Christina Chen and Kuan-chen Lee[1]
As China continues to expand its military capabilities and presence in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan faces an increasingly severe security threat.[2] Meanwhile,uncertainty surrounding U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly its commitment to the security of the Taiwan Strait, has been heightened by the U.S.presidential election, positioning the future of Taiwan-U.S. relations as a critical areaof concern.[3]
Taiwan’s ability to navigate these evolving security challenges and geopolitical shifts is crucial for its national security and long-term development. Public backing for defense and foreign policy initiatives is essential to the government’s ability to effectively implement these policies. In light of this, this paper draws upon the latest public opinion survey from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) to analyze how Taiwanese people perceive the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), evaluate current defense preparedness, regard Taiwan’s existing foreign policies, and assess their trust in international allies.[4]
Ⅰ. THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE CCP AS A CRITICAL THREAT
The survey used the following question to assess public perceptions of various threats to Taiwan’s vital interests: “The following are potential threats to Taiwan’s major interests in the next ten years. For each, please indicate whether you believe it is a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all.” When asked about “China’s territorial ambitions,” 64% of respondents identified it as a “critical threat,” 19% viewed it as an “important but not critical threat,” and only 9% considered it “not an important threat” (Figure 1).
Compared to other challenges Taiwan faces, the survey found that the percentage of respondents viewing “China’s territorial ambitions” as a critical threat (64%) was similar to those who saw “extreme weather and natural disasters” (67%) and “economic stagnation” (63%) as critical threats. Since issues like climate change and economic development are more directly related to people’s daily lives, the result indicates that the public perceives security challenges posed by the CCP to be just as significant as threats from economic and environmental crises.
It is noteworthy that the majority of the public does not believe an imminent military invasion by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is likely. Figure 2 indicates that only 24% of respondents think it is possible that the PLA will attack Taiwan within the next five years, while approximately 62% believe such an event is unlikely. Despite most respondents viewing China’s territorial ambitions as a critical threat, more than half do not believe that these ambitions will manifest in the form of a military invasion. Instead, the public seems more concerned about the CCP’s use of military exercises, grey-zone incursions, cognitive warfare, legal warfare, and other unconventional tactics, which are perceived as encroaching on Taiwan’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and overall security.
Ⅱ. TAIWANESE PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS
When asked, “If the CCP were to invade Taiwan by force, would you be willing to fight to defend Taiwan?” approximately 68% of respondents expressed a willingness to stand up and defend the nation, demonstrating a strong sense of self-defense and resolve among most Taiwanese citizens (Figure 3). Further cross-analysis reveals that this willingness is notably higher among Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters, respondents in their 50s, and individuals with technical or vocational education backgrounds. In contrast, the percentage of those willing to fight is lower among supporters of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).
In terms of evaluating the defense capabilities of Taiwan’s military, Figure 4 shows that 47.5% of respondents expressed confidence in the military's ability to defend the nation, while 47.9% were less confident. Although the difference between these two groups is minimal, it reflects a slight lack of overall public confidence in the military’s defense capabilities. Cross-analysis indicates that DPP supporters, those aged 60 and above, and individuals with lower educational level tend to have more confidence in the military’s defensive strength. On the other hand, KMT and TPP supporters, as well as respondents with a university education or higher, exhibit less confidence in the military’s ability to defend Taiwan.
Taiwan’s defense preparedness not only hinges on the public’s resolve and the military’s capabilities but also on the size of the defense budget. Increasing the defense budget is seen as a means to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities and public confidence. The survey posed the question: “Do you support the government increasing the defense budget, even if it might reduce spending on areas such as education, the economy, or social welfare?” The results show that 49% of respondents supported the increase, slightly higher than those who opposed it (44%, Figure 5). Among those expressing support, DPP supporters had a higher level of support compared to other political party identifiers, and respondents aged 60 and above were more likely to endorse the defense budget increase than younger respondents. Conversely, KMT supporters and politically neutral individuals expressed more reservations about raising the defense budget.
In addition to concerns about resource allocation, the survey also asked, “Do you support the government increasing the defense budget, even if it might require raising taxes?” Figure 6 reveals that approximately 49% of respondents expressed general support for this idea, slightly exceeding the 46% who opposed it. Again, party affiliation continues to be a significant factor influencing attitudes toward the defense budget. Among supporters of the DPP, around 71% favored raising taxes to increase the defense budget. In contrast, only about 30% of Kuomintang (KMT) supporters agreed with raising taxes for this purpose. This disparity indicates that there is still no consensus in society regarding the need to increase the defense budget.
Ⅲ. TAIWANESE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN POLICY
Taiwan collaborates with its democratic allies to collectively address the challenges posed by China and authoritarian regimes. The survey measured public support for this foreign policy strategy through two items: “Do you think that Taiwan’s relationship with the United States (or Japan) strengthens or weakens Taiwan’s national security?” Figure 7 indicates that 72% of respondents believe that Taiwan’s relationship with Japan strengthens national security, with 28% indicating it strengthens it significantly and 44% stating it strengthens it somewhat. Regarding Taiwan’s relationship with the United States, more than 60% of respondents perceive that the Taiwan-U.S. relationship contributes positively to enhancing national security, while approximately 24% feel that it weakens Taiwan’s security. These results demonstrate that a majority of the public supports the current diplomatic approach, believing that strengthening ties with both the U.S. and Japan benefits Taiwan’s national security.
Despite the majority supporting engagement with the United States and Japan, cross-analysis reveals that party affiliation significantly influences public evaluations of foreign policy (Figure 8). Among supporters of the DPP, approximately 88% believe that the Taiwan-U.S. relationship strengthens national security. In contrast, only about 37% of KMT supporters share this view, with over half (53%) of KMT supporters believing that the Taiwan-U.S. relationship undermines Taiwan’s national security. Regarding Taiwan’s relationship with Japan, more than 90% of DPP supporters feel that this relationship enhances national security, while around 52% of KMT supporters hold the same view. This indicates a clear partisan divergence in perspectives on Taiwan’s foreign policy.
Ⅳ. TAIWANESE PUBLIC ASSESSMENTS OF U.S. DEFENSE ASSISTANCES AND POSSIBILITIES
During his presidency, U.S. President Joe Biden has stated five times that he does not rule out the possibility of deploying forces to defend Taiwan.[5] However, the U.S. government continues to adhere to a policy of strategic ambiguity. The manner in which the U.S. responds to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan not only affects its credibility in Asia and globally but also has profound implications for Taiwan’s defense and public morale.[6] The survey conducted by the INDSR sought to gauge the Taiwanese public’s assessment of the methods and likelihood of U.S. assistance in resisting a Chinese invasion.
Figure 9 indicates that if China were to invade Taiwan, approximately 74.8% of respondents believe the U.S. might “airlift food or medical supplies to Taiwan”; around 73.4% think the U.S. would “impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on China”; about 76.3% believe the U.S. would “provide Taiwan with weapons and military supplies”; approximately 39.6% think the U.S. would “break the Chinese blockade with its navy, even at the risk of U.S.-China conflict”; and about 52.6% believe the U.S. would “send troops to Taiwan to assist in its defense.” This suggests that if China were to resort to military action against Taiwan, over 70% of the public believes the U.S. would offer indirect support, including arms supplies, sanctions against China, and airlifting essential goods. The Taiwanese public appears more reserved regarding the likelihood of direct U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan Strait conflict.
Furthermore, public perceptions of the various methods and possibilities of U.S. assistance in repelling a Chinese invasion are influenced by party affiliation. For all assessed forms of U.S. support for Taiwan, DPP supporters tend to view the likelihood of assistance more favorably compared to KMT supporters. This divergence is particularly pronounced regarding U.S. naval actions to breach a blockade and the deployment of American troops to assist Taiwan, highlighting the complex relationship between domestic political polarization and confidence in international alliances.
Ⅴ. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The INDSR survey reflects the attitude of the Taiwanese public regarding current security challenges and the international situation. The results show that over 60% of respondents consider China’s territorial ambitions to be a serious threat to Taiwan; however, only a minority believe that the Chinese military will invade Taiwan within five years. This indicates that while the public recognizes the rising threat, they remain calm in the face of it.
Moreover, the Taiwanese people’s resolve vis a vis self-defense is relatively strong, but their confidence in the military’s defensive capabilities appears to be somewhat lacking. In terms of defense spending, there is a clear divide in society regarding increases, whether in the context of resource allocations or tax increases. Regarding foreign policy, the public supports strengthening cooperation with democratic nations like the U.S. and Japan, viewing this as beneficial for Taiwan’s national security. However, considering changing international circumstances and pressure from China, the Taiwanese government needs to enhance communication with the people to broaden consensus. Based on these findings, this paper proposes the following policy recommendations:
(Ⅰ) Strengthen Defense Preparedness and Enhance Public Confidence
Given that the Taiwanese public generally views China as a critical threat, the government should continue to push for defense reforms that bolster the military’s capabilities and enhance public confidence in its effectiveness. Specific measures include improving military transparency, fostering trust between the military and the public, and enhancing defense education to promote a nationwide awareness of defense issues.
(Ⅱ) Enhance Responses to Non-Traditional Security Threats
The public regards issues like climate change and economic development as equally important challenges compared to traditional security threats. The recent establishment of the “National Climate Change” and “Whole-of Society Defense Resilience” committees indicates the government’s recognition of the threats posed by climate change, natural disasters, and authoritarian expansion, as well as its determination to strengthen national resilience. Taiwan should integrate domestic resources in this direction and collaborate with the international community to seek effective experiences and jointly develop strategies to address non-traditional threats.
(Ⅲ) Promote Social Consensus and Resolve Party Differences
Political affiliation significantly influences attitudes toward defense budgets and confidence in international alliances. The Taiwanese government should enhance cross-party communication to build a social consensus on defense policy and avoid defense issues sparking partisan conflict. Hosting national security forums can help unify public opinion, ensuring that defense policies are consistent and stable.
(Ⅳ) Deepen International Cooperation and Expand Diplomatic Space
The majority of the public support collaboration between Taiwan and democratic nations such as the U.S. and Japan, viewing it as beneficial for national security. The government should continue to deepen strategic partnerships with the U.S. and Japan while actively seeking support from other international allies to expand diplomatic space, thereby strengthening Taiwan’s position in the international arena.
(Ⅴ) Enhance Public Awareness and Confidence in Alliances
Policies should consider how to bolster the Taiwanese public’s confidence in U.S. assistance. This can be achieved through clear communication about the direction of defense cooperation and by integrating track 1.5 or 2 strategic dialogues. This approach will ensure that the Taiwanese people understand the forms of assistance the U.S. can provide, avoiding expectations that are either too high or too low.
[1]
Christina Chen is Assistant Research Fellow of Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts, INDSR.
Kuan-chen Lee is is Assistant Research Fellow of Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts, INDSR.
[2]
“China is Using an ‘Anaconda Strategy’ to Squeeze Taiwan,” The Economist, October 3, 2024, https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/10/03/china-is-using-an-anaconda-strategy-to-squeeze-taiwan.
[3]
Bonny Lin, “U.S. Policy toward China and Taiwan,” CSIS, September 26, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
us-policy-toward-china-and-taiwan.
[4]
The survey was commissioned by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) and conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University. The target population consisted
of residents of Taiwan aged 18 and above, with the survey carried out through random sampling via telephone interviews. The data collection period spanned September 11 to September 16, 2024. A total of 1,214 valid responses were obtained, comprising 851 landline samples and 363 mobile phone samples. At a 95% confidence level, the maximum margin of sampling error is estimated to be ±2.81%.
[5]
“Biden Does not Rule Out Possibility of Using Forces to Defend Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan, June 4, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202406040025.
[6]
Kuan-chen Lee, Christina Chen, and Ying-Hsuan Chen, “Core Public Attitudes toward Defense and Security in Taiwan,” Taiwan Politics, January 9, 2024, https://doi.org/10.58570/WRON8266.