Volume 8 Issue 1
Revisiting “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy”
By Liang-chih Evans Chen
Introduction
During the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China’s military expenditure was approximately double that of Taiwan, and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force aircraft and Navy vessels rarely passed through the Taiwan Strait or approached the island. Now, however, Beijing’s military spending is approximately 15 times greater than that of Taipei, and its aircraft occasionally flies over the Strait and in close proximity to Taipei’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). China’s recent increase in military modernization and capability of invading Taiwan drive the island’s decision makers to reconsider their defense strategy. The United States, Taiwan’s most critical military ally, has urged the island to further develop its porcupine strategy against China’s military threat as the military imbalance across the Strait has increased.[1]
Washington wants Taipei to acquire smaller, cheaper, more lethal, and more mobile weapons that could exhaust Chinese military attacks close to Taiwanese territory, rather than large and expensive weapons such as jet fighters, battleships, and submarines, which are much better appropriate to counter Chinese military attacks in a manner of symmetry.[2] Indeed, the porcupine strategy is conducive to Taiwan’s defense in the context of China’s increasing military threat to the island. However, is Washington’s advice regarding this defense strategy outdated and unsuited to Taipei, and can the island opt for any alternatives to more effectively deter an invasion from Beijing?
In 2008, William S. Murray, a professor at U.S. Naval War College, published an article entitled “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” suggesting that Taiwan needs to transform its defense strategy and switch to concentrating on an army-centered framework. Murray’s theory later attracted serious attention among both Taiwanese government and scholars, but his arguments also received criticism. Despite some flaws, Murray’s porcupine strategy recommendations are generally suitable for Taiwan’s defense against China. However, because China’s military power is now much greater than it was 10 or 20 years ago, the porcupine strategy may not be an effective deterrent against the threat of China. This paper argues that Taiwan cannot merely retain its purely “defensive” defense policy. Instead, the island must reconsider the establishment of an “active defensive” strategy, considering the mainland’s continuing and overwhelming military advantage.
Murray’s Porcupine Strategy for Taiwan
In his article “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Murray argued that Beijing either already had or would soon have the capability to destroy Taipei’s air force and navy in preparation for its invasion of the island. Because it would be highly difficult and costly for Taiwan to defend itself against China’s military attacks following a blockade, precision bombardment, and then invasion, Taiwan needs to discard its overwhelming reliance on expensive weapons systems purchased from the United States, including the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile system, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, F-16 fighter aircraft, Kidd-class destroyers, and diesel submarines.[3]
Instead, Murray suggested that Taiwan must concentrate on more affordable, more effective, and less destabilizing approaches to defense to deter China’s intention of invading the island. Accordingly, Murray considered that Taiwan must focus on strengthening its crucial political and military facilities, and consolidating protection of critical infrastructure, to survive and overcome the blockade period and serious bombardment at the beginning of wartime. Moreover, because its air force and navy are less likely to survive a severe attack from China, Taiwan needs to concentrate on developing a strong and professional standing army equipped with fast mobile and short- range defensive weapons. Additionally, to withstand a continuing economic and military blockade, Taiwan should increase stocks of critical supplies and materials in a consolidated infrastructure that would support civilians and the military throughout a war.[4]
Regarding Taiwan’s overall defense strategy, Murray recommended that Taiwan avoid an offensive military strategy, which is highly destabilizing to the situation in the Taiwan Strait, following the logic of the security dilemma theory. Offensive military capabilities could be either nuclear weapons adopted in a counterstrike or long-range traditional weapons aimed at some symbolic targets such as the Three Gorges Dam or Shanghai City. [5] Murray argues that offensive weapons have a high potential to destabilize military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait because China would have difficulty in distinguishing whether such counterstrikes originated from Taiwanese or American military platforms. However, Taiwan seems highly unlikely to be able to acquire sufficient numbers of offensive weapons to deter China. [6] Because of the aforementioned difficulties faced by Taiwan’s defense strategy, Murray strongly suggested that Taiwan transform its policy to a porcupine strategy, which renders Taiwan a difficult target to attack or invade.
According to Murray’s theory, first, the porcupine strategy would provide Taiwan an alternative to resist and delay China’s military coercion for weeks, or perhaps months, without immediate U.S. intervention because its enhanced defense abilities should require more time of China to accomplish its invasion plans. Second, the strategy is much less provocative to Beijing, compared to Taiwan’s offensive defensive strategy in the 1990s and 2000s. [7] Because the porcupine strategy emphasizes its capability of deterrence, it truly discourages Beijing from taking military action. Third, and perhaps most vital to Washington, the strategy would allow the United States to deliberate and reevaluate whether it needs to intervene in the cross-Strait military confrontation. The United States could spend weeks or months struggling with options for stabilizing and restoring the turmoil between the two sides without becoming involved in a war for which China might have been preparing long-term. [8]
Criticisms of Murray’s Porcupine Strategy
Murray’s porcupine strategy provides a useful method to restructure Taiwan’s defense policy for deterring China’s military invasion; however, it still has some flaws. First, the argument that the porcupine strategy is less provocative to Beijing might prove untrue. Based on China’s consistent position on reunifying Taiwan and Xi Jinping’s continuing tough stance of sending fighters, bombers, and warships to circle the island, Beijing’s attitude, in terms of its diplomatic and military actions, is much more hostile to Taipei. Whether Taipei chooses a defensive or offensive strategy in response to China’s military threat is irrelevant to Beijing. Even if Taiwan chooses to acquire only defensive weapons systems, they are still offensive to China because all defensive military equipment is a major hurdle to China’s ambition of reunification.
The issues covered by the Tsai Ing-wen administration are much more comprehensive than those proposed by Murray; the administration’s overall defense policy is much more active than Murray’s porcupine strategy.
Second, the porcupine strategy might be too passive, or not active enough, to resist China’s military attack by missile strikes from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Second Artillery, Navy, and Air Force. Murray seriously considered that Taiwan’s acquisition of PAC-3 interceptors, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, and diesel submarines from the United States would have difficulty effectively withstanding a Chinese attack, and therefore recommended the island to harden key installations and construct more critical infrastructures. Although Taiwan does need to consolidate its critical infrastructures and military fortifications, this does not necessarily mean that the island must abandon the advantages of its air force and navy. By contrast, seeking a partial (relative) advantage of air force and navy is still critical to Taiwan’s defense, and Murray did not emphasize this point of view. Additionally, a merely army-centered armament might be too passive and risky because the army cannot confront the PLA’s overwhelming attack from the air, ocean, and land without any assistance from the air force and navy. Although Murray suggested some key weapons systems that are “all affordable and unambiguously defensive in nature” for Taiwan’s army to defeat the PLA’s invasion, such as mobile coastal-defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), attack helicopters (Apache AH-64D), the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and surf-zone sea mines, [9] the relatively negligible role of the air force and navy appears passive to Taiwan’s defense.[10]
Taiwan’s Current Defense Policy, beyond the Porcupine Strategy of Murray
As encouraged by Washington, Taiwan has moved toward the porcupine strategy to deter China’s military threat but has gone beyond Murray’s original concept. In general, the issues covered by the Tsai Ing-wen administration are much more comprehensive than those proposed by Murray; the administration’s overall defense policy is much more active than Murray’s porcupine strategy.
In the 2015 Defense Policy Blue Paper, then presidential candidate Tsai concentrated on key promotions of Taiwan’s armed forces, including combining cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, strengthening missile defense capabilities, increasing its asymmetric capabilities, preserving the existing air and naval projection capabilities of maintaining the security of sea lines of communication, and establishing a rapid response ground force. [11] After taking power in 2016, the Tsai administration began improving the nation’s Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) as well as Information, Communications, and Electronic Force Command (ICEFCOM); enhancing concealment of military installations and establishing the Republic of China Air Force Air Defense and Missile Command (ROCAFADMC); building indigenous submarines, high-speed stealth vessels, and shore-based mobile missiles; purchasing M1A2 Abrams and Army aviation equipment; and enhancing the personnel recruitment system and promoting the image of the military. [12] Additionally, following the development of high technology, Taiwan has started to develop intelligent sea mines and unmanned platforms so that the new weapons systems can increase the island’s capabilities to deter China’s invasion. [13] On January 25, 2019, President Tsai Ing-wen urged the acceleration of mass produced anti- tactical ballistic missiles and the Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missil. Table 1 shows a comparison between Murray’s porcupine strategy and Taiwan’s current defense strategy.
Table 1. Comparison between Murray’s porcupine strategy and Taiwan’s current defense strategy
No.
|
Murray’s porcupine strategy
|
President Tsai’s defense policy (before the DPP took power)
|
President Tsai’s defense policy (after the DPP took power)
|
1
|
Strengthen crucial political and military facilities; consolidate protection of critical infrastructure
|
Combine cyber and electronic warfare capabilities
|
Strengthen Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and establish Information, Communications, and Electronic Force Command (Jul. 1,
2017)
|
2
|
Concentrate on a strong and professional
|
Strengthen missile defense capabilities
|
Strengthen concealment of military
|
|
standing army with fast mobile and short-range defensive weapons
|
|
installations and establish Republic of China Air Force Air Defense and Missile Command (Sep. 1, 2017)
|
3
|
Stock up on critical supplies and materials in a consolidated infrastructure
|
Emphasize asymmetric capabilities
|
Develop indigenous submarines and high-speed stealth vessels
|
4
|
Mobile coastal- defense cruise missiles
|
Preserve air and naval projection capabilities and maintain the security of sea lines of communication
|
Develop indigenous submarines, high- speed stealth vessels, and shore- based mobile missiles
|
5
|
Attack helicopters (Apache AH-64D)
|
Establish a rapid response ground force
|
Purchase M1A2 Abrams and Army aviation equipment
|
6
|
Multiple Launch Rocket System
|
Military budget
|
1.86% (2017),
1.84% (2018),
2.16% (2019) (of
|
|
|
|
Taiwan’s gross domestic product)
|
7
|
Surf-zone sea mines
|
Military industries
|
Self-reliant defense and indigenous weapons
|
Source: author.
U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), completed a transit of the Taiwan Strait in March 2019, the fifth such transit in six months, demonstrating the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. (Source: Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet)
Conclusion
Ten or 11 years ago, William Murray’s porcupine strategy elucidated the transformation of Taiwan’s defense framework. However, his recommendations tended to be passive or not active enough to resist a military attack from China. This study on Taiwan’s current defense policy revealed that the Tsai administration’s defense strategy appears to be more active and more comprehensive. Although it reemphasizes the importance of concealment of military installations (“preservation of warfighting capability”), “pursuing decisive victory in the littoral area” (濱海決勝) and “annihilating the enemy in the beach area” (灘岸殲敵), [14] the administration is conducting Taiwan’s new defense in an asymmetric manner and expanding its concentration on warfare in terms of information, communication, and cyber security, air defense missiles, submarines, intelligent mines, and unmanned platforms. [15] Based on China’s fast military modernization and increasing capability of invading Taiwan, the island needs to develop its defensive thinking beyond Murray’s theory.
Both the United States and Taiwan should try to avoid any notion that Washington is hesitant or reluctant to assist Taipei or that Taipei is unwilling to defend itself.
Washington must understand that Taipei’s transformation of its defense toward an active porcupine strategy, such as possessing submarines and stealth aircraft, is not an attempt to provoke Beijing but to strengthen its capabilities to deter a military attack by the PLA. As argued previously, any defensive strategy and weapons, in a rival’s eyes, are offensive. Finally, both the United States and Taiwan must also enhance their mutual understanding regarding defense policies and strategies toward each other. The United States must keep its promise to assist Taiwan to resist any Chinese threat or invasion. Similarly, Taiwan must demonstrate its determination regarding self- defense. Both sides should try to avoid any notion that Washington is hesitant or reluctant to assist Taipei or that Taipei is unwilling to defend itself.
Dr. Liang-chih Evans Chen is currently assistant research fellow of the Division of National Defense Strategy and Policy at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) in Taiwan. Before he joins INDSR, he was assistant professor at Transworld University (2012- 2018) and National Chung Cheng University (2009-2012). Dr. Chen completed his doctorate in political science at the University of California at Riverside. His research interest centers on U.S. Foreign Policy, U.S.-China Relations, and East Asia Security, in particular from the theoretical perspectives of balance of power, security dilemma, and power transition.
[1] “China’s might is forcing Taiwan to rethink its military strategy,” The Economist, Retrieved January 26, 2019, from https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/01/26/chinas-might-is- forcing-taiwan-to-rethink-its-military-strategy
[2] Ibid.
[3] William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (2008), p. 4.
[4] Ibid., pp. 4-5.
[5] Ibid., p. 4.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid., p. 5.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., pp. 16-17.
[10] Professor Shih-yueh Yang considers that Murray’s porcupine strategy is still an idea of “pursuing decisive victory in the littoral area” (濱海決勝), echoing Taiwan’s current military strategy. See Shih-yueh Yang, “Military? Politics? Reflections on the Critiques of ‘Porcupine Strategy’,” Prospect Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2009), pp. 99-100.
[11] Defense Policy Advisory Committee of New Frontier Foundation, Taiwan’s Military Capabilities in 2025 (Taipei: New Frontier Foundation, 2015), pp. 6-9.
[12] Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C., National Defense Report 2017 (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense), pp. 74-85 and Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C., 2017 Quadrennial Defense Review (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense), pp. 44-47.
[13] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018), p. 102.
[14] Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C., National Defense Report 2017, p. 67 and Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C., 2017 Quadrennial Defense Review, pp. 38-39.
[15] Drew Thompson, “Hope on the horizon: Taiwan’s Radical New Defense Concept,” War on the Rocks, Retrieved October 2, 2018, from https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/hope-on-the-horizon-taiwans-radical-new- defense-concept/