By Che-Jen Wang

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s sudden resignation put an end on the 7-years-and-8-months long pro-Russian administration. Although having built a strong personal connection with President Vladimir Putin and promoted economic projects in the Far East Siberia of Russia, Abe failed to solve this problem during his entire life as a Prime Minister. The reasons are two folds. The first is the lack of trust between Moscow and Tokyo which primarily comes from the military alliance between Japan and US. The second is domestic constraints on territorial dispute. Before striking a territorial deal with Russia, the new Suga administration has to avoid the possible US encroachment in the future on Russia’s national security concern in the Pacific. For domestic issues, the administration must reach agreements among the Japanese society on the number of islands returned and the procedure of returning the islands.

On August 28, 2020, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suddenly announced to resign due to his health issue and put an end on the 7-years-and-8-months long administration’s Russia policy. Former Secretary of State Suga was elected as the successor prime minister. Since his third administration in 2012, Abe has attended 27 summit meetings with Putin, visited Russia nine times, while Putin has visited Japan only twice. It should be noted that there was no meeting for leaders of both states for consecutive 11 years (2005-2016). That’s why many consider the best Japan-Russia relations has passed.[1] Solving the territorial dispute with Russia is one of Abe’s diplomatic goal, which is inherited from his father and his grandfather. Although having built a strong personal connection with Putin and promoted economic projects in the Far East Siberia of Russia, Abe failed to solve this problem all his life as a Prime Minister. This paper explains why Prime Minister Abe can’t achieve the mission in solving the 70-year historical dispute.

Before the WWII, the demarcation of the Russia-Japan borders over Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were settled by The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia in 1855, the Treaty of Saint Petersburg and in 1875 and The Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, as shown in Figure 1.[2] As the WWII approaching to the end, the Soviet Union (SU) declared war on Japan on August 9, 1945, quickly occupied the entire Kuril Islands,[3] nationalized all the property on the Islands, and finally amended the Soviet Constitute to include the Islands as part of Soviet Territory. In 1951, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty to terminate the war with other Allied Powers and to renounce the territories occupied before/during the WWII, including the South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. However, the term of “Kuril Island” mentioned in the Treaty were not clearly defined.[4] Although taking part in the Treaty Conference, the SU delegation refused to sign the Treaty for the US not amending the Treaty according to SU’s demand for including Communist China. These reasons make room for dispute from both countries.[5]

Figure 1: The Demarcation of Territory Between Russia and Japan (1855-1905)

The most important step toward solving the Kuril Islands dispute[6] after the end of WWII is the signing of The Joint Declaration in 1956. Not only does the Declaration put an end to the state of war between Russia and Japan and restored the diplomatic relations, but stated that Russia agrees to transfer the Habomai Islands and Shikotan to Japan, after signing the peace treaty. However, as the Soviet-West tension grew in the late 1950s, the Japanese government, supported by the US, changed its position by asking the return of all four disputed islands in one time, known as “All-Four-Islands-Return-Together” policy (四島一括返還).[7] Later the renewed US-Japanese Security Treaty signed in 1960 allowing the US military presence in Japan and terminated SU’s willing to negotiate as SU perceived threats from the US. Later Andrei Gromyko, then foreign minister of the SU, delivered a memorandum to Japan requiring the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japan as a fresh condition for signing a peace treaty.[8] Japan rejected the demand. Since then on, the Soviets turn to a more abstinent stance, nullifying their part in the Joint Statement and refusing the returning the two smaller islands.

Many efforts had been tried before 2012 when Putin and Abe started their respective third term as national leaders. However, these efforts did not bear any concrete result. The relationship between Japan and Russia deteriorated substantially after the Crimea Crisis, because Japan, in order to maintain solidarity with the West, imposed sanctions against Russia in August 2014. The discussion of Putin’s visit to Japan was abruptly postponed right after the sanction. Not until Abe successfully met Putin in Sochi in May 2016 the negotiation started again. During the meeting, Abe presented an eight-points economic cooperation plan, which includes cooperation in sectors like energy, transportation, agriculture, science and technology, health care, urban infrastructure, culture, and investment in small and medium-sized enterprises.[9] It is deemed as a “New Approach”.[10] The $1-billion Russia-Japan Investment Fund was established jointly by two government-backed investment vehicles – the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Japan’s Bank for International Cooperation in August 2017. The Fund focuses on projects that foster economic cooperation between the two nations. After 2 years of devotion in promoting bilateral cooperation, there are, by the end of October 2018, about 150 joint projects have already been created within the framework of the eight-point cooperation plan, and about half of them are already at the stage of concrete implementation.[11] It is clear that although not clear stipulated, Abe try to use the economic cooperation and benefit to soften Russia’s tough stance on territorial negotiation. This strategy is known as “Two Islands Plus Alpha,” and Alpha means economic cooperation.

On September 12, 2018, Putin suddenly proposed that Moscow and Tokyo should sign, without precondition, a peace agreement as the foundation to resolve their long-running territorial dispute by the end of 2018. The offer, contradicting to Japanese long-term strategy to use the peace agreement as a negotiation chip for the return of the Kuril Islands, was rejected by the Abe Government right after the proposal was raised. Abe, when addressing speech in UN Assembly, emphasized that the territorial issue must be dealt before concluding the peace treaty.[13]

In terms of the territorial dispute of Kuril Islands, Russia has inherited the standpoint of SU, who claimed the occupation of the Kuril Islands is based on the Cairo Declaration in 1943, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Yalta Agreement[14] in 1945 and the subsequent General Order No. 1, which issued on 2 September 1945 by Truman later in the same year. The Cairo Conference did not mention Kuril islands, but the Potsdam Proclamation and the Yelta Agreement state that “the Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine” and “the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union” respectively.[15] The following General Order No. 1 agrees Soviet occupation all of Kuril Islands.[16] So when Japan relinquished all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it has no ownership to the Islands, even that the SU did not sign the Treaty has no effect on Japan’s renouncing of the Islands. In addition, Russia believe that the casualty of Shumshir battle justifies the liberation of Kuril Islands at the end of WWII.[17] The Kremlin does not consider there is a territorial dispute with Russia as early as Khrushchev and Brezhnev’s time and the discussion was only limit to the upper echelons of the Communist Party. Local authorities like Sakhalin did not consider the chain of Kuril Islands to be broken, and the border between the SU and Japan, according to the Soviet’s perspective, are “in the middle of Nemuro Strait, Notsuke Strait and Goyomai Strait.”[18]

Since SU was not a signatory to the San Francisco Treaty, Japan, therefore, argues the seizure of the four islands and their subsequent incorporation into the SU were of no legal grounds in the following three points.

Firstly, although the Yalta Agreement did state that “the Kurile islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union,” Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that Yalta Agreement “did not determine the final settlement of the territorial problem, as it was no more than a statement by the then leaders of the Allied Powers as to principles of the postwar settlement… Japan is not bound by this document, to which it did not agree.”[19] Secondly, although Japan renounced all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands in the San Francisco Treaty, the Treaty did not specify to whom the islands were renounced. Since the SU was no party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it is arguable that the SU has sovereignty right over the Kuril Islands.[20] Thirdly, the SU violated the Atlantic Charter for aggression on Japan’s territorial integrity and Japanese islanders’ right to self-determination.[21]

The lack of trust between Moscow and Tokyo and domestic political constraints on territorial dispute cause the failure of Abe’s Russian policy.

(1) The lack of trust between Moscow and Tokyo

When asked about whether to apply Russia-China model to settle the Kuril Islands dispute, Putin said the territorial dispute between China and Russia was resolved “only due to a high level of trust between the states”.[22] As Kuril Islands serve as Russian naval access to the Western Pacific and play a critical role in Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy. The islands’ strategic value to Russia has been increasing in recent years. Returning the islands to Japan would make Moscow lost the control of the whole Sea of Okhotsk and no longer has unrestricted access to the open seas. This will reduce the Russian Pacific Fleet’s effectiveness and lower Russia’s security. The obstacle of trust does not come from Japan only, but, more importantly, from US.

The Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (安保条約, the Security Treaty thereafter) allows the US troops to use the military facilities in Japan.[23] Would the US, after Japan taking over the islands, take advantage of the Security Treaty and use the naval base in the islands to undermine the Russia’s interest in the Pacific? This sets Russia’s national security on alert. Under the on-going contending phenomenon between the West and Russia due to the Ukraine crisis, US military presence in Japan has complicated the search for a formal peace treaty between Moscow and Tokyo.[24] President Putin has been referring to US threats since 2001, when the Irkutsk statement was announced. Therefore, Russia also requests that the memorandum delivered to Japan in 1960 demanding the pullout of all foreign troops from Japan as a condition for the return of disputed islands should be taken into account in any peace treaty talks between Moscow and Japan.[25]

In order to dispel Moscow's concern over US presence on the islands, Abe, on the one hand, promised Putin that Japan will not let the US to build any military bases there after Russia returns them to Japan.[26] On the other hand, Abe sought the US support for concluding the peace treaty with Russia, saying a closer Tokyo-Moscow ties will help counter a threat posed by China.[27] However, Abe administration’s effort did not work out, as Moscow did not believe Japan has the ability to reject US request for using the naval base in the islands, as Japan’s security still depends on the military alliance with the US. Moreover, rejecting US request is hardly acceptable for Japanese society for, as Muneo Suzuki points out, the mindset of the Japanese media, diplomats and politicians all tend to be influenced by the US.[28]

Another negative reason for building trust is the economic sanction after Crimea crisis. Though reluctantly and symbolically joined the anti-Russian sanctions, Japan voted for the UN resolution for sanction. In response to Japan’s sanction, Putin dropped plans to visit Japan in the following month. The sanction not only damage the economic relationship, but also violate the 1956 Joint Statement.[29]

(2) Domestic Constraints on Territorial Dispute

Public opinion against territorial cession in both nations create a ravine that is impossible to cover for both administrations. In 2019, around 96% of citizens of the Kuril Islands oppose handing over the territory to Japan. Similar polls held in 2018, 2009 and 1994 find similar results.[30]

On November 29, 2018, the Sakhalin Oblast Duma appealed to the Russian Foreign Ministry with a request to exclude the territorial issue of Kuril Islands from the negotiation process on a peace treaty.[31] In addition, petition with signatures were collected and an appeal was sent to Putin for preventing an exchange of territorial concession for peace agreement. Therefore, most of the scholars and political elites, with support from the public, insist no-returning of any island to Japan. Political activist and former leader of National Bolshevik Party Eduard Limonov said that Russia has no need of a peace treaty with Japan and that Putin would not be forgiven for transferring territory to Japan.[32] Professor Yury Tavrovsky at the Russian Peoples' Friendship University predicts that nothing in signing a peace treaty would really be achieved and “no single stone in the Kuril Islands will become Japanese in the foreseeable future.”[33] The constitutional amendment in July 2020 practically made the territorial ceding impossible.[34]

The Japanese public also shows a strong determination in the returning of the Kuril Islands, as they have been treated as an inherent part of the territory of Japan. Whenever issues infringing Japan’s sovereignty on the Kuril Islands happen, a demand of toughing stance to Russia from politicians usually follows. For example, on the news that Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev was planning in August to visit Etorofu and a Russian A-50 observation plane entered the airspace of Takeshima Island, Yuichiro Tamaki, the leader of National Democratic Party, said Japan need not to speed up for researching a peace treaty. It is necessary to return to the blank basis, including joint economic activities.[35] A stronger stance was made by Hodaka Maruyama, a young politician in the House of Representatives in the Diet, suggested, during a visit to the Kunashiri Island, that there is no other solution for the Kuril Islands except war.[36]

The failure to reach an internal consensus regarding the number of islands returned has been one of the obstacles in Japan’s negotiations with Russia. “All-Four-Islands-Return-Together” has been the official position of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, securing the ownership of the 4 disputed islands is the most favored option. A recent Nikkei poll finds 67% of respondents in favor of Abe’s agreement with Putin to accelerate peace treaty talks.[37] As for how many islands need to be returned, 33% of respondents favored “All-Four-Islands-Return-Together,” 46% Two-Islands-First (which implies the negotiation on the returning of Etorofu and Kunashiri will be started after signing of peace treaty) , and only 5% for Just-Two-Islands.

Not only there is no consensus about the number of islands Russian should return, but also the cleft on the approach dealing with Russia. In 2017, the Abe’s foreign policy circle rifted over the foreign policy priority. Toshihiro Nikai and Takaya Imai, Abe's chief secretary with the background of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) rather than the Foreign or Defense Ministry, emphasized on economic cooperation, while the Foreign Ministry underpinned on the security issues.[38] After Imai won Abe’s trust and played a big role in foreign policymaking, Abe’s diplomacy shifted to economic interests. When the rift applied to northern territory issues, Imai represented a soft approach and support the “Two-Island-Plus-Alpha” policy, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a tough stance to Russia and favored the “All-Four-Islands-Return-Together.”

Abe’s administration’s futile efforts in settling the territorial issue between Japan and Russia can be attributable to multiple reasons. Both Abe and Putin have sufficient domestic support and personal willpower to promote the solution to this historical problem, but there are still many obstacles to be overcome in the future. First and foremost, how to pacify Russia’s security concern on the possible US military deployment on the islands. Under current situation between the West and Russia, there is no available solution for this yet. Russia currently occupies the islands with stronger military might and, therefore, has the superior bargaining position over the negotiation. Japan cannot help but to recognize that “All-Four-Islands-Return-Together” is not a viable option.