In the Light of a China Clouding Era—A glance at Australia’s Strategic Landscapes in the South Pacific
2019.12.31
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By Oddis Tsai
Introduction
China has outrun the US as the country which has the most diplomatic posts worldwide in 2019.[1] By gaining 7 more allies defected from Taiwan’s side since 2016, China now runs 276 diplomatic posts globally, three more than the US.[2] Such outrun not just reflects Beijing’s ambition to expand its global reach but also provide a clear message that Taiwan’s international space is the last stronghold related to China’s ultimate “win” in a US-predominant world. In particular, the area where lies in between two giants—the South Pacific.
The South Pacific has long represented the strategic gateway for the US to enter the Indo-Pacific waters and hence significant to the defence of Australia homeland and other US allies along the Pacific Island chains. This op-ed introduces a strategic outlook from Down Under and China’s looming economic power to the island-dotted region.
The South Pacific
The South Pacific comprises 14 countries, including 9 sovereign states and 5 freely associated countries.[3] Samoa, Nauru, Tonga, Fiji, Papua New Guinea,[4] Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Vanuatu are fully independent. The other five enjoy different degrees of autonomy according to their agreements with regional powers, which are responsible for their defence and security respectively. Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau sign the “Compacts of Free Association (COFA)” with the United States. The US Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) offers financial assistance through COFA frameworks, in return for the exclusive rights of US to operate military bases on these islands. Cook Islands(1965) and Niue(1974) become self-governing in free association with New Zealand within similar arrangements.
Australia, New Zealand, the US and France, these four western powers traditionally play a more predominating role in this part of the world. They form the “Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group” (Oceanian QUAD) to foster multilateral approaches in order to tackle traditional and non-traditional security challenges, such as Niue Treaty.[5] Noteworthily, the Oceanian QUAD states hold ten overseas territories in Oceania where 43% of the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) locates.[6]
Australia’s Strategic View to the Region
From Canberra’s perspective, there are three primary strategic interests corresponding to the three-layered concentric circles of Australia’s defence.
Firstly, the Australian Continent with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication, this part comprised of the mainland and the north arc, namely Indonesian archipelago along with adjacent Melanesia. The northern arch is the gateway of those trade routes to Asia and security channels to Japan at the First Island Chain and those US bases in the Second and Third Island Chain.
Secondly, peace and stability in South East Asia and the South Pacific, this part connects South China Sea, Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea in the west, as well as maritime transportation to North and South America in the east. Lastly, a stable Indo-Pacific and rule-based global order, this part implies that Australia tends to maintain the strategic status quo it has been enjoyed since the Pacific War.[7]
Canberra perceives the security of its immediate neighbourhood of the northern arch equally crucial as its homeland because Australia’s long coastal line is almost indefensible to its population scale of 2.3 million. Any external power’s attempt to project influence into this region would be seen as a potential threat due to its empirical instincts from the past. Moreover, any attempt to block the US access to South Pacific would legitimately be seen as latent hostility simply because of Australia’s long strategic tradition to rely on an Anglo-Saxon predominant power.
China’s Trial in the Deep Waters
China’s silent immersion into the South Pacific has not raised the alarm to the Australian public until recent years. Such powerful influence which China now processes in the South Pacific, with an intent to pursue interests of the largest autocracy on earth, may sometimes be referred to the term “sharp power,” implying a disrupting nature of such power to the regional status quo. Intriguingly, under these circumstances, Taiwan’s diplomatic footprint in the region turns out to be an unexpected indicator to such penetration.
China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) had articulated that the South Pacific is a part of the blue economic passages, leading China’s way to the open ocean.[8] However, due to the lack of proper risk assessment, those BRI plans sometimes leads to soaring debt for local countries. Tonga is heavily indebted to China by over 25% of its GDP, followed by Samoa’s 20% and Vanuatu’s 17% strong.[9] The Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Nauru and Palau, these diplomatic allies of Taiwan are currently the only four island nations in the region which haven’t joined the BRI. Moreover, China’s total trade with Taiwan’s regional allies (US$3.8 billion) has exceeded that of its own (US$3.5 billion) since 2017.[10] Bilateral trade indeed gives Beijing growing leverage over Taipei’s regional friends.
If one looks at the locations, Taiwan’s 4 allies in the region lie in the midway between Australia and Hawaii, three in Micronesia (Palau, the Marshall Islands, Nauru) as well as one in Polynesia (Tuvalu). Interestingly, China’s ten diplomatic allies contrarily rest on the strategic nodes regarding the second and the third island chain, naturally covering the conjunction points of submarine cables across the ocean (Australia-Guam-Japan and Australia-Hawaii-US west coast).Noteworthily, China has become the second-largest donor to the South Pacific since 2011 with US$5.88 billion worth of aid, catching up Australia’s US$6.72 billion, especially Beijing’s commitment to US$ 4 billion aid in 2017 alone. China could replace Australia in the near future if it keeps going on the same track.[11]
On the afternoon of September 21, 2019, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks in Beijing with Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade Jeremiah Manele of Solomon Islands and signed the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the People's Republic of China and Solomon Islands. (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China)
Last but not the least, a rarely mentioned strategic importance of the Pacific, lies in the deep ocean—marine-based rare earth. Researchers have found 78 sites in the region with rare-earth concentrations of about 0.2%. At such concentration, 1 square kilometre of sea-floor mud could suffice to meet one-fifth of the world’s annual rare-earth demand.[12] Despite the immaturity of seabed mining technologies at the moment, a possibility of the South Pacific being enmeshed into power struggles in terms of resource control in a near future should not be ignored, particularly referring to the looming Sino-American “Tech War” we have witnessed today.
Figure 1. REY (rare-earth elements and yttrium) Seabed Reserves
Source: Yasuhiro Kato, "Deep-sea mud in the Pacific Ocean as a new mineral resource for rare-earth elements," Frontier Research Center for Energy and Resources Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, https://www.pecc.org/resources/environment-1/1923-deep-sea-mud-in-the-pacific-ocean-as-a-new-mineral-resource-for-raw-earth-elements/file
Conclusion
Australia, with its special geological and demographical figures, depends on a secure immediate neighbourhood to keep hostile power offshore. Therefore, the island-spread South Pacific means not only layers of protection to its homeland, but also passages to connect major allies. A more dominating role of China in the region would eventually mean to demising US presence in the First and Second Island Chain, leaving the democratic world in the West Pacific defenceless.
It is noteworthy that Taiwan’s diplomatic presence is turning into “the canary in the coal mine” in the South Pacific nowadays. This metaphor implies that such an identity could be a natural barrier against China’s influence. More and more like-minded countries, including Australia, start to realise a fact that a blow of cutting ties with Taipei will not just suffocate Taiwan with thinner diplomatic air, but also eventually ring the bell to the region for the looming Chinese atmosphere.
Oddis Tsai is a Policy Analyst at the Division for National Defense Resources and Industries, the Institute of National Defense and Security Research. He received his Master Degrees in Diplomatic Studies and Strategic Studies from the Australian National University. Oddis’ research topics cover the South Pacific region and defence industries.
[1]Ben Westcott, “China has overtaken US as world's largest diplomatic power, think tank says,” CNN, November 27, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/26/asia/us-china-diplomacy-lowy-intl-hnk/index.html; Bonnie Bley, “The New Geography of Global Diplomacy China Advances as the United States Retreats,” Foreign Affairs, November 27, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-11-27/new-geography-global-diplomacy.
[2]Those former allies of Taiwan include Sao Tome and Principe (2016), Panama (2017), the Dominican Republic(2018), Burkina Faso (2018), El Salvador (2018), the Solomon Islands (2019) and Kiribati (2019). The number of Taiwan’s allies downsized from 22 in 2016 to 15 in 2019.
[3]South Pacific is a terminology within Taiwanese context, it sometimes called otherwise due to different strategic outlooks from alternative countries. For instance, the US and Japan may this vast area refers to the four adjacent theaters in the Pacific War, namely North Pacific, Central Pacific, Southwest Pacific, South Pacific.
[4]Papua New Guinea is also known as PNG.
[5]Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), "Niue Treaty," https://www.ffa.int/taxonomy/term/451.
[6]Guam (US), Northern Mariana Islands (US), Wake Island (US), American Samoa (US), Hawaii (US), New Caledonia(France), Wallis & Futuna (France), French Polynesia (France), Tokelau (NZ) and Norfolk Island (Australia) in addition to UK’s Pitcairn Islands and Chile’s Easter Island. “Coast Guard, Navy Complete Joint Oceania Maritime Security Initiative Patrol in Pacific Ocean,” USINDOPACOM, May 1, 2018, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1509299/coast-guard-navy-complete-joint-oceania-maritime-security-initiative-patrol-in/.
[7]Defence White Paper 2016, Department of Defence of Australian Government, 2016, https://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper.
[8]“China proposes ‘blue economic passages’ for maritime,” China Daily, June 21, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-06/21/content_29825517.htm.
[9]Jamie Smyth, “China warned to reform its lending to indebted Pacific Islands,” Financial Times, October 20, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/3a53131a-f2d5-11e9-b018-3ef8794b17c6.
[10]China’s trade with the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea comprised 72% of its total trade with PIF members. Ethan Meick, Michelle Ker & Han May Chan, “China's Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Implications for the United States,” Staff Research Report, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 14, 2018, p.7, https://www.uscc.gov/Research/china%E2%80%99s-engagement-pacific-islands-implications-united-states.
[11]James Griffiths & Ben Westcott, “China could overtake Australia as biggest donor to Pacific, if it pays up,” CNN, August 9, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/09/australia/china-pacific-aid-belt-road-intl/index.html. “Pacific Aid Map,” Lowy Institute, https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/.
[12]Yasuhiro Kato et al., “Deep-sea mud in the Pacific Ocean as a potential resource for rare-earth elements,” Nature Geoscience, July 3, 2011, pp. 535–539, https://www.nature.com/articles/ngeo1185.