HOW TO CREATE A MORE EFFECTIVE ARMY: LESSONS FROM THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR
2023.09.04
Views
921
INTRODUCTION
The Russian-Ukrainian war has become a valuable source for military analysis and even revision of approaches, strategies and tactics of military operations. The assessments made earlier by Western capitals, based on the balance of military forces, and prediction the imminent collapse of the armed forces and the resistance of Ukraine as soon as it clashed militarily with Russia, have been shown to be well wide of the mark. The Armed Forces of Ukraine not only successfully resisted the Russian army, vastly superior in terms of numbers and weapons, but also demonstrated high-level ability to think and act proactively, unconventionally and creatively, in the face of a disruption of military and administrative control and logistics lines.
Russia’s absolute advantage in aviation and missiles, navy, tanks, combat vehicles, artillery and ammunition was largely mitigated by Ukraine’s approach to defense, which combined flexibility of management, decentralization, independence from high command, the use of a variety of tactics and means, and the integration of traditional and asymmetric tactics.
The unexpectedly fierce defense of Ukraine frustrated the plans of the Russian command, led to enormous losses in manpower and equipment by Russia, and forced them to retreat from the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions of Ukraine. Subsequently, thanks to the supply of Western weapons, Ukraine was able to successfully carry out a counter-offensive operation, liberating the Kharkov region and Kherson.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the aspects that improved the effectiveness of the Ukrainian army, the advantages of which neutralized the numerical and qualitative advantage of the Russian armed forces.
Military analysts highlight a number of advantages of the Ukrainian army over the Russian one. The main ones are high morale on the battlefield, reconnaissance efficiency, flexibility and decentralization of command and control, high speed of decisionmaking, accuracy of artillery strikes, and initiative and non-standard thinking of junior and middle commanders.[1] Now we can say that the factors that contributed to the achievement of these qualities include the principles of network-centric warfare, the leadership of junior commanders[2] and high combat morale. Let us discuss in more detail these factors and their constituent components.
FACTOR 1 - NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
Ukraine has successfully used the principles of network-centric warfare, which is a military doctrine or theory of war that aims to translate an information advantage, enabled partly by information technology, into a competitive advantage through the computer networking of dispersed forces. For its effective implementation, it is necessary to have reconnaissance means; control systems that will allow automatic or semiautomatic transmission of information to command posts and fire units; and precision fire systems.
Intelligence systems were provided with a large number of tactical UAVs, which were located in almost every platoon of the Ukrainian army, and made it possible to significantly increase the situational awareness of the military units. In addition, the availability of their own intelligence information at first hand made it possible to achieve high unit autonomy, and even independence from headquarters. Indeed, in conditions of war, the General Staff and army headquarters are oversaturated with information, part of the communication lines can be destroyed or disrupted and do not work, so management is difficult. Under these conditions, possessing their own reconnaissance means makes it possible for units to operate effectively in a rapidly changing situation.
A control system is needed to ensure fast transmission of target data. In Ukraine, back in 2017-2018, the tactical-level combat system “Kropyva” of its own design was introduced; it is designed to automate control systems at the level of battalion-company-platoon-separate piece of equipment.[3] “Kropyva” helps to combine the means of reconnaissance, control and fire destruction of different units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard into a single information field. According to NATO classification, this system belongs to type C2 (command and control).
The "Kropyva" provides:
● Access to an electronic map of the area with the display of your own position on the GPS;
● Data exchange with other subscribers of the system: positions of allied units, coordinates of detected targets and short text messages;
● Solution of individual calculation tasks, such as calculation of a march, fire damage zone or artillery corrections;
● Ensuring interaction and data transmission in automatic mode from reconnaissance means - UAVs, radar and sound-measuring systems.
The use of the Ukrainian combat system made it possible to reduce the deployment time of an artillery battery by five times, the time to hit an unplanned target is reduced by almost three times, and the time to open counter-battery fire - by ten times. To work with the combat system, you need to know the coordinates of the target and the location of your artillery battery and weather conditions. This data is entered into the tablet with the “Kropyva” software, and the direction of fire and the distance to the target are calculated automatically. The system is quite simple to learn and can be installed on any tablet or smartphone. After installing the necessary software, the user can see a map of the area with their position on it. “Kropyva” also allows you to use data from rangefinders, sniper systems, weather stations or drones and provides integration and data exchange with radio stations or other users of the system.
Another necessary element in network-centric warfare is the availability of highspeed Internet connections. In the context of the destruction of mobile communications towers in combat areas by the Russian armed forces, the Starlink satellite communications system of the American company SpaceX has been a game changer. The first Starlink terminals were activated on the territory of Ukraine on February 26, two days after the start of the full-scale war. According to the Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov: Starlink helps us in our daily struggle on all fronts. Even if there is no electricity or the Internet, through the generators, with the help of Starlink, we will be able to restore any connection in Ukraine.
As of autumn 2022, about 20,000 Starlink terminals were activated in Ukraine, which made it possible to neutralize Russia's efforts to deprive Ukraine of mobile and Internet communications through missile, cybernetic and radio-electronic attacks. Russian efforts to disrupt SpaceX with cyberattacks, pinpoint the location of the Starlink terminals, and suppress their operation with the help of electronic warfare have so far been unsuccessful. The presence of a stable Internet connection allowed the Ukrainian armed forces to ensure effective C2 and implementation of network-centric warfare methods.
FACTOR 2 - LEADERSHIP OF JUNIOR COMMANDERS
The armed forces have traditionally been a very conservative and vertically oriented structure, in which discipline, unity of command, and strict execution of orders are key and indispensable elements. However, in a high-intensity war against a dominant enemy, orders from higher headquarters may be significantly delayed, or due to poor situational awareness of higher headquarters, be completely wrong. In this case, as the Russian troops’ experience has shown, the troops lost the initiative on the battlefield, did not know what to do, suffered significant losses, and lost morale.[4] Therefore, it is important for troops to learn to act autonomously, without waiting for orders from higher headquarters, guided by their own intelligence and the situation on the ground. Having one's own intelligence is a key element for taking the initiative, but it is important to teach junior and middle commanders to act without orders from above and take responsibility for themselves, and senior commanders must learn to delegate authority to junior ones. The underlying principle should be – “it is better to make the wrong decision than not to make it at all.”
In Ukraine, a striking example where a system of horizontal ties was formed is the Territorial Defense Forces, one of the reserve components of the Ukrainian armed forces. The territorial defense was established in January 2022 on the basis of the Law of Ukraine "On the Foundations of National Resistance," consisting of 25 brigades (one brigade per region of Ukraine), consisting of more than 150 battalions. One of the principles of the territorial defense forces is territoriality and dual subordination. Territoriality means that the brigade is responsible for its area from which volunteers are recruited. This allows for good situational awareness, as the locals have a good knowledge of the area in which their unit is located. In addition, they can quickly create a network of informants from among their friends and relatives living nearby, which gives them an intelligence advantage. The second principle is dual subordination: vertically to the military command, as well as to the military-civilian administration of a certain area. This allows you to establish logistics, supply, and support independent of the vertical military command and thus increase the autonomy and survivability of units. These principles, in turn, lead to greater initiative by commanders, and a willingness to operate effectively in isolation from the central command, relying on their own intelligence and logistics.
This can be described by the Mission Command approach, which empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. Mission Command supports the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.
Mission Command is based on the following conditions:
● War is chaotic and uncertain;
● No plan can account for every scenario; plans must change rapidly during the mission to accommodate changing situations.
● Subordinate commanders often have a better understanding of what is happening during combat and are likely to respond more effectively to threats if they are allowed to make decisions and act on changing situations not considered in the original plan in order to achieve their command
● Enemy forces may behave differently than expected, the route may become impassable, or units may expend supplies at an unexpected rate.[5]
Mission Command is an important means of implementing C2 and entails central planning but decentralized execution. Junior leaders understand the intentions of their superiors and act in accordance with this intention without asking permission. This is sometimes referred to as “disciplined defiance”. According to some data obtained during the discussions about C2 in Ukraine, the model of Mission Command up to and including the brigade has been implemented in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In addition to regular combat training, which ensures the implementation of the approach of Mission Command, the way to increase the leadership of junior commanders and reduce the Soviet vertical style of management is the introduction of special training courses organized by volunteers and civil society. For example, a few years ago, the public sector undertook to solve this problem: the Leadership Center of the Ukrainian Catholic University, together with the International Charitable Foundation «Come Back Alive», began to develop leaders in the military environment. Civilian specialists started to implement the program “Management and leadership in the military uni” for junior officers. In 2019, classes were held for 20 brigades, including 700 people - junior and senior commanders. The questions included the organization of effective management, task setting, delegation of authority, exercises and theoretical blocks about team building, negotiation, etc. Practice took 60-70% of the entire leadership and management program, and sessions were held every month with results of changes in behavior and commander approaches checked.[6]
In the same way, the role of sergeants was strengthened - they were given more authority and responsibility, and a program was organized for their training in leadership issues. On the basis of the 197 Training Center for the training of sergeants of the Ukrainian Army, training for a period of up to two months on management activities was organized. Classes were conducted by instructors with experience in combat operations and who underwent multi-level training, including under the guidance of foreign instructors. After the outbreak of full-scale war, Ukraine's NATO partners also organized a series of training courses for sergeants in leadership, which significantly improved the quality of C2 on the ground and provide an advantage over the enemy.[7]
Last but not least in terms of leadership has been successful civil-military integration. The mobilized and volunteers who joined military units, for the most part, had a higher education and had already established themselves as successful businessmen, engineers, and leaders. On the one hand, this became a challenge for regular officers to prepare civilians for military service in a short time, and on the other hand, it forced conservative officers, accustomed to the unquestioning obedience of subordinates, to change their methods. The presence of seniors in age, social status and intellectually high subordinates, raised the bar for the leadership qualities of officers, forcing them to improve in order to ensure effective management. The old Soviet methods proved to be ineffective under these conditions, and the control system evolved and improved its performance.
FACTOR 3 - HIGH MORALE
According to the results of sociological surveys made before the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainians showed a high level of readiness to defend their Motherland with weapons in their hands. According to polls by the Kyiv Institute of Sociology in December 2022, 57.5% of Ukrainians are ready to resist, of which 37.3% are armed.[8] This shows the high-level readiness of society for resistance and sacrifices for the sake of a free future, and on the other hand, the unity and solidarity of the Ukrainian nation.
After a full-scale invasion, the polls were confirmed by reality: queues at mobilization points and the reserve and territorial defense units, fierce resistance by the armed forces of Ukraine, and stoic resistance of Ukrainian society to Russian occupation. Moreover, after the first victories, morale soared – according to the results of a study by the “Sociological Group Rating” in March 2022, 80% of Ukrainians surveyed were ready to defend Ukraine with weapons in their hands;[9] in February 2023 - 89% of Ukrainians were ready to continue the fight until the complete liberation of the occupied territories, despite Russia threatening to launch a nuclear strike on Ukraine.[10]
In addition, the confidence and support of Ukrainians in state bodies has grown. In February-March 2023, 96% trusted the armed forces of Ukraine, 87% trusted volunteer units, 86% trusted the National Guard of Ukraine, 83% trusted the President of Ukraine, and 74% trusted the Security Service of Ukraine.[11] This confidence and support is also an element of successful resistance and defense.
At the moment, it can be assumed that the reasons for the maintenance of high morale by Ukrainians are the following factors:
First, the effective resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces and the performance of the military-political leadership of Ukraine. In the event of a quick defeat of Ukrainian troops, mass surrender and flight of Ukrainian leaders abroad, the consequences for national morale would have been catastrophic and Ukraine would most likely have capitulated. Therefore, it was important not to fall in the first days and weeks of the war, which in the future would make it possible to mobilize forces and society for steadfast defense.
Secondly, post-material values are inherent in Ukrainian society. This was vividly demonstrated by the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2013, when Ukrainian society protested against blatant injustice (in 2004 due to massive election fraud, and in 2013 due to the government’s harsh crackdown on a peaceful demonstration). The readiness for self-sacrifice for the sake of post-material values probably became the element that cemented Ukrainian society in 2022 and allowed the people it to oppose brutal aggression.
Thirdly, the war is perceived by Ukrainian society as existential, a war for the survival of the nation. Everyone understands that in the event of a military defeat, not only will the state collapse, but also the nation, with its rich and centuries-old history. Russia, carrying out genocide on the territory of Ukraine, erasing everything Ukrainian, carrying out mass deportations of Ukrainians from the occupied territory, is trying to destroy the very essence of Ukraine, which is unacceptable to its citizens.
Fourth, Ukrainian leaders have established very effective communication with their people. President Volodymyr Zelensky's daily addresses to the nation have become an effective communication channel, a platform for exchanges between the government and society, a core element of people's trust in the leadership. Zelensky’s regular posts inspire confidence, loyalty, hope and high morale. The vitality of the digital infrastructure, and in particular Starlink, has become important, providing real-time communication between the government and the people.
Fifth, the war became a trigger for the development of patriotic musical works, which became the basis of optimism, humor, national resilience, unity and Ukrainian identity. The song “Oh, the Red Viburnum in the Meadow,” performed by the leader of the Boombox group Andriy Khlyvnyuk with a machine gun in his hands against the backdrop of St. Sophia in Kyiv, became a hit and aroused tremendous interest in Ukraine and its diaspora in the West, significantly strengthening international support for Ukraine. In this regard, other symbols of Ukrainian resilience and victory played a big role: the “Russian warship” stamp, “Dog Patron,” Bayraktar and others inspired millions.
CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of the actions of the Ukrainian army and defense as a whole was achieved due to a number of factors that had a multiplier effect and increased flexibility and survivability. In this sense, an integrated approach is needed, since some factors automatically affect others. For example, the presence of drones makes it possible to ensure effective reconnaissance of tactical units, apply the principles of network-centric warfare, strengthen the leadership of commanders, achieve qualitative advantages on the battlefield, thus ensuring military victories, saving the lives of soldiers, and maintaining high morale.
The second conclusion is the strengthening of Ukrainian defense through active and effective civil-military cooperation. Courses organized by volunteers, aimed at developing leadership in the army, made it possible to improve the leadership qualities, initiative and flexibility of junior commanders, which made it possible to form a more effective army compared to the Russian invaders. The influx of civilians into the army, especially in the territorial defense units, made it possible to create an intellectual core that effectively introduced new technologies, made it possible to reduce the conservatism of the military, increase its flexibility, and made defense the concern of the whole nation.
Thirdly, the activities and post-material values of society, the understanding that the defense of Ukraine is a top priority for Ukrainians, effective communication between the authorities and the people, the use of cultural and symbolic symbols of Ukrainian victory, have significantly increased the resilience of Ukrainians.
In this regard, the following recommendations can be made to improve combat capabilities of Taiwan: provide units with automatic C2 systems with all the necessary components, including the integration of intelligence; review the system of combat training of service personnel, and if necessary, include issues of leadership development of junior and middle commanders, as defined in the Mission Command concept; create conditions and ensure effective military-civilian interaction that will enhance the capabilities of the armed forces, promote high morale and ensure the implementation of the concept of total defense.
Mr. Yurii Poita is Head of the Asia-Pacific Section at the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies (CACDS) in Kyiv and Asia Section at the New Geopolitics Research Network (NGRN), European China Policy Fellow at Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS, Germany). Since October 2022, he has been working as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research. Yurii Poita specializes in China's influence in the post-Soviet space, Ukrainian-Chinese relations, China’s factor in Russian-Ukrainian war, hybrid and conventional warfare
[1] “Expert Pointed Out Advantages Of Ukrainian Army Over Russian Army,” Хартия'97, October 21, 2022, https://charter97.org/en/news/2022/10/21/520890/; “Five reasons why Ukraine has been able to stall the Russian advance,” France 24, March 8, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220308-five-reasons-why-ukrainehas-been-able-to-stall-russian-advance; Christopher Morris, “Ukraine war: Russia’s problems on the battlefield stem from failures at the top,” The Conversation, September 14, 2022, https://theconversation.com/ukraine-warrussias-problems-on-the-battlefield-stem-from-failures-at-the-top-189916; СОНЯ САВИНА, “Какие слабости показала российская армия в Украине [What Weaknesses did the Russian Army Show in Ukraine],” Важные истории, April 13, 2022, https://istories.media/opinions/2022/04/13/kakie-slabosti-pokazala-rossiiskaya-armiya-vukraine/.
[2] According to the RUSI report Russian military had low tactical competence and lacks the strength of junior leadership. Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds, Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 (2022).
[3]Combat Management System of the "Kropuva" Tactical Unit in The Service of the Armed Forces, Defense Express, July 6, 2020, https://defence-ua.com/news/bojova_sistema_upravlinnja_taktichnoji_lanki_kropiva_na_sluzhbi_zsu_ta_ngu_foto-1129.html.
[4]СОНЯ САВИНА, “Какие слабости показала российская армия в Украине”; Christopher Morris, “Ukraine war: Russia’s problems on the battlefield stem from failures at the top”; Tim Ripley, “Ukraine conflict: Russian military adapts command-and-control for Ukraine operations,” Janes, March 7, 2022, https://www.janes.com/defencenews/news-detail/ukraine-conflict-russian-military-adapts-command-and-control-for-ukraine-operations
[5]Wade, Norman M. BSS6: The Battle Staff SMARTbook (The Lightning Press, 2020).
[6]Людмила Кліщук, “Менеджмент для молодих командирів: як цивільні навчають військових бути лідерами [Management for Young Commanders: How Civilians Teach Military Leaders],” LB.ua, December 3, 2021, https://lb.ua/society/2021/12/03/500056_menedzhment_molodih_komandiriv.html.
[7]“У Британії розпочалася підготовка молодших командирів ЗСУ [In Britain, the Training of Junior Commanders of the Armed Forces has Begun],” Укрінформ, October 5, 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3586250-ubritanii-rozpocalasa-pidgotovka-molodsih-komandiriv-zsu.html.
[8]Opinions and views of Ukrainians regarding Ukraine's relations with the West: results of telephone surveys conducted on February 14-22, 2023 and February 22-March 6, 2023, Kyiv Institute of Sociology, https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1203&page=1.
[9]“ЗАГАЛЬНОНАЦІОНАЛЬНЕ ОПИТУВАННЯ: УКРАЇНА В УМОВАХ ВІЙНИ (1 БЕРЕЗНЯ 2022) [National Poll: Ukraine at War (March 1, 2022)],” Соціологічна група «Рейтинг», March 1, 2022, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina_v_usloviyah_voyny_1_marta_2022.html.
[10]Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut and Leonard Schütte, “Auch bei russischem Nuklearschlag: 89 Prozent der Ukrainer wollen unter allen Umständen weiterkämpfen, Tagesspiegel [Even in the case of a Russian nuclear strike: 89 percent of Ukrainians want to continue fighting under all circumstances],” Tagesspiegel, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/internationales/auch-bei-russischem-nuklearschlag-89-prozent-der-ukrainer-wollen-weiterkampfen--biszur-ruckeroberung-der-krim-9299993.html.
[11]1 Інна Андаліцька, “Кому українці довіряють найбільше: результати опитування (інфографіка) [Who do Ukrainians trust the most: survey results (infographic)],” UNIAN, March 15, 2023, https://www.unian.ua/soci-ety/reyting-doviri-v-ukrajini-rezultati-svizhogo-opituvannya-ta-infografika-12180378.html