By Shao-Cheng Sun

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has intensified its aggressive maritime activities in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, posing a grave threat to the region’s security and stability.[1] In the East China Sea, Chinese naval warships routinely patrol waters around Japan, projecting its naval presence into the Pacific Ocean. Since 2012, PRC Coast Guard vessels have operated almost daily near the Tiaoyutai Islands to claim sovereignty. In the South China Sea, China has advanced its territorial claims in the contested waters through various hostile activities, including building artificial islands, increasing maritime patrols, and deploying weaponry. Their fishing and coast guard vessels have constantly operated in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Indonesia. In the Taiwan Strait, Chinese warships frequently conduct military exercises near Taiwan, to intimidate Taiwan’s leaders. They also practice “anti-access, area denial” tactics to prevent United States (U.S.) forces from coming to Taiwan’s defense.[2]

In the face of China’s maritime expansion, leaders from Taiwan, the U.S., and Japan believe in enhancing maritime security cooperation. In January 2021, China passed a law that authorized its Coast Guard to use weapons against foreign ships, if they illegally enter “China’s waters.” In response, Taiwan and the U.S. established a Coast Guard Working Group on March 25.[3] In November 2022, U.S., Japanese, Australian, and Canadian warships conducted joint exercises, countering Chinese assertiveness in the region.[4] On January 11, 2023, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoshimasa Hayashi and Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada convened the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. They condemned China’s military activities around Japan, including missile launches in August 2022, during which several missiles landed in waters near Japan’s Sakishima Islands.[5] On January 13, 2023, President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio met in Washington, D.C., encouraging the peaceful resolution of Taiwan issues. They reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.[6] In April, the U.S. sent 200 military personnel to train Taiwan troops. Defense contractors also visited Taiwan in early May, discussing the joint production of drones and ammunition.[7]

The author proposes options for enhancing Taiwan-U.S.-Japan maritime security cooperation by reviewing current cooperation and challenges and suggesting policy recommendations to help counter China’s maritime threat.[8]

Since Ukraine turned the tide of the war and regained Kharkov and Kherson from September to November 2022, its unwillingness to negotiate with Russia has only hardened. However, the war situation reached a stalemate thereafter, and Ukraine continues to seek increased military aid from the West, particularly heavy military equipment, to facilitate the recovery of territory.

Taiwan is located at the center of the First Island Chain. Based on its geo- strategic advantage, Taiwan is an asset for the U.S. and Japan to confront China’s maritime ambitions. U.S., Taiwanese, and Japanese coast guards (USCG, TCG, and JCG) are committed to the rule of law in encounters at sea. The threats presented by Chinese vessels are one of the main concerns. Several threats are identified: First, various Chinese vessels are active in the region, including fishing vessels, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). It is difficult to discern their intentions. Second, the expanding authority of the CCG in early 2021, including the potential use of force and a broader area of operations, have increased concerns. Third, China uses its vessels to conduct gray- zone activities, ranging from regular incursions into Japan and Taiwan’s waters. With the deterioration of Cross-Strait relations, these gray-zone activities are dangerous.[9] With China’s maritime activities increasing, coordination between Taiwan, the U.S., and Japan on maritime issues has become more important.

Taiwan and the U.S. have increased their cooperation to counter China’s incremental poaching in Taiwan’s territorial waters. For example, China has sent hundreds of sand dredgers to offshore islands under Taiwan’s control. Taiwan’s coast guard vessels have seized many dredgers, but their numbers are overwhelming.10 As a result, Taiwan and the U.S. signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to establish a Coast Guard Working Group.[11] Their objectives are preserving maritime resources, reducing illegal fishing, and participating in joint maritime search and rescue.[12] This group focuses on improving communications, building cooperation, and sharing information between Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). This is accomplished through their designated representatives, the USCG and TCG.[13] This working group symbolizes the U.S.-Taiwan effort to counter China’s use of its coast guard and civilian fishing militia to assert its territorial claims.[14] This mechanism will enhance future naval cooperation in confronting China’s naval expansion in the Pacific Ocean. For example, TECRO stated that the coast guards of both countries would forge a stronger partnership and contribute even more to a Free and Open Indo- Pacific region. AIT echoed that the U.S. supports Taiwan’s contributions to issues of global concern, including maritime security and law enforcement.[15]

In an effort to support Taiwan, a U.S. Navy destroyer and Coast Guard Cutter Munro staged a series of routine exercises in the East China Sea. They conducted routine Taiwan Strait transit on August 27, 2021. Before transiting the Taiwan Strait, the Cutter Munro participated in a deployment with the Japan Coast Guard vessel Aso for the drill, including communication, search and rescue, and confronting threats. They emphasized that their vessels followed international law but sent a clear message to China.[16] Looking forward, the Taiwan Coast Guard and the Navy vessels could also conduct joint and cooperative maritime drills, maritime law enforcement training, and exercises with the U.S. Coast Guard and the Navy vessels.

Taiwan has received strong bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress to boost bilateral relations, bolster Taiwan’s defenses, and encourage its participation in international organizations. In August 2022, then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei and met with President Tsai. Beijing retaliated with military exercises that surrounded Taiwan. During a March 2023 visit to California, President Tsai met with new House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, the highest-ranking U.S. official to meet a Taiwanese president on U.S. soil. China responded with a new wave of military exercises. China has sent military planes and ships toward Taiwan almost daily. It also held large-scale drills modeling a blockade and simulating strikes on important targets in Taiwan.[17] In response, the U.S. and Taiwan strengthened their security relations. For example, U.S. lawmakers have called on the Biden administration to follow through on the nearly $19 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. In May 2023, a delegation of U.S. defense contractors, led by retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Steven Rudder, visited Taiwan. Gen. Rudder pledged the beginning of deeper cooperation with Taiwan. The U.S. wants to be part of Taiwan’s defense capabilities and improve Taiwan’s supply chain resilience.[18]

Despite being unable to agree on the sovereignty of the Tiaoyutai Islands, the governments of Taiwan and Japan concluded almost three decades of negotiations on a fishery agreement in April 2013. Under this agreement, they agreed to resolve fisheries issues stemming from overlapping EEZs. Both countries also exempted their fishing boats from each other’s law enforcement agencies.[19] Further, the first Taiwan-Japan Maritime Affairs Cooperation Dialogue, held in October 2016, covered bilateral cooperation on various issues such as fisheries, and marine technology. The Taiwan Coast Guard Administration and its Japanese counterpart can work together regarding rescue at sea.[20]

In 2018, Taiwan and Japan signed two memoranda of understanding (MOU) to enhance maritime cooperation in fighting illegal immigration.[21] On August 26, 2021, Sato Masahisa, head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) committee on Taiwan relations, tweeted that “one day, Japan, U.S., and Taiwan coast guards will train together.” On August 28, the ruling parties, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Japan’s LDP, held a virtual meeting on coast guard cooperation. The two parties discussed improving deterrence and security capabilities, such as information exchanges and bilateral cooperation.[22] These developments reflect a growing consensus in Tokyo that China’s rising threat against Taiwan also seriously impacts Japan’s security.[23] On January 13, 2023, Taiwan and Japan held the 5th Maritime Affairs Cooperation Dialogue. During this conference, the Taiwan Ocean Affairs Council and its Japanese counterpart exchanged views on marine environment cooperation, maritime security cooperation, marine science cooperation, and fisheries cooperation. Both countries will continue to exchange information under this framework.[24]

The Biden administration has fulfilled its commitments outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) by providing arms sales and carrying out freedom of navigation exercises in the Taiwan Strait.[25] In recent years, tensions have increased between Japan and China over the disputed Tiaoyutai Islands. While Japan and China have a territorial dispute, Taiwan also has sovereign claims over the Islands.[26] Thus, there are challenges for any future maritime cooperation. The first challenge is political consensus within U.S. and Japan domestically. Despite President Biden agreeing to send U.S. forces to defend Taiwan, U.S. officials attempted to backpedal such statements by reiterating that there was no change in the official “One China policy.” In addition, the Japanese government remains concerned about China’s reactions to deepening Japan-Taiwan security ties, and the political establishment in Japan has not reached a consensus on its approach towards Taiwan. Though some officials within Japan’s ruling LDP have been strong proponents of closer cooperation, other voices in the LDP and other parties are more reluctant to forge more robust security ties with Taiwan.[27] The second challenge is the institutional constraint between the JCG and the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF). For coast guard cooperation, the differing authorities of each coast guard present obstacles. The USCG and the TCG can cooperate with their respective navies, but the JCG has little cooperation with the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF). The JCG is prohibited from conducting military activity.[28] Third, trilateral cooperation remains limited due to the absence of alliances or diplomatic relationships with Taiwan. The lack of in-depth and real-time intelligence sharing impedes effective defense cooperation.[29]

The U.S., Taiwan, and Japan are interested in preventing armed conflict over Taiwan and thwarting China’s attempts to force unilateral changes to the status quo. A Taiwan Straits conflict has a considerable risk of spillover into Japan’s waters and airspace and could escalate to a great power conflict between the U.S. and China.[30] If China took over Taiwan, Beijing would dominate East Asia. This would pose a serious threat to the U.S.-Japan security alliance framework. If the U.S. decided to defend Taiwan, it would seek support from Japan and would rely on U.S. forces posted in Japan.[31] Here are several suggestions for policymakers in formulating maritime security policies in dealing with a potential crisis:

The U.S., Taiwan, and Japan should explore cooperation and communication between their coast guards. Cooperation should focus on less politically sensitive and humanitarian issues. Law enforcement activities may be an area for cooperation. Communication should prioritize information sharing. This can start with tri-coast guard liaison.[32] The U.S. and Japan could improve military-to-military communication with Taiwan at the senior and middle levels. Formal contacts could include joint training exercises with the Coast Guard regarding humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. Informal channels could send active-duty personnel to serve as visiting fellows at research institutions and observers to the same Track 2 or Track 1.5 dialogues.[33]

To deter China’s military aggression, the U.S. and its allies could warn Beijing that their intervention is likely in the event of a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. The U.S. could also encourage its allies to support Taiwan, joining the regional security framework. For example, the U.S. Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) aims to bolster the capabilities of regional allies and partners to resist Chinese coercion. The PDI also highlights investments to improve the capabilities of allies and their partners, and to develop innovative concepts to counter threats through advanced technologies. Under the PDI framework, the U.S. could encourage East Asian countries to enhance their security cooperation with Taiwan.[34] For Taiwan, rising concerns over China’s aggressive military maneuvers have prompted Taiwan’s leaders to extend the mandatory military service period from four months to a year. However, compared to the militaries of other democratic countries (South Korea 18- 21 months, Singapore 24 months, and Israel 24-30 months,) Taiwan’s conscription period is the shortest. Facing China’s immediate threat, Taiwan’s military needs to prolong its mandatory service. Additionally, many former conscripts stated that their training was “outdated, boring, and impractical,” lacking instruction in urban warfare or modern weapons like drones.[35] Ukraine’s experience in fighting against the Russian invasion is an important lesson for Taiwan.

Since Taiwan and Japan have territorial claims over the Tiaoyutai Islands, the two countries have discussed maritime-related issues to resolve potential friction flashpoints, since the inaugural maritime dialogue in 2016.[36] On Aug. 26, 2021, Sato Masahisa, head of the LDP’s committee on Taiwan relations, tweeted that “one day, Japan, U.S., and Taiwan coast guards will train together.” On Aug. 28, the ruling parties of Taiwan and Japan held a virtual meeting on coast guard cooperation. The two parties discussed improving deterrence and security capabilities, such as information exchanges and bilateral cooperation. These dialogues may serve as a format for future communication between the two governments.[37] Since the U.S. and Taiwan have established a Coast Guard working group and U.S.-Japan Coast Guard cooperation has become solid, the U.S. government could facilitate the establishing of a similar working group by Taiwan and Japan.

There is a need for the U.S., Taiwan, and Japan to work closer to counter China’s military aggression. At a private fundraising event on July 5, 2021, Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso stated that if a major problem occurred in Taiwan, Japan and the U.S. would have to work together to defend Taiwan.[38] On July 29, lawmakers from the U.S., Taiwan and Japan participated in a strategic, virtual dialogue to deepen cooperation between the three parties.[39] In August, virtual talks between the ruling parties of Japan and Taiwan took a big step forward. The discussions were labeled the party-to-party equivalent of U.S.-Japan “two plus two” security talks. During the talks, they discussed deeper military cooperation, particularly bilateral coast guard cooperation and trilateral cooperation with the U.S.[40] These messages show that China’s threat against Taiwan has caused great concern in Japan. However, Japan is a law-abiding country. Without a legal framework, the improvement of Taiwan-Japan security relations will be restricted. After the U.S. shifted its diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China, the U.S. Congress enacted the TRA to define their unofficial relations. Thus, the idea of a Japan Taiwan Relations Act (JTRA) has attracted interest from leaders and lawmakers in Taiwan’s DPP and Japan’s LDP.[41] Washington and Taipei can encourage Tokyo to stipulate the institutionalize of a Japan-Taiwan security mechanism in Japan’s Taiwan Relations Act.

Peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are critical interests of the U.S. and Japan. Given the growing Chinese assertiveness in the region, security planners must explore creative approaches to pursue greater security cooperation.[42] After Taiwan and the U.S. established a Coast Guard Working Group, a similar mechanism between Taiwan and Japan became indispensable. Foundational to U.S. strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region is its network of allies and partners. This is an advantage that China doesn’t have.[43] The U.S. is strengthening its alliances with South Korea and the Philippines. The AUKUS security pact of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. exemplifies collaboration with allies to expand combined capacity in the region. The U.S. is also making significant investments in defense ties with India.[44] Among the U.S. allies, Japan plays the most crucial role. Japan’s involvement could mitigate the geographic vulnerabilities of the U.S. and deny China’s ability to take Taiwan by force.[45]

Several suggestions have been proposed. First, Taipei and Washington need to advance bilateral maritime security cooperation. The coast guards and navies could conduct joint maritime exercises. Second, the U.S. and its allies could warn Beijing that they will respond to China’s invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. should push its allies to establish security cooperation with Taiwan. Third, to institutionalize a Taiwan- Japan security mechanism, Japan and Taiwan can establish a regular pattern of “legislator-level 2+2” talks. Washington and Taipei should encourage Tokyo to formulate a JTRA. Lastly, since Taiwan and the U.S. have set up a Coast Guard working group, the U.S. government could help Japan establish a similar working group with Taiwan.

Facing China’s maritime expansion, there is an urgent need for strategic planners to formulate more practical and creative options to develop a solid trilateral maritime security cooperation to counter China’s rising threat. The U.S. should also increase crisis communication with China, even though China has a history of ignoring hotlines during crises.[46]

Dr. Shao-Cheng Sun served in the Taiwanese army and retired as a colonel. He joined the Citadel faculty as an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the fall of 2018. He previously was a Visiting Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and an adjunct assistant professor at Taiwan's National Defense University. Dr. Sun is the author of China's Cultural Soft Power in the United States and The Decision-Making Process of the United States Government During the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. East Asian security and politics, US-China relations, and US security policy in Asia are among his research interests. He teaches East Asian studies as well as international politics.