Taiwan’s Transition to an All-Volunteer Force — A Policy Assessment and Recommendations
2019.10.01
Views
75
By Vanessa Molter
Introduction
In January 2019, Taiwan completed its seven-year transition from military conscription to an all-volunteer force (AVF)[1] system. Across partisan lines, Taiwanese administrations had supported a policy of gradually reducing conscription time from a peak of two years for the Army and three years for the Navy, Air Force, and Marines before 1990, to only four months of military training for Taiwanese males born after January 1, 1994. (There is no conscription for females.) (See Table 1)
As the one-year conscription since 2008 left only about nine months of active duty service after basic training, Taiwanese policy makers decided to further reduce conscription and introduce an all-volunteer force. Conscripts now enter the work force earlier and reconnect with society faster than before, reducing social costs and allowing for more freedom of Taiwan’s youth. As a result, public support for an AVF policy has been high, despite government officials, military leaders, and scholars disagreeing about the viability and sustainability of an all-volunteer force for Taiwan.
With an AVF, policy makers have argued, Taiwan can improve combat capabilities[2] by achieving a “highly skilled, innovative, high-tech force”[3] that experts maintain Taiwan requires for modern combat. This modern force, despite its higher cost, should thus enhance Taiwan’s defense readiness, as a smaller, better-trained force will be better suited to operate modern weapons.
Table 1
Year |
1954 |
1990 |
2000 |
2004 |
2005 |
Service time |
Army: 2y; Navy, Air Force, Marines: 3y |
2y |
1y 10m |
1y 8m |
1y 6m |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2013 |
|
|
1y 4m |
1y 2m |
1y |
4m training for those born after Jan. 1, 1994 |
|
Source: Tse-Chun Pu, “Military Volunteer System of the Republic of China (Taiwan)” (August 2019).
In an AVF, personnel changes are much less frequent – minimum enlistment for volunteers is now four years – which allows for better training and a build-up of experience among service personnel. As a result, Taiwan can invest more into training service members, and achieve a better-trained force with a higher level of expertise. As opposed to conscripts, who only undergo a few months of basic training, volunteers receive an additional two to six months of specialist training. In fact, average service time[4] has increased from 2.73 years in 2016 to 3.30 years in 2018 when new all-volunteer conscripts completed their minimum four-year service.[5] This service time increase also allows for longer use of specialist’s capabilities, reducing education expenses.
However, the all-volunteer policy lacks military leadership support. Some senior officials grudgingly express that they do not consider the AVF to be a good policy for Taiwan and wish instead that (longer) conscription were still the case.[6] In light of this criticism, current AVF policy implementation efforts and challenges need to be assessed to determine how policy implementation and sustainability could be improved to enhance Taiwan’s defense readiness.
Taiwan’s Current Efforts
To achieve a successful transition to the AVF, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has raised salaries for military personnel, through both an increase in base pay as well as the introduction of a system with attractive bonuses and benefits. For example, the base salary for a voluntary enlisted Private1 (requires secondary education degree) is now NT $34,340,[7] exceeding salary expectations of even new university graduates at NT $33,053.[8] In addition, according to data published by Taiwan’s Ministry of Labor, 77% of recent university graduates[9] earn NT $45,000 or less (See Figure 1),[10] below entry-level base pay for officer base (requires undergraduate degree) of NT $48,990.[11]
Figure 1 – Ministry of Labor Graduate Full-Time Salary Scale / Author’s Calculations
Moreover, retention incentives introduced in 2015 offer up to NT $100,000 for volunteers who extend their four-year minimum service by 3 years.[12] Additional bonuses and incentives include combat job allowances, off-island allowances for those serving on postings on Taiwan’s small offshore islands, cyber warfare pay and more.
In addition to pay increases, the MND introduced further benefits aimed at improving personnel’s quality of life. The major areas it has targeted are military barracks renovation, improving living facilities, reconstructing retirement homes, and re-issuing combat equipment. In 2018, 32 military barracks were renovated, which affected 684 families, and living facilities were improved in 401 cases.[13] Further benefits include increased cooperation with civilian schools to expand education opportunities for military personnel, with 71 diploma programs offered in addition to 50 certification programs in twenty categories. Education opportunities have also expanded with a growing Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, which went from only seventeen participants in 2016 up to over 700 participants in 2019.[14]
Commencement of the R.O.C. Air Force Academy. (Source: Youth Daily News)
Concurrent with these benefits, the MND has boosted its recruitment efforts. In 2016, Taiwanese university and high school students and faculty still had little knowledge about military job tasks and responsibilities.[15] To counter this problem, the MND has established partnerships with 139 colleges and 506 senior high schools and vocational schools,[16] a pillar in the recruitment strategy. To strengthen these partnerships, senior military officials are now visiting schools in addition to recruiters. Recruitment officials are also considering offering financial and other incentives to school officers and teachers to encourage students to enlist.
The MND’s efforts seem to be paying off, as the number of volunteers in the Republic of China military has increased from 124,000 in 2014 to 158,000 in 2018.[17] However, the AVF policy faces several challenges and threats to a successful and sustainable implementation.
The number of volunteers in the Republic of China military has increased from 124,000 in 2014 to 158,000 in 2018.
Challenges to a Successful All-Volunteer Force System in Taiwan
1. Excessive Cost
As a result of the AVF transition, personnel expenses have increased by 11.4% from NT $149 billion (US $ 4.74 billion) in 2014 to NT $166 billion (US $5.29 billion) set aside for personnel expenses in the 2020 defense budget. Since the current number of 158,000 volunteers is still well short of the targeted 188,000, personnel expenses will likely continue on this increasing trend. The MND has furthermore declared it intends to continuously improve pay and allowances for personnel, including an increase for combat jobs pays and further education and training incentives.[18] This might prove necessary because, as the United States experience shows, personnel cost in an AVF steadily increases since the military competes for talent with the civilian economy.[19] Growing personnel expenses are now less problematic due to the recent 5.2% defense budget increase to NT $358 billion for 2020,[20] up from NT $340 billion in the current year.[21] The budget for non-personnel expenses in 2020 at NT $192 billion indicates a continuation of an upward trend that began at NT $171 billion in 2018, after a stagnating between 2014 and 2018. (See Figure 2)
Such an increase could help to alleviate widespread worries about budgetary tradeoffs and decreased overall defense readiness[22] caused by the AVF transition. Nevertheless, with the upcoming January 2020 presidential election, the budget increases could be reversed. Although the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) president Tsai Ing-wen has increased defense spending in the context of increased economic growth helped by the U.S.-China trade war,[23] a resolution to the trade war could slow growth and weaken the justification for this increased spending. Moreover, academics at the National Policy Foundation, a think-tank affiliated with the opposition Nationalist party (Kuomintang, or KMT) are urging defense budget cuts,[24] which could foreshadow the policy decisions of a KMT president.
As a result, the cost of the AVF remains a central challenge to its success in Taiwan. High personnel cost could force the MND to adjust its recruitment target of 188,000 volunteers or risk harming defense readiness, undermining the overall policy target.
Figure 2 – MND Statutory Budget Book/Author’s Calculations
2. All-Volunteer Force Quality
Another central concern is the quality of Taiwan’s all-volunteer force. The AVF policy was introduced as a way to improve personnel quality by increasing the average duration of service and allowing for a small, well-trained force. However, chasing numerical targets, Taiwan’s military officials do not (yet) emphasize personnel quality in their recruitment. In addition, under the AVF system, the military no longer has guaranteed access to highly educated youth. Previously, highly educated Taiwanese youth were required to serve for a year or longer, yet now they can opt to stay for only four months, instead finding high-paying jobs in the civilian sector. Subsequently, the AVF transition does not guarantee higher quality personnel and could even lead to a smaller, costlier, but lower-quality military force for Taiwan.
3. Decreased Reserve Force Readiness
Simultaneously, the AVF policy could negatively affect defense readiness through the reserve forces. In the Taiwanese system, former conscripts (and veterans) enter the mandatory reserve forces upon their completion of service. With decreases in conscription time, reservists are now less well trained than before, entering the reserve forces with only four months of experience. Taiwanese military officials argue that conscription was still preserved at a level that allows for necessary basic training, but a 2017 report by the RAND Corporation on Taiwan’s reserve forces finds that the current training approach could be “inadequate for maintaining the readiness of (…) reserve units” who engage in combat [25]. The same report also finds that the Reserve Command does not have the needed funding for frequent and realistic training needed to maintain reservists’ skills (Easton et al., 2017), which might be alleviated by the recent budget increase. Moreover, concurrent with a smaller active duty force, the share of reservists with professional military experience is shrinking, affecting the reserve forces’ overall quality.
Even if problems with budget and quality are solved, Taiwan’s demographics still pose a long-term threat to a successful AVF.
4. Taiwan’s Unfavorable Demographics
Even if problems with budget and quality are solved, Taiwan’s demographics still pose a long-term threat to a successful AVF. Unless the MND can achieve recruiting an unusually high percentage of the working-age population,[26] it will struggle to fill its ranks and will be faced with uncomfortable policy choices in years to come. Around the introduction of the AVF policy in 2015, Taiwanese men aged 15 to 29 amounted to 2.438 million people.[27] For 2030, the estimate in the same age bracket is only 1.680 million, a sharp reduction.[28] (See Figure 3) Considering Taiwan’s total fertility rate[29] of 1.175 children per woman,[30] the third lowest globally, this problem will likely not be solved any time soon.
Figure 3 -- Author’s Calculation / UN DESA Population Division 2019
5. Risk of Deteriorating Civil-Military Relations
Last, the all-volunteer force policy could cause a further deterioration of Taiwan’s civil-military relations. For instance, four-month conscripts complain that much of their service time is spent performing menial tasks or waiting (sometimes for hours) to use equipment shared with several others.[31] Unfortunately, incidents like this help to foster views that military personnel do not fulfill useful tasks. Under longer conscription periods, young Taiwanese men would typically undergo more rigorous training and serve on active duty, both experiences which could improve their perceptions of military service. However, the conscription experience in the current environment might even lower the public’s general support for the military in both budget and ideology. The fact that the young generations - who have not experienced war and question high military spending - first engage with the military in this less than ideal manner exacerbates the perception problem.
Moreover, recruitment officials admit that although students from various backgrounds are interested in serving, ethnic minorities and lower income groups as well as those with military family members are overrepresented among the new volunteers.[32] As a result, Taiwan’s military without conscription is less representative of society, with certain population groups bearing a disproportionate share of the burden for defending Taiwan.
Policy Recommendations
As discussed before, the MND has implemented various policy changes such as pay increases, facility improvements, and educational benefits to achieve a successful transition to the AVF system. Nevertheless, various challenges have put at risk the ability to achieve and sustain increased defense readiness through the all-volunteer force policy. Taiwanese policy makers can take various steps to address these challenges.
1. Improve Basic Training for Both Volunteers and Conscripts
The AVF was introduced to ensure a higher quality in the Taiwanese military. But the foundation for criticism regarding the capabilities of active duty soldiers and reservists remains unchanged: inadequate training. Currently, conscripts in basic training only shoot a weapon a handful of times despite a training duration of multiple months. Moreover, conscripts in basic training are assigned unnecessarily inflated menial tasks, such as performing cleaning duties before going to sleep and the same ones again after getting up. It is unacceptable that young people – volunteers or not – are forced to spend months in training where they perform several such tasks instead of maximizing their learning and training for a better defense of Taiwan.
The “Path of Heaven” of the R.O.C. Marines Amphibious Reconnaissance and Patrol Unit. (Source: Youth Daily News)
To maximize trainee capabilities, Taiwanese policy makers should consult with education and learning experts to reform basic training in military tasks and standards. This improved training could also counter criticism from conscripts who complain their time was “wasted” by serving in the military because of ineffective and tedious training.[33] Improved basic training would not only enhance capabilities of both active duty and reserve personnel but likely also support recruitment efforts by improving both the military’s public image as well as the service members’ job satisfaction. In conjunction with basic training, reservist training is also in need of reforms that in addition to reservist capabilities, reservist training could improve morale among Taiwanese civilians and bolster the public’s confidence in Taiwan’s ability to defend the homeland.
2. Develop a More Successful, Cost-Effective, and Resilient Recruitment Strategy
a. Increase spending on recruitment
Although pressure on recruitment has arguably increased since the AVF transition, this was not matched with an increase in the recruiting budget or change in recruitment strategy. Despite potentially unsustainable cost, the military’s recruitment strategy still relies heavily on economic appeal for volunteers. Instead of continuous pay raises, increased recruitment spending could be a cost-saving way to recruit volunteers for the AVF. According to former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management Frederick Vollrath, investing more in military recruitment is an efficient and cost-saving way of increasing the number of forces.[34] This assertion is supported by experimental studies conducted at the time of the US transition to an all-volunteer force.[35]
b. Emphasize non-monetary benefits of service
Moreover, the heavy reliance on pay disregards other factors potential service members consider when making their decision to enlist and re-enlist, which includes quality of life for military families. A study by the RAND Corporation found that the US Department of Defense’s past neglect of the needs of service members and their families after the transition to an all-volunteer force led to a low level of enlistment and low quality in recruits in the US military before improvements were made.[36] As an AVF tends to be older due to longer service times, the share of those with dependents is higher as well.[37] In its recruitment strategy, the MND needs to consider such aspects for a better return on its investments. For example, it could highlight in the recruitment strategy non-financial benefits and incentives such as health insurance for spouses and dependents, improved family housing, and education benefits that can also improve career opportunities after retiring from service.
In addition, recruiters could emphasize moral aspects of service such as fulfilling one’s duty and protecting one’s country. If volunteers perceive their work as honorable, they might be willing to accept lower salaries than those attainable to them in other occupations. Given the low prestige of the military in Taiwan’s society, such a change in perception might be difficult yet should still be attempted through recruitment campaigns. Some successful examples to brand military occupations as honorable include videos shared on the MND spokesperson’s Facebook page.[38] In one video, young soldiers explain their reasons for joining the military – duty, honor, patriotism, family – in their respective mother tongue, which includes Mandarin, Taiwanese, and Aboriginal languages.[39] Recruiters could show such videos in their visits to schools and promote them on their own online and social media presence.
c. Better support for veterans’ transition to civilian life
Another aspect that has been neglected in recruitment is ensuring veterans’ smooth transition to civilian life upon leaving military service. This transition fundamentally affects perceptions around military employment and Taiwanese youth’s willingness to enlist. In the US, successful veteran transition to civilian life was found as key to recruitment.[40] The MND now offers certifications and six-month training for military personnel who have served for ten years or more, which are meant to increase veteran employment opportunities beyond the infamous “three bao” – security (保全, bǎoquán), insurance (保險, bǎoxiǎn), and funeral services (寶塔, bǎotǎ).[41] Considering that only 36 out of the 6,952 volunteers leaving the service in 2018 completed service times of 10 years and longer, with 89.2% leaving after 4 years or less, this measure does not affect volunteers at large.[42] A cost-effective way to support veterans could be helping them find and apply for jobs that fit their skills, support in writing applications, or even offering preferential tax treatment for companies that employ veterans. Veterans could also be hired as civilian recruiters by the MND, sharing their own military experiences with those interested in serving.
d. Recruit more conscripts and veterans
Conscripts could be a key recruitment demographic since they are both qualified to serve and exposed to the military. However, currently only unit-level recruiters interact with conscripts. Recruitment center personnel, who better understand the overall recruitment strategy, focus only on visiting schools and university campuses. Through also targeting conscripts by regularly touring conscript training sites and organizing recruitment events, recruitment center personnel could support unit-level recruiters.
The Taiwanese military should also consider its prior service personnel as a recruitment target. Returning service women and men would already have valuable knowledge and skills when starting their service, which reduces training expenses and increases the level of experience and expertise in the forces. Moreover, according to internal MND surveys, the most frequently cited reason volunteers leave the military before the end of their enlistment period is a failure to adapt to the military life.[43] Having lived a military lifestyle, veterans might find it easier to adapt and could thus be more likely to stay and succeed.
e. Reach out to youth directly through social media
Currently, the MND’s recruitment strategy relies on partnerships with schools and universities, usually helped by so-called military instructors (教官),[44] military officials stationed at schools and universities. However, a proposed legal change would require that these military instructors leave campuses by 2023, weakening ties between the military and schools and their students.[45] If not revised as military recruitment officials hope, this law could undermine military recruitment and its effectiveness. To prepare for such a scenario, the MND should diversify its recruitment approach to better reach out directly to potentially interested youth.
One timely step is developing the military’s recruitment social media presence and online strategy. Recent surveys show that social media and mobile device usage are very popular especially among Taiwanese youth.[46] Establishing social media presences, for example in the form of a Facebook page or LINE account, could support military recruitment efforts together with the existing commendably mobile device-optimized recruitment website (rdrc.mnd.gov.tw). In addition, existing YouTube accounts of the MND could be better leveraged for recruitment for example through cooperation with popular Taiwanese YouTubers and other figures that have influence among young Taiwanese. Military recruiters should assess which kinds of videos are especially popular among the target demographic to decide which ones to promote.[47] An online recruitment strategy can help assess various ways in which recruitment can be aided through social media and online advertisement to find the most effective steps to take.
3. Increase Retention
a. Consider military family needs
As mentioned above, service members strongly consider quality of life for their families when deciding on re-enlistment. Renovations of current military housing could help improve quality of life, but further efforts are needed. For example, the MND could help military spouses find employment after re-location or support with finding schools for service members’ children. The MND should first conduct surveys among military families to understand which (cost-effective) policies would effectively advance their quality of life.
b. Increase incentives for good leadership
Leaders who create learning opportunities and try to increase their soldiers’ job satisfaction are also contributing to increasing capabilities and improving retention. However, military officers presently have strong incentives to perform the more challenging, interesting tasks themselves rather than teaching their subordinates. If such a task is delegated successfully, officers are not rewarded, but still face punishment in case of a mistake. The MND should create incentives for good leadership, for example adding retention rates to the existing factors considered for promotion to a higher rank.
c. Offer retention incentives aimed at well-trained key personnel
In addition, the MND should consider allowing for (some) flexibility in pay, rank, and career progression for its exceptionally talented personnel. With a better-trained AVF, retention is even more critical, and such flexibility could allow for special accommodations of key personnel to increase their duration of service.
4. Educate the Public on the Threat to Taiwan
Absent a threat to national security, serving in the military can seem like a waste of time. However, in face of an increasingly assertive and aggressive China, the threat to Taiwan’s security is very real despite low public threat perception.[48] A public information campaign could address this by raising public threat awareness, which can help justify an increased defense budget and build public support for recruitment.[49]
Conclusion
Taiwan has taken several commendable steps to achieve a successful transition to an AVF. Increases in personnel pay, recruitment efforts, as well as expanded education opportunities and improved facilities have led to continuous achievement of recruitment targets. The latest increase in the defense budget has further improved financial sustainability of an AVF in Taiwan.
However, several challenges remain. Personnel costs are likely to increase further, and could threaten the all-volunteer force’s financial sustainability. Moreover, recruitment efforts have not yet been modernized and face a significant challenge posed by Taiwan’s demographics and sharp reduction in available youth in the near future. It is not yet clear how Taiwan’s military will adapt. Personnel targets may have to be lowered, or some alternate form of longer conscription introduced to support the AVF.
The threat posed to reserve force capabilities by less well-trained reservists has also not been mitigated. Taiwanese leadership needs to consider restructuring basic training for short-term conscripts and volunteers both to ensure maximum defense readiness and also to counter criticism that even short conscription is a waste of time. If the four-month conscripts experience their service time as rewarding and instructive, there could be more public support for re-introducing longer conscription should Taiwan’s security environment and demographic challenges require it.
Overall, it is not yet evident the AVF transition has resulted and will result in the overarching policy goal of creating a more effective, better trained force that improves Taiwan’s defense capabilities and readiness. Taiwanese policy makers should avoid equating achieved recruitment targets with benchmarks for judging the success of the Taiwanese AVF transition. Rather, they should assess Taiwan’s defense needs, and consider reserve force and recruitment budgets and training procedure as important components in this strategic structural shift. With capable reserve forces, an even further reduction of Taiwanese active-duty personnel could be plausible. However, at current readiness levels, a decrease in active-duty personnel would further impair Taiwan’s defense readiness. Reforming basic training and diversifying the recruitment strategy should be the primary steps the MND takes to increase AVF sustainability and broaden future policy choices.
Vanessa Molter is a Master in International Policy candidate at Stanford University, where she focuses on International Security in East Asia. She holds a B.S. degree from the University of Tubingen, Germany in International Business and East Asian Studies and is fluent in Japanese. She has spent two months at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research studying Taiwanese security and Taiwan’s transition to an all-volunteer military force.
[1] “All-volunteer force” is actually a misnomer for the Taiwanese case, where males are still subject to a four-month conscription period, although the active duty force no longer relies on these conscripts.
[2] “Ministry of National Defense Press Release Regarding the Media Coverage of ‘Combat Capability Impacted by the Cancellation of Conscription?’” Ministry of National Defense (MND), Republic of China (ROC), February 16, 2019, https://www.mnd.gov.tw/english/Publish.aspx?title=Defense%20News&p=76066.
[3] Michael Mazza, Taiwanese Hard Power: Between a ROC and a Hard Place (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2014), p. 211.
[4] A service time of less than 1 year is weighted as 0.5 years in this calculation.
[5] Data provided by the MND upon author’s request (MND, ROC, August 14, 2019).
[6] Nevertheless, all also stated that it is the government’s decision they cannot change and need to accept.
[7] “National Army 2019 Volunteer Soldier Selection Guide (國軍108年志願士兵甄選簡章)” (Recruitment Center of National Armed Forces, June 21, 2019), https://rdrc.mnd.gov.tw/userfiles/files/05志願士兵/第2次修頒國軍108年志願士兵甄選簡章.pdf.
[8] Yi-chu Tsai and Frances Huang, “Anticipated Starting Salaries for New Graduates NT$33,053: Survey,” March 2, 2018, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201803020018.aspx.
[9] Graduated within the last five years, including both undergraduate and graduate degrees and paying pension.
[10] Ministry of Labor, “College Graduate Full-Time Salary Scale as of April 2019 (108年4月底大專畢業生全時工作薪資統計表);” "Salary Market and Employment Navigation for College Students, Labor Pension Contribution Inquiry (薪資行情及大專生就業導航 勞工退休金提繳查詢)," accessed August 30, 2019, https://yoursalary.taiwanjobs.gov.tw/salary/cgi-bin/cognosisapi.dll.
[11] “Career Path and Salary Explanation (生涯願景與薪資待遇說明),” Recruitment Center of National Armed Force, July 20, 2018, https://rdrc.mnd.gov.tw/EditPage/?PageID=3ada0d3c-245c-4db0-8d97-2e53736d4668.
[12] Pu, “Military Volunteer System of the Republic of China (Taiwan).”
[13] Pu.
[14] Pu.
[15] Pu.
[16] “Ministry of National Defense Press Release Regarding the Media Coverage of “Conscription Cannot Be Fully Abolished, Difficult in Recruiting Reserved Non-Commissioned Officers, Recruitment Is Unable to Maintain a Long Period of Stable Manpower“,” MND, ROC, July 8, 2019, https://www.mnd.gov.tw/english/Publish.aspx?title=Defense%20News&p=76462.
[17] Pu, “Military Volunteer System of the Republic of China (Taiwan)”; “Press Release,” July 8, 2019.
[18] Pu, “Military Volunteer System of the Republic of China (Taiwan).”
[19] Phillip Carter et al., “AVF 4.0: The Future of the All-Volunteer Force” (Center for a New American Security, March 28, 2017), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/avf-4-0-the-future-of-the-all-volunteer-force.
[20] “2020 Central Government General Budget and Subsidiary Unit Budget and Summary Table (109年度中央政府總預算案暨附屬單位預算及綜計表)” (Executive Yuan, August 15, 2019), https://www.ey.gov.tw/File/2C34DE4673F1785E?A=C.
[21] “Statutory Budget Book of the Ministry of National Defense, 2014-2018 (103-108年度國防部所屬單位法定預算書表),” MND, ROC, October 30, 2017, https://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?p=71877&title=政府資訊公開.
[22] Carter et al., “AVF 4.0;” Michael Cole, “Taiwan’s ‘All-Volunteer’ Military: Vision or Nightmare?,” The Diplomat, July 9, 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/taiwans-all-volunteer-military-vision-or-nightmare/; Craig Murray and Kyle Churchman, “Taiwan’s Declining Defense Spending Could Jeopardize Military Preparedness,” Washington: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013; “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019).
[23] Ing-wen Tsai, “Facebook post on Tsai Ing-wen’s page,” Facebook, August 1, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/tsaiingwen/posts/10155986524506065.
[24] Abraham Gerber, “KMT Academics Decry Military Spending,” Taipei Times, May 16, 2017, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/05/16/2003670684.
[25] Ian Easton et al., “Transformation of Taiwan’s Reserve Force” (RAND Corporation, 2017), X.
[26] If all males aged 15-29 are considered as the volunteer force recruitment pool, this would mean in 2020, 8.36% of this group need to enlist, which increases to 11.19% for 2030. Respective figures for the United States are 3.79% and 3.88% (at a force of 1.3 million) UN DESA / Population Division, “World Population Prospects 2019,” 2019, https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/..
[27] UN DESA / Population Division, see Figure 2.
[28] UN DESA / Population Division.
[29] The total fertility rate equals the average number of children that would be born per woman if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to a given fertility rate at each age
[30] UN DESA / Population Division, “World Fertility Data 2017,” 2017, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/dataset/fertility/wfd2017.asp.
[31] Author’s interview with former conscript Lin Chung-hsien in Taipei, August 3, 2019.
[32] Author’s interviews with the ROC National Armed Forces recruitment officials, August 2019.
[33] Philip Tsien, “Begrudging Service,” Taipei Times, July 19, 2018, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2018/07/19/2003696933; Author’s interview with former conscript Lin Chung-hsien in Taipei.
[34] Frederick Vollrath, “Panel 2: Current Issues and Future Challenges of the All-Volunteer Force,” The All- Volunteer Force: A Symposium in Honor of Water Oi (September 23, 2014).
[35] Gus W. Haggstrom and Bernard D. Rostker, “An Analysis of Recruiter Productivity in the Air National Guard” (RAND Corporation, October 1974).
[36] Bernard D. Rostker and K. C. Yeh, I Want You!: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force (RAND Corporation, 2006).
[37] Christopher J. McMahon and Colin J. Bernard, “Storm Clouds on the Horizon—Challenges and Recommendations for Military Recruiting and Retention,” Naval War College Review 72, no. 3 (2019), p. 7.
[38] Military Spokesman’s Facebook Page, accessed August 31, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/MilitarySpokesman/ .
[39] Military Spokesman, “All-round national army – All-round guardian (全方位國軍 全方位守護)” (April, 2019) https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=585389918623614 .
[40] Phillip Carter et al., “AVF 4.0: The Future of the All-Volunteer Force” (Center for a New American Security, March 28, 2017), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/avf-4-0-the-future-of-the-all-volunteer-force.
[41] MND, ROC, “Career Planning,” Recruitment Center of National Armed Force, July 27, 2018, https://rdrc.mnd.gov.tw/EditPage?PageID=d19afef9-6bc9-4b00-96ef-51b0609dc595.
[42] Data provided by the MND upon author’s request.
[43] “Data provided by the MND upon author’s request.”
[44] In Taiwan’s unique system, a military instructor is stationed at most senior high schools and universities to help enforce discipline measures, teach all-out defense courses, and serve as a point of contact for students interested in military service.
[45] “Preview of the amendment to Article 8 of the ‘National Defense Education Curriculum Contents and Implementation Measures for All Levels of Schools’ 教育部公告:預告「各級學校全民國防教育課程內容及實施辦法」第8條修正草案” (The Executive Yuan Gazette Online (行政院公報資訊網), January 26, 2018), https://gazette.nat.gov.tw/egFront/detail.do?metaid=96254.
[46] Jalen Chung and Frances Huang, “LINE Tops Other Social Media among Taiwanese Smartphone Owners,” Focus Taiwan, February 2, 2016, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ast/201602020027.aspx; “Survey: 90% of Youth on Social Media,” Taipei Times, July 11, 2019.
[47] Some videos have been viewed only a few hundred to a few thousand, while others count hundreds of thousands of views.
[48] “White Paper: China’s National Defense in the New Era” (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019).
[49] Albert Willner, “Implications of Recent and Planned Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Posture,” in New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security, by Roger Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott Harold (RAND Corporation, 2011), pp. 81–88.