public Security both hinted that Dong is still in China on messages released on June 18 and

---

<sup>1</sup> 〈習近平：在慶祝中國共產黨成立一百周年大會上的講話〉，《新華網》，2021年7月1日，  
<https://reurl.cc/839mqd>。

June 23 respectively. On June 19, the official website of China's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection published a story of Gu Shunzhang, a CCP member who defected to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the 1930s, to warn the potential traitors.<sup>2</sup> Before the story, over 500 Hong Kong police raided the *Apple Daily* newspaper and arrested five executives on June 17, forcing the paper and its website to cease operations on 24th. Seven Taiwanese officials stationed in Hong Kong were forced to leave on June 20 due to their refusal to sign the "one China commitment letter" while the acting commissioner of Taiwan's representative office in Macao was deported for the same reason on June 27, causing the possible shutdown of both offices.<sup>3</sup>

On June 25, China's State Council Information Office released the "China's Political Party System: Cooperation and Consultation" white paper stating that the Chinese system consists of only the leading CCP and other "cooperative and advisory parties," which means "China has no opposition party whatsoever".<sup>4</sup> The aforementioned incidents in fact reflect Xi Jinping and CCP's fear and uneasiness facing the recent challenges.

<sup>2</sup> 6月18日，中共中央政法委微信公眾號「長安劍」發文稱董經緯當天主持「反間諜座談會」。23日，公安部官網發出新聞稿並附上照片，揭露董經緯參與當天的上海合作組織成員國安全會議秘書第16次會議。顧順章為中共早期領導人之一，1931年轉投國民黨，供出共黨內部機密，導致中共上海地下機構被剿滅。中共對顧發出「第223號通知」，其家人親友共30多人遇害。請見〈國家安全部：既要抓間諜，又要抓“內奸”和“幕後金主”〉，中共中央政法委長安劍，2021年6月18日，<https://reurl.cc/vqvyYo>；〈趙克志出席上合組織成員國安全會議秘書第十六次會議〉，中國公安部，2021年6月23日，<https://pse.is/3jr6gp>；〈重溫經典 砥礪前行 | 永不叛黨不僅僅是一句誓言〉，中共中央紀委國家監委，2021年6月19日，<https://reurl.cc/LbleAy>。

<sup>3</sup> 〈香港蘋果日報停刊 國際媒體：敲響新聞自由警鐘〉，《中央社》，2021年6月24日，<https://reurl.cc/ZGZaYW>；賴言曦，〈駐港辦7人返台僅留1人 起因港府要求限時離境〉，《中央社》，2021年6月20日，<https://reurl.cc/DgKnQm>；賴言曦，〈駐澳門代處長簽證期滿返台 當地剩4名派駐人員〉，《中央社》，2021年6月29日，<https://reurl.cc/bX34Kv>。

<sup>4</sup> 鄭巧，〈中共中央統戰部副部長許又聲：中國新型政黨制度是對人類政治文明的一大貢獻〉，《中國新聞網》，2021年6月25日，<https://reurl.cc/mLrDmI>。



To Xi Jinping, the man who seeks to make China great again and is confident on his third tenure starting in 2022, the 100-year anniversary was just an intermission of his political play. What matter more are goals including keeping himself and CCP on the throne forever, strengthening loyalty of CCP members, solving national debt problems and real estate bubbles, narrowing wealth gaps, improving the national image and ending isolation by the international society.

## **Loyalty from Shocking**

Should the defection of Dong Jingwei be true, though denied by both China and the US, the information he could have provided to the US about, for instance, the origin and early research of Wuhan Pneumonia (COVID-19) and Chinese intelligence agents in the US will certainly bring enormous impact on the Chinese regime. In addition, Dong Hong, the former deputy chief of the Central Inspection Team under China's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the former aide of Wang Qishan, was arrested in early June. Dong might also give details about high-level corruptions and cause serious consequences.

On the same day the official website hinted that Dong Jingwei is still in China, Xi Jinping along with Wang Qishan and other high-level officials visited the CCP History Museum to refresh their memories on “Keep the Party's Secrets” and “Never Betray the Party” oaths. The second day, Cai Qi, CCP Secretary of Beijing, also led his subordinates to the Museum and vowed for their loyalty to CCP, followed by Zhao Kezhi, Minister and Party Committee Secretary of the Ministry of Public Security, Chen Min'er, CCP Secretary of Chongqing, and Xian Hui, Governor of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in similar occasions.



On June 22, Yuan Jiajun, secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee, led a group to take the oath in Jiaying. Through the peer pressure, the senior CCP officials were reminded not to have second thoughts about the party, while their voice might also become the source of courage for Xi.

## **The Laws Ensuring Perpetual Dominance of Xi and CCP**

In addition to propaganda and education on supporting CCP, the party also keeps ensuring Xi Jinping's unchallenged place and its perpetual but legitimate ruling with the power of decrees and regulations. In September 2018, the CCP put forward the "two safeguards" discipline that calls for maintaining Xi's core position in the party and upholding the absolute authority and centralized leadership of the CCP. In October 2019, after the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP, the "Regulations on the Work of the CCP Central Committee" were published, with the 8th Article explicitly requiring that "...all Party organizations and members must... uphold the authority and centralized leadership of CCP". The aforementioned white paper also emphasizes that China is led by CCP through the cooperation with several "advisory parties" that answer only to the CCP. In other words, the CCP is the only ruling party and "China has no opposition party whatsoever".

## **Suppressing of Any Ideas Threatening CCP**

With a series of austerity policies, CCP left almost no room for thought and speech freedom in China. On the eve of its centennial anniversary, Hong Kong's freedom of speech and Taiwan's offices in Hong Kong and Macao became targets of CCP's purge actions.





In response to Taiwan's withdrawal of its HK and Macao offices, China's Taiwan Affairs Office told Taiwan's DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) government to "immediately retreat from undermining Hong Kong's prosperity and stability or will be severely punished", while the Chinese Foreign Ministry said the HK police were lawfully "fighting crime and maintaining the social order" and asked the US to "stop meddling in HK affairs in any way and stop interfering in China's internal affairs." It is clear that the CCP is further suppressing free speeches and eliminating any possible foreign and Taiwanese influence and "threats" to the authority of both HK and China.

In terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), China's GDP has surpassed the US to become the world's largest in 2013. In November 2020, China's Ministry of Defense also announced that the PLA forces were mechanized and made significant progress in the information warfare infrastructure. At the end of February 2021, Xi Jinping announced that China has become a well-off society.

However, there are still more goals for Xi to accomplish. As he enters his third term in 2022, he has to turn China into a manufacturing powerhouse by 2025 and reach the PLA's "centennial goal" (some would consider that includes military invasion of Taiwan) by 2027. If there is a fourth or even fifth term, Xi must complete the goals of modernizing socialism as well as defense and its armed forces, in addition to reaching the medium level of the world's manufacturing power by 2035.

In other words, the pressure on Xi is that he must seize the short "strategic opportunity period" before China's economic growth slows down, the population structure becomes aging, and pressure from the international society emerges. Through effective



execution of such policies, China may have a chance to successfully perform the so-called “overtaking on the curve”. To Xi, the expectations are a deeper source of his feeling of urgency and anxiety.

## **Preventing Financial Risks for Sustainable Economic Growth**

The pursuit of economic growth along with prevention and control of risks are focuses of the Xi administration. IHS-Markit, a global market research firm, predicts that China’s real GDP could surpass that of the US by 2033. Another guess is 2028 as estimated by the British Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR), but this is only possible if China’s GDP grows by 7% annually.

While pursuing economic growth, Beijing has to deal with various systemic financial risks. In addition to the much-discussed control of central and local government debt balances (46.55 trillion RMB at the end of 2020, accounting for 45.8% of GDP) and the rapidly increasing corporate debt defaults (232.4 billion RMB at the end of November 2020), the most serious problem is the financial bubbles of the real estate sector, as repeatedly warned and called “gray rhino” by Guo Shuqing, chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission.

As China’s real estate leverage (the ratio of real estate mortgages to GDP) surged from 15.9% in 2010 to 40.1% at the end of 2020, it far surpassed 32% of the US before the subprime crisis. In the meantime, China’s total real estate market value has reached 65 trillion USD, about 500% of its GDP, compared to Japan’s 215% of GDP at the peak of the house market bubble — a serious potential problem for China.



## Maintaining Social Stability to Counter Population Issues

Despite China's claim of the successful elimination of poverty, its economic downward spiral is still difficult to reverse. Unemployment is worsening, the wealth gap is widening, and the three issues — housing, education and health care — hindering general consumption are yet to be resolved. Since the benefits from economic development are monopolized by a relatively small group, average people feel deprived. This not only adds pressure on social stability, the younger generation would give up struggling and move from “involution” to “lying down flat,” which could become a new problem in China.<sup>5</sup>

The aging population and low birth rate pose are pressing issues as well. China's mainstream labor force (age 15-64) has been declining since 2014, and the median age is now 42, surpassing 38 in the US. The population of China is expected to reach its peak between 2025 and 2030 (of up to 1.45 billion), and could start to show a negative growth rate — and possibly a negative impact on economic growth rate — thereafter. To address this, the Chinese government allowed all married couples to have two children in 2014 if one of them is an only child; and this policy was extended to all couples in 2015.

After presiding over a Politburo meeting and receiving a briefing on measures addressing the aging population issues during the 14th Five-Year Plan period on May

---

<sup>5</sup> “Involution”(内卷) is an anthropological term in Asian agricultural society that originally referred to the problem of invest a lot of laboring in long-term intensive farming, but failed to achieve economic breakthroughs. It is now used to describe the frustration of excessive competition in many industries, but unable to achieve breakthroughs. The concept of “lying flat”(躺平) refers to young people who are disappointed in the real environment under China's economic downturn and the intensification of social problems, and they have adopted an attitude of rather than stick to the expectations of society, it is better to choose “lying flat”. Oxford University professor Xiang Biao believes that lying flat is a kind of young people's resistance to “involution.” Please refer to 王凡,〈「内卷」與「躺平」之間掙扎的中國年輕人〉,《BBC 中文網》, 2021 年 6 月 2 日, <https://reurl.cc/EngGnm>。



31 this year, Xi announced that party committees and governments at all levels are ready to implement a “three-children” policy to reverse the trend of aging population and declining labor force.

## **Strategic Alliances to Resist Western Pressure**

In response to the rising “anti-China” ideology and a such coalition assembled by the US, Xi must come up with some effective strategies.

On May 31, Xi presided the study meeting of the CCP Politburo and said that China should make more foreign friends and build the “credible, lovable and respectable” image; and also set the “modesty and humility” baseline, a significant turnover to its aggressive “wolf warrior diplomacy” image.

On the other hand, China continues to strengthen its “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Russia. A document obtained by *Reuters* in March even suggests that China and 16 other countries, including Russia, North Korea and Iran, are building a new alliance that claims to defend the UN Charter but is actually formed to confront the US and other democratic Western countries.<sup>6</sup> With the efforts on both sides in progress, the future of the competition between the US and China remains to be seen.

---

<sup>6</sup> The document stated that multilateralism is currently “under unprecedented attacks and threatens global peace and security” and hopes to establish a new alliance to defend the UN Charter. The founding members include China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Algeria, Angola, Belarus, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cuba, Eritrea, Laos, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent, Grenada, Syria and Venezuela, plus Palestine. Please refer to Michelle Nichols, “China, Iran, North Korea seek support at U.N. to push back against unilateral force, sanctions,” *Reuters*, March 12, 2021, <https://reurl.cc/3a632V> °

## CCP At 100: Xi Jinping's Hidden Political Message

Cheng Jung Lin

Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts

On 23 July 23, 1921, the Chinese Communist Party selected a dozen or so representatives from the 50 members in the communism subcommittee and convened the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai.<sup>1</sup> July 1 was later designated as CCP memorial day in the 1941 Central Directive on the Chinese Communist Party's 20th Anniversary and Commemoration of the 4th Anniversary of the Anti-Japan War, and known as July 1 CCP Founding Day.<sup>2</sup> Since the establishment of its regime in 1949, the CCP has held seven large celebrations occurring every 10 years (except in 1971). Naturally, an extravagant event took place at Tiananmen Square on 1 July 2021, celebrating the CCP's centenary with Xi Jinping delivering a speech exceeding 7,000 words emphasizing "resisting foreign aggression and stabilizing the country."<sup>3</sup> The following article is an analysis of the hidden political message in Xi Jinping's grand speech at the CCP's centenary celebration.

### Reinforcing Xi's Rule for Home Audience

The CCP centenary celebration took place at Tiananmen Square in Beijing for the first time ever. This is a square filled with history and representing the highest power

<sup>1</sup> 〈中國共產黨的一百年時間線〉，《BBC 中文網》，2021 年 6 月 29 日，<https://bbc.in/3xla2jJ>。

<sup>2</sup> 〈中央關於中國共產黨誕生二十周年、抗戰四周年紀念指示〉，《中國經濟網》，2017 年 5 月 22 日，<https://bit.ly/3heM7Nm>。

<sup>3</sup> 〈習近平：在慶祝中國共產黨成立一百周年大會上的講話〉，《新華網》，2021 年 7 月 1 日，<https://bit.ly/3xfQkWw>。

in China. The scale and the number of participants reached a record high.<sup>4</sup> The centenary celebration also differed from the past in many other ways. The military's J-20 stealth fighters participated for the first time as was the 100-gun salute at the opening. The celebration promoted Red Tourism, showcased the first art performance at the National Stadium, and unveiled the first-ever "July 1 Medal", along with an award of memorial medals for 50-year Party membership. These events highlighted ordinary heroes at Tiananmen Square, further strengthening the celebration campaign, and pointed to a grand internal and external propaganda campaign. Party anniversary celebrations in the past have mostly been held within the party and not nationally, mainly geared toward party members with simple ceremonies held indoors. However, the centenary celebration this year transformed into a national celebration and was held at the highest level, meaning it aimed to align the Chinese Communist Party system to the country itself.<sup>5</sup>

From Xi Jinping's speech, we sense the following political intent with an aim to encourage people to share good CCP stories themed "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "the national rejuvenation of the Chinese people". In addition to describing the historical background of the CCP and the persistent leadership of the Party, Xi's speech mainly aimed to advertise the political achievements of "becoming a society of middle-class households", "full victory in the fight against poverty", and "victory in the fight against the pandemic", plated as a gift for "the first centenary of

---

<sup>4</sup> 中共建政後，先後於 1951、1961、1981、1991、2001、2011 和 2016 年舉行建黨慶祝大會，除 1951 年 30 周年慶祝大會於北京先農壇體育場舉行外，其餘均於北京人民大會堂舉行。〈首於天安門廣場慶祝 規模歷來最大〉，《東方日報》，2021 年 7 月 2 日，<https://bit.ly/3jEPH4O>。

<sup>5</sup> 〈黨慶變國家慶典 中共百年大會與以往黨慶有何不同〉，《中央廣播電台》，2021 年 7 月 1 日，<https://bit.ly/3yqZYWB>。



CCP". With brand-new packaging, the Party history was retold as the story of a new era, and a response to people's expectations with reinforced ideology of the Party. Most of all, the speech pointed fingers at the bullying and oppression of the "foreign force".<sup>6</sup> Greatly applauded by the audience, such remark was to inspire their nationalism and patriotism. This helps signify the turning point of the CCP as they march into the second centenary, towards the goals of "2027 Army Modernization Centenary" and "2049 PRC Founding Centenary".<sup>7</sup>

In short, the hidden political message in Xi Jinping's speech aimed to highlight his political achievements, reinforce the historical status of the Xi Jinping administration, and break away from the former pattern of succession. After removing presidential term limits in 2018, he is now strategically prepared for re-election at the 20th National Congress next year, and well on his way to being the leader for an unprecedented third term, to rule the only ruling party of the most populated country in the world.

## **Warning to Foreign Forces for Away Audience**

Xi Jinping was targeting not only party members in his speech, but a worldwide audience, including the people of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Using strong words against foreign forces, he made four solemn declarations and proposed nine statements based on history. The four solemn declarations included Chinese people will no longer

---

<sup>6</sup> 〈摘口罩抗外來勢力 中共風雨飄搖裡邁向明天〉，《中央通訊社》，2021年7月1日，<https://bit.ly/3hCrB8e>。

<sup>7</sup> 〈黨慶變國家慶典 中共百年大會與以往黨慶有何不同〉，《中央廣播電台》，2021年7月1日，<https://bit.ly/3yqZYWB>。

be bullied by others; socialism saves China; reform and opening up is the key turning point for the nation; and that China's national rejuvenation has become a historical inevitability. The nine statements based on history included upholding socialism with Chinese characteristics; leadership of the Party with rigorous self-governance; reinforce unity; and accelerate modernization of technology and strong military.<sup>8</sup> The speech further emphasized faster modernization of the military – "a strong country must have a strong military, as only then can it guarantee the security of the nation"; "we will never allow any foreign force to bully us, they will find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people"<sup>9</sup> Among which, "armed forces" and "on a collision course" are strong political messages against foreign forces, implying that the CCP will no longer hide and bide time but take the initiative in their "wolf warrior action". The CCP's military power ranks third in the world, just behind the United States and Russia. The PLA fields 350 navy vessels and submarines, the largest navy scale in the world, exceeding the 293 vessels of the United States.<sup>10</sup>

Once the national interest of CCP is violated, it will likely strike with a limited war. Responding to Article 47 of the newly enacted National Defense Law, which states in case the People's Republic of China's sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity, security and development interest are threatened, the state will start national mobilization or partial mobilization in accordance with the provisions of the

<sup>8</sup> 〈開創未來安內攘外 中國重塑國際秩序〉，《明報》，2021年7月2日，<https://bit.ly/3yqWyTQ>。

<sup>9</sup> 〈習近平：在慶祝中國共產黨成立一百周年大會上的講話〉，《新華網》，2021年7月1日，<https://bit.ly/3xfQkWW>。

<sup>10</sup> 〈中國海軍增長迅猛受多方關注 印太上演合縱連橫〉，《法廣》，2020年12月22日，<https://bit.ly/3hjOGxK>。

Constitution and laws, and strike war without hesitation.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, in Chapter 6 of the newly enacted Coast Guard Law of China on the use of police gear and weapons, authorization to use weapons is clearly outlined in principle, including should foreign vessels enter waters claimed by China, weapons can be used on those that violate China's laws, which poses a bigger threat to countries in neighboring waters.<sup>12</sup> The CCP Coast Guard jurisdiction includes internal waters, territorial seas, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the waters above China's claimed continental shelf, and "other waters". A review of the Coast Guard Law of China reveals focus on islet cruising, mainly covering Senkaku Islands, Taiwan, and islets in waters neighboring the South China Sea.<sup>13</sup> We can infer that this move largely jeopardizes the sea lanes of the South China Sea and East China Sea, creating grey zone conflicts or encouraging maritime militia, and putting neighboring countries on edge and worry. For example, CCP coast guard ships have recently been seen in waters neighboring the Senkaku Islands for 112 days in a row, breaking the record of consecutive cruising days since Japan nationalized Senkaku Islands in 2012, and could set off regional conflict at any time.<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, we can tell from Xi Jinping's Party centenary speech that the CCP is now taking a strong-armed attitude towards foreign forces, and combined with the recently enacted new laws, CCP aims to add intensity by passing laws first and adding muscle later to gain legitimacy and legality to strike war for national and development

<sup>11</sup> 〈中華人民共和國國防法〉，《人民網》，2020年12月29日，<https://bit.ly/3rTDDON>。

<sup>12</sup> 〈全國人大常委會表決通過海警法〉，《人民網》，2021年1月23日，<https://bit.ly/3xtei0s>。

<sup>13</sup> 〈中共通過海警法 學者：授權海警必要時向外國船隻開火〉，《聯合報》，2021年2月17日，<https://bit.ly/2V3K0Dg>。

<sup>14</sup> 〈釣魚島：中國海警船連112天航入〉，《法廣》，2021年6月4日，<https://bit.ly/36akoa2>。



No.1 August 2021

---

interests. In other words, their reputation of continued expansion of armed forces and intense warning against strong foreign forces is foreshadowing the competition and challenges among international hegemony.

