Wilfried von Bredow

On February 20, 2014, Russia started a military conflict on the Eastern border of Ukraine. It occupied and annexed the Crimean Peninsula, and promoted secessionist attempts in two Eastern provinces of Ukraine. Evidently, this aggression was carefully calibrated. The hybrid war operations were a mixture of physical violence, cyber-attacks, and massive propaganda. This violation of international law was widely criticized by Western governments and international organizations. Various diplomatic efforts to stop the war and find a political solution to the conflict however remained unsuccessful. Some comparatively mild sanctions against Russia’s political and economic establishment had no measurable effects on the Kremlin. On the contrary – many Western governments continued to buy strategically important goods (like natural gas and other fossil energy sources) from state-owned Russian companies. Thus, the energy consumption of some European countries, including Germany, had become dependent on energy imports from Russia. A rather uncomfortable situation, but widely ignored.

Eight years later, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a comprehensive military aggression against Ukraine. President Putin (and subsequently all state-controlled media in Russia) called it a special operation with the objective of terminating the status of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state. It came as a shocking surprise to Western governments in the European Union and in NATO. This time reactions differed sharply from the low-profile response in 2014. Western governments denounced the Russian aggression not only as a serious breach of international and grave violation of humanitarian law but also as an attack on international order.

The Russian military procedure abruptly revealed the Western naivety of putting their energy security in the hands of a ruthless dictator. February 24 ,2022 marks a turning point in Western perceptions of Russia’s political trustworthiness. Popular concepts in international relations like democratic ‘change through trade’ suddenly had lost their convincing power. EU and NATO states began supporting the Ukrainian government not only in political and economic terms, but also by providing weapons and military aid.

No country has been more deeply imbedded in the clouds of international policy illusions than Germany. For several years now, most experts within Germany’s (relatively small) security community have repeatedly demanded a reset of the country’s foreign and security policy. Until February 2022 practically without public resonance. After World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany developed a political culture with strong pacifist and anti-military characteristics. The inaccurate slogan “war is no solution” was (and still is) rather popular among Germans. In their political judgment, international politics is mostly influenced by a mixture of moral values and rationally calculated economic interests. In this worldview, mutually useful trade relations and the common search for civilized compromises will eventually bring about a peaceful world. The triumph of modern democracies will guarantee worldwide democratic peace.

No country was consequently more surprised and disappointed when Russian President Putin started his war against Ukraine. It was a wake-up call which required an immediate response, and a fundamental change of the country’s security concepts and priorities. The era of chancellor Angela Merkel had ended in December 2021. The successor coalition government (Social Democrats, Green Party, Liberal Party) started with high hopes for progress in energy and climate policies. These priorities were, indeed, turned upside down by the Russian attack on Ukraine. Three days after the attack, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz issued a policy statement in the German Bundestag. In it, the term ‘turning point’ (Zeitenwende) took center stage. Scholz emphasized the dramatic geopolitical turnaround and announced a handful of special German measures together with a strong collective response by Western states .[1] The collective measures included economic sanctions against Russian banks, against the assets of Putin-friendly oligarchs in Europe, and a prevention of the export of cutting-edge technology to Russia. More important (and much more difficult) is the implementation of measures to reduce the import of gas, oil, and coal from Russia. Up until February 2022, Germany had invested considerable funds in a joint venture with the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom to build a second gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea (North Stream 2). During its construction period, this project had been harshly criticized by many Western allies, especially by the neighbouring Poland, but also by countries as geographically distant as the U.S.A. For years, the government ignored all objections and continuously protected the involved German companies against all foreign pressures. In early 2022, the construction of North Stream 2 was completed. But the Russian attack on Ukraine meant its temporary, perhaps its definitive death.

The most spectacular part of Scholz’ government statement was the announcement of starting a build-up program for the armed forces. Germany will take on a leading role in preventing Putin’s war from spilling over into other European countries. For this purpose, it needs a powerful, cutting-edge progressive Bundeswehr with renewed strong capacities to deter a bellicose aggressor and defend NATO territory on its Eastern border. The chancellor announced a one-off sum of 100 billion euro for necessary investments and armament projects. Meanwhile, this special fund has been integrated in Germany’s Basic Law (Constitution). Scholz also declared that his government will from now on raise the military budget to above 2% of the country’s GDP.

International crises and rapid cooling of the political climate in international affairs hardly ever occur at the right time. Decision-makers must improvise, immediate measures are required – even if the attention of the political personnel and the public are distracted by other issues. Furthermore, any cognitive dissonance between the familiar worldview and new realities may be the root cause of political mistakes. In early 2022, the Covid-19 pandemic and its repercussions on social life overshadowed all other discourses. And the Bundeswehr was still in a state of shock because of the badly planned and hasty retreat from its Afghanistan mission in mid-2021 .[2] One textbook example of cognitive dissonance in Germany is the surprisingly lenient assessment of the Russian president’s aggression by a considerable number of intellectuals and among members of extremist parties both on the right and the left.

The most salient of Germany’s security and military policy problems are a clear vision of national strategic priorities, accumulated deficits of armament und military equipment, and the entanglement in a jungle of red tape which paralyzes internal decision processes. Over the past two and a half decades, the Bundeswehr had become run down. The day Russia started its aggression on Ukraine, the Chief of the German Army, General Alfons Mais, issued a statement about the extremely limited defense options of the Bundeswehr and especially the Army. “The Bundeswehr is more or less empty-handed.” [3]

This statement might have been a little overdramatized. And yet, it holds as a mostly correct assessment of the dilapidated condition of the armed forces. Other than in the years before, the German government and the public now were alarmed and seemed determined to alter this condition. The Russian aggression was regarded as an attack not only on Ukraine but on the Western alliances in Europe and across the Atlantic. It demanded new and somewhat unaccustomed efforts to improve the military weight of the armed forces, to augment their capacity for interoperability with other NATO defense forces, and to support the Ukrainian armed forces with weapons and military equipment.

Announcements alone do not reform entrenched faulty conditions. The 100-billion-euro cheque allows for long-awaited (and hopefully quick) improvements of military equipment. To increase efficiency, the upgrading of military hardware needs a swift professional procurement. The acquisition of new arms and equipment alone does not, however, guarantee a change in the geostrategic mind-set of decisions-makers and the public.

Both chambers of the legislature (Bundestag and Bundesrat) adopted the government draft of the 100-billion-euro fund for the build-up of the Bundeswehr. For decades, the annual military budget in combination with the over-bureaucratic and time-consuming procurement regulations had resulted all too often in delays and breakdowns. It is therefore one of the main purposes of the fund to help procure the necessary equipment for the Federal Armed Forces more quickly.

Current plans for acquisitions are distributed between the air force (about 41 billion euro), the naval forces (about 20 billion euro), and the army (nearly 17 billion euro). Approximately 21 billion euro are earmarked for procurements to promote the command capability and digitalization. Furthermore, a considerable portion will be used to modernize the personal outfit of the soldiers, e.g., new battle helmets and night vision devices.

The air force will purchase American-built F-35s jets as successors of the outdated Tornado jets. This is a bold decision by Defense Minister Lambrecht for the jet is a most complex and vulnerable aircraft with high service and maintenance costs. The special fund will also be used to support the development of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) in cooperation with France and Spain, by buying more Israel-built Heron drones and, among others, support helicopters. In addition, the Bundeswehr will purchase 60 transport helicopters Chinook CH-47F.

The navy wants to buy more corvettes K130, frigates F126, and submarines. Some money is allocated towards the development and procurement of future naval strike missiles, anti-submarine missiles IDAS, and underwater locating and communication systems. The army is waiting for more and retrofitted armoured infantry vehicles Puma (successor of the armoured infantry vehicle Marder) and the armoured personnel carrier Fuchs.

The military shopping list features more details, some of which may still be changed or dropped. To be sure, various troops have much longer wish lists. All in all, the special fund presents a considerable boost for the armed forces which had become used to improvising with all kinds of insufficient equipment.

Meanwhile, the plans for making the Bundeswehr strong again are on the verge of implementation. The determination of both the political and the military top decision makers is not questionable. The long and complicated implementation process, however, will have to overcome at least three significant obstacles.

First, the Bundeswehr has, over the years, developed a strong and time-consuming procurement bureaucracy. The procurement agency Bundesamt für Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung der Bundeswehr (BAAINBw) has a history of fussiness, unnecessary delays, and disputable decisions, some of which had to be revoked. The deplorable condition of the agency is not a secret. Measures to improve the output of the BAAINBw have been tried and tried again, but without notable consequences. Under the impression of special urgency, the Berlin Parliament passed a law in July 2022 designated to speed up the procurement process. It is called Bundeswehrbeschaffungsbeschleunigungsgesetz (BwBBG) which even in German is an unusually long name – hopefully not a bad omen for prompt and responsible procurements.

Secondly, the Bundeswehr needs a new strategic catalogue with clear assertions about its traditional (basic) role as deterrence and defense force and its complimentary role as expeditionary and interventionist force. The amalgamation of traditional military and non-traditional skills is one of the most important developments of the profession of arms in recent years. The Afghanistan mission of the Bundeswehr demonstrated good political intentions without adequate military means. Such a gap in the professional strategic assessment must be overcome.

The third obstacle affects not so much the military apparatus but rather civil society as a whole. A clear-sighted American observer remarked some time ago that Germany’s fitful attempts to grow into its relative heft in European institutions remain tortuous. No country could do more to contribute to European collective security than Germany, the largest economy in Europe, but also a persistently reticent power. [4]

The deficiencies of German strategic culture and the poverty of Germany’s strategic debate have been addressed and described by many observers. An analysis of the country’s history since World War II reveals strong factors at play that induce German foreign and security policy to be reactive, passive, and reluctant. [5]

The Russian aggression on and invasion of Ukraine was a serious jolt for Germany, in political, economic, and military terms. It spoiled all expectations for a beneficial and peaceful future in world politics. Since February 2022, the government has pushed many buttons to bring about a reset of the Bundeswehr. There are other signs which appear to illustrate that Germany’s self-image and its perception of conflicts in world politics are changing. This is a painful process. And new conflicts lurk on the horizon, the future of Germany’s economic relations with China among them. Fortunately, the basic German consensus about the multilateral integration of the country in alliances like NATO and European Union is not up for discussion.

It remains to be seen whether the new alertness will create new durable self-perceptions, more suitable concepts for Germany’s security policy, and new military capacities for the currently de-globalizing international world.

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wilfried Freiherr von Bredow (ret.) was a professor of political science at the University of Marburg from 1972 to 2009. He was research fellow and guest professor at Oxford, Toronto, Saskatchewan, Toulouse, Lille and Chiayi, Taiwan. From 2011 to 2018 he was a Faculty-Member of the Geneva Graduate School of Governance. Prof. von Bredow focuses on German foreign/security policy, military-society relations, transatlantic security policy and the international roles of Canada.