THE EXPANSION OF CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS IN THE ARCTIC
2022.12.22
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2018, the State Council of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released the White Paper on China's Arctic Policy, the first official document revealing Beijing's Arctic policy objectives and positions. The release of this document signifies that Arctic affairs is now officially part of Beijing’s national security agenda and has become an important issue that must be addressed in Beijing's contemporary national security arena. As Beijing’s involvement in the Arctic deepens, abutting nations are increasingly concerned about its intentions, and attracting scholars of international relations and strategic studies to conduct extensive research on related issues. However, most of these studies focus on Arctic governance, resource development, trade and navigation, climate change, and environmental protection, while less attention has been paid to the PLA’s naval strategy and its growing presence in the Arctic.
In essence, the PLA’s naval strategy and its Arctic presence reflects two different aspects: intention and capability. The former relates to why the PLA's navy conducts demonstrations in the Arctic, which is closely related to Beijing’s view of national security and strategic changes in the navy. The latter relates to how the PLA's navy conducts the Arctic demonstration, with two crucial points: the choice of access point and the establishment of a supporting structure. Without the ability to support the operation, the strongest intentions will only become lip service and will not pose a real threat to potential opponents. Even if the PLA's navy was sufficiently capable, the special maritime geography of the Arctic Ocean and the potential resistance of the Arctic nations will place a considerable constraint on the PLA’s Arctic missions. This article will provide an analysis and draw preliminary inferences on Beijing’s Arctic strategy as well as the limitations and challenges Beijing might face when developing its Arctic policy.
THE EXPANSION OF BEIJING’S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT
It is not surprising that Beijing has a growing interest in the Arctic. Often, it is suggested that the main reason for Beijing's active involvement in Arctic affairs in recent years is that the Arctic region is rich in natural resources and its huge navigational interests, both can provide a sufficient material basis for Beijing's future sustainable development. However, it is to be noted that Beijing's involvement in the Arctic is not simply a matter of economic security, or a deliberate challenge to U.S. strategic interests in the Arctic but is inextricably linked to the evolution of its view of national security.
In theoretical terms, national security approaches are States subjective understanding of national security, which includes but not limited to the assessment of the security environment, the judgment of the security environment faced, and the overall understanding of national security interests. States formulate a security strategy, determine security objectives, and carry out activities related to national security based on these subjective ideas. Since national security is a subjective perception, and the environment in which the State operates changes frequently, the approach of national security must be adjusted accordingly. Professor Kaibin ZHONG (鍾開斌) of the Central Party School divides the evolution of Beijing's national security approaches into three different stages: the first generation – “traditional approach to national security” (from the establishment of the CCP to the reform and opening), the second generation – “transitional approach to national security” (from the reform and opening to the 18th National Congress of the CCP [中共十八大]), and the third generation - “holistic approach to national security” [總體國家安全觀] (after the 18th National Congress). These three approaches of national security cover different situations, security threats as well as security maintenance, and their evolutionary trends have shifted from focusing on unitary to systematic construction, while the role of national security has changed from a mere participant to a leading one. [1]
The main feature of the current third generation of national security approach adopted Beijing is the expansion of the theme of the era from “peace and development” to “security and development”. Thus, the non-traditional security of peacetime has been incorporated and refined into the “holistic approach to national security”, which was included in the 19th National Congress[十九大] as the basic strategy for upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era and written into the Party Constitution. In July 2015, the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress passed and promulgated The National Security Law of the People's Republic of China [中共國家安全法], which is an important action to realize Beijing's “holistic approach to national security” from idea to policy.
Of particular importance is the fact that various issues of Beijing's national security are intertwined and overlapped to a significant degree, such as the close relationship between climate change and food security, and the boundaries between these issues are becoming increasingly blurred as they permeate each other. Among the non-traditional security issues which Beijing is facing and probably will matter more in the future, polar security is one of the most complex issues, and its outreach includes economic security, climate change, food security, ecological security, resource and energy security, and security of overseas interests, etc. Therefore, Beijing's recent active planning and involvement in Arctic affairs has its practical considerations. It is very like that Beijing will focus more on coordinating national resources to prevent the potential impact which Arctic issues might have on its national security. The provisions of the National Security Law already provide a solid legal basis for such actions. [2]
LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES OF THE PLA’S ARCTIC STRATEGY
Although Beijing is now actively involved in Arctic affairs and has acquired observer status at the Arctic Council, it has adopted a “low political” approach in Arctic affairs to avoid overreaching and arousing the wariness of Arctic states. Given the growing importance of the Arctic to Beijing's national security, it is reasonable to argue that the PLA’s has a strategic need for a military presence in the Arctic. In the foreseeable future, it is very likely that the PLA will deploy forces in the Arctic Ocean to conduct military demonstrations in order to maintain its political and economic interests in the region. However, even if the PLA is willing and able to conduct an Arctic military mission, it still has to overcome various challenges, such as the collective resistance from Arctic states, constraints in the maritime geography, and lack of awareness of the maritime environment, all of which are considerable challenges to the PLA's naval strategy in the Arctic.
I. COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE OF ARCTIC COUNTRIES
In recent years, the PLA has reiterated its commitment to the principles of “respect, cooperation, win-win, and sustainability” [尊重、合作、共贏、可持願] in order to contribute to the peaceful and stable development of the Arctic. However, considering the PLA's growing ambition to expand in the Arctic, the US - led Arctic states have actively cooperated to stop the PLA's expansion in the region. For example, immediately following the release of the 2018 White Paper on China's Arctic Policy, the U.S. State Department refused to acknowledge the White Paper's assertion that the CCP is a "near-Arctic state.”[3] In September 2018, the U.S. and Denmark joined forces and Chinese investors walked away from a bid for three new airports in Greenland.[4] In July 2022, Norwegian Air Force Commander Major General Rolf Folland told the U.S. military website Breaking Defense that a new Nordic air operations center should be considered after NATO formally accepts Sweden and Finland, and it could be beneficial to all three States if conducting joint air operations. [5]
Since these three countries are Arctic nations, and because of their limited military strength, it is wise to strengthen their strategic posture in the Arctic region by bringing in NATO forces. In addition to the U.S.-led Western countries, Russia is also wary of the increasing activities of the PLA in the Arctic region, and has recently stationed troops in Siberia, added new military bases, and held frequent polar exercises. Since the Arctic countries have their own geopolitical interests, it is easy to form a group consciousness that excludes non-Arctic countries from participating in major issues, making it difficult for the PLA to get deeply involved in Arctic affairs.[6] When the PLA’s navy conducts a mission in the Arctic waters, it could easily trigger strong reactions from the Arctic countries and corresponding military actions, which will put the PLA in an unfavorable situation.
II. MARINE GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRAINTS
The Arctic Ocean is a typical semi-enclosed sea, and there are several straits and choke points between it and the ocean. Although these waters do not pose a physical obstacle to ship navigation in normal times, States that hold the key points of this ocean can pose a potential threat to other States’ naval operations in wartime. The marine choke points adjacent to the Arctic Ocean include the Bering Strait, which connects to the Pacific Ocean, and the Greenland - Iceland - UK Gap, which enters the Atlantic Ocean via the Norwegian Sea. These vital sea lanes are now firmly controlled by the United States and its allies. During the Cold War, the U.S. deployed a sound surveillance system over a large area of the sea near these important gaps to counter the Soviet Navy’s submarines and deployed many P-3C anti-submarine aircraft on land around them to conduct anti-submarine surveillance missions for years and years.
As a result, PLA naval vessels passing through these waters are easily exposed and become targets for U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines to track. In addition, the special geography of the Bering Strait puts the PLA’s naval strategic missile submarines at high risk when sailing through these waters. Although the Bering Strait is 80 km wide, its navigable waterway is only a few kilometers away from the Alaskan coast, and it is therefore easy to be detected by U.S. anti-submarine forces during the summer months. In winter, the ice ridge thickens, and the space for the submarine to navigate safely under the ice will be greatly compressed. Therefore, it is unlikely that the PLA will deploy a strategic missile submarine to cruise in the Arctic Ocean, as this type of submarine is the most important strategic asset of the PLA, since safety and stealthiest are its operational priorities.
CONCLUSION
Arctic affairs have become increasingly important for Beijing’s national security, national strategy, and its future survival. Therefore, it is not surprising that the PLA has become more engaging in its strategic presence in the Arctic, including establishing naval bases along the polar route, to be prepared in the potential conflict over the routes. It is very likely that, in the foreseeable future, the sea power competition between U.S. and China will expand from the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait to the Arctic Ocean, making the Arctic another potential hot spot of conflict in the bilateral relationship between the United States and China.
Alice Chang-Jung Yang is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research and Adjunct Assistant Professor of the Department of Law, Soochow University, and of the Management College, National Defense University. Her research interests include International Law, Defense Strategy, and Defense Industry.
Wen-Chung Chai is a retired Navy Captain and an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research. His research interests include Chinese Maritime Strategy, PLA Modernization, and PLAN related issues.
[1]Chen, Jinghui, “Zhongguo guojia anquanguan de yanhua yu zhanwang [The Evolution of China’s National Security Concept],” Dangzheng luntan, June 2018, pp. 22-24.
[2]See Article 18 of the National Security Law.
[3]Alex Fang, “US rejects China’s ‘near-Arctic state’ claim in new cold war,” NIKKEI, April 24, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-rejects-China-s-near-Arctic-state-claim-in-new-cold-war.
[4]Valerie Insinna, “Norwegian air chief wants ‘Nordic Air Operations Center’ if Sweden, Finland Join NATO,” Breaking Defense, July 08, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/norwegian-air-chief-wants-nordic-air-operations-center-if-sweden-finland-join-nato/.
[5]Valerie Insinna, “Norwegian air chief wants ‘Nordic Air Operations Center’ if Sweden, Finland Join NATO,” Breaking Defense, July 08, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/norwegian-air-chief-wants-nordic-air-operations-center-if-sweden-finland-join-nato/.
[6]Qian, yinxin, “Zhongguodalu fazhan bingshang sichouzhilu de zhanlüe yi tu yu weilai fazhan zhi yanxi [Strategic Intentions and Future Development of the Silk Road on Ice in Mainland China],” Zhan wang yu tansuo,Vol 17, Issue 4, April 2019, pp. 46-47.
[7]Richard Boyle, “Warfighting in MIZ Estuaries–The Ultimate Littoral Challenge,” (November 1997), Waldo K Lyon Papers, Navy History and Heritage Archive, Washington DC, box 45, folder 9.