Strategic Security Implications of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019
2019.11.08
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I. News Focus
The Unites States Senate passed the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 with a unanimous consent on October 29, 2019, following likewise a unanimous passage by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SCFR) on September 25, 2019. And on October 30, 2019, House Foreign Affairs Committee also unanimously passed its version of the act, readying the act to go to the House floor for a vote. How the entire House will vote for the act remains to be seen. The House version of the TAIPEI Act is essentially the same as the version passed by the Senate which expresses that under appropriate circumstances and in alignment with the US interests, for countries that take serious or significant actions to undermine Taiwan’s international presence, the US should consider reducing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with such countries.[1]
Both versions of the act call for the US administration to “engage in bilateral trade negotiations with Taiwan, with the goal of entering into a free trade agreement that is of mutual economic benefit and that protects United States workers and benefits United States exporters.” [2] The act also asks for the US administration to support Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.
II. Security Implications
1. States severing formal ties with Taiwan are militarily siding with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the US
Although not explicitly stated in the final version of the TAIPEI Act passed by the Senate, the SCFR version of the act states that the US will terminate or reduce not only economic but also military assistance to countries severing formal ties with Taiwan which suggests that arms sales to and international military education and training with the countries will end. The breaking of formal relations with Taiwan signifies that the countries have already accepted the PRC’s military aid. Pacific island, Latin American and Caribbean countries’ security is usually maintained by the US. Their switch to the PRC is highly symbolic. In particular, the open economic order in Asia has been undergirded since the nineteenth century by American naval power. When Pacific Island states side with Beijing, the US military position in the Indo-Pacific is weakening.
2. The TAIPEI Act is a show of the US bipartisan support for the US allies in the Indo-Pacific region
By establishing formal relations with Pacific Island states, the PRC may gain bases from those states to threaten the second island chain,[3] rear security of the US, and US allies such as Australia and the Philippines. Therefore, the TAIPEI Act is a show of the US bipartisan support for the US allies in the Indo-Pacific region.
3. Taiwan’s security partnership with the US is more important than partnerships on other matters for Taiwan to garner support from the US to be a part of the international community
As the US is practicing principled realism,[4] upholding its national interests is its foremost national strategy. Security interests are in fact the most important national interests for the US in the Indo-Pacific region as it is facing a militarily expanding PRC. Furthermore, since the open economic order in Asia has been guarded since the nineteenth century by American naval power, the economic gains the US has earned since two centuries ago and especially since the end of World War II in Asia have been premised upon a strong US military presence in the region. Therefore, Taiwan’s security partnership with the US is its most important relation with the US than relations on other matters for Taiwan to be a part of the international community, including the participation in international organizations, because Taiwan’s security interests now overlap with the US most important national interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
III. Trend Analysis
1. Taiwan’s loss of allies might be slowed down due to the deterrence effect of the TAIPEI Act
Both versions of the TAIPEI Act clearly articulate the US strong resolve to protect Taiwan’s allies and enhance its relations with them. Furthermore, it is implied that formally severing ties with Taiwan is strategically choosing the PRC over the US. As a result, when Taiwan’s remaining formal allies are contemplating cutting relations with Taiwan, they will have to think twice about whether they want to strategically choose the PRC over the US. Consequently, Taiwan’s loss of allies might be slowed down due to the deterrence effect of the TAIPEI Act.
2. The US and Taiwan could enter into a free trade agreement
Both Senate and House versions of the TAIPEI Act call for the US administration to engage in bilateral trade negotiations with Taiwan, with the goal of entering into a free trade agreement. As Taiwan now has fewer formal allies than ever before, it genuinely needs to enhance truly beneficial relations with countries of significant benefit such as the US. As a result, Taiwan will seek to conduct bilateral trade negotiations with the US, aiming that a free trade agreement will be reached. However, the issues of importing US pork and beef still remain which could obstruct the negotiation process between the two countries.
[1]S.1678 – Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, 116th Congress (2019-2020), Text, https://tinyurl.com/y3nec4aj ; H.R. -- Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, 116th Congress (2019-2020), Text, https://curtis.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CURTUT_041_xml2841.pdf .
[2]Ibid.
[3]The Second Island Chain can refer to different interpretations, but the version most commonly used refers to the island chain which is formed by the Ogasawara Islands and Volcano Islands of Japan, in addition to Mariana Islands which is US territory. As it is located within the middle portion of the Pacific Ocean, it acts as a second strategic defense line for the US.
[4]National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, pp. 1-4, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.