BIDEN’S TAIWAN POLICY UNDER THE MOUNTING CHINA’S THREAT
2021.07.01
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By Shao-cheng (Michael) Sun
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2020, cross-Strait tensions have mounted as China has increased its military aggression on Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said that their exercises aimed to send a warning to Taiwan that they would not give in on its “sovereignty.”[1] On March 10, 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson, the former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, stated that China’s threat against Taiwan will manifest in the next six years.[2] On April 12, U.S. President Joe Biden sent a delegation to Taiwan led by former Senator Chris Dodd, a close friend of Biden’s. The White House called this visit as a “personal signal” of the Biden’s solid commitment to Taiwan.[3] In response, China dispatched 25 warplanes intruding on Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). The Taiwan Affairs Office of China commented that the PLA’s response was an “actual combat” exercise aimed to curb “Taiwan-U.S. collusion.”[4] Since the PLA warplanes’ intrusion have become frequent, the Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense said jet pilots would no longer scramble to encounter the PLA aircraft each time and would instead track them with ground-to-air missiles.[5] With the rising cross-Strait tension, The Economist labeled Taiwan as “the most dangerous place on earth.”[6] This paper examines what the Chinese government has done to increase its threat against Taiwan and what the Biden administration’s response has been to deescalate the crisis and ensure Taiwan’s security.
II. CHINA’S RISING THREAT
Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen won the presidential election, Taiwan policy under Xi Jinping has become aggressive. In 2019, Xi stated that China did not promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option to use all necessary measures.[7] Xi’s administration has framed reunification with Taiwan as a requirement for achieving the China Dream.[8] With the strong rhetoric and increased military activities, the PLA has taken steps to enhance its capabilities to conquer Taiwan.
1) STRONG RHETORIC AGAINST TAIWAN’S LEADER
Since President Tsai was re-elected in 2020, Beijing has intensified their rhetoric against her administration. Their criticisms include the following:
First, Taiwan’s moves toward independence. The Chinese government asserts that the escalating cross-Strait tension is attributed to Tsia’s administration refusal to accept the “1992 consensus.” In March 2021, Premier Li Keqiang said that China would deter any separatist activity seeking Taiwan’s independence.[9] China’s Ministry of Defense claimed that Taiwan’s separatist forces remained the gravest threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait. They threatened, “Taiwan independence means war.”[10]
Second, Taiwan’s push for de-Sinicization. China claimed that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has pushed for “de-Sinicization” in all fields of Taiwan. For example, a high school history curriculum passed by Taiwan’s Ministry of Education made Chinese history part of East Asian history. The China’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that pushing de-sinicization in education would poison the younger generation in Taiwan.[11]
Third, Taiwan’s pursuit of international recognition. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of masks and medical supplies to its diplomatic allies and close countries including the U.S. and European countries. Taiwan’s efforts in fighting COVID-19 and assisting other countries have dwarfed the Chinese image of intervention on Hong Kong protests, and aggressive territorial expansion in the South China Sea. However, Taiwan’s efforts for being a responsible stakeholder of global public health has been interpreted by China as an attempt to disrupt the cross-Strait status quo.
Fourth, Taiwan’s collusion with the U.S. After President Tsai took office, U.S. and Taiwan relations have improved. For example, the U.S. Congress passed the Taipei Act in 2019, which committed the U.S. government to help Taiwan improve its international standing. President Trump started to dispatch cabinet members to Taiwan. The visits enraged Chinese leaders, who view the U.S. as violating China’s domestic affairs. More importantly, the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have increased. Since May to October 2020, the U.S. approved five billion dollars in arms sales. China retaliated by sanctioning U.S. companies selling weapons to Taiwan.[12] Chinese media also threatened Taiwan that they would pay a heavy price for it.[13]
China believed that Taiwan not only pushed for de-Sinicization, but also colluded with the U.S. against China. To prevent this trend, the Beijing regime and their official mouthpiece have threatened the Tsai’s administration that the PLA has prepared to take Taiwan by force.
2) THE MILITARY THREAT
China is preparing for military means against Taiwan. Their military threats are listed below.
To begin with, the PLA intrudes Taiwan’s ADIZ. Since September 2020, the PLA’s warplanes have been flying across the median line of the Taiwan Strait and flying around Taiwan almost daily.[14] On April 12, twenty-five PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ, the largest number of warplanes ever recorded.[15] There are several purposes for the PLA’s warplanes intrusion including intimidating Taiwan’s government and people, wearing out Taiwan’s Air Force, testing Taiwan’s military response, and preparing for a future invasion.
In addition, China began taking steps to prevent a U.S. intervention. The PLA is deploying long-range missiles along the Southeast coastal areas of Mainland China. Their pilots are conducting long distance flight training to prevent U.S.’s military intervention in cross-Strait conflict.[16] As further proof, the PLA released a video displaying H-6 bombers making a simulated strike against Anderson Air Force Base in Guam to deter the U.S. intervention.[17]
Finally, the PLA has conducted exercises simulating the invasion Taiwan. On October 10, 2020, Taiwan’s National Day, China staged an island invasion military exercise. The Chinese media disclosed the entire process of a staged military landing in Taiwan.[18] On April 5, 2021, the PLA Navy announced that the Liaoning aircraft carrier was conducting exercises near Taiwan.[19] China claimed that these exercises could improve their ability to prevent Taiwan from seeking independence.
The Chinese government believes that the most effective way to prevent Taiwan from separation of the “motherland” is using military coercion. Therefore, they are using the verbal warnings and military preparations to achieve their political and military goals.
III. BIDEN’S TAIWAN POLICY
Amid arm sales and high-level official visits to Taiwan under the Trump’s administration seems to be continuing under President Biden.[20] The Biden team has shown a hardline approach toward China. Biden said China was the U.S.’s most serious competitor. Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Secretary of Defense, commented that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan must be “crystal clear” under the rising China threat.[21] Under Biden, the U.S. will likely provide the following supports.
1) THE POLITICAL SUPPORT
The U.S.’s and China’s growing rivalry increases Taiwan’s attraction to the U.S. government to confront China.[22] As containing China becomes the U.S. policy, Taiwan’s geographic location has turned to be more important to the U.S.’s interests. Biden seems to be tough on China while demonstrating commitment to Taiwan. When the PLA’s warplanes approached Taiwan, the State Department urged China to cease its military pressure by affirming that the U.S.’s commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid.[23] On April 16, 2021, Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Suga had a summit on the recent cross-Strait tension. Both leaders “underscore the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.[24] Maintaining the status quo is the priority for the Biden’s administration. High-ranking U.S. officials also show support for Taiwan. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan called for the U.S. to invest in capabilities that would bolster deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Secretary of State Blinken ensured that the U.S. will provide Taiwan with the capabilities it needs to defend itself.[25]
2) THE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT
Beijing has shown hostility toward Taiwan by working to exclude Taipei’s international participation. In response, the Biden administration is supportive of enhancing U.S. and Taiwan relations, and facilitating Taiwan’s participation in the international organizations. First, the U.S. government has strengthened relations with Taiwan. In January 2021, Biden became the first President since 1978 to host Taiwan’s envoy at his inauguration.[26] The State Department announced a new policy to encourage engagement of bilateral government officials.[27] Second, the U.S. assists Taiwan’s contributions in meaningful international organizations. The Biden team supports the Taipei Act and encourages governments and international organizations to increase their relations with Taiwan. Blinken also affirmed U.S.’s support for Taiwan’s membership in the World Health Organization.[28]
3) THE MILITARY SUPPORT
As China’s fighter jets and carrier group harasses Taiwan, the military support under Biden’s administration increased. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin responded, “He would make sure that the U.S. are living up to its commitments to support Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.”[29] There is some military support under the Biden’s administration. First, military deterrence. The guided missile destroyer conducted a transit of the Taiwan Strait on March 3, 2021. The U.S. commented this transit demonstrated its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.[30] Second, arm sales. In March 2021, the American Institute in Taiwan informed the Tsai’s administration that an arm sale that include 40 M109A6 “Paladin” self-propelled howitzers, with delivery expected between 2023 and 2025.[31] Third, self-defense capabilities. On April 15, Chris Dodd led a delegation to Taiwan at the Biden’s request to reaffirm the U.S.-Taiwan partnership, which he described as “stronger than ever.” Dodd added that Biden would support Taiwan military investments in self-defense.[32]
Under Biden, the U.S. will continue to maintain its security commitments as outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances by providing arms sales, carrying out freedom of navigation exercises in the Taiwan Strait, advocating for Taiwan’s international participation, and sending U.S. officials to Taiwan.[33]
IV. TAIWAN’S RESPONSES
President Tsai has sought to bolster Taiwan’s defense by raising the defense budget, reforming the reserves, and purchasing weapons. Her administration has also pushed to revive Taiwan’s domestic weapons manufacturing, including submarines, armored vehicles, and aircraft.[34]
1) SHOWING RESOLVE TO DEFEND TAIWAN
To show Taiwan’s resolution of defending their homeland, Foreign Minister Joseph Wu stated that the defense of Taiwan is the responsibility of Taiwanese people. Tsai’s government will effortlessly improve defense capability. Taiwanese people will defend themselves to the very last day.[35] In March 2021, the Taiwan Defense Minister said that “I always tell my peers to stop asking, ‘how many days we need to hold out?’ The question is, ‘how many days does China want to fight?’ We’ll keep them company for as many days as they want to fight.”[36] Taiwan attempted to send a clear message to the international society that their military have the resolve to defend Taiwan and will not take advantage of the U.S. security commitment.
2) INCREASING DEFENSE BUDGET
In 2021, President Tsai’s administration has increased its military budget 10 percent, to about $15 billion a year.[37] The acquisitions of weapons include two main sources. First, Taiwan has purchased upgraded warplanes, howitzers, missiles, and other military hardware from the U.S.[38] Second, with China firmly opposing Taiwan’s weaponry acquisition from foreign countries, Tsai administration has actively pushed to revive Taiwan’s domestic weapons manufacturing, including submarines, armored vehicles, and military aircraft.[39]
3) REQUESTING THE U.S.’S SUPPORT
The Biden administration prevents China from coercing democratic Taiwan. The U.S. and Taiwan governments have taken steps to enhance their bilateral relations that would be consistent with the sprits of the Taiwan Relations Act, the Taiwan Travel Act, and the Taipei Act.[40] The Tsai’s administration has acknowledged that its cooperation with the U.S. is essential in resisting China’s military threat. Taiwan has requested the U.S. government can have a greater clarity and assurance of U.S. commitments to defend Taiwan because it is critical for the purposes of deterrence.[41]
4) IMPROVING DEFENSE CAPABILITY
The Han Kuang military exercises are held annually in two stages: the tabletop drills and live-fire drills. The “tabletop” stage of the 2021 took place from April 23 to 30 to test Taiwan’s defense against a simulated attack by China.[42] With China’s escalating military aggression, the 2021 tabletop drills lasted for eight days, the longest in the history of the exercises. The live-fire component of the exercises is scheduled from July 12 to 16.[43] The drills are designed based on the toughest enemy threats, simulating all possible scenarios on an enemy invasion on Taiwan.[44]
V. CONCLUSION
As China’s threats against Taiwan have mounted, the U.S. strategists have been debating whether it is time for shifting U.S. security commitment to Taiwan from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity.”[45] The U.S. polling suggests that while foreign policy elites endorse going to war for Taiwan, ordinary Americans are skeptical. A 2021 report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that while 85 percent of Republican leaders support sending U.S. troops to defend Taiwan, only 43 percent of Republicans among the public agree.[46] As a senator, President Biden voted in favor of the TRA. However, Biden wrote a Washington Post opinion article in 2001 arguing that the TRA did not require the U.S. to come to Taiwan’s defense.[47] It is likely that the Biden’s administration will continue to implement strategic ambiguity.
Polling indicates that most Taiwanese do not feel very threatened and are not worried about imminent attack.[48] Since it is difficult to predict whether the U.S. will come to defend Taiwan if China attacks Taiwan, Tsai’s administration has the responsibility to inform the public that the war is possible. The Taiwanese people need to be actively preparing for the worst-case scenario. The ruling party of Taiwan should also do all means to prevent the war from happening.
Dr. Shao-cheng (Michael) Sun is an Assistant Professor at The Citadel. His research interests are U.S.-China relations and U.S. security policy in Asia. He can be reached at ssun@citadel.edu.
[1] Associated Press, “Taiwan Will Fight ‘to the Very Last Day’ If China Attacks,” The Diplomat, April 8, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/taiwan-will-fight-to-the-very-last-day-if-china-attacks/.
[2] Chip Gregson, Russell Hsiao, and Stephen Young, “How the Biden Administration Can Support Taiwan,” The Diplomat, April 30, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/how-the-biden-administration-can-support-taiwan/.
[3] Reuters, “As Biden’s emissaries go to Taiwan, China terms exercises ‘combat drills’,” Reuters, April 14, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-its-taiwan-strait-military-drills-necessary-address-security-2021-04-14/. Yimou Lee and Ben Blanchard, “Taiwan says China bolstering ability to attack, blockade island,” Reuters, March 19, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-defence/taiwan-says-china-bolstering-ability-to-attack-blockade-island-idUSKBN2BB16V.
[4] Reuters, ibid.
[5] Erin Hale, “Is China really about to invade Taiwan?” Aljazeera, April 14, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/14/is-there-really-a-risk-that-china-will-go-to-war-with-taiwan.
[6] Justin Metz, “The most dangerous place on Earth,” The Economist, May 1, 2021, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/05/01/the-most-dangerous-place-on-earth.
[7] Alex Ward, “How China could force Biden’s hand on defending Taiwan,” VOX, May 5, 2021, https://www.vox.com/22405553/taiwan-china-war-joe-biden-strategic-ambiguity.
[8] John Culver and Ryan Hass, “Understanding Beijing’s motives regarding Taiwan, and America’s role: A 35-year CIA officer’s view,” Brookings, March 30, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/understanding-beijings-motives-regarding-taiwan-and-americas-role/.
[9] Yimou Lee and Ben Blanchard, ibid.
[10] Joshua Keating, “How Long Can the Biden Administration Stall a Crisis in Taiwan?” Slate, February 2, 2021, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/02/biden-taiwan-china-crisis.html.
[11] “Beijing criticizes Taiwan’s de-sinicization act,” CGTN, April 15, 2018, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d774d7941544e79457a6333566d54/share_p.html.
[12] Gabriel Crossley and Ben Blanchard, “China threatens retaliation over new U.S. arms sales to Taiwan,” Reuters, October 22, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-arms/china-threatens-retaliation-over-new-u-s-arms-sales-to-taiwan-idUSKBN2770C6.
[13] Global Times editorial, “Tsai’s soft rhetoric cannot fool world on ‘one China,’” Global Times, October 11, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1203125.shtml.
[14] Yimou Lee, Ben Blanchard, ibid.
[15] Zhang Han and Liu Xuanzun, “1st reported Taiwan arms sales under Biden admin come early, further strain situation,” Global Times, April 20, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1221502.shtml.
[16] Yimou Lee, Ben Blanchard, ibid.
[17] Alex Ward, ibid.
[18] Alex Ward, ibid.
[19] Zhang Han and Liu Xuanzun, ibid.
[20] “Tabletop Han Kuang games begin,” Taipei Times, April 25, p.3.
[21] Derek Grossman, “Biden doubles-down on Trump's Taiwan policy, but will it last?” February 6, 2021, Nikkei Asia, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Biden-doubles-down-on-Trump-s-Taiwan-policy-but-will-it-last.
[22] John Culver and Ryan Hass, ibid.
[23] Joshua Keating, ibid.
[24] Ralph Jennings, “US-Japan Statement Raises Issue of Taiwan Defense Against China,” VOA, April 24, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/us-japan-statement-raises-issue-taiwan-defense-against-china.
[25] David Sacks, “Biden Administration Sends Important Signals for the Future of U.S.-Taiwan Ties,” Council on the Foreign Relations, January 28, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/biden-administration-sends-important-signals-future-us-taiwan-ties.
[26] Peter Beinart, “Biden’s Taiwan Policy Is Truly, Deeply Reckless,” The New York Times, May 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/05/opinion/biden-taiwan-china.html.
[27] Robert Delaney, “US announces new policy encouraging government ties with Taiwan officials,” South Morning Post, April, 10, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3129013/us-announces-new-policy-encouraging-government-ties-taiwan
[28] Derek Grossman, ibid.
[29] David Sacks, ibid.
[30] “U.S. Warship Transits Taiwan Strait Amid China Tensions,” Reuters, April 7, 2021, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-04-07/us-warship-transits-taiwan-strait-amid-china-tensions
[31] John Feng, “Joe Biden Set To Approve First Arms Sale to Taiwan Amid China Threat,” Newsweek, April 20, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/joe-biden-set-approve-first-arms-sale-taiwan-amid-china-threat-1584931.
[32] John Feng, ibid.
[33] Bonnie Glaser, “Biden to adopt policy of 'doing no harm' to Taiwan: Bonnie Glaser,” January 22, 2021, Focus Taiwan, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202101220009.
[34] Erin Hale, ibid.
[35] Associated Press, ibid.
[36] Ryan Pickrell, “Taiwan warns it will fight to ‘the very last day’ if attacked as China steps up its military activity nearby,” Insider, April 7, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/taiwan-warns-fight-to-end-conflict-with-china-2021-4.
[37] Michael E. O’Hanlon, “An asymmetric defense of Taiwan,” Brookings, April 28, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/04/28/an-asymmetric-defense-of-taiwan/.
[38] Associated Press, ibid.
[39] Erin Hale, ibid.
[40] Chip Gregson, Russell Hsiao, and Stephen Young, ibid.
[41] Chip Gregson, Russell Hsiao, and Stephen Young, ibid.
[42] “Tabletop Han Kuang games begin,” Taipei Times, April 25, p.3.
[43] “Tabletop Han Kuang games begin,” ibid.
[44] Ben Blanchard and Yimou Lee, ibid.
[45] Michael E. O’Hanlon, ibid.
[46] Peter Beinart, ibid.
[47] Alex Ward, ibid.
[48] John Culver and Ryan Hass, ibid.