Amphibious Forces: Still Relevant but They Need “Selling” (and Don’t Be Afraid of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief)
2019.07.19
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By Grant Newsham
Few people would argue an Army, Navy, or Air Force is unnecessary. Nor that their main raison d’etre is to fight. Amphibious forces combine each of these capabilities – ground, sea, and air – but are often viewed, even within militaries, as being of limited usefulness or at least deserving a low priority.
Yet, the Indo-Pacific with its islands, coastlines, and vast ocean expanses is perfectly suited – and indeed demands – amphibious capabilities.
With an amphibious force, a military can conduct operations seamlessly between the sea and land – rather than being confined to one or the other. Indeed, being “amphibious” allows a military to view the ocean as “maneuver space” (sort of like an empty highway) through which forces can move freely and without permission – and are able to get ashore by sea or by air almost anywhere.
Otherwise, huge stretches of the map – the littoral areas – even within one’s own country are mostly off-limits as forces cannot move personnel and equipment from ship to shore and vice versa – unless there is a port or airfield available. Thus, a military comes to resemble a “ferry service” or an “airline” that happens to have weapons.

The U.S. Marines of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. (Source: The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command)
The importance of amphibious forces is self-evident – at least to Marines (a notably self-confident bunch) and “amphibious sailors.”
However, with perhaps one exception there is not a Marine Corps or an amphibious force anywhere in the Indo-Pacific or beyond that has enough ships, funding, or even recognition and understanding of how an amphibious capability is indispensable to a nation’s defense – or for a government’s ability to care for citizens in distress.
What explains this shortchanging of amphibious forces?
“Iwo Jima” is part of the problem. Mention the words “amphibious” or “amphibious force” to most people – even in the military – and it conjures up images of the massive, bloody U.S. Marine/U.S. Navy assault on the Japanese-held island, Iwo Jima in 1945.
And there has not been another large-scale amphibious assault since the Incheon landing in 1950 during the Korean War. And it is doubtful even the United States could conduct something similar these days given resource shortfalls. Thus, in a miles-wide leap of logic, naysayers take the least likely possibility on the broad spectrum of possibilities and declare amphibious forces useless or irrelevant.
This is akin to saying you do not need a knife because you will never use it to fight off a tiger. But there are many other things one uses knives for. The same is true with amphibious forces. They are useful for much more than another Iwo Jima.
Nonetheless, such thinking persists and the range of excuses is predictable:
-We have no enemies.
-We will not be fighting a war in the foreseeable future. It is unthinkable.
-“My service alone” can handle it all (so give us more of the defense budget).
-Today’s coastal defenses are too powerful – especially long-range anti-ship missiles and other precision weapons. And satellite surveillance means an amphibious force will be spotted and destroyed long before it nears the coast.
-There is not enough wherewithal anyway – not enough money for ships, manpower, and weapons.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) appears not to have gotten the word – as it is building up a massive amphibious assault capability for use against Taiwan. The PLA is also readying to seize Japan’s Senkaku Islands when the time is right, just as the Argentinians managed an amphibious seizure of the Falkland Islands in 1983, before the British sent their own amphibious task force to retake the islands.
Even Saddam Hussein (from the next world) would be surprised to learn amphibious operations are passé. He thought American forces were coming ashore in Kuwait in the first Gulf War in 1990-1991, and was thus distracted when land-based U.S. forces swung around his flank and destroyed his army.
The point: Amphibious warfare has been declared prematurely dead more than once. Within the Indo-Pacific, besides the much-feared PLA’s Taiwan invasion threat there are a number of plausible scenarios for deploying amphibious forces in combat situations.
First, amphibious forces – particularly armed with long-range precision weapons – are useful for island and coastal defense, and if necessary to retake lost terrain. Malaysian forces learned a hard lesson in this regard in 2014 when a small band of Sulu insurgents seized a piece of Malaysian territory. Japanese amphibious forces are already fortifying several of Japan’s southern islands and a key role of Japan’s newly formed Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade is “island retaking.”
Second, amphibious forces are valuable as a mobile counterattack force, able to operate in the littorals, hard to target and armed with anti-ship and anti-air weapons. This is a role for which a “revamped” Taiwan Marine Corps is well suited – and given Chinese PLA’s preparations for a major amphibious assault on Taiwan, it is urgently required.
Third, there are the high-end amphibious operations for which the Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine Corps and Navy have been preparing for decades in the event of a Korean peninsula conflict.
Fourth, conducting small-scale amphibious and littoral operations in the context of an insurgency – such as the Philippine Marines have been involved in for years. Sri Lanka’s armed forces also gained considerable experience with such amphibious operations during their near 30 year conflict with the Tamil Tigers.
Fifth, there is the scenario of carrying out amphibious force interventions (humanitarian, restoring order, non-combatant evacuations) in locations where there is violent civil unrest such as happened in Timor in the early 2000’s, and there is a potential need to ‘shoot one’s way in’ and then defend oneself once ashore.
Sixth, there are potential uses of mobile amphibious forces in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, the Andaman Islands and elsewhere to seize or deny key terrain for anti- access/area denial (A2AD) purposes – or to facilitate maneuver of naval and air forces. A2AD is not a Chinese monopoly – but works both ways.
These are not contrived scenarios seeking a role for amphibious forces, and a military unable to conduct certain of these operations will find itself embarrassed – at a minimum. Nevertheless, amphibious forces often lack support even within a nation’s armed services.
Lacking a “Natural Constituency”
A big part of the problem is that amphibious forces have no “natural constituency.” For a military to have an amphibious capability each service – Army, Navy, Air Force – has to give up something – and also must cooperate in ways that senior officers frequently resist with childlike stubbornness.
Instead, each service instinctively defends what it views as its core interests:
Air Forces want fighters, bombers, and missiles. Navies want frigates, submarines, and aircraft. Armies want tanks, artillery, infantry, and Special Forces.
With an amphibious force, a military can conduct operations seamlessly between the sea and land.
If anything is left over in the budget it might go to amphibious forces. Indeed, just about the only places in the Indo-Pacific where amphibious forces are something of a priority are Australia and the People’s Republic of China. The Australians have created a small but effective amphibious unit in recent years. And far outdoing the Aussies, the PLA is going “all out” to expand its Marine Corps and its amphibious ship fleet – for use in the region and beyond. It has already deployed PLA Marines to Djibouti, and more is to come elsewhere.
Even in the United States, the U.S. Marines are in a constant fight for resources – if not survival – despite their mythic reputation with the broader American public. And U.S. Navy amphibious forces are low on the service’s totem pole. One fairly notes that Tom Cruise in the movie Top Gun played an F-14 Tomcat pilot – not an amphibious ship skipper.
Amphibious forces may indeed be the unloved stepchildren, but this simply highlights the permanent requirement to “sell” amphibious capabilities. And selling means more than a “high-level visit” between a visiting U.S. General or Admiral and the local “amphibious force” commander, or hosting journalists to cover annual staged beach assault “VIP landings.”
Rather, what is needed is a year-round, coherent scheme to “educate” key constituencies – politicians, key officials, academics, the media, defense analysts, and business and citizen groups – both domestic and sometimes foreign. And pay attention to potential “allies” within one’s own services – some of whom are simply unfamiliar with amphibious forces.
Based on this author’s experience, an amphibious force commander will do well to turn things over to a few smart Captains and Majors and the results will be more than satisfactory.
Selling Points
One generally sells amphibious capabilities on two things: Usefulness for taking lives or usefulness for saving lives.
The emphasis will vary from country to country. For example, the U.S., South Korean, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, and even Japanese amphibious forces have a reasonably well-understood amphibious “warfighting” requirement. In other places it is not so obvious or is myopically overlooked, and thus is considered a lower priority – along with amphibious forces in general.
However, besides the actual and potential combat roles for amphibious forces mentioned earlier in this article, there is another excellent – but often overlooked or underappreciated – selling point for demonstrating the usefulness of amphibious forces: That is -- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR).
Natural disasters occur frequently throughout the Indo-Pacific region. According to the United Nations (UN) figures, from 2002 to 2011 alone, about 2.2 billion people in the region were affected by natural disasters and almost 750,000 were killed.
And amphibious forces (combining air/sea/ground capabilities that include specialized equipment, transport, communications, logistics and medical service capabilities) are ideally suited for disaster response. This is especially so when affected areas can only be approached from the sea, as often happens when roads and other infrastructure are damaged or rudimentary to begin with.
There are many examples of amphibious capabilities being brought to bear in HA/DR operations in the Indo-Pacific region. A few include:
Operation Damayan (2013): Following Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, American, Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean, and other amphibious forces rapidly converged to lead the initial relief effort. By many estimates, this rapid amphibious response saved thousands of lives in the typhoon’s aftermath and immensely reduced suffering.
Operation Unified Assistance (2004): After the massive Boxing Day Earthquake and Tsunami that killed nearly 300,000, U.S. and other regional amphibious forces came from the sea to provide assistance throughout the region in affected areas in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia. Some estimate that hundreds of thousands of lives were saved from this HA/DR response.
Operations Sea Angel I (1991) and II (2007): U.S. Marine and U.S. Navy amphibious forces twice played the leading role in typhoon response in Bangladesh, saving tens of thousands of lives. U.S. Marine General Henry Stackpole who commanded Operation Sea Angel I once commented on the immense satisfaction this HA/DR operation gave him – in a career that also included more than a little combat.
These successful amphibious HA/DR operations resulted from a handful of amphibious proponents in key nations having the vision to build and maintain credible amphibious forces, despite many obstacles.

The U.S. Marines in the Cobra Gold 2019 exercises of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. (Source: The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command)
HA/DR as a Selling Point? Really?
Oddly enough, one often notes skepticism towards HA/DR activities within many militaries. This is perhaps because such operations contrast with the “warrior” self-image. Indeed, military services sometimes seem embarrassed to be seen doing HA/DR operations.
This brings to mind the “we don’t do counter-insurgency” arguments from certain quarters within U.S. forces before the Afghan and Iraq campaigns within U.S. forces. “Only high-end warfare for us.” In effect, military leaders can resemble labor union bosses; declaring there are some things they just will not do – even though they can do them and to outside observers ought to be doing them.
But natural disasters and HA/DR are something citizens, politicians, media, academics, and defense analysts all understand – and can easily imagine happening – compared to “combat operations.” And they are the people that shape defense policy – and budgets.
Amphibious forces must be able to conduct combat operations – and even HA/DR operations can take place in a dangerous environment.
Thus, if one wishes to “sell” the importance of amphibious forces – it is necessary to sell on the basis of activities and scenarios that “key audiences” understand and also value.
In a curious recent case, New Zealand’s government readily understood the justification for creating an amphibious force to conduct HA/DR operations. But the military then had to convince the government that the force also needs a “combat” capability. This is an important point that needs stressed – and repeatedly. Amphibious forces must be able to conduct combat operations – and even HA/DR operations can take place in a dangerous environment. Indeed, even an opponent with a few light machine guns can make life difficult, or impossible, for a landing force that is not prepared or geared for a fight.
HA/DR Response: A Political Liability or a Political Advantage
If a military fails at or fumbles the HA/DR response, it inevitably embarrasses all but the most heartless or tone-deaf government – and can even be destabilizing. And official and public perceptions will regard the military as “useless” or “inept” – and not deserving existing budget and resources.
Moreover, within the military an amphibious force’s already precarious position will become even more difficult.
However, conduct effective HA/DR operations and the government will benefit from an image of competence and looking after its citizens. And official and public perceptions of Marines and amphibious forces will take a positive turn.
As an instructive example, following Japan’s 3/11 tsunami/earthquake, the Japan Self Defense Force’s (JSDF) successful response to the HA/DR challenge transformed public opinions of the JSDF for the better. Even the Japanese government had to grudgingly concede the JSDF’s importance.
As importantly, this also contributed to political and official support for developing Japan’s new amphibious force – along with an overdue appreciation of JSDF capabilities as a combat force to defend Japan’s southern islands.
The Philippine government’s handling of the response to the massive Typhoon Philippines Hayan (2013) that included Philippine and foreign amphibious forces provided a useful boost to the then-Philippine Government, whereas a fumbled response would have been a considerable blow.
Royal Thai Marines, Taiwan Marines, Indonesian Marines, and others have similarly garnered public esteem as a result of successful domestic HA/DR work over the years.
On the other hand, following Typhoon Nargis in 2008, Myanmar’s regime refused to accept foreign assistance from amphibious forces and allowed nearly 200,000 citizens to perish. This did nothing for the regime’s already sketchy reputation inside and outside the country – and added to pressure on the military junta running the country.
The Japanese Government was, in fact, fortunate to escape blame for the JSDF not having an amphibious force on 3/11 – the absence of which resulted in several thousand avoidable civilian deaths. This owed to decades of Japanese civilian leadership along with academia and a mostly hostile media slamming down any attempt to develop amphibious capability as being “offensive” and thus “illegal.” Even the so-called “Hokkaido Mafia” – the tank officers that dominated the Ground Self Defense Force hierarchy for decades had scant interest in an amphibious capability.
With some imagination, successful HA/DR work also can position an amphibious force to request additional resources – that are in fact “dual use” – and suitable for both regular warfighting amphibious operations and HA/DR operations.
These include:
-Amphibious ships
-Helicopters
-Assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) and other amphibious vehicles
-Engineering equipment
-Communications – both hardware and systems that allow for joint communications between air, sea, and ground units
-Money – to include funding for exercises, specialized training, and more personnel
Persistent Institutional Resistance to HA/DR
But despite the manifest value of a solid HA/DR capability, there is often even further institutional opposition within militaries to giving HA/DR its due.
Put simply, disaster relief is viewed as a distraction from the more important “warfighting” mission. And it is argued that if the Marine/amphibious force is training for or conducting HA/DR operations, it is not improving or maintaining warfighting skills. In short, it is seen as a zero-sum game.
As a result, some militaries tend to take a reluctant, half-hearted approach to HA/DR operations – looking at HA/DR as an “unavoidable burden” to be handled as incidents occur – and not as a priority. This leads to shortchanging on training, preparation, developing Standard Operating Procedures and the like.
However, a closer examination tells a different story. Consider the overlap between HA/DR and “warfighting” skills. They are, in fact, 90%-95% identical.
A retired senior U.S. Marine Officer recently offered insightful comments on the use of “combat Marines” for HA/DR work:
“When we sent a Battalion (from Camp Pendleton, California) to the Yellowstone fires (at Yellowstone National Park), the same complaints about ‘not training for war fighting’ were rampant.”
But consider the skill requirements:
- Intelligence gathering on a dangerous enemy with tendencies but not entirely predictable
- "Fire" team coordinated action
- Small and medium unit leadership
- Planning and maneuver
- Difficult terrain logistics
- Engineering
- Communications
- Air support for both maneuver and "bombing"
- Field medical and sanitation
- 24-hour operations
- Joint operations coordination
- Security and front line unit rotations
“Sounds like some of the best possible realistic training - just with different weapons.”
“And as we know from the Japanese earthquake relief ferry planning, except for more disposable diapers and fewer bullets, (there is) virtually no difference between an amphibious assault and a relief landing into demolished infrastructure.”
Improving Joint Capabilities
Moreover, HA/DR training is excellent training in “joint operations.” Most regional militaries are deficient in this regard – and real world HA/DR is ideal for improving inter-service coordination that makes a military exponentially more effective.
Looking Beyond the “Operational”
Combining amphibious forces and HA/DR also offers a nation unique opportunities for strategic and political advantages. In this regard, two scenarios are offered:
First, consider the political significance of Australia’s and Japan’s new amphibious forces joining to conduct serious combined training.
This might proceed as follows:
As a first step, using an HA/DR focus with the objective of being able to operate together on actual HA/DR operations, Japanese and Australian planners might put together and conduct a JSDF-ADF amphibious exercise (to be held bi-annually) – either in the vicinity of Australia, in Japan, or perhaps around Guam. Only the most churlish nations or opponents will object to training to save lives.
Such exercises are complex; so start small, and even a couple ships – say, the HMAS Canberra and a Japanese Landing Ship Tank (LST) – will do at the start.
Both sides will need to conduct the necessary joint planning that goes into the exercise, to include working out joint electronic communications, and then handle the essential “cross decking” of each side’s aircraft and personnel along with ship to shore movements during the execution phase of the exercise.
This is not easy, but it pays considerable dividends in the form of improved operational skill and confidence and a genuine ability to operate together – rather than in parallel – that does not yet exist between Japan and Australia, or between most other regional nations for that matter. And beyond the operational benefits, there is the significance of two of the region’s leading democracies (and former enemies) combining their military resources.
And afterwards, for a real pay-off, look for opportunities to join Japanese and Australian forces together in the event of a real-world HA/DR contingency – an event likely to occur in the Indo-Pacific region. This might even lead to a measured effort to include other friendly regional nations’ amphibious forces to join in the Australia-Japan amphibious program. And looking out a few years, the Japan-Australia amphibious linkage might serve as the nucleus of an amphibious “RIMPAC” (Rim of the Pacific Exercise) held in Darwin, Shoalwater Bay or even Guam.
The following is a second proposal for using amphibious forces and HA/DR to improve operational capabilities while having out-sized strategic effects – in this case demonstrating support for Taiwan while helping the Taiwan Armed Forces break out of decades-long “isolation.”
Consider the following:
Create a Central Pacific Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Force—using U.S. and Taiwan amphibious forces to plan, train, and exercise for HA/DR operations—and respond when disasters occur. Locate the outfit in Taiwan and attach US officers—perhaps from the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet and 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit that are well versed and prepared for disaster response.
Taiwan already has excellent HA/DR capabilities—combining both civilian and military resources. An advantage of using amphibious forces is that it is the equivalent of CrossFit training—exercising air, sea, and ground capabilities at the same time. And it exercises skills that are the same as for “regular” military operations—except for the shooting.
Do some of this joint training and Taiwan’s military skills will rapidly improve – as will the ability to operate with American forces—and vice versa.
The U.S. territory of Guam is a perfect training location, and there are other locales elsewhere in the South Pacific where Taiwan still has diplomatic allies.
To bring this to fruition will require Taiwan liaison officers at American headquarters in Hawaii. And the Americans can assign Chinese-speaking Marines and Navy officers as liaison officers to Taiwan forces. And each nation’s amphibious ships making port calls in each other’s ports will be a natural outcome as well.
Expect political and psychological knock-on effects in Taiwan, Washington, Beijing, and regionally.
First, it allows Taiwan’s military to break out of 40 years of isolation that has stunted its development which has also been psychologically debilitating – to the military itself, the civilian population, and Taiwan’s political leadership.
Second, it demonstrates Americans’ “seriousness.” Adversaries might reckon they have underestimated U.S. resolve. And friends like Australia, Japan, or the French and British might get involved. And maybe a few “undecided” nations will come down off the fence. People will also see that Taiwan is serious about defending itself.
There is precedent for all this. Taiwan Navy ships and Air Force C-130s delivered emergency supplies to the Philippines in 2013 after Typhoon Haiyan. And more recently, Taiwan military medical staff joined in U.S.-led HA/DR exercises in Kiribati in 2017 and the Solomon Islands in 2018—both nations that recognize Taiwan. In 2009, the USS Denver amphibious ship with heavy-lift helicopters provided assistance to Taiwan following Typhoon Morakot.
Summation
Despite amphibious operations’ manifest utility going back to at least Julius Caesar’s amphibious campaign against pirates on the coast of Asia Minor, one imagines that amphibious forces have always been underappreciated once the immediate need for them has passed.
Thus, the onus is on amphibious force commanders to explain themselves and drum up necessary support. And while warfighting capability is the primary requirement of amphibious forces – as it is with any military service – commanders should not shy away from humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, or the preparation and training needed to carry them out effectively.
HA/DR offers military skills training that is largely identical to “warfighting” training, and it is also manifestly useful in its own right when employed to save citizens’ lives. Even more, HA/DR work enhances recognition of amphibious force utility on the part of key parties – particularly outside the military services – whose support is essential.
Finally, it is rare that an operational capability – “amphibiosity” – also has a potential political and indeed strategic effect – such as when foreign amphibious forces join together for training – and even when the training is for HA/DR purposes – as suggested in this article.
Grant Newsham is a retired U.S. Marine Officer. He was the first U.S. Marine Liaison Officer to the Japanese Self Defense Forces and was instrumental in the development of the JSDF’s recently formed amphibious capability.