CHINA’S AGGRESSIVE DIPLO- MACY IN THE XI ERA: WILL THE WOLVES BE TAMED?
2023.11.24
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By Christina Chen
INTRODUCTION
China has become increasingly aggressive. The country continues to devote a significant budget to military development, pressuring its neighbors into an arms race. China’s moves in areas such as the South China Sea, most notably the construction of artificial islands and subsequent military bases on these islands, are seen by the United States (US) and its allies as threats to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. However, China is not only aggressive in its behavior. In fact, observers are equally concerned about the country’s diplomacy. Ever since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, observers have been noting Chinese diplomats’ use of harsh, provocative language when responding to inquiries and criticisms of Chinese foreign policy. Widely known as “wolf warriors,” the diplomats’ official speeches and personal Twitter accounts were infused with offensive rhetoric, defying what would be expected of professional diplomats and thus drawing criticism from all over the world.
Perhaps sensing that aggressive diplomacy did little to help China improve its foreign relations, in May 31, 2021, President Xi Jinping remarked in a Politburo meeting that Chinese official should create a “trustworthy, lovable and respectable” national image, and China needed to “be open and confident, but also modest and humble,”[1] thereby suggesting a policy U-turn with regard to aggressive diplomacy. Despite Xi’s call, these wolf warrior diplomats continue to “snarl” at foreign comments. During the early stage of war between Ukraine and Russia this year, some Chinese diplomats used provocative language to frame the US government as ineffective and the American people as bumbling, and also responded to a report indicating Xi’s knowledge of Russia’s plan to invade Ukraine by calling it “disinformation.”[2] In his speech at George Washington University in Washington on May 28, 2022, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken openly stated, “Beijing is engaging in increasingly provocative rhetoric and activity [against Taiwan].”[3] Therefore, the attempt by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership to tone down “wolf warrior diplomacy” did not succeed. What explains China’s continuation of aggressive diplomacy, despite the negative reactions it generated overseas, and the top leadership’s attempt to tame it?
EXPLAINING THE PERSISTENCE OF AGGRESSIVE DIPLOMACY
Political developments since Xi—bureaucratic resource constraint, conflicting policy direction and the rise of state nationalism—explain the continuation of aggressive diplomacy.
RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS ALTERED BUREAUCRAT STRATEGIES
As the bureaucracy responsible for foreign policy implementation, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has faced serious resource constraints in recent years. In 2020, the country’s total diplomatic spending was 51.41 billion yuan, a significant 16.47% reduction on the year before. Similarly, the Belt and Road Initiative, the signature foreign policy undertaking and the country’s most serious attempt to pursue major country diplomacy has also seen funding cut—investment in the initiative was at its lowest point ever.[4] The dramatic cut in the resources available to the ministry reflects weakened economic conditions and the CCP’s turn away from big projects. With their resources limited, China’s diplomats had to modify their strategies to achieve the goal of Chinese national rejuvenation. While aggressive diplomacy existed before 2020, it became more attractive because it was “cheaper” to execute and could attract attention very quickly. China’s diplomatic spending in 2022 increased by 2.4% to 50.27 billion yuan, still lower than earlier years.[5] Thus, it is expected that aggressive diplomacy will continue.
XI’S CONFLICTING POLICIES ALLOWED AGGRESSIVE DIPLOMACY TO CONTINUE
Politics under Xi has transformed from collective to personalistic rule. Fiscal intergovernmental reform, along with the creation of several leading groups such as the National Security Commission and the Leading Small Group for Comprehensive Deepening of Reform, have strengthened central government’s authority over party-state officials at the ministerial and subnational levels. Second, Xi has made himself the head of the small leading groups, the center of the “cult of personality” campaign, and the leader who has surpassed term limits after such a requirement was removed from the PRC Constitution in 2018. Third, Xi launched a widespread anti-corruption campaign, which resulted in the downfall of high-ranked officials such as Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang as well as nearly 1.5 million party and government officials, thereby leading to subsequent curtailing of the discretionary power of government officials (for fear of being the targets of corruption charges). For China’s foreign-policy making, these political developments greatly consolidated Xi’s power at the expense of the foreign-policy apparatus, which in turn altered the incentives of Chinese diplomats.
For China’s government officials, career survival after Xi rose to power has been dependent on a strict adherence to Xi’s diplomatic agenda. On numerous occasions, Xi has instructed party-state officials to have a “fighting spirit,” thereby indicating the leader’s preference for assertive policy behavior.[6] Even though the remark made by Xi in May suggested a U-turn in aggressive diplomacy, subsequent statements indicated otherwise. In July 2, 2021, at the 100th anniversary celebration of the founding of the CCP, Xi delivered a very hawkish speech, saying that Beijing will not tolerate “sanctimonious preaching,” will never allow anyone to “bully, oppress or subjugate China,” and vow that anyone who tries will “have their heads bashed bloody against the Great Wall of Steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.” This speech was seen by many observers as targeting the US and the West since they have criticized China’s human rights abuses and crackdown in Hong Kong.[7] On May 10, 2022, at the meeting celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Communist Youth League of China, Xi urged members to have firm belief, and have fighting spirit in the face of struggle.[8] With those remarks, Xi was sending conflicting messages to his subordinate officials. For diplomats, such conflicting messages may have even given them the impression that Xi’s call to be “lovable” and “humble” did not apply to them. In fact, after Xi’s Politburo statement, China’s envoy to France, Lu Shaye, attempted to legitimize aggressive diplomacy in an interview on June 17, 2022. Since China has grown in strength and influence, and the West is “bent on suppressing China’s growth”, it is necessary to respond with “justified defense,” “to protect our rights and interests,” Lu remarked.[9]
It follows that Chinese diplomats would have a greater incentive to follow the leader’s preference for bold, and aggressive if needed, advocacy and defense of China’s national interests; and there are indications that such adherence pays off. Zhao Lijian, who pioneered the combative style of diplomatic exchanges while serving as deputy chief of mission in Pakistan, was promoted to the post of deputy director general of the Ministry’s information department in 2019.10 Hua Chunying, another prominent wolf warrior, opened her Twitter account in early 2020, and has been actively using the platform to engage in aggressive diplomacy since then. She was promoted to the post of China’s assistant foreign minister in October 2021.11 While not every Chinese diplomat engages in aggressive diplomacy, those that do so were rewarded with political promotion. This further increased Chinese diplomats’ incentives to continue aggressive diplomacy.
RISING NATIONALISM NURTURES AGGRESSIVE DIPLOMACY
Even though the Chinese people lack the power to select the CCP leadership, they still exert an influence on how the party responds. Developments in the 1990s and 2000s induced the party to enhance its ruling legitimacy through nationalism. First, China’s rapid economic growth gave rise to the middle class, which seemed less interested in, if not supportive, of party positions. Moreover, the party sensed the erosion of Communist ideology as a source of regime legitimacy and the rising demand of Chinese people for more political rights (as manifested in the Tiananmen protest). Due to these developments, the party began to tout a form of state-led nationalist narrative that focused on criticisms of the US and Japan.[12]
This “state nationalism” was heightened and expanded after Xi came to power. In 2012, Xi made reference to the “Chinese dream of national rejuvenation,” a loose concept that speaks to the Chinese people, with the ultimate goal of making China the dominant global power. In 2017, the party amended the Party Constitution to include Xi’s concept of “the China Dream,” signifying the formal inclusion of nationalism into Chinese communist ideology. Such a vision of China was “assertive”—for it called on China to abandon the “keep a low profile (tao guang yang hui)” attitude and instead to actively project and fulfill its ambitions. Thus, it was not surprising that nationalism was heightened during this period, as such sentiment could help the CCP rally the Chinese people.
In recent years, the mounting socio-economic problems in China have generated internal pressures, which may have increased the party leadership’s incentive to rely on nationalism to maintain support of the regime. China’s economic growth has been slowing from 2010: the rate of GDP growth went from 10.6% in 2010 to 8.1% in 2021, compared to the rate of 8.49% in 2000 to 10.6% in 2010.[13] The party leadership also confronted rising social problems: the gini coefficient has been rising steadily, ranging from 46.2 in 2015 to 46.8 in 2020. While the unemployment rate went down slightly from 4.6% in 2015 to 4.4% in 2017, it rebounded afterward, going from 4.3% in 2018 to 5.1% in 2021.[14] These trends show that the party leadership has yet to resolve these issues, and the continuation of the Covid-19 pandemic and Russo-Ukrainian war could further impede growth and development in the country. From the party leaderships’ perspective, nationalism has become an even more convenient tool to secure domestic support. This context provides a fertile ground for propagation of aggressive diplomacy.
CONCLUSION
The CCP is facing a challenging year. Although China is not playing a direct role in the Russo-Ukrainian war, which began in February, its conflicting attitude— particularly its refusal to impose sanctions on Russia—resulted in widespread criticism and thus further distrust from the West. In Shanghai, the municipal authorities announced a surprise rotating lockdown in March 27, and then suddenly a city-wide lockdown on April 1, resulting in inadequate food provision, strained medical resources, and even family separation. Both crises occurred in the year of the 20th party congress, with power transition about to take place. This is also a year full of domestic problems—the economic outlook is bleak, as the GDP performance is expected to be lower than the announced target of 5.5%; unemployment remains high, especially for college graduates. Externally, China’s relations with the US have evolved into an all-out diplomatic, technological and even military rivalry, while relations with the EU have soured as well. Given the challenges the party faces, it is best if China adopts a more friendly attitude with the outside world to avoid conflict.
On May 26, 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi led a delegation on a 10- day tour of the South Pacific, in an attempt to sign a security deal with 10 Pacific nations. Wang showed friendly and positive attitude during the trip, leading some observers to argue that aggressive diplomacy is coming to an end. However, it seems unlikely that the party will rein in its wolf warrior diplomats in the near term, given the ambiguity of Xi’s direction, the association of career promotion with aggressive posture, and rising nationalist sentiment at home. The continuation of aggressive diplomacy will have a negative impact on the rule of the CCP. As many analysts have already pointed out, China’s wolf warrior diplomacy engendered mostly negative responses outside the country. Before Xi came to power, the US and other countries remained mostly cooperative with China, so China’s aggressive rhetoric and behaviors were mostly overlooked by these countries. In recent years, however, the nature of the relationship has become much more competitive. In the new context, China’s aggression will be read by the already distrustful US and its allies as realistic challenges. Thus, China’s aggressive diplomacy, which has been mostly for the domestic audience and leadership, will inadvertently generate a stronger backlash from target countries, which will in turn increase domestic strife and pressure on the CCP. This is a vicious cycle that the party leadership probably does not foresee.
Dr. Christina Chen currently is an Assistant Research Fellow at the INDSR, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Tunghai University. Dr Chen received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego. Her research interests include Chinese politics, political economy, state and society, and central-local relations.
[1]“Xi Seeks ‘Lovable’ Image for China in Sign of Diplomatic Rethink,” Bloomberg News, June 1, 2021, https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-01/xi-seeks-lovable-image-for-china-in-sign-of-diplomatic- rethink#xj4y7vzkg.
[2]Jessica Brandt, “China’s ‘Wolf Warriors’ Are Having a Field Day with the Russia-Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Policy, January 28, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/28/russia-ukraine-crisis-china-diplomacy-social-media- twitter/.
[3]Anthony J. Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” (Speech, Washington, DC, May 26, US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach- to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
[4]Liam Gibson, “China Cuts Spending on Diplomacy as US Splurges,“ Taiwan News, December 13, 2021, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4374249.
[5]“China’s Diplomacy Budget Grows While Trade Deal Outlook Narrows,” South China Morning Post, March 6 2022, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/chinas-diplomacy-budget-grows-while-093000813.html.
[6]Guo Ben-shen and Wong Zi-hui, “Knowledge Point: ‘Xi Talks about Governance and Rule,’ Part III, Why Emphasizing Struggle? (zhi shi dian xi jinping tan zhiguo lizhen disanjuan weihe pinpin qiang diao douzheng)” Xinhua News, September 4, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2020-09/04/ c_1126451268.htm.
[7]“CCP 100: Xi Warns China Will Not be ‘Oppressed’ in Anniversary Speech,” BBC News, July 1, 2021, https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57648236.
[8]“Xi Urges Youth League Members to Have Fighting Spirit,” CGTN, May 10, 2022, https://news.cgtn.com/ news/2022-05-10/Xi-urges-youth-league-members-to-have-fighting-spirit-19UVwta0uxa/index.html.
[9]Yew Lun Tian, “China’ ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomacy is Justified Defence’, Says Envoy,” Reuters, June 17, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-is-justified-defence-envoy- says-2021-06-17/.
[10]Alex W. Palmer, “The Man Behind China’s Aggressive New Voice,” New York Times Magazine, July 7, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/07/magazine/china-diplomacy-twitter-zhao-lijian.html.
[11]Chen Qingqing and Du Qionfang, “FM Spokesperson Hua promoted to Assistant Foreign Minister in ‘Recognition of Her Work’ in Conveying China’s Voice,” Global Times, October 24, 2021, https://www. globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1237176.shtml.
[12]Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism,” China Perspectives 59 (2005), https:// journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/2793.
[13]“China GDP Growth Rate 1961-2022,” Macrotrends, https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/ unemployment-rate.
[14]“China GDP Growth Rate 1961-2022,” Macrotrends, https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/ unemployment-rate; “Unemployment, Total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)-China,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=CN.