UNCOVERING PLA’S SHARP INCURSION INTO TAIWAN AIRSPACE
2021.12.19
Views
574
By Jung-Ming Chang
An unprecedented number of 150 sorties of PLA’s military aircraft breaching Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) between October 1 and October 5 drew a great attention of international society. Even though the PLA began their frequent presence and harassment of the island since 2016 when President Tsai won the election, released data from the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan starting from September 2020 demonstrates a significant rise in the trend. (See Figure 1)
FIGURE 1: A Run Chart of PLA Aircraft Incursion into Taiwan since September 2020
Source: MoD, Taiwan
From January to October this year, 2021, moreover, the total sorties have been more than 600, in which one fourth sorties took place in the first five days of October. In the meantime, six national navies, including the US, the UK, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and Netherlands were involved in a joint exercise in the Western Pacific, and followed by the US, the UK, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia navies reportedly convergence in the Southeast China for another two-week exercise. Putting these military exercise activities near Taiwan together, tensions erupted and escalated by the warplanes and warships shadowed the Indo-Pacific region. (See Table 1)
TABLE 1: PLA Incursion into TW Airspace and Big Event (Oct.1-5)
|
Date |
PLA Military Aircraft Number |
Incidents |
|
10/1 |
J-16 (fighter) *28 SU-30 (fighter) *4 H-6 (bomber) *4 Y-8 ASW (transport aircraft) *1 KJ-500 (early warning aircraft) *1 |
PRC National Day |
|
Total: *38 |
||
|
10/2 |
J-16 (fighter) *26 SU-30 (fighter) *10 Y-8 ASW (transport aircraft) *2 KJ-500 (early warning aircraft) *1 |
US, UK, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and Netherlands joint exercise in the Western Pacific |
|
Total: *39 |
||
|
10/3 |
J-16 (fighter) *38 SU-30 (fighter) *2 Y-8 ASW (transport aircraft) *2 H-6 (bomber) *12 KJ-500 (early warning aircraft) *2 |
|
|
Total: *16 |
||
|
10/4 |
J-16 (fighter) *38 SU-30 (fighter) *2 Y-8 ASW (transport aircraft) *2 H-6 (bomber) *12 KJ-500 (early warning aircraft) *2 |
Joint exercise held by US, UK, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia in the South China Sea |
|
Total: *56 |
||
|
10/5 |
Y-8 ASW (transport aircraft) *1 |
|
|
Total: *1 |
Source: MoD, Taiwan
Analysts have warned that the risk of war breakout is indeed growing, if not unlikely. Kuo-cheng Chiu, the Defense Minister of Taiwan, acknowledges at a meeting of Legislative Yuan that the current situation over the Taiwan Strait is the most difficult occasion since his service in the military.[1] Against this background, any misstep of action by one side might trigger irreconcilable and uncontrollable consequences.
This essay aligns with an argument that the intention of the recent Chinese aggressive moves might not to launch war, but to pose blare political and military menaces and then achieving certain goals. To consider proper ways of response, Taiwan needs to accurately interpret the situation.
POLITICAL DETERRENCE
Since President Tsai won the election in 2016, Beijing has adapted to a unilateralist stance in its Taiwan policy. The authority closed the previously established official communicating platforms with Taipei and squashed Taiwan’s international space over the past years. It also suspended the issuing of travel visas to the Chinese mainlanders who planned to visit the island. Then came into the public notice is the Chinese military activities with various tactics such as gray-zone warfare in operation. Swarms of sand dredgers and fishing boats from China kept crossing the middle line and stayed near Taiwan’s Matsu and Kinmen islands. There were also reported incidents caused by the PLA military airplanes. The tension has been straightforward. The PLA tried to exhaust Taiwan’s force strength and they are posing a clear but intimidating signal.[2]
Applying the observation insight to the Chinese recent behaviors, we are sure that China is replicating its means of deterrence against Taiwan and many international defenders, particularly the U.S. Blatantly to say, China is presenting its red line with armed forces that China’s sovereignty over Taiwan cannot be compromised. China will be willing to pay a price to counter those international behaviors that are defined as crossing such a red line. We have seen similar scenarios when the PLA sent more sorties into the ADIZ in the past one year when the US senior officials visited Taiwan, and when Taiwan was mentioned by global leadership at the G7 Summit.
While Taiwan is rapidly expanding its global network with the support from the US and from the like-minded alliance and benefit from China’s failed wolf warrior diplomacy, China seems to continue its courses of action based upon the above logic.
It has been heard that China’s activities in the early October this year were to target the joint exercises near the South China Sea, where Taiwan only played a limited role. Accordingly, the exercise dates were prescheduled and revealed in advance, and that was the first time for the US, the UK and Australia to perform joint action after their creation of AUKUS. Whatever Beijing’s perception will be, however, it could take advantage of sending military aircrafts to express its protests under the cloak of a training program. This ambiguity offered China a cover of its real intention.[3]
NATIONAL PROPAGANDA
In addition to posing a signal of intimidation, the PLA’s proactive incursions into Taiwan airspace served as another purpose for the Chinese domestic propaganda. October is a sensitive month for both China and Taiwan as their individual National Day are in the same month. More sensitivities added to this year is due to the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. On 1 July, Xi Jingping in his speech asserted the CCP’s historical mission which was to resolve the Taiwan question and to realize China’s complete reunification; he said that was also an unshakable commitment of the CCP.[4] Such a tone appeared again on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of Xinhai Revolution, dated on October 9 when Xi reaffirmed the necessity and inevitability of the Chinese national reunification.[5] Many observers believe that Xi’s talk target and satisfy the nationalist audience, which is rising in China.
It is argued that the Chinese authority planned to show its “hard power” in the early October to mobilize the domestic sentiment, which was expected to transform into a public opinion to support the CCP.[6] Furthermore, the sentiment was expected to help the ruling party to tackle the domestic problems.
The CCP is right now facing tough challenges in and outside China, those including the endless waves of COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, and emerging issues such as the electronic power shortage, economic recession as well as the strategic competition with the US on bilateral and multilateral occasions. To deal with them, the authority adopted various way, including tightening social space and deepening control on Big Tech which have been witnessed in recent months. Having taken these measures, many analysts do not rule out that the Beijing would resort to military manner to Taiwan to distract the domestic attention. As Xi is paving the way of maintaining his power at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, domestic stability must be listed as the main priority.[7]
DEMONSTRATING OFFENCE CAPABILITIES
The third implication from the PLA’s aggression focused on the military aspect. Arguably, China wanted to demonstrate its resentment and military capability against the US-led series of joint exercises in the Indo-Pacific region, if we examine the frequency and timing.[8] As has been noted, China might believe that it can wear down the Taiwanese society as well. For Taiwan, on the other side, we also capture some significant aspects from these Chinese military activities.
First of all, the surged number and intensity within a short time demonstrates that the PLA has forged a mature chain of logistics.[9] Benefited from that progress which would provide important support to the troops, the warplanes can then conduct sophisticated and long-distance tasks more effectively and efficiently. In line with this point, the PLA must have upgraded their command-and-control capability to manage a larger scale of air force than before.
The second point, raised by many military and strategic analysts, is the possibility whether the J-16D electronic warfare airplanes have been deployed in these operations.[10] If confirmed, not only will the Taiwanese force but also the military troops of neighboring states need to build their countermeasure. The J-16D airplane is reportedly outstanding in its capability to disrupt radar and electronic systems. The airplane can effectively support and combine with other sorts of fighter jet to undermine air defense on lands, guaranteeing the PLA’s advantage in contrast to its adversary. On the first day of October, we observed a complete task force with sufficient types of bombers, fighters, and warning and control aircrafts, and we must keep our eyes on.[11] That is why the scale as well as the types of planes caught international attention.
In addition, we can foresee future constitution of PLA aircraft deployed in the region. Taiwanese media have reported that during one of the six navies exercises, a group of attacking forces appeared, and it was constituted as tens of J-16 jets coming first along with H-6 bombers, and then KJ-500. Such a formation (number and order) was in place to perform the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) tactics.[12] Due to the lack of first-hand information we are not going to dig further such content here, but given the knowledge about the specific features of the shown warplanes, picturing the PLA’s operation in advance might be workable.
SEEKING BREAKTHROUGH AGAINST US ENCIRCLEMENT
Overall, the Chinese sudden and rising military presence intends to achieve multiple goals. One of which, China looks for having a “substantial and meaningful” dialogue with the US. Since President Joe Biden took office in January, China was not yet able to reverse the US’s current China policy set up by the Trump Administration. As a result, taking Taiwan as a potential breakthrough might be risky, but worth trying, as it is also in line with Beijing’s intention of deterrence on President Tsai.
On October 5, President Biden himself expressed his concerns over Taiwan. Biden said that he had a phone call with Xi Jinping and they both agreed to follow the “Taiwan Agreement,” which subsequently was clarified by the White House staff what Biden referred to was Taiwan Relations Act. On October 6, the US national security adviser Jake Sullivan held a close-door meeting with China’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director Yang Jiechi in Zurich. Both sides, 8 hours later, agreed to hold a US-China Leadership Summit, presumably to be in the form of online.[13] Although their interaction was rarely interpreted as warm, there is an indicator that the two sides are ready to improve their current strategic rivalry. However, neither show a willingness to prevent Taiwan from turning into sparks of fire, despite the communication.
To look forward, tension should remain, and pressure turn to be heavier over the area of Taiwan Strait, if no one is willing to concede, though war arguably is not imminent. The strategic competition between the US and China would no doubt fuel the fire. Still, the thing that the distance between competition and conflict is just one way step. Having said so, all engaged actors explicitly express their interests and concerns respectively and yet practically they would balance tactics to prevent from accidental violent conflicts. To conclude, no one side should be going to faceoff with military means in the short term,[14] but the spiral of uncertainty and pressure of conflict are rising for all.
Tsung-Han Wu is an Assistant Research Fellow, Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan. His research interests cover international relations, conflict study, and Chinese politics.
Hsiao-Huang Shu is an Assistant Research Fellow, Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan. His research interests cover PLA, military operation concept, and weapon and strategy.
[1]“China-Taiwan Military Tensions ‘Worst in 40 Years’,” BBC, October 6, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58812100.
[2]Yimou Lee, David Lague, and Ben Blanchard, “China Launches ‘Gray-zone’ Warfare to Subdue Taiwan,” Reuters, December 10, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/hongkong-taiwan-military/.
[3]Wen Dong, “wu tian nei 150 jia zhan ji rao tai jie fang jun ling lei shi yi yue bing yan gei shei kan [五天內150架戰機擾台 解放軍“另類十一閱兵”演給誰看?, Incursion into Taiwan by 150 sorties within 5 days, for whom does PLA special military parade target to show],” VOA, October 8, 2021, https://www.voacantonese.com/a/China-sends-150-warplanes-into-taiwan-defense-zone-in-five-days-20211008/6262612.html.
[4]“Full Text: Speech by Xi Jinping at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the CPC,” Xinhua, July 1, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2021-07/01/c_1310038244.htm.
[5]William Zheng, “Chinese President Xi Jinping Says Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan Is in Country’s Best Interests,” South China Morning Post, October 9, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3151755/chinese-president-xi-jinping-says-peaceful-reunification-taiwan.
[6]Ralph Jennings, “Why China Sends Warplanes into Taiwan’s Airspace But Doesn’t Attack,” VOA, October 8, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-taiwan-airspace/6263246.html.
[7]Junhua Zhang, “ke zuo ping lun: Xi jin ping er shi da qian hou de ji jian tou teng shi [客座評論：習近平二十大前後的幾件頭疼事, Comments: Affairs disturb Xi Jinping before and after the 20th National Congress],” DW, October 25, 2021, https://reurl.cc/pxqxq4; Christian Shepherd, “China’s Xi Jinping, Preparing for a Third Term, Shuts the Door on the Past,” Washington Post, November 5, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-xi-jinping-history/2021/11/05/387835c8-388f-11ec-9662-399cfa75efee_story.html.
[8]“25 jia gong ji shi yi guo qing rao tai xue zhe: xiang guo ji yan xi biao tai [25架共機十一國慶擾台 學者：向國際演習表態, 25 sorties of PLA aircrafts incursion into Taiwan on October 1 National Day, expert claims: China showing its standpoint to international society],” UDN, October 1, 2021, https://udn.com/news/story/10930/5786759; Keoni Everington, “Chinese media warns US troops defending Taiwan would suffer ‘death blow’,” Taiwan News, October 15, 2021, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4315793.
[9]Zhong Jie, “10 yue gong jun da gui mo kong zhong cao bing tou lu de jing xun [揭仲專欄：10月共軍大規模空中操兵透露的警訊, Zhong Jie: The alarmed signal revealed by the PLA operations with large scale in October],” Storm Media, October 18, 2021, https://new7.storm.mg/article/3994688.
[10]Kaixiang You, “gong ji ri ye rao tai jia ci lian liang tian chuang gao xue zhe: xiu chuji neng li shi ya tai mei [共機日夜擾台架次連兩天創高 學者：秀出擊能力施壓台美, Numbers of PLA Military Aircrafts Invading Taiwan Reach New Record in Two Days. Experts: China is Showing its Offence Capability and Putting Pressures on Taiwan and the US],” CNA, October 3, 2021, https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202110030079.aspx.
[11]Shuhua Shi and Shuren Gu, “zui wei xian de hai xia: gong ji wei he zhuan xiang Taiwan xi nan jiao [最危險的海峽：共機為何轉向台灣西南角？, The Most Dangerous Strait: Why does the PLA Aircrafts Fly to the Southwest Corner of Taiwan], CommonWealth Magazine, October 27, 2021, https://web.cw.com.tw/taiwan-strait-2021/index.html.
[12]Shumei Yang, “gong ji rao tai zhen xing tu bian cai ying wen qiu guo zheng jing jue bing xiong zhan wei [共機擾台陣型突變蔡英文邱國正警覺兵凶戰危, PLA Warplanes Suddenly Change its Constitution President Tsai and Minister Chiu Sense the Alarm],” Storm Media, October 8, 2021, https://www.storm.mg/article/3980306.
[13] Alexandra Alper, David Brunnstrom, and Ben Blanchard, “Biden Says He and China's Xi Agree to Abide by Taiwan Agreement,” Reuters, October 6, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/biden-says-he-chinas-xi-have-agreed-abide-by-taiwan-agreement-2021-10-05/; Shannon Tiezzi, “China-US Meeting in Zurich Paves the Way for a Biden-Xi Virtual Summit,” Diplomat, October 7, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/china-us-meeting-in-zurich-paves-the-way-for-a-biden-xi-virtual-summit/.
[14]Owen Greene and Christoph Bluth, “China and Taiwan: Why the War of Words is Unlikely to Lead to Military Conflict (for now, at least),” Conversation, October 13, 2021, https://theconversation.com/china-and-taiwan-why-the-war-of-words-is-unlikely-to-lead-to-military-conflict-for-now-at-least-169746.