By Shu-Ting Liu

TikTok (or “Douyin” in China) has become one of the most influential social media in the world in recent years to. Several governments, commentators and studies have warned against the security issues presented by TikTok, but except for the fact that the platform sends users’ data back to China and this constitutes an information security problem, there remains no direct evidence showing that it influences the mind, cognition and therefore interests of the audience. This has led some commentators to argue that the threat posed by TikTok should be re-examined.[1]

This paper engages with this issue, suggesting that reframing the debate surrounding TikTok may expand the scope of research. Currently, most discussion focuses on the effects of TikTok, and an implicit assumption is that if no negative effects are observed, then TikTok poses no security threats. Consequently, when TikTok is “securitized” in Taiwan, the discussion often is construed as political attacks of domestic party-politics or even a struggle between different political parties’ Cross-Strait relations agendas without recognizing the danger of the authoritarian regime behind this technology, rendering society further divided.[2] INDSR’s “2022 Survey ofChina’s Threats to Taiwan and the United Front Work” (2022 年中國對台威脅與統戰網路調查 ) also shows that Taiwanese people hold divergent views of TikTok. When asked if the government should regulate TikTok because of information security concerns, 43.1% of the respondents disagreed, while 56.9% agreed. When asked if TikTok should be regulated because of the concern about China’s united front work, 45.6% of those surveyed disagreed, while 54.2% agreed.[3]

Given the rapid development of technology, the ways in which new media such as TikTok affect the audience may not be readily observed. It is therefore suggested that the TikTok issue is re-assessed, based not on its effects but on its use as a political instrument of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This paper adopts the perspective of “technological authoritarianism” to establish a relationship between the CCP, TikTok, and Chinese society. Through control of the Internet, media, and technology by the state, the CCP has been able to consolidate its control and advance its influence with seemingly non-political but more nuanced instruments. New media such as TikTok infiltrate Chinese people’s daily life as it has become part of their socializing, entertainment, and consumption. It has been further weaponized by the CCP to project influence overseas. It is this complex relationship between the state and media that TikTok is a threat to Taiwan’s national security.

The concept of “technological authoritarianism” refers to the use of technology by an authoritarian regime to strengthen its control over society and even export this model to the outside world. China is the most prominent example of this. A study contends that by using technology to control the people’s words, deeds and even their hearts in an all-round way, China has crafted a system of “perfect dictatorship” not seen in other authoritarian regimes, and its essence may be termed “controlocracy.”[4] The CCP’s use of technology can be divided into three levels: mastery, application, and innovation. First, in terms of the mastery of technology, the CCP uses laws, institutional designs and the co-optation of technology companiesto integrate resources and technology, making them a perfect tool for its rule. Second, in terms of the application of technology, the CCP incorporates information technology in its “despotic power,” making it possible for the state to implement its will through various policing mechanisms and without the consent of society.[5] Finally, with regard to innovation, technology is a means to strengthen the CCP’s “infrastructural power.” The development of technology improves China’s (digital) infrastructure, which in turn makes the state able to intervene in people’s social and economic lives. The people accept the role and control of the state not because of fear or subjugation, but because of the convenience and pleasure of consumption, entertainment and other social services that are heavily monitored and regulated by the state. This soft social control model, which is also termed “popular techno-authoritarianism” ( 受歡迎的科技威權主義 ), is a combination of soft and hard power.[6]

Consequently, the CCP’s authoritarian governance of society in an age of rapid development of science and technology consists of three aspects. The first is surveillance. The mastery and application of technology helps realize physical and networked surveillance. For example, both the “Skynet” ( 天網 ) and “Sharp eyes” ( 雪亮 ) projects deploy such technologies as face recognition, big data, and artificial intelligence to transform street cameras into a real-time monitoring system, in which people’s whereabouts and their social activities are constantly monitored. In recent years, the CCP has further tightened its control of cyberspace as well as censorship of speech, exploiting information technology to detect, identify and block unfavorable public opinions on the Internet. The second is collection. In the name of the people’s economic wellbeing, health, and safety, the CCP combines despotic and infrastructural powers to comprehensively collect the people’s personal information for social control purposes. It can collect the people’s digital footprints from the platforms operated by huge technology companies, reconstruct their online behavior, habits, and preferences, and make use of them. The third is manipulation. With the information of the people at hand, the CCP can manipulate their thoughts and behavior through incentive mechanisms. The “social credit system” ( 社會信用系統 ) is a good example. An individual’s personal information such as his or her credit card records, traffic records, and opinions on the internet are gathered, classified, and rated. Consequently, individuals with a good rating can enjoy benefits in transportation, employment, children's schooling, social subsidies, and even entertainment and shopping, while those with a poor rating are subject to certain restrictive measures. Through this system of reward and punishment, or carrot-and-stick, the CCP manages people’s behavior without resorting to physical violence.

Different from past authoritarian regimes that stressed only the oppressive aspects of power such as domination, surveillance, and policing, the CCP’s “tech dictatorship” manifests the characteristics of soft governance that make its social control more delicate. Scholars find that the CCP’s power over the media is threefold. First, through coercive power the state forces the media to “do what it (the media) doesn’t want to do.” Second, through institutional design, the state constrains the media, leaving the latter “unable to do what it wants to do.” The third and the highest expression of power is the construction of culture, values, and norms, which makes the media not able to “think of doing or not doing certain things.”[7] This conception of power derives from the work of French thinker Michel Foucault, whose “the technologies of power” describes how modern subjects have come to internalize social discipline and engage in self-identification, monitoring, and restraint.[8]

From this perspective, a variety of measures deployed by the CCP can be understood as instances of “the technologies of power” and “technologies of the self.” These include laws, official media, new media, internet public opinion analysis industry, Nmslese ( 小粉紅 ), and the notion of the security of national culture, among others.[9] With these means and practices, the CCP’s power is decentralized, externalized, and becomes relatively intangible, but the effect is that its power and influence penetrates to every corner of society. As a result, there is a tendency for people to follow the rules voluntarily.

Douyin is an example of this advanced technological authoritarian in contemporary China. First and as mentioned above, the CCP integrates resources and technology through institutional innovation. This is shown in the CCP’s policy of content review on platforms including Douyin, as well as its demands for Douyin to launch an recommendation mechanism algorithm that meets political requirements. Furthermore, the CCP purposefully supported “ByteDance” ( 字節跳動 ), the parent company of Douyin, when it established a party branch within the company,[10] and listed its CEO as a key target of the united front work,[11] all of which sought to control and make use of the technology company.

Second, Douyin serves as a means for “incorporating management into service” ( 寓管理於服務 ). As a company that seeks to maximize economic interests, Douyin has developed convenient, easy-to-use, eye-catching services and functions, as well as a variety of preferential measures, so that people are willing to give out their personal information and digital footprints in exchange for Douyin’s selection of popular and automatically broadcasted audio-visual services, music, and special effects. Given the close connection between the technology company and the state, the people’s personal information can be easily assessed by it. The latter is, therefore, able to perform a kind of social control where the people’s daily lives and entertainment are the target.

Finally, there is affective guidance. Technological authoritarianism in China not only seeks the people’s voluntary submission to the state, but also aims to guide public opinion and effect. For example, the CCP promotes a movement of “developing a more civilized and well-regulated cyberspace” (「新時代網路文明建設」運動 ). As a result, patriotic youth groups on the internet, also known as the Nmslese, propagate nationalism as an emotional call on platforms including Douyin. They not only internalize the spirit of “conforming to the norms” and self-censor their comments on social media, but also engage in collective surveillance, asking others to like and share content that conforms to the norms. Creating hot topics through tags and memes on Douyin is therefore a more delicate operation of Chinese technological authoritarianism.[12]

To successfully move onto the international stage, the CCP has presented and promoted TikTok as a product that suits the free market. However, TikTok’s parent company is still registered in China and must obey the CCP’s orders by the laws of the People’s Republic of China. In this sense democracies are not competing with China in the area of international communication on a level playing field.

In recent years, several countries have realized that the CCP is exporting technological authoritarianism overseas,[13] using technology companies in particular to expand its influence. There are two main approaches. First, Chinese technology companies directly cooperate with other authoritarian regimes. Supported by the Chinese state, these technology companies have signed investment or cooperation agreements with other governments, providing the latter with technologies of face recognition and cyber monitoring and helping them establish monitoring equipment and databases. The second approach is for Chinese technology companies to expand overseas markets. They brand their companies and promote their products in a capitalist fashion, striving to win the favor of international consumers. Most of their products, such as search engines and audio-visual platforms, are “depoliticized” and related to ordinary livelihood and entertainment. By so doing, consumers are more likely to ignore potential security implications and become dependent on these products. Over time, a direct and close connection between these Chinese companies and democratic societies is established.

It is the latter that is worrying. Several democratic governments are vigilant against the monitoring systems and communications equipment exported by Chinese technology companies and have tightened regulation. However, there remains a lack of consensus among democratic countries on how to deal with the circulation of those seemingly apolitical products and services by Chinese technology companies in the name of free market. Take the issue of TikTok in the United States as an example. Due to security concerns, several U.S. government agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department have banned their employees from using TikTok on government devices, with more and more departments likely to follow. Yet, as TikTok has become the most popular app among people under the age of 35 in the United States, an announcement by then President Donald Trump to ban TikTok caused a backlash.[14] Internet celebrities who have 100 million followers issued a petition against the proposal,[15] and there were even reports suggesting that Trump might lose a large number of young votes and affect his re-election.[16]

The lack of consensus on TikTok brings division and confrontation to democratic societies. In Taiwan, this is further utilized as an instrument of united front work. On July 30, 2022, Xi Jinping attended the central conference on the united front work, underscoring that “certain profound changes” ( 某些重大變化 ) have taken place. In this new era, united front work requires “new ideas, thoughts and strategies”( 新理念新思想新戰略 ). It is necessary for “the united front work in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and overseas to play a role in winning people’s hearts” ( 發揮港澳台和海外統戰工作爭取人心的作用 ), and “enhance cyberspace united front work”( 做好網絡統戰工作，走好網絡群眾路線 ).[17] As Douyin is an instrument of united front work in China, there is no reason not to infer that its overseas version, TikTok, also serves the same purpose.

There are three possible ways in which TikTok performs its united front work function. The first is cooptation. TikTok has driven an international trend and has become a popular social media for young people in Taiwan. On September 15, 2021, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office Zhu Fenglian ( 朱鳳蓮 ), claimed that Taiwanese teenagers are accustomed to using TikTok. It is a new phenomenon, and it is believed that “using simplified characters, listening to mainland songs, watching mainland movies and TV dramas, and using popular words in Mainland China”has become a fashion for Taiwanese teenagers.[18] Consequently, the CCP can exert its influence on Taiwanese youth through TikTok. Moreover, as TikTok collects users’ personal information including basic information, digital footprints, habits and preferences, and even emotional responses, it is able to identify issues that interest young people in Taiwan, the types of audio-visual material that attract them, and the content that satisfies them, thereby further bringing them closer to China.

The second is to divide Taiwanese society. The media features of TikTok, such as hashtags, emotional contagion by the audio-visual services, a recommendation mechanism algorithm, and the emergence of highly popular internet celebrities,[19] may be instrumentalized. They can be used to disseminate hate speech and disinformation that discredit the governments of Taiwan and the United States,[20] and/or promote views favoring the CCP.

The third is to target the CCP’s main enemy, namely the DPP government and those so-called Taiwan independence separatists. Through manipulating public opinion in Taiwan, the CCP is able to “turn the people against the government” ( 以民逼官 ), discrediting Taiwan’s government and even interfering in its decision-making process, thereby hindering the normal operation of Taiwan’s democracy.

These are possible scenarios for TikTok is weaponizationby the CCP to undermine Taiwan’s national security. While it may not have caused harm to Taiwan, the complex relationship between the platform and the CCP makes such a threat very likely if not imminent.

Adopting a perspective of technological authoritarianism, this paper contends that since the CCP uses Douyin as a tool in its internal rule, there is no reason that it will not use TikTok, the international version of Douyin, to extend its influence overseas. The bigger TikTok’s share in the global market, the more serious is its threat to democracies. In an era where the international community has become wary of China and its threats in terms of military expansion, “wolf warrior diplomacy,” economic coercion, disinformation, and cyber threats, the CCP is more likely than ever to exert its influences in areas that are usually taken as apolitical. Chinese social media like TikTok hence become powerful instruments for the CCP’s united front work.

Currently it remains difficult to prove that TikTok has seriously undermined Taiwan’s national security. The absence of effects, however, does not necessarily mean that TikTok poses no threat to Taiwan. The paper suggests that in addition to—or instead of—looking for effects such as the spread of disinformation and the risk of information security, we should note the complex relationship between the CCP and TikTok (and other new media platforms). A perspective of technological authoritarianism suggests that as technological companies are coopted and controlled by the CCP, the development and promotion of media platforms such as TikTok necessarily carries a political dimension. In other words, it is always possible that TikTok functions as a channel through which the CCP exerts its influence on Taiwan. Consequently, it is imperative for various governmental bodies to coordinate with one another, enhance communication with society, and bolster the public’s media literacy to continue discussion on and raise awareness of the threat of TikTok.