The purpose of deterrence is to influence the hostile decision process and the goal is to dispel or change his decision that is not in the defender’s interest. It cannot be denied that military capability is the key element that influences a regime’s decision, but not the only one. The final decision comes from a comprehensive measurement of the pros and cons of multiple criteria and the resulting optimal solution for his goal that satisfies the constraints of criteria.

The aggressor needs to consider internal criteria such as social, political, economic, and cultural factors that affect the stability of the regime, as well as external criteria such as geopolitics, global economy, and diplomacy, depending on the connotation of the overall interests he pursued. On the other side, the defender measures the key criteria that affect the outcome of the aggressor's decision and take corresponding actions, to convince the aggressor to divert or cancel his operations accordingly, thus achieving the purpose of deterrence.

Ukraine is confronting a neighbor with superior economic and military power and is ruled by an aggressive leader. Russia's invasion declared the ineffectiveness of deterrence, Ukraine was held accountable, and so did the western democratic allies. In the so-called strategy of deterrence, whether it is punishment, denial, or extension, the result remains the ultimate will of the aggressor. While one expects successful deterrence, he should also anticipate the risks of failed deterrence. Together with Ukraine, the international community is now sharing the cost of deterrence failure.

Since Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, NATO's collective defense policy has strengthened its security posture in the eastern rim, hence impacting the three small Baltic states’ security and defense strategies. Most NATO documents and their officials have revealed that NATO's post-2014 security strategy in the Baltic Sea region is deterrent through punishment. NATO's deterrence strategy is an expanded form of deterrence based on solidarity among member states, with the United States playing a key role. [1]

A study of the Baltic states' defense strategy tendencies shows that given NATO's collective defense strategy, it has been found that Estonia tended to be in denial, Lithuania emphasizes denial rather than punishment, and Latvia thinks it is a punishment. On the other hand, the perception of their national defense strategies is that both Estonia and Latvia are inclined to be in denial, and Lithuania shows a clear denial. A common feature of their strategic thinking is to invest the government's overall resources in comprehensive defense. [2]

A study that modeled denial and punishment deterrence strategies by exploring the interplay between defenders and aggressors, found that minimizing the risk of war with the deployment of denial or punishment ability depends on the balance of military capabilities of the defender and the aggressor. That is, if defenders cannot compete with aggressors in conventional combat, such as North Korea and terrorist organizations, all resources should be used for punishment ability. If the defenders can maintain a partial balance with the aggressors, such as Germany and Japan, they should focus on the ability to deny. Only when defenders have considerable resource advantages, such as the five permanent members of the United Nations, should they have the ability to develop denial and punishing capacities simultaneously. [3]

The above study of the Baltic States’ strategy thinking pointed out that the historical and cultural cognition of the people in the territory may lead to differences in the strategic orientation of defense. Regardless of the differences in cognition, the core concept should be the same, that is, to protect and maintain a liberal democratic, and pluralistic society.

Notable among them is the perception of deterrence. The study found that the three Baltic states realize that their strength cannot punish nor deter their hostile neighbor and that they need a deterrent environment with collective strength to have a comparative advantage, hence relying on the collective capability of NATO with the United States as a key contributor to deter Russia. However, doubts about the effects of deterrence, especially after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, have increased the need to strengthen their denial capabilities to face imminent threats.

The Baltic states’ recognition highlights the limited strategic options of small states in an asymmetric threat environment. Considering Taiwan's situation, what kind of denial capability should be established in the face of the PRC's threat to Taiwan?

‘Taiwan National Defense Report 2021’[4] reveals five defense strategy objectives, which are universally applicable to modern democracies. That is, they lack characteristics that are specific to Taiwan’s geopolitical environment. In the context of unbalanced military power, what kind of defense strategy thinking should be adopted by Taiwan?

The core concept of the US 2022 defense strategy is ‘integrated deterrence’. [5] Integrated means could form an effective deterrence, and military power is one of the key elements. Deterrence measures are used to influence the adversary's decision, timing is critical, and active shaping is better than passive reaction. The United States, which is already a global big power, has realized that in the face of Russia and China’s threat, it needs to adopt integrated deterrence as the core concept of US defense strategy, not to mention Taiwan, which has limited conventional military power.

Where does Taiwan’s deterrence for PRC come from? Like the Baltic states, Taiwan needs to pursue integrated means, including diplomacy, economy, resources, military power, and moral value judgments, to build credible influence capabilities to deter the Chinese communist regime.

Secretary Blinken said that “If something happens to Taiwan, the global economy may be devastated.”[6] Leaders from democratic allies have emphasized: "We need to learn from Ukraine"; "The free world did not fight back against Russian aggression at an early stage"; "We cannot allow this to happen in other parts of the world"; "We must ensure that democracies like Taiwan can defend themselves."

The international community now has a clear understanding of Taiwan's experience in the face of the Chinese communist threat, and also has a clear understanding through the lessons of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Rather than focusing on the expectation of influencing the decision-making variables of the enemy beyond our control, it is more practical to focus the strategic concept on decisions of how to plan and construct denial capabilities that can be controlled by oneself to resist the enemy's aggression.

For example, Russia's establishment of anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) systems and precision strike capabilities in the Kaliningrad enclave for tight defense, which is said to disrupt, suppress, or even destroy NATO forces in the Baltic Sea before reinforcements arrive. In addition to preventing NATO reinforcements to the Baltic Sea or costing a high price, this denial capability was said to be sufficient to withstand NATO's air and sea superiority in the Baltic Sea and much of Poland and Germany.

One mission of the PRC military modernization is to build the A2/AD capability to deter the US military's involvement in the Western Pacific region, so could achieve the purpose of forcefully occupying Taiwan. In the same context, Taiwan can also build an area denial capability capable of responding to and successfully defending Taiwan against the threat of PRC military aggression.

The denial area may be located, not limited, around or in either of Taiwan's east, west, north, and south, and Taiwan needs to have the ability to defeat the enemy in these areas. The integrated denial capability is a joint combat capability that requires highly effective operational interoperability among the services and arms in the region. It requires unobstructed ISR capability to construct a common operational picture (COP) and therefore maximizes the effectiveness of battlefield command and control (C2).

The building of resilient and capable defense needs strong budget support, and the people of Taiwan have shown unified support for the defense budget increase in recent years. With resources limited in mind, the government still needs to perform a proper assessment to ensure the most cost-effective military capability to be acquired. Building an integrated area denial capability should fit this requirement.

In addition to destroying the adversary's aggression activities, these integrated denial capabilities can also gain control of the region. This regional control will effectively open and secure the sea line of communication (SLOC), as well as the air corridor for military and civilian supplies delivered from international space to Taiwan’s ports, thus supporting people’s will of people to resist the enemy and strengthening national resilience.

Do not rely on the enemy not coming, rely on our readiness and waiting for him to come (勿恃敵之不來，恃吾有以待之).

The launching of war is not necessarily the result of rational decision-making, no one can fully grasp the factors that start a war. The focus of defense is not to hope that the war will not occur, but to be prepared for the coming of war. After the outbreak of the Ukraine War, Ukraine still has to rely on its military and civilian forces to resist the invasion.

Given the unbalanced military power across the Taiwan Strait, to acquire effective deterrence, the use of an integrated approach emphasizes interoperability across domains, with partners, and across the whole government and like-minded countries is essential. With the continuous and firm substantive support of international like-minded friends, Taiwan is building an armed force and social resilience capable of regional denial capabilities. With a strong belief in democracy and freedom, and the will to resist PRC’s aggression, Taiwan can have a strong and lasting resilient power, so can have a substantial impact on the PRC's decision of invading Taiwan by force, resulting in a substantial deterrent effect.

Taiwan's national defense strategy focuses on building a modernized military with asymmetry capability that can successfully deny the adversary’s gray zone or invasion activities. This strategy is defensive, just denial of the invasion, not conquest, dismembering China, or changing its regime. Timely and early assistance to Taiwan to obtain and build an area denial ability capable of resisting the PRC's military invasion is a reasonable action that all like-minded countries have to take, to maintain peace, security, and international order in the Indo-Pacific region. The strengthening of operational interoperability with like-minded countries in these areas, especially in the defense of Taiwan, is the key to the urgent need for Taiwan and these countries to work together to make breakthroughs.

Tzuli Wu is an associate research fellow at The Institute for National Defense and Security Research. His research interests include Military Operations Research, Defense Strategy, Defense Industry, and Defense Affairs.