Volume 8 Issue 4
China’s Next-Generation Missile: The DF—17 in Pacific Conflict and Great Power Competition
By Cameron Freeman
Introduction
Hypersonics are frequently described as a game changer. Military officials, researchers, and security experts have for years highlighted hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and scramjet-powered cruise missiles as technologies which could fundamentally alter the balance of a conflict; advantages in speed, maneuverability, and trajectory over ballistic missiles and ramjet cruise missiles may allow hypersonics to erode defenses and provide asymmetric advantages to nations which employ them from the onset of an engagement.[1] After years of speculation and classified development, HGVs are no longer theoretical but in the field or on the cusp of deployment for several nations. Unsurprisingly, one the most scrutinized weapons displayed at the People’s Republic of China’s October 1, 2019 National Day parade was the Dong Feng-17 (DF-17) HGV system. Though ascertaining the exact technical capabilities of the DF-17 from public sources is not yet possible, it is without a doubt a next-generation weapon. Its deployment will certainly factor into future strategic, tactical, and political calculations made regarding the Asia-Pacific. This article seeks to examine how the DF-17 might be used in a Pacific conflict and the larger role it plays in China’s regional missile strategy and international position in a new era of great power competition.
Though hypersonic weapons have not yet integrated themselves as core component of any nation’s missile strategy, with further technological advancements and increased hypersonic weapons production on the horizon, that seems likely to change. China, Russia, and the United States are competing to rapidly build and deploy HGVs. China’s October 1st exhibition of the DF-17 followed significant Russian announcements the year prior: Vladimir Putin claimed to have begun serial production of Russia’s nuclear-capable Avangard HGV in March 2018, advertising a purported lead in research and development which increased pressure on Chinese and American HGV programs.[2] Though the US Department of Defense (DOD) examined and began testing conventional HGVs as an avenue for its Prompt Global Strike mission as early as 2003, recent advances made by Russia and China seemingly indicate that the US defense community lags behind its competitors—in timeline if not in technology.[3] This delay has led to increasing concern in the US military and policymaking circles and prompted a new push for hypersonic weapons quantified by $2.6 billion allocated for hypersonic prototyping in the DOD FY2020 budget.[4] The US Army plans to field its first HGV battery in 2023.[5]
In China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has in recent years greatly expanded its military capacity by developing its ballistic missile and cruise missile capabilities. As a part of sweeping 2015 military reforms, the PLA formed the as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), a full service on-par with the army and navy. The mass of theater weapons the PLARF has fielded are primarily intended to threaten Taiwan and US Pacific assets—ostensibly to deter the United States from entering into conflict over the island. The PLARF is the backbone of China’s “active defense” strategy and island chain control.[6] With the increasing ability of US ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, Chinese strategists may perceive an aggressive hypersonic missile program as a strong avenue to renew and expand the PLARF threat. The impact of the DF-17 will depend on whether it can truly out-maneuver the point defense systems designed to counter existing PLARF theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). If the DF-17 is indeed capable of evading these interceptors, it stands to play a significant role in the Pacific as a new conventional first strike option which grants China leverage without straying from the no first use nuclear weapons policy. American military officers and defense officials have stated that US forces are not currently prepared to combat an HGV attack, making the looming threat of one more powerful.
Though this article primarily focuses on the known technical capabilities and combat applications of the DF-17, it is essential to highlight that deploying and publicly displaying the DF-17 is intended to serve as a CCP propaganda tool and sign of PLA strength. Even if the DF-17 did not measure up to its purported capabilities, its existence serves to promote the CCP narrative about China’s “rejuvenation” and its position as a world leader. It is conceivable the DF-17 may a political investment almost as much as a strategic or tactical one. Though serious military conflict in the Pacific remains unlikely, the DF-17 may contribute to China’s increasingly bold military operations and posturing in the Asia-Pacific given an increased degree of confidence in PLA threat and prestige.
Advantages of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles
Hypersonic glide vehicles possess a number of clear advantages over traditional ballistic missiles, including those with maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities. The term “hypersonic weapons” gives credence to common misconception that these weapons are faster than ballistic missiles. This is not the case. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) reentry vehicles (RVs) enter the atmosphere at high hypersonic speeds between Mach 17.6 and Mach 23.5, values comparable with only the fastest HGVs like the HTV-2 built by The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which travels around Mach 20.[7] Some HGVs, including DF-17 and the US Army’s Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) are significantly slower than ballistic RVs, at Mach 5-10 and Mach 8 respectively.[8] The real strengths of HGVs lie in trajectory and maneuverability.
HGVs are launched on ballistic missile boosters and separate after the rocket’s burn is complete but, unlike ballistic re-entry vehicles, do not continue into space on a predictable trajectory. Instead, gliders remain within or quickly reenter the atmosphere. They use fins to steer and glide unpowered at altitudes between 40 and 100 km until reaching their intended target. An advanced HGV can theoretically travel as far as an ICBM simply by using aerodynamic forces to continuously generate lift.[9] Because the glide vehicles travel within the atmosphere and necessarily possess control surfaces, they can also maneuver at any point in their flight after completing the initial ballistic stage, making them significantly more dynamic than conventional ballistic missiles.[10] An advanced HGV could switch targets mid-flight or falsely indicate a target before changing course, a capability termed target obfuscation. The glider could also steer around or mislead interceptors, a major focus of hypersonic weapons discussions.
Since ballistic missiles arc predictably over the Earth’s surface, reaching apogees well above 1,000 km at longer ranges, even advanced MaRV and MIRV systems are potentially susceptible to exo-atmospheric midcourse interception.[11] Even shorter-ranged SRBMs and MRBMs (which strike targets up to 3000 km from their launch site) reach apogees several hundred kilometers above the 100 km Kármán line demarcating space.[12] Though ballistic missiles typically employ decoys and countermeasures to complicate midcourse interception, HGVs possess the immediate advantage of not being susceptible to exo-atmospheric ballistic missile defense systems at all.[13] Without a midcourse interception option, only boost-phase and terminal interception are feasible. Yet boost phase interception is difficult without capable missiles and sensors located in close proximity of the missile launch site and a chain of command prepared for immediate action.[14] This is further complicated if the missiles are road-mobile and somewhat unpredictable or if the missiles are launched deep inland. Terminal missile defense, on the other hand, cannot protect a large area from attack, only a small pre-determined priority area. Even then, many fear that the maneuverability of HGVs will allow them to evade modern terminal BMD systems.
The suppressed trajectory and unusual design of HGVs provide further advantages over ballistic missiles in tracking. Any nation which relies on ground-based line-of-sight sensors to track incoming missiles will not be able to detect or track the HGV until the final stages of its decent due to the curvature of the Earth.[15] In essence, because ballistic missiles travel so far over the surface of the planet, radar installations can directly “see” ballistic RVs much sooner than they can HGVs, which remain closer to the ground.[16] A RAND Corporation report determined that the radar detection time for a 3,000 km ballistic RV would be halved with an HGV—from approximately 12 minutes to 6.[17] Even nations with geostationary satellite tracking may not be able to accurately track HGVs which are, “10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S. normally tracks by satellites.”[18] Detecting and combatting HGVs requires significant new defense investments which could in turn trigger further HGV development in rival nations in a dangerous cycle. Experts have widely warned of the potentially destabilizing effects of HGV proliferation: arms-racing, potential nuclear escalation, implementation of launch-on-warning systems, and more.[19]
Capabilities of the DF-17
The DF-17 is a weaponized version of the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, formerly known as the WU-14 in the United States. The Chinese government began developing the DF-ZF in 2009 and reportedly first tested the HGV in January 2014.[20] By 2016, the DF-ZF had been tested at least 7 times, 6 of these times successfully.[21] According to US intelligence officials, DF-ZF demonstrated a high degree of maneuverability in these tests.[22] Though there was significant speculation about the weaponization of the HGV, these fears were not substantiated until December 2017 when The Diplomat reported on two DF-17 tests the month prior, citing unnamed US intelligence officials.[23] The DF-17’s introduction worried observers. The weapon was a significant leap in the HGV race: the November tests were the world’s first tests of an HGV system intended for field operation.”[24]
When the weapon’s existence was first reported, sources in the US government indicated that the DF-17 would reach initial operating capability (IOC) around 2020.[25] This estimate did not vary among analysts until the first public appearance of the DF-17 at the October 1, 2019 Chinese National Day military parade. By including the 16 DF-17 missiles in the event, the Chinese government intended to showcase that the weapon had beaten speculation and reached IOC within 2019.[26] Parade announcers specifically described the DF-17 as a conventional missile but independent analysis indicates the glider also supports nuclear warheads by design. An August 2019 news article quoted an unnamed employee of the glider’s manufacturer, the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), who described the glider as nuclear and conventionally dual-capable.[27] This account corroborated a late-2017 description of the HGV by a US intelligence source.[28] The state’s portrayal of the glider as a conventional precision strike weapon reflects a strategic choice rather than a technical one; by choosing to pursue conventional gliders, the PLARF increased the likelihood the glider would be employed in combat while mitigating potential accusations of violating China’s no first use nuclear weapons policy. A Chinese military source told reporters in November 2019 that all further DF-17s introduced to service would possess conventional warheads.[29]
According to US intelligence assessments, the booster of the DF-17 is heavily based on the two-stage, road-mobile, solid-fueled DF-16B SRBM.[30] The DF-16 entered service in 2011 or 2012 and carries three MIRV conventional, submunition, or nuclear warheads with a range of 800-1,000 km.[31] The DF-17 is longer ranged than its ballistic counterpart and can reportedly strike targets 1,800-2,500 km from its launch point, traveling at speeds between Mach 5 and Mach 10 altitudes around 60 km.[32] The DF-ZF glider is wedge-shaped, taking after DARPA’s HTV-2 and Russia’s Avangard rather than the US Army’s conical AHW, a graphic of which was sometimes confused for the DF-ZF in early reporting.
By the numbers, the DF-17 is not as ambitious of an HGV as those tested by DARPA, the US Army, or the Russian government, something potentially overlooked if one conflates all hypersonic weapons despite speed differences greater than Mach 10 and thousands of kilometers in range discrepancy. Even at the upper end of the DF-17’s speed estimate, Mach 10, it falls far short of DARPA’s HTV-2’s Mach 20 or Russia’s Avangard’s alleged (likely exaggerated) Mach 27 flight velocity.[33] Similarly, though the range of the DF-17 (1,800-2,500 km) is significant, it is well shy of the 6,000+ km ranges of the Avangard and the US Army’s AHW and certainly not on the order of 16,000 km, as some researchers have based broader assessments of HGVs.[34] Though some analysts have suggested that placing the DF-ZF on an ICBM would give it global range, this is implausible. The DF-ZF is almost certainly incapable of withstanding the heat stress and maintaining the required lift-to-drag ratios and speeds required for a long-distance glide.
While the United States and Russia worked for years on long-range HGVs, China chose to focus on the medium-range DF-ZF. This choice may indicate an effort to increase the program’s speed, given fewer technical challenges, but it also likely reflects the PLARF priority on theater-use weapons not mirrored by American and Russian counterparts. Sources within the Chinese military have described the DF-17 as a replacement for the older and less accurate DF-11 and DF-15 SRBMs trained heavily on Taiwan.[35] This, coupled with the missile’s conventional nature, suggest a different objective than Russia’s Avangard program, which aims to defeat US national missile defenses to deliver a nuclear strike. China and Russia do share similar concerns about US BMD and future prompt global strike programs eliminating their strategic deterrent, however. Analysis of Chinese HGV literature shows little distinction between national and theater missile defense systems in technical reports.[36] The likely next goal in China’s HGV program—creating a glider with ranges comparable to US and Russian systems—will introduce significant new challenges in modeling, aerodynamic control, navigation, and testing.[37] The DF-17 will undoubtedly act as a stepping stone in its efforts to develop such a weapon.
The DF- 17 in a Conflict
Some reports describe the DF-17 as a weapon driven by technology development to catch up with the United States and Russia rather than for a specific military objective.[38] Though this is likely true (or was in earlier development) the DF-17 now stands to play an important role for the PLARF. Though the DF-17 lacks some of the attributes analysts have described as major benefits of HGVs (i.e. extreme range and high hypersonic speed), it nonetheless boasts a variety of advantages over the TBMs China has deployed to this point. Despite some speculations about anti-area access denial (A2/AD) anti-ship applications, the DF-17 is not currently able to target a moving aircraft carrier.[39] The consensus among specialists is that the DF-17 is designed primarily to evade the BMD systems deployed by the United States and its allies in the Pacific.[40] US-developed point defense systems include land-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), and Aegis Ashore interceptors as well as ship-based Aegis BMD (see table 1).
System
|
Developer
|
Intercept Phase(s)
|
Location(s)
|
Operator(s)
|
THAAD
|
Lockheed Martin
|
Midcourse, Terminal
|
Guam, South Korea
|
United States
|
PAC-3
|
Raytheon
|
Terminal
|
South Korea, Japan, Taiwan
|
United States, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan
|
Aegis Ashore
|
Lockheed Martin
|
Ascent, Midcourse, Terminal
|
Japan (planned)
|
NA
|
Korean Air and Missile Defense
|
Multiple
|
Terminal
|
South Korea
|
South Korea
|
Sky Bow (天弓)
|
National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology
|
Midcourse, Terminal
|
Taiwan
|
Taiwan
|
Aegis BMD
|
Lockheed Martin
|
Ascent, Midcourse, Terminal
|
Ship-based
|
United States, South Korea, Japan, Australia (planned)
|
Table 1. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Employed by the United States and its Allies in the Pacific.
Source: author’s compilation from Arms Control Association 2019, Alex Calvo 2018, National Research Council (U.S.) 2012, 74.
Some experts have suggested current terminal BMD systems might be adapted to defend against HGVs like the DF-17.[41] Crucially, if this is true, the DF-17 will do little to alter the status-quo and have a minimal impact on the US-China strategic balance or China’s regional hold. But if the DF-17 is indeed capable of evading these BMD systems, as some US officials have suggested, then the PLARF may now be capable of crippling critical defense systems of its opponents at the onset of a conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. In such a conflict, the DF-17 would likely act as a first strike weapon to destroy BMD batteries and radar installations, making way for ballistic missiles and slower cruise missiles to strike essential targets unimpeded. As the tip of the spear in Chinese missile strategy, HGVs may soon constitute a critical cog in the PLARF combat machine. A 2017 Center for a New American Security simulation found that the sheer number of PLARF SRBMs and could overwhelm current US BMD at bases in Japan in a preemptive strike scenario but that a significant portion of the ballistic missiles would be intercepted: ~40-70% at Okinawa, ~65-80% at Yakota, ~40-60% at Yakosuka, and ~40-70% Misawa.[42] If an initial HGV strike were to effectively eliminate BMD systems, it would significantly increase the efficiency and lethality of the missiles that followed, allowing for the near-complete destruction of command and control centers, ships at port, runways, hangers, and logistical facilities which could tip the scales of a conflict. Though it is already possible for China to achieve significant damage by exhausting and overwhelming interceptor missiles, the DF-17 would allow the PLARF to strike more targets and quicken the assault.
This principle applies worryingly to Taiwan. As outlined in the US Department of Defense 2019 China Military Power Report: “The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.”[43] Though the PLA currently possesses the military capability to overwhelm Taiwan, the DF-17 serves to ensure a lethal and efficient conflict which would further advantage China from the start and cripple Taiwan’s asymmetric advantages as a defender. Eliminating Taiwanese indigenous and imported BMD (Sky Bow and PAC-3 systems) would allow ballistic missiles to efficiently eliminate Taiwan’s defenses and control and logistics centers from afar before risking the significant casualties an invasion might incur. This is potentially a sharp blow to Taiwan, whose defense posture rests in large part on assuring that any invasion, even if eventually successful, would be excruciatingly painful and protracted and therefore not worth the risk.[44] By quickening the speed of an invasion, the DF-17 would also further a key element of China’s invasion plan: seizing the island so quickly and decisively that the United States would not have time to deliberate and plan an intervention.
Great Power Competition Implications
Given the continued improbability of US-China military conflict, the DF-17 will likely play its most important role as a deterrent and tool to grant China increased leverage rather than a tactical weapon. The PLA aims to build a force sufficiently threatening to dissuade the United States from intervening in a conflict with Taiwan or contesting its claims in the South China sea.[45] Because the DF-17 exposes the United States to sudden and increasingly lethal attack, its introduction strengthens the Chinese hold over the Asia-Pacific. So long as global policymakers believe Chinese HGVs are a serious threat to adversarial forces in the Pacific, the DF-17 will remain a critical element in assessing the strength of the PLA and the risks of involvement in regional conflict. At a 2018 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, US Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin stated:
China has fielded or can field […] hypersonic delivery systems for conventional prompt strike that can reach out thousands of kilometers from the Chinese shore and hold our carrier battle groups or our forward-deployed forces on land that we have bases […] at-risk. We, today, do not have systems that can hold them at-risk in a corresponding manner, and we do not have defenses against those systems.[46]
US Air Force General John Hyten, now Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then-head of the United States Strategic Command, responded similarly when asked about HGVs before the same committee, “We don’t have any defense that could deny the employment of such a weapon against us.”[47] These testimonies indicate that concerns about hypersonic weapons and the DF-17 are at the forefront of US policymakers and military officials’ minds. The DF-17’s presence will have had a real impact on how the PLA threat is perceived.
China has capitalized on “hypersonic hype,” the significant rise in speculations and hyperbolic depictions of hypersonic weapons. China’s public display of the DF-17 at its National Day parade all but proclaimed victory in the HGV race. Media reports picked up on this, announcing that China had beaten the United States and Russia in their pursuits of hypersonic weapons but often failing to describe the strategic or technical differences in the systems each nation is developing. Given the perception of hypersonic weapons as an invincible next-generation asymmetric weapon, this development seemed like a testimony that the PLA is catching up with, and even eclipsing, the US military. This perception helps the PLA expand its reputation as a major power in Asia and beyond.
Using the DF-17 to evidence the PLA’s supremacy also serves to strengthen the PLA’s image and appeal at home while advancing the narrative that China under the CCP has returned as a great power to fear and respect. Though the DF-17 or any one weapon cannot shift perceptions or transform the PLA overnight, they contribute to the larger CCP efforts to incite nationalism and improve the military’s standing. If these schemes continue to succeed, the PLA may become increasingly bold in the face of the United States and American allies, for example increasing military presence and armament in the Spratly Islands and sending naval vessels and jets near or through Taiwan’s Air Defense and Identification Zone (ADIZ).[48]
Conclusion
The DF-17 does not grant the PLARF sudden new capabilities to challenge US or its allies’ military targets. Assuming the HGV is capable of evading BMD, however, the missile does increase the efficiency and threat of the PLARF and its existing missiles. The DF-17 may not greatly alter US Pacific strategy for the short term, but it remains a powerful weapon, both in combat situations and a larger context. The looming threat of an asymmetric anti-BMD strike, enhanced by efforts to capitalize on “hypersonic hype,” could aid the reputation and perception of the PLA and ultimately strengthen its ability to deter regional intervention in a regional conflict—the most important purpose of the weapon’s development. The scope of the DF-17 and its inherent challenge to US BMD in the Pacific indicate a gain for China’s active defense strategy. Until the United States develops adequate hypersonic weapons defense systems, a strategic response for the weapon, or engages in talks with the Chinese government, the DF-17 will provide the PLARF a regional threat boost as a capable non-nuclear deterrent. The DF-17 will also certainly serve as a stepping stone for further HGV development, indicating the worrying potential for future arms racing and escalation. Though the introduction of this one weapon alone will not change the US Indo-Pacific stance overnight, China undoubtably hopes the DF-17 is a significant step toward control over the Pacific.
Cameron Freeman is a research intern at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in partnership with the US-Taiwan Business Council. He is a rising freshman at Yale University interested in international relations and security issues in East Asia.
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[2]“Russia Begins Serial Production of New Cutting-Edge Glide Vehicle,” TASS, accessed October 22, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/992297.; “Putin Announces Russia Possesses Hypersonic Weapons,” TASS, accessed October 22, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/992214.
[3]Amy F Woolf, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues” (Congressional Research Service, August 14, 2019), 2, 10.
[4]“United State Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request” (United States Department of Defense, 2019), 1-9, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
[5]Michael Peck, “You’re Dead: The U.S. Army’s Truck-Mounted Hypersonic Missile Is Coming,” The National Interest, September 29, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/youre-dead-us-army%E2%80%99s-truck-mounted-hypersonic-missile-coming-74016.
[6]China and State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era, 2019, 21.
[7]“Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat” (Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, 2017), 8, https://www.nasic.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=F2VLcKSmCTE%3d&portalid=19; Peter Erbland, “Falcon HTV-2,” DARPA, accessed October 22, 2019, https://www.darpa.mil/program/falcon-htv-2.
[8]Peck, “You’re Dead: The U.S. Army’s Truck-Mounted Hypersonic Missile Is Coming.”
[9]Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 9.
[10]Smith, “Hypersonic Missiles Are Unstoppable. And They’re Starting a New Global Arms Race.”
[11]Rob Brown, “Ballistic Missile Defense Challenges” (Missile Defense Agency, November 20, 2002).
[12]Brown, “Ballistic Missile Defense Challenges.”
[13]National Research Council (U.S.), ed., Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (Washington, D.C: National Academies Press, 2012), 102.
[14]National Research Council (U.S.), Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense, 30.
[15]Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation 10-11.
[16]Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation 10-11.
[17]Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation 11.
[18]Kelley Sayler, “Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress” (Congressional Research Service, September 17, 2019), 3, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf.
[19]“Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control” (New York: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, 2019), 18-19, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/hypersonic-weapons-study.pdf.
[20]Henri Kenhmann, “DF-17 : Ce que l’on sait de cette arme hypersonique chinoise,” East Pendulum (blog), October 7, 2019, http://www.eastpendulum.com/df-17-ce-que-lon-sait-de-cette-arme-hypersonique-chinoise; Richard D. Fisher Jr., “US Officials Confirm Sixth Chinese Hypersonic Manoeuvring Strike Vehicle Test,” IHS Jane’s 360, November 29, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20151129233721/https:/www.janes.com/article/56282/us-officials-confirm-sixth-chinese-hypersonic-manoeuvring-strike-vehicle-test.
[21]Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” accessed October 22, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-missile-defense-systems/; James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed October 22, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095.
[22]Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems,” accessed October 22, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-tests-new-weapon-capable-of-breaching-u-s-missile-defense-systems/; James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed October 22, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095.
[23]Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed With a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” accessed October 22, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/.
[24]Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile.”
[25]Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile.”
[26]Kenhmann, “DF-17.”
[27]“China’s Hypersonic DF-17 Missile Threatens Regional Stability, Analyst Warns,” accessed October 22, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3023972/chinas-hypersonic-df-17-missile-threatens-regional-stability.
[28]Ankit Panda, “Hypersonic Hype: Just How Big of a Deal Is China’s DF-17 Missile?,” accessed October 22, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/hypersonic-hype-just-how-big-of-a-deal-is-chinas-df-17-missile/.
[29]Minnie Chan, “Will Hypersonic DF-17 Missile Transform Beijing’s Taiwan Strategy?,” South China Morning Post, November 16, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3037972/will-hypersonic-df-17-missile-transform-beijings-taiwan.
[30]Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile.”
[31]“DF-16 (Dong Feng-16 / CSS-11),” CSIS Missile Threat, November 14, 2019, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng-16-css-11/.
[32]Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile.”
[33] “Борисов: испытания комплекса ‘Авангард’ доказали его способность разгоняться до 27 Махов,” TASS, December 27, 2018, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5958896.
[34]“Avangard,” CSIS Missile Threat, September 29, 2019, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/; Woolf, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” 16; Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation, 9.
[35]Minnie Chan, “Will Hypersonic DF-17 Missile Transform Beijing’s Taiwan Strategy?”
[36]Lora Saalman, “China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, August 15, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.
[37]Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons.”
[38]“Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic Arms Control,” 15.
[39]Minnie Chan, “Will Hypersonic DF-17 Missile Transform Beijing’s Taiwan Strategy?”
[40]Karen Montague Erika Solem, “The Ultimate Guide to China’s Hypersonic Weapons Program,” The National Interest, May 3, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-ultimate-guide-chinas-hypersonic-weapons-program-16029.
[41]James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed November 27, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957.
[42]Thomas Shugart and Javier Gonzalez, “FIRST STRIKE: China’s Missile Threat to U.S. Bases in Asia” (Center for a New American Security, 2017), 14, JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06168.
[43]“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019” (Department of Defense, 2019), 70, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.
[44]“2017 National Defense Report” (Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, December 2017), 67, http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/2017_december_taiwan_national_defense_report.pdf.
[45]“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” 70.
[46]Michael Griffin, Hearing to Receive Testimony on Accelerating New Technologies to Meet Emerging Threats, April 18, 2018, 13, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-40_04-18-18.pdf.
[47]Amanda Macias, “China and Russia Are ‘Aggressively Pursuing’ Hypersonic Weapons, and the US Can’t Defend against Them, Top Nuclear Commander Says,” CNBC, March 20, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/20/china-and-russia-aggressively-are-pursuing-hypersonic-weapons-general.html.
[48]“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” 15.