Volume 11 Issue 1
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE BEIDOU SYSTEM IN AFRICA
by Domingo I-Kwei Yang
FOREWORDS
Despite a plethora of research looking into China’s increasing engagement with African countries in the midst of US-China competition, China’s growing interests in Africa’s space sector remain quite a puzzle to most analysts in the field. China has assisted Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Nigeria to launch satel-lites into space.[1] It has also granted loans to develop joint space programs and ex-ported satellite-based technologies to countries including Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Sudan, Tunisia and Zambia.[2] The China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024) has explicitly mentioned that Africa’s aerospace sector is one of the highlights in the China-Africa industrial partnership, technology application and infrastructure development.[3] Among the mentioned above, Beidou System (BDS), a global navigation system China operates by itself, is one of the priorities in China-Africa space-cooperation programs aimed at positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services with high accuracy around the clock.
On November 5th, 2021, Beijing organized the first China-Africa Beidou System (BDS) Cooperation Forum.[4] Nearly 50 African countries took part in. Foreign repre-sentatives in the meeting included 8 ministers and 8 ambassadors.[5] Since it has been estimated that the space industry revenue in Africa would surpass $10.24B USD by 2024, it is not surprising that there are a great number of African countries expressing their wishes to develop their own national space programs, leaving Chi-na many advantages in prospect.[6] China claims that entering BDS applications can improve Africans’ living standards, drive social and economic development of the locals, and prevent environmental disaster so as to sustain eco-environmental protection.[7] Despite the propaganda surrounding China’s BDS narrative, this article at-tempts to explore the strategic implications of BDS in Africa by investigating China’s revisionist ambition, potential security challenge to the U.S. and direct contractors of BDS in Africa. The author finds that the BDS is orientated by a revisionist intention of China to become the leading space power and expand the market share of Chi-nese satellite-based technologies in Africa. To be more specific, application of BDS in Africa would enhance China’s offensive capabilities of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) system. This can further impose a direct threat to the east part of the American Continent, altering the geopolitical status-quo. Lastly, the author also finds that the direct contractors of BDS projects in Africa are related to China’s de-fense industry enterprises. Based upon the above findings, this article argues that China is using the BDS to increase its sphere of influence as footholds of military and influence operations in the African Continent.
CHINA’S SPACE TECHNOLOGY AND REVISIONIST AMBITION
China’s BDS cooperation with African countries resonates with China’s revision-ist ambition to challenge the existing balance of power and equilibrium of capabili-ties. The development of China’s space technology is revisionist by nature because it serves the goal of overall enhancement of national strength aiming to upgrade its capabilities relative to the competing powers. In the White Paper of China’s Space Pro-gram in 2021, China’s President Xi Jinping claims that China wants to become a space power that leads the world backed by self-reliant technologies.[8] This narrative has implied that China at the current stage is not satisfied with the existing status and it seeks to alter the balance among all the relative capabilities in terms of space influ-ence. As having been well-known to the observers in the field, the Chinese space industry is subject to national strategic needs of safeguarding national security, im-proving launch vehicles, satellite communications, global data collection and inte-grating remote-sensing, communications, navigation, and positioning satellite tech-nologies.[9] All these strategic goals require to have an independent satellite-based ecosystem, without which, Beijing will find it difficult boosting its overall relative ca-pabilities.
Geopolitically speaking, China’s effort of BDS cooperation with African coun-tries is likely to exclude other satellite-based technology suppliers so that it can maximize the market share of Chinese BDS applications in Africa via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Take Mozambique for instance. Mozambique shifted to a Chi-nese satellite system on January 3rd, 2020.[10] With a view to natural disaster monitor-ing, Mussa Mustafa, Director of Mozambique’s National Meteorology Institute, val-ued China’s BDS and monitoring satellite system better than the former suppliers.[11] Mustafa’s decision to shift indicated that China has become an attractive competitor in the eyes of the African clients, who have tended to adapt its satellite-based tech-nologies, excluding former European satellite-tech providers. As Temidayo Isaiah Oniosun, a Nigerian space scientist, noted, China has become the key financier to develop African countries’ space programs and facilitate China-Africa BDS coopera-tion.[12] A contrast to European space cooperation with African countries that has been mainly research-driven, China’s space cooperation with Africa is similar to its BRI inducements characterized by turnkey contracts.[13] In other words, there are packages of grants, loans, credits and commercial investments, possibly resulting in a burden of debts on African borrowers. In short, Beijing will be highly likely to be the very one to reap the lion’s share. Economically, Chinese founded space projects in Africa would facilitate China’s telecommunication, digital economics, data centers, to name but three. Politically, China’s space cooperation with African countries is part of the Chinese grand strategy to equip Beijing with the capabilities to project influence across the globe.[14]
CHALLENGING THE U.S. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
While experts have found that China has a militarizing implication of the BRI, China’s BDS engagement with African countries has also posed challenges toward the U.S. security on its continent. According to the U.S. congressional testimonies in 2022, China’s expanding footprints in Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea are becoming two rising concerns in Washington’s overall defense-security planning. According to the testimony given to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee by General Ste-phen Townsend, commander of the U.S. Africa Command, China is seeking a naval base in West Africa, and its selection can likely be located in Bata of Equatorial Guin-ea.[15] Sasha Baker, deputy undersecretary of defense, sent similar signals, warning about China’s increased power projection activities and a steady development of military and logistical support systems in Africa.[16]
Given that BDS technologies have a dual function either for civil or military purposes, the author would like to remind readers of the strategic potentials that Chinese penetrated positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems in Africa are intertwined with offensive capabilities.[17] Indeed, the satellite application of geo-location, geo-intelligence and navigation are critical to modern weapon systems. Warning given by General Townsend about China’s intention of building a naval base in West Africa implies a scenario that the closer a Chinese naval presence is to the U.S. East Coast, the shorter time for Washington to react. If China has a naval base in Equatorial Guinea, China’s BDS engagement with African countries will in-crease Chinese ballistic missile threat to the eastern coastlines of the U.S.[18] It is in this strategic prospect that the author is of the view that China’s BDS engagement with Africa has a revisionist implication. They have delivered impacts on the current Chinese sphere of influence and posed new security challenges to the east part of the American Continent. Despite the reiterated neutral position declared by China with the construction of a Chinese naval base in Bata, Washington has to be cau-tious. The scenario can develop from bad to worse with China possessing space-technology backed by a missile launch system and situated in the west coast of Afri-ca.
CONTROVERSIAL MILITARY CONTRACTORS OF BDS IN AFRICA
The strategic implication of BDS can be even more manifest if we examine the direct contractors of the projects in light of the links between these contractors and China’s defense industry enterprises according to the official document 10 Applica-tion Scenarios of BDS in Africa released by China Satellite Navigation Office on May 11th, 2021.[19] Take NORINCO Equipment and NORINCO International for instance. These contractors are in charge of mining and surveillance of natural resources in application of the BDS (Table 1). As it is, both NORINCO Equipment and NORINCO International are the subsidiaries to China North Industries Group, a Chinese state-owned defense corporation that produces armored assault vehicles, precision strike equipment, long range weaponry, defense aircrafts, and anti-missile systems, etc.[20] The public safety application of digital surveillance is contracted by North Electronics Research Institute and Shenzhen Zhongbing Konka Technology (Table 1). These two enterprises are also branches of China North Industries Group. Qianxun Spatial Intelligence, the direct contractor of BDS-based smart city projects in Africa, is also owned by China North Industries Group.[21] When it comes to Land Surveying, Com-Nav Technology is a major manufacturer of China’s military electronic devices and products.[22]
Having been involved with the above-mentioned Chinese defense industry en-terprises, the BDS’ projects of highly sensitive geo-intelligence, data, information and unmanned systems in Africa can hardly be ridded of the public suspicion that Beijing has carefully designed its strategic blueprint for a revisionist style of power expan-sion. It is possible that when these military enterprises are conducting BDS projects in Africa, they are practicing and gaining experiences of navigation warfare and im-proving combat efficiencies. The land surveying project of BDS will give strength to China’s industry of unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance. The collected data and geo-intelligence will improve China’s weapon system. The involvement of Chi-nese military contractors of BDS in Africa has sent a signal that China’s preparation for future multi-domain operation has integrated satellite-based technologies that can be operated globally. This should be a wake-up call to Washington given that the U.S. private sectors remain a peripheral player in Africa’s overall space program. Since African countries have joined the space race, it is high time for American poli-cymakers to establish rules-based space cooperation with Africa.
TABLE 1: The 10 Application Scenarios of BSD in Africa
Scenarios
|
Application and Solutions
|
Prime Contactor
|
Management of Vehicle and Transport
|
BDS positioning, navigation, warning and data collection services
|
China Transport Telecommunications & Information Center
|
Railway Industry
|
Railway construction and maintenance, time synchronization and manage passenger and freight transportation scheduling and warning system
|
China Railway Fifth Survey and Design Institute Group
|
Precision Agriculture
|
Auto-steering system and unmanned driving, remote maintenance, and big data
|
China Agricultural University
|
International Search and Rescue
|
Satellite alarm system, information transmission, positioning service
|
China Transport Telecommunications & Information Center
|
Land Surveying
|
High-precision positioning service, continuously operating reference stations, city planning, land surveying and mapping, urban and rural construction, environmental monitoring, disaster prevention, traffic monitoring, mine surveying
|
ComNav Technology
|
Digital Construction
|
Scientific control and management of construction process (highway, water conservancy excavation, dam, airport, etc.), multi-level of supervision.
|
Shanghai Huace Navigation Technology
|
Intelligent Mining
|
High-precision positioning, integrated intelligent monitoring platform, personnel security system and asset management system
|
NORINCO Equipment and NORINCO International
|
Public Safety
|
Real-time positioning, dynamic location monitoring, information aggregation, high-definition video recording, data collection and sharing
|
North Electronics Research Institute and Shenzhen Zhongbing Konka Technology
|
Wildlife Conservation
|
High-precision positioning, satellite remote sensing technology, wildlife tracking and monitoring
|
Chinese Academy of Forestry
|
Smart City
|
High-precision space-time common service system, safety monitoring, and green urban management, spatial-temporal related data collection
|
Qianxun Spatial Intelligence
|
SOURCE: China Satellite Navigation Office, “10 Application Scenarios of BDS in Africa,” Beidou, November 2021, http://m.beidou.gov.cn/xt/gfxz/202111/P020211105587887134672.pdf.
CONCLUSION
In light of the increasing Chinese engagement in the space sector with African countries and prospective Chinese satellite technologies highlighted by the China-Africa space cooperation, this article explores the strategic implication of the case of BDS applied in Africa. The author arrives at the conclusion that the export policy of China’s satellite technology to Africa has been driven by a revisionist line, not just seeking to expand China’s space tech market share in Africa. In addition to the mar-ket, the deployment of BDS in Africa is likely to tip the balance of the U.S. security environment. On the one hand, Washington is currently speculating a second Chi-nese naval base to be established in Equatorial Guinea. On the other hand, China’s satellite technology can enhance its offensive capability, threatening the U.S. home-land, or at least the East coast, from Africa. More intriguingly, the direct contractors of BDS projects in Africa are related to Chinese defense enterprises. This has re-vealed a revisionist nature of BDS as a strategic instrument after the deployment.
The application of BDS in Africa will render African countries and neighboring regions highly vulnerable given China’s state-owned defense enterprise can access sensitive geospatial intelligence and track down the exact position of human activi-ties. All these have clearly indicated a revisionist line of China’s export policy of BDS in application to African countries. Given the current limited role of U.S. engagement with Africa’s space sector, the author recommends that it is time for Washington to implement new policies of US-Africa space cooperation. There is a need to be physi-cally present as a stakeholder in the African countries’ space programs.
[1]Julie Michelle Klinger, “China, Africa, and the Rest: Recent Trends in Space Science, Technology, and Satellite De-velopment,” China Africa Research Initiative Working Paper, No. 38 (2020), pp. 1-25.
[2]Ibid.
[3]FOCAC, “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, November 30, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202112/t20211202_10461183.html.
[4]Zhao Lei, “China and Africa will strengthen cooperation on Beidou satellite system,” China Daily, November 6, 2021, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202111/06/WS618587cfa310cdd39bc73aa8.html.
[5]Ibid.
[6]“African Space Industry Revenue to Surpass USD 10.24 billion by 2024 Despite COVID-19 Setback,” Space in Africa, July 6, 2021, https://africanews.space/african-space-industry-revenue-to-surpass-usd-10-24-billion-by-2024-despite-covid-19-setback/.
[7]Ibid.
[8]State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” China Daily, January 29, 2022, https://language.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202201/29/WS61f4dee0a310cdd39bc84216.html.
[9]Ibid.
[10]Xinhua, “Mozambique starts using Chinese satellite system for predicting cyclones, natural disasters,” Xinhua, Janu-ary 3, 2020, http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2020-01/03/content_75576630.htm?_ga=2.54765231.568353810.1578123636-1883158874.1578123625.
[11]Ibid.
[12]Eric Olander, “China’s Role in Africa’s Rapidly Growing Space Market,” The China Africa Project, November 19, 2019, https://chinaafricaproject.com/podcasts/chinas-role-in-africas-rapidly-growing-space-market/.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Thomas P. Cavanna, “Unlocking the Gates of Eurasia: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for U.S. Grand Strategy,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 2 No. 3 (2019), pp. 10-37.
[15]David Vergun, “General Says China Is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” US Department of Defense, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/.
[16]“Statement by Sahsa Baker Deputy under Secretary of Defense for Policy Office of the Secretary of Defense,” House Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2022.
[17]“Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 10, 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_14ch1.pdf?ver=qmkgYPyKBvsIZyrnswSMCg%3D%3D.
[18]“Digital Press Briefing on Security and Stability,” U.S. Department of State, April 7, 2022, https://www.state.gov/digital-press-briefing-on-security-and-stability/.
[19]BeiDou, “The First China-Africa BDS Cooperation Forum Held in Beijing,” BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, May 11, 2021, http://en.beidou.gov.cn/WHATSNEWS/202111/t20211108_23350.html.
[20]“China North Industries Group Corp Ltd,” Bloomberg, May 10, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/CNIZ:CH.
[21]Yanhong Luo, “Jhongguó Bingchì Gongyèh Jítuán Hàn Alǐbaba Chuzih Shèlì Chian Syún Weìjhìh Wǎngluò Yoǔsiàn-gongsih” [China North Industries Group Corporation and Alibaba Funded the Establishment of Qianxun Spatial Intelligence Inc.], The Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2015, https://cn.wsj.com/articles/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E5%85%B5%E5%99%A8%E5%B7%A5%E6%A5%AD%E9%9B%86%E5%9C%98%E5%92%8C%E9%98%BF%E9%87%8C%E5%B7%B4%E5%B7%B4%E5%87%BA%E8%B3%87%E8%A8%AD%E7%AB%8B%E5%8D%83%E5%B0%8B%E4%BD%8D%E7%BD%AE%E7%B6%B2%E7%B5%A1%E6%9C%89%E9%99%90%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8-121647239087.
[22]81IT, “Sihnán Weìsingdaǒháng T300 Gnss Jiehshouji” [ComNav Technology’s T300 GNSS], 81IT, May 10, 2022, http://www.81it.com/2016/0601/6853.html.