SOUTH KOREA’S STRATEGIC DILEMMAS IN THE CONTEXT OF SINO-U.S. RIVALRY: IS HEDGING POSSIBLE?
2023.11.24
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By Men-Fung Yeung
INTRODUCTION
In response to North Korea’s provocations and the Sino-U.S. rivalry, President Park Geun-hye tried to hedge risks in Northeast Asia by adopting “Trustpolitik.” Park’s policy amplified South Korea’s relations with the U.S. and China to deter any North Korean provocations. In the meantime, the Park administration promoted economic cooperation with North Korea to persuade Pyongyang to suspend its nuclear and missile development.[1]
However, Pyongyang conducted two nuclear tests in 2016 that made the Park administration terminate economic cooperation with North Korea. Meanwhile, the administration agreed with Washington to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (the THAAD system) in South Korea to prevent North Korea’s possible military provocations. However, due to the fact that the deployment of the THAAD radar system in South Korea can possibility deter China’s military deployment, Beijing believes the missile system undermines its security. Beijing expressed its opposition to Park’s arrangement by launching economic retaliations against South Korea; the dispute damaged trust between Beijing and Seoul.
After President Moon Jae-in replaced President Park, he tried to alter her foreign policy. To maintain a space for South Korea to hedge risks, President Moon tried to settle the THAAD dispute with China, promoted economic cooperation with North Korea, and tried to keep a distance from the U.S. even though he maintained the alliance with the U.S.. However, support in South Korea for Seoul’s alignment with the United States made it more difficult to maintain equidistant diplomacy vis- à-vis China and the United States. Under such a circumstance, Seoul has tried to amplify the security cooperation with Washington and Tokyo since Yoon Suk Yeol came to office. In fact, the simultaneous pressure from North Korea, Sino-U.S. competition, and public opinion in South Korea reduces the possibility for policymakers in Seoul to adopt a hedging strategy.
SOUTH KOREA’S STRATEGIC DILEMMAS
Facing North Korea’s threat and the power competition between China and the U.S., South Korea adopted a hedging strategy similar to as Southeast Asian states. However, since the Moon Jae-in administration, it has become more difficult for Seoul to offset risks in Northeast Asia as there are four dilemmas that make hedging a less feasible policy option for Seoul.
First, South Korea faces a dilemma with regard to North Korea. President Moon believed an engagement-oriented policy helped moderate North Korea’s aggression. During Moon’s presidency, Seoul tried to promote confidence building measures with North Korea. For instance, President Moon tried to promote economic cooperation with North Korea and reduce the military presence along the 38th parallel.[2] Furthermore, to accelerate the peace-building process on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul tried to serve as a bridge for bilateral negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. Although it is true that President Moon tried to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula, his policy did little to achieve his goal. In fact, North Korea aimed to seek bilateral negotiations with the U.S. that neglected a role for South Korea.[3] In addition, North Korea provoked South Korea when it did not fulfill Pyongyang’s demands. In June 2020, North Korea cut off communication with South Korea and demolished the Inter-Korean Liaison Office due to North Korean defectors in Seoul using balloons to spread anti-North Korean regime leaflets. Hence, Seoul will be the victim if North Korea commits provocations.
Second, South Korea needs to overcome the negative consequences caused by the discrepancies of interests with Beijing over North Korea’s missile and nuclear threat. On the one hand, South Korea’s engagement policy with China attempted to utilize Beijing’s influence to constrain North Korea’s provocations. On the other hand, China’s engagement with South Korea aimed to weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance.[4] North Korea’s two nuclear tests in 2016 exposed that their interests on this issue are incompatible. South Korea agreed to deploy the THAAD system to deter North Korea’s possible provocations. However, the Chinese government believed Seoul’s decision aimed to constrain China collectively with Washington;[5] Beijing launched an array of economic sanctions to pressure Seoul to withdraw the decision. Although President Moon tried to reconcile with China by his “Three No’s” commitments after he had replaced President Park,[6] Seoul’s conciliatory approach to China failed to receive credit from the Chinese government as Beijing believed South Korea has taken the U.S. side against China.
Other than the conflict of interests between China and South Korea over North Korea’s threat, there is a possibility that Seoul will be entrapped by Sino-U.S. competition. Since the Xi Jinping Era began, the Chinese government has attempted to enhance its influence internationally. In the meantime, Beijing has tried to reshape the existing order in its favor; Beijing’s approaches undermine the U.S. leadership position in the Asia-Pacific region. For instance, the government of China has increased the frequency of enforcing economic sanctions against foreign countries when their policies undermine China’s national interests, promotes its ideology and values abroad that challenge liberal values, and China’s maritime activities undermine security in the South China Sea.[7]
In response to China’s influence, the Trump administration launched the “Indo- Pacific” strategy to counter the rise of China.[8] With the “Indo-Pacific” strategy, the Trump administration tried to mobilize U.S. Asian allies to counterbalance China collectively. At the same time, the Trump administration attempted to constrain China economically and geo-politically. Furthermore, after the U.S. leadership shift from Trump to Biden, Washington has continued to amplify quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, India, and Australia; it has also tried to include South Korea in the U.S.-led “Indo-Pacific” Strategy. However, the Moon administration managed to keep a distance from the U.S.-led “Indo-Pacific” strategy primarily because the administration wanted to avoid taking a side vis-à-vis the U.S. and China.[9] In other words, the Moon administration hoped to maintain its economic interests with China and security ties with the U.S. simultaneously.
Finally, it has become more difficult for officials in South Korea to respond to public opinion regarding South Korea’s foreign policies. Although the Moon Administration tried to maintain a stable relationship with China after the THAAD dispute, anti-China sentiment grew during the period in South Korean society. According to a survey conducted by Pew Research Center in 2021, 77% of South Korean respondents claimed that they had an unfavorable view of China.[10] Moreover, anti-China sentiment has overtaken anti-Japan sentiment. A joint survey conducted by Hankook Research and the Korean news magazine SisaIN reveals that the percentage of respondents who favored China was lower than Japan; the former accounted for 26.4%, whereas the latter was 28.8%.[11] In fact, the growth of anti-China sentiment in South Korea is primarily due to China’s attitude to North Korea’s nuclear tests and THAAD deployment. South Koreans were disappointed by China’s passive response to North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2016 and its overreaction to South Korea’s deployment of a purely defensive missile system.[12] Since the THAAD dispute, they believe that Seoul should keep a distance from China in order to ensure South Korea’s national security and dignity. In this regard, the South Korean government has found fulfilling the demands of public opinion and handling risks from Sino-U.S. rivalry onerous.
THE 2022 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND SOUTH KOREA’S FOREIGN POLICY
Facing strategic dilemmas and the voice of keeping a distance from China, the 2022 presidential election was a turning point in South Korea’s foreign policy development. During the election campaign, the debate between the progressive and conservative candidates on their diplomatic approaches offered an opportunity for the public to consider which measures were suitable to withstand pressure from North Korea and Sino-U.S. rivalry.
Admittedly, the foreign policy positions from progressive and conservative candidates attempted to overcome Seoul’s strategic dilemmas. Nonetheless, their approaches to safeguarding South Korea’s national interests were different. Lee Jae-Myung, a progressive candidate, tried to maintain Moon’s approach. He proposed to maintain an engagement-oriented policy for North Korea. To encourage North Korea to uphold its commitment of promoting denuclearization, he suggested promoting sanctions removal and providing humanitarian aid to North Korea to address COVID-19. In addition, in response to Sino-U.S. rivalry, Lee proposed to maintain an equidistant diplomacy vis-à-vis China and the U.S. More specifically, Seoul should maintain its economic ties with China. Meanwhile, he suggested South Korea should maintain a distance from the US-led “Indo-Pacific” campaign even though he recognized the importance of maintaining the alliance with the US. With this approach, Lee hoped South Korea could avoid offending China and the US, thereby maximizing South Korea’s interests.[13]
On the other hand, a conservative candidate, Yoon Suk Yeol, proposed to adopt a hardline approach to North Korea and a pro-U.S. policy. Yoon suggested promoting economic cooperation, humanitarian aid, and sanctions removal on North Korea only if Pyongyang showed its sincerity with regard to achieving “complete denuclearization.” Meanwhile, to ensure South Korea's security, Yoon suggested deploying the THAAD system to deter North Korea’s possible missile tests; he opposed Moon’s attitude to China regarding THAAD as it undermined South Korea’s sovereignty and security.[14] Furthermore, regarding his policy line toward ROK-China relations, Yoon suggested maintaining cooperation with China with regard trade and North Korea issues. Nevertheless, he argued that equidistant diplomacy vis-à- vis China and the U.S. is unfeasible due to the discrepancies in political values and security interests between China and South Korea. Instead, he proposed South Korea should amplify its relations with Japan and participate in the U.S.-led “Indo- Pacific” campaign to ensure South Korea’s security and sovereignty. [15]
After Yoon was elected, the administration enhanced Seoul’s security cooperation with Tokyo and Washington. For a start, the Yoon administration adopted a conciliatory policy towards Japan to promote security cooperation. Before Yoon’s inauguration, he sent a delegation to Japan in April to improve the ROK’s bilateral relations with Japan. He proposed to adopt a “future-oriented” approach to maintain South Korea’s relations with Japan. Unlike his predecessor’s focus on the historical and territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan, Yoon amplifies security cooperation with Tokyo; he believes this approach helps address the security challenges in Northeast Asia.[16]
Moreover, the Yoon administration has strengthened Seoul’s security cooperation with Washington. Unlike the Moon Jae-in administration which maintained an ambiguous attitude, the Yoon administration has shown an active willingness to participate in the U.S.-led “Indo-Pacific” campaign. Not only has President Yoon expresses his willingness to participate in the “Quad” Dialogue,[17] he also agreed that Seoul should participate in the U.S-led “Indo-Pacific” economic framework during their bilateral summit after Biden’s visit to Seoul.[18] Furthermore, President Biden and Yoon made the Washington Declaration in April 2023. Both sides agreed to enhance the deterrence of the alliance against North Korea’s threat; Seoul even agreed that a U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine could visit South Korea.[19]
CONCLUSION: SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO SOUTH KOREA’S FOREIGN POLICY
Facing North Korea’s threat and competition between China and the U.S., it is difficult for Seoul to adopt equidistant diplomacy with Beijing and Washington. In other words, a hedging strategy is gradually becoming a less feasible choice for South Korea to overcome security challenges in Northeast Asia.
Since President Yoon took office, South Korea’s foreign policy has shifted from a nationalistic approach to a security-oriented approach. President Yoon has adopted an appropriate approach in response to challenges in the “Indo-Pacific” region. The Yoon administration has adopted a conciliatory policy with Japan over historical issues and seeks security cooperation with Tokyo to overcome North Korea’s threat collectively. At the same time, Seoul has strengthened the deterrent capability of the U.S.-ROK alliance to deter North Korea’s possible provocations. With these approaches, South Korea does not need to counter threats alone and thus can deter adversaries collectively.
Admittedly, amplifying South Korea’s relations with Japan and the U.S. does not mean that South Korea needs to counter China directly. Nonetheless, the Yoon administration needs to reduce the negative consequences of overly relying on China, especially security and economic aspects. The THAAD dispute between China and South Korea revealed that Beijing has limited leverage to constrain North Korea’s aggression largely because of its geo-political concerns; common interests between Seoul and Beijing are limited on this issue. At the same time, economic retaliation from China following the missile system’s deployment demonstrate that South Korea is vulnerable when its trade overly relies on a specific market.[20] Under these circumstances, policymakers in South Korea may reconsider the possibility of seeking security cooperation with China in addressing North Korea’s threat. To defend South Korea, Seoul may consider enhancing its defense capability against the North. In the economic realm, it is necessary for Seoul to put more effort into expanding overseas markets in order to reduce the over-dependence on a specific market. Although it has become difficult for Seoul to maintain strategic ambiguity vis- à-vis China and the U.S., Seoul has space to expand its trade network to reduce its economic vulnerability.
The new government has tried to alter the foreign policy made by the previous government. Nonetheless, the administration should preserve some measures from the previous government that help expand South Korea’s trade network to reduce possible economic losses in the future. For instance, Moon Jae-in’s “New Southern Policy” and “New Northern Policy” have tried to expand South Korea’s economic network with India, ASEAN, and Central Asian states. These policies help expand Seoul’s trading network and reduce overdependence on a specific trade partner, thereby preventing economic risks that undermine South Korea’s sovereignty and security.
Overall, space for South Korea to adopt a hedging strategy has been reduced gradually due to the change in the strategic environment in Northeast Asia. In response to these changes, the Yoon administration has tried to solidify Seoul’s relations with democratic countries within the U.S.-led “Indo-Pacific” campaign to promote deeper security cooperation. In the economic realm, South Korea should continue to expand its trade network instead of depending on a specific market to reduce South Korea’s economic vulnerability. With these approaches, South Korea will have more capability to withstand pressure from the strategic dilemmas.
Man Fung Yeung is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University. His research interests focus on alliance politics, economic sanctions, U.S. Asia-Pacific policy, and Northeast Asian Security.
[1]Park Geun-hye, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, no. 5 (September/October 2011), pp. 13-18; Yun Byung-se, “Park Geun-hye's Trustpolitik: A New Framework for South Korea's Foreign Policy,” Global Asia, Vol. 8, no. 3 (September 2013), pp. 8-13.
[2]Jangho Choi and Jae-Young Lee, “Making Transformative Peace: The Bold Vision for A Peace-Driven Economy,” Global Asia, Vol. 14, no. 2 (June 2019), pp. 40-43.
[3]Inhan Kim, “No More Sunshine: The Limits of Engagement with North Korea,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 40, no. 4 (October 2017), pp.165–181.
[4]Suk Hee Han, “Resetting the South Korea–China Relationship: The THAAD Controversies and Their Aftermath,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 31, no. 4 (January 2019), pp. 539–557.
[5]Tiancong Lau, “ROK Factor for the Deployment of THAAD,” Contemporary International Relations 27, no. 3 (2017), pp. 26–32.
[6]Three No’s commitment including: (1) no deployment of additional THAAD system; (2) no participation in the U.S.-led missile defense network and; (3) no participate in a trilateral alliance with the U.S. and Japan.
[7]Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018); Jennifer Lind, “Life in China’s Asia: What Regional Hegemony Would Look like Essays,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (March 2018): 71–82; Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Why Chinese Assertiveness Is Here to Stay,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, no. 4 (October 2014), pp. 151–170.
[8]Er-Win Tan, Jae Jeok Park, and Tomohiko Satake, “Security Hedging Strategies of U.S. Allies and Partners in the Era of Trump,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 32. no. 2 (January 2020), pp. 163-184.
[9]“Victor Cha Says South Korea Refused to Join the Quad,” The DONG-A ILBO, January. 28, 2022, https:// www.donga.com/en/article/all/20220128/3173224/1.
[10]Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, “Large Majorities Say China Does Not Respect the Personal Freedoms of Its People,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, June 30, 2021, https://www. pewresearch.org/global/2021/06/30/large-majorities-say-china-does-not-respect-the-personal-freedoms- of-its-people/.
[11]이오성 , “중국의 모든 것을 싫어하는 핵심 집단 , 누굴까 ,” 사사 In, 2021 년 06 월 17 일 , https://www.sisain.co.kr/news/ articleView.html?idxno=44821&utm_source=pocket_mylist.
[12]According to the survey conduct by The Asan Forum, the percentage of respondents believed the U.S. was a reliable ally increased from 59.6% in 2014 to 67.3% in 2017. Also, regarding the arrangement of the THAAD deployment, the percentage of approval of the deployment decreased from 73.9% in February 2016 to 55% in June 2017. Nonetheless, the majority still claimed that they approved this arrangement. See: Jiyoon Kim, “South Korean Public Opinion,” The Asan Forum, February 27, 2018, https://theasanforum. org/south-korean-public-opinion/.
[13]Lee Jae-Myung, “A Practical Vision for South Korea,” Foreign Affairs, February 24, 2022, https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2022-02-23/practical-vision-south-korea.
[14]Yoon Suk Yeol, “South Korea Needs to Step Up,” Foreign Affairs, February 17, 2022, https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2022-02-08/south-korea-needs-step.
[15]“A Rundown of Leading Candidates’ Positions on Defense, Foreign Relations and the Economy,” The Korea Herald, February 16, 2022, https://m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220216000621.
[16]“(3rd LD) Yoon’s Delegation Arrives in Japan with Letter Outlining Will for ‘New Relations,’” Yonhap News Agency, April 24, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220424000553315; Da-gyum Ji, “[Shangri-La Dialogue] S.Korea Intends to ‘Normalize’ Security Cooperation with Japan against N.Korean Threats,” The Korea Herald, June 12, 2022, http://m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220612000135&ACE_SEARCH=1.
[17]Yonhap, “Yoon Says Will 'Positively Review Joining' Quad If Invited: Report,” The Korea Herald, April 26, 2022, http://m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220426000151.
[18]He-rim Jo, “S. Korea Aligns with US Indo-Pacific Strategy,” The Korea Herald, May 22, 2022, http:// m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220522000216; Remarks by President Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press Conference,” The White House, May 21, 2022, https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/21/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president- yoon-suk-yeol-of-the-republic-of-korea-in-joint-press-conference/.
[19]“Washington Declaration,” The White House, April 26, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/.
[20]China is the biggest trade partner of South Korea and 40% of South Korea’s trade comes from China. Reference: James Park, “South Korea’s Enduring Restraint Toward China,” The Diplomat, February 18, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/south-koreas-enduring-restraint-toward-china/.