By Arthur S. Ding

On May 8, 2020, Xi-jin HU, the editor of Beijing based Chinese language Global Times, China’s tabloid media, proposed in his weibo chat room that China needs to increase its total size of nuclear forces to one thousand missiles (and warheads) in very short period of time, and among the total size of one thousand nuclear missiles (and warheads), at least 100 should be DF-41. Hu made this remark as a response to mounting pressure launched by the US in the context of escalating and comprehensive US-China tension.

DF stands for Dong Fong, or East Wind. DF-41, which was officially unveiled on Oct 1 2019 National Day military parade, is believed a solid- fuelled road and rail mobile intercontinental ballistic missile able to hit the whole US continent from China. It reportedly carries at least six nuclear warheads with multiple independently re-entry vehicle at a falling speed of Mach 25 capability able to penetrate US developed national missile defense system.

Hu’s remark is sensational enough and has been echoed by many “little pink” fans who are ultra-nationalistic Chinese people. Nevertheless, will Hu’s proposal be endorsed by Chinese Communist Party top leaders sitting in the Forbidding City? The answer is probably negative and likely disappoints him and his “little pink” fans.

Many factors, which are somewhat inter-related, have been considered by CCP/People’s Liberation Army (PLA) top leaders to assess and evaluate the future role of nuclear weapon and ideal size of its nuclear force. These include, but are not limited to, assessment of long term external environment, evolving warfare and operational trend in the world, and new technological development.

Chinese leaders frequently make assessment of external environment, and this is particularly the issue over peace and war. Their assessment can be read from series of China’s National Defense which is regarded as China’s defense white paper illuminating China’s defense policy. Every version of the defense white paper starts from review of external environment.

There is no exception for the latest one, which is titled China’s National Defense in the New Era, released on July 24 2019.[1] Briefly speaking, they are optimistic about the change of external environment, though with some caveat. It should bear in mind that the 2019 version was released after the trade war between the US and China had been launched by US President Trump, and outlook for the impact of the trade war on the future environment should be factored in this version.

The CCP top leadership sees a total re-alignment of international power in the making and this trend poses China opportunity. “The world today is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century. As economic globalization, the information society, and cultural diversification develop in an increasingly multi-polar world,(italic by this author)…As the realignment of international powers accelerates and the strength of emerging markets and developing countries keeps growing, the configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced. The pursuit of peace, stability and development has become a universal aspiration (italic by this author) of the international community with forces for peace predominating over elements of war.”

Some interpretations are warranted for the above observation by the CCP top leadership. The first is about US role and status in a “multi-polar world.” A multi-polar world implies that no single power, the US, can dominate the world any more, while others, including China, are rising with growing national capabilities able to catch up those of the established power, the US. This involves the assessment of national powers among major powers, and many take the view that China surely cannot overtake the US yet at present, but China has grown rapidly while the US’ power suffered a lot in the wake of the 2008 global financial meltdown.

A multi-polar world has serious implication for international relations (IR). IR theory dictates that in a multi-polar world, major powers form different coalitions based on different issues to compete one another. This implies that the US cannot dictate its old allies established since World War II anymore and the old allies are gradually falling apart. Amid this transition, some old allies form coalition, if not alliance, with China on certain issues.

The second involves the issue of peace vs. war. Since late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping had launched the economic reform, assessment on peace and war has been frequently made. Unlike the one forecast by Chairman Mao in the 1960s at the heyday of the Cold War that an early, large scale and nuclear war was inevitable, Chinese leaders since Deng have observed a world trend toward peace. For instance, in late December 1985, Deng, when chairing the expanded Central Military Commission meeting, expounded a peaceful world ahead. It should be emphasized that Deng pointed to a stable and peaceful relations among major powers, although military conflicts among regional and small powers would erupt.

What can be implied from the forecast made by Chinese leaders? Briefly speaking, a peaceful world among major powers implies that likelihood for a nuclear exchange among major powers is low, and, as a result, there is no need to make huge investment in nuclear weapon in a hurry manner, nuclear weapon would be placed in back seat, and resources should be re-allocated to other urgent and prioritized programs and items.

As said, there is a caveat for the above mentioned conclusion of a peaceful trend. That is the US, and a rising strategic competition with the US is envisioned in the defense white paper. The US is accused of adopting unilateral policies in the white paper: “…It has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability…” This implies that China has fully realized an across-the-board competition with the US ensues, and competition in military sector is included, though likelihood for all-out war with nuclear exchange is very low.

Parallel to the changed perception of war and peace is the adjusted observation of type of war or operational mode, and China has also gone a long way on this issue. Again, this has serious implication for the role of nuclear weapon, and as a consequence, procurement and deployment of nuclear weapon may be affected.

Several stage of the development of operational modes can be identified after Deng launched the reform in late 1978. Immediately after the reform was launched, it was “People’s War under modern condition.” In late 1985 when one-million force was cut, Deng instructed to fight a “local war.” After the 1991 Gulf War in which US led coalition force employed high-tech weapon to crush Iraqi force, a new doctrine was ushered and it was “local war under high tech condition.” Since 2004, operational doctrine has evolved to “local war under informationalized condition.” In the latest version of 2019, no new doctrine was ushered by Xi and it is believed that “local war under informationalized condition” continues to be the official doctrine.

Two common features can be drawn from those doctrines. The first is that the old scenario of a war of invasion has been totally outdated. Chairman Mao envisioned a mighty Soviet force which might crush PLA force. In order to effectively resist possible Soviet invasion, Chairman Mao advocated to adopt “People’s War” by luring the enemy forces deep into China’s hinterland and PLA would be mobilized to cut the enemy force’s logistical supply, and in the end, the enemy force would be forced to retreat.

The new scenario is to pursue a war of limited objective. In fact, “local war” is equivalent to “limited war” of western concept, and it indicates a war is confined in an area with limited political objective such as maritime resource, territorial dispute and terrorist problem, and the objective is to place self in a favorable position for future political negotiation. Escalation is possible, but it does not aim to employ massive force to totally annihilate an adversary force.

A study of two textbooks on PLA’s strategy vividly shows this change of military strategy and different concept of strategic focuses in China.[2] On Strategy of 1984, which was published by PLA Academy of Military Science, PLA’s top research institute set up by Chairman Mao, still focuses on possible invasion of the Soviet force and the book only concentrates on issues of war time. Nevertheless, in a new book On Strategy of 1997, which was published by PLA National Defense University presumably as a professional military education textbook for PLA officials of different services, issues have been diversified to include peace time and war time, and focus has been shifted to local war.

Secondly, it is assumed that conventional force and its employment should be the main focus. If political objective is limited, there is no need to employ nuclear force, particularly those high yield nuclear weapons because high yield nuclear weapons can cause unnecessary massive casualties and ruin everything.

Related to focus on local war, a rising priority has been identified by PLA, and Xi Jinping’s un-precedent defense/military reform of 2015/16 aims to achieve that prioritized goal. That is (integrated) joint operation, and it can be defined as: connected by synchronized information technology instrument to allow all operating units to share same battlefield awareness, all operational forces of different services fight against same target from different aspects.

What can be implied from the above discussed evolving operational mode for the role of nuclear weapon? A military conflict (or war) employing conventional force for a limited objective is more likely to erupt. The role of nuclear weapon has receded to serve as a deterrent against possible nuclear intimidation and coercion by an adversary power.

Nevertheless, there is a caveat again. That is the role of low-yield nuclear weapon in asymmetric operation against powerful US force in the Pacific Ocean region. Recently, China was accused by the US of “…lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities – which has included frequently blocking the flow of data from its International Monitoring System (IMS) stations to the International Data Center operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization…” [3] and rumor about developing and testing low-yield nuclear weapon abounds.

This kind of rumor about China’s development of low-yield nuclear weapon is not new. There was another one in the late 1980s, in which a Chinese analyst discussed neutron bomb and as a result, a speculation on China’s development of neutron bomb flied around.

The theory of this rumor has that given the fact that US force is perceived much experienced in executing joint operation with much advanced weapon systems, PLA will not be able to withhold US force and ultimately be forced to use low-yield nuclear weapon to dispel, if not to defeat, US force coming to Taiwan’s aid. This theory is similar to that of the late 1980 in which PLA force could not resist Soviet mighty force and ultimately PLA had to use neutron bomb or low-yield nuclear bomb to wipe out those invading Soviet force within China’s own territory.

To some extent, this theory makes sense. But, it will inevitably run the risk of escalating fight from conventional to nuclear level, and the worst risk involves legitimacy and justice of using nuclear weapon, even low-yield one. In other words, nuclear option is left out in this author’s argument.

China closely monitors the development of new technologies which may shape future direction of military operation. It involves China’s strong belief that technology deeply affects a nation’s economy and national security, and endorsing the well known 863 program by Deng Xiaoping exemplifies this belief.[4] Intensified strategic competition with the US definitely will enhance this belief.

With this belief, emerging technologies are frequently identified and assessed for their potential military application. Again, the 2019 defense white paper gives us a useful hint over what emerging technologies are monitored. “Driven by the new round of technological and industrial revolution, the application of cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data, cloud computing and the Internet of Things is gathering pace in the military field. International military competition is undergoing historic changes. New and high-tech military technologies based on IT are developing rapidly. There is a prevailing trend to develop long-range precision, intelligent, stealthy or unmanned weaponry and equipment. War is evolving in form towards informationized warfare, and intelligent warfare is on the horizon.”

It should be emphasized that some technology can be used to further improve capability of nuclear weapon. A typical case is that of hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). Media reported that China made a test of this vehicle on January 9, 2014.[5] Although no technological detail was unveiled, it is assumed that with its changed trajectory of nuclear warhead after re- entering the atmosphere and high speed, it is impossible for the US missile defense to intercept the incoming ICBM.

In other words, some new technologies can boost China’s capabilities of nuclear weapon, and HGV is one of them. Along with road and rail mobile, all these technologies can help China’s nuclear weapons escape US’ first strike and interception by US missile defense, allowing China’s nuclear weapons to survive and penetrate missile defense of the US, and ultimately accomplishing the goal of deterrence or retaliation.

Further, new technology is likely to bring systemic change in military operation. A typical case is that of cyber operation. A successful cyber operation penetrating into adversary’s computer system can disrupt and delay, if not totally ruin, its command and control mechanism, making weapon system useless. That can partially explain why Xi Jinping established the Strategic Support Force (SSF) by amalgamating relevant cyber/IT warfare related institutes and agencies, and one of SSF’s major pillar is to develop and execute cyber related operations.

Another example has something to do with the combination of cyber and dis-information/mis-information operation. The objective is to divide and rule of an adversary’s elites and society so that the adversary’s overall morale deteriorates and national solidarity breaks up.

This kind of systemic change in military operation is highly aspired in Chinese way of conducting warfare and operation. The well known classics, Sun Zi’s Art of War, which is a must read for PLA’s professional military education program at different levels, stipulates that the best smart way of conducting a warfare is to subdue an adversary force without a fight, while the worst is to have real fight. To some extent, cyber operation can help realize the above stated aspiration.

Nevertheless, Chinese top leaders are fully aware that cost has to be paid in keeping abreast of the development of new technologies. Identifying emerging technologies is the first step. Following the identification is a challenging and daunting task ranging from organizing teams to further study concrete direction of research and development (R&D) of those emerging technologies, making investment in new facilities for the R&D, to hiring qualified staff to do practical R&D work with decent pay. Briefly speaking, massive resources will be invested in the whole process, and Chinese leadership has to weigh new technology development against procurement and deployment of weapons and seek to strike a balance and to pursue an optimal usage of budget.

The above stated development of new technologies in the context of Chinese aspiration implies that as long as Chinese leadership is confidence of China’s nuclear survivability and retaliation capabilities, though limited, likelihood for allocating more resources to increase the size of nuclear force is relatively low.

This does not mean that Chinese leadership is benign actor. Like any political leader in the world, they are realists who are keen on making calculation all the time, including that related to statecraft and international relations. War is a matter involving a dialectical relationship between political objective and economy, and it needs frequent assessment and calculation between the two elements. Economy may be preferable if political objective can be achieved.

There is no doubt that Hu’s remark on deploying thousands of nuclear weapons is related to the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty under President Trump and China needs to make some response in order to safeguard China’s national security.

INF Treaty, which stands for Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (or formally, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate- Range and Shorter-Range Missiles), was signed between the US and the Soviet Union (and its successor state, the Russian Federation) on December 8, 1987, and ratified on June 1, 1988. Its purpose is to eliminate all of the two nations' land-based ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and missile launchers with ranges of 500–1,000 kilometers (310–620 miles) (short medium-range) and 1,000–5,500 km (620– 3,420 miles) (intermediate-range). The treaty did not apply to air- or sea-launched missiles.

President Trump’s decision to withdraw from INF Treaty was made based on the allegation that Russia breached the treaty. Nevertheless, many speculate that the withdrawal aims at China which, through having deployed many short and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles, along with rapidly modernizing its conventional forces, has developed a force able to execute anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) mission against US force in the Asian Pacific region. In other words, withdrawing from INF Treaty will allow the US to develop and deploy ballistic missiles of medium range and somewhat reverse the unfavorable configuration for the US in this region.

Aside from withdrawing from INF Treaty which was announced on October 20, 2018, and effective on August 2, 2019, President Trump also proposed to include China in a multilateral negotiation of nuclear weapons. This may reflect a fact that Trump administration has perceived a world of different system in which China has been a formidable power with its growing military capability, and as a result, many nuclear related arms control regimes, in which INF Treaty was included, need to be re-arranged.

China’s opposition to the US withdrawal from INF Treaty and the proposal of multi-lateralization of nuclear arms control is expected. China’s position was explained by Hua Chunying, spokeswoman of PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Her remark included several points:[6]

● China is concerned with and opposes the possible abandonment of the treaty as a result of U.S. unilateral withdrawal.

● China will in no way agree to making the INF Treaty multilateral… multilateralization of the treaty, which is bilateral in nature, involves political, military, legal and a series of other complex issues.

● China's development of intermediate-range missiles is purely for defensive purposes, which is not intended to and will not pose a threat to any other country. The true purpose of the United States pulling out of the treaty is to avoid its bounden duties.

● China champions a comprehensive ban on and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, but nuclear disarmament should adhere to the internationally recognized principle of 'undiminished security for all' concerning arms control.

Real questions are two: will the withdrawal really help US militarily and will the withdrawal pose a military threat to China? A short answer to these two question is No, although it may cause problem for China to monitor.

The withdrawal makes no difference to US force and poses no threat to China in conventional force. INF Treaty only restricts those ground based ballistic and cruise missiles, leaving sea and air launched ones untouched. Since the 1980s, the US has deployed well known Tomahawk cruise missiles in surface warships and submarines with ranges between 1,300 kilometers and 2,500 kilometers, and the cruise missiles have been launched in many large military operations by the US with proven record.

It means that the US can extend the flight range of Tomahawk missiles easily with its established technology to hit fixed targets in China. This extension of range is required assuming that China may execute A2/AD operation denying the US force to get close to Chinese mainland. What these Tomahawk missiles cannot do is to hit Chinese military’s mobile targets both in the sea and land, allowing PLA military assets to survive.

There is no doubt that the US can easily produce land based ballistic and cruise missiles. Nevertheless, the problem is on deployment: where they can be deployed in countries along the first island chain? Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are very likely to reject requests made by the US of deploying ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles for fear of angering China, and in the end, the US may find no ground base to deploy those missiles, and ultimately, the US will continue to rely on surface warship and submarine launched cruise missiles.

Further, the above stated reason can be applied to medium-range missiles with nuclear warhead. Nuclear warhead can be mounted on Tomahawk missiles to hit China’s targets from US surface warships and submarines, while no country along the first island chain will agree to deploy US’ ground launched nuclear warhead mounted ballistic and cruise missiles. This means that the withdrawal does not help US force and pose no real threat against China at all. It actually makes no difference at all.

As for multilateralization of nuclear arms control, it will go nowhere at this stage. Given the fact that US-Russia relations has deteriorated, it is unlikely for Moscow to echo the US proposal so that Moscow-Beijing can continue their anti-US coalition and to have the US fight a two-pronged pressure. Reluctance by Russia will create no pressure against China, while other western nations of US allies will concentrate on more urgent issues such as revitalizing own economies and combating COVID-19 pandemic.

US’ withdrawing from INF Treaty is definitely a big issue. As many have posited that it may spark another round of arms race among US, Russia, and China. In fact, a strategic competition in the field of space and nuclear which are inter-related between the US and China had been kicked off in the 2000s as China quietly modernized limited nuclear force and developed its space assets. [7] Previous practice initiated by Russia President Putin on many international issues demonstrates that he will not sit idle on the withdrawal issue.

PLA’s force development pattern in the past more than two decades reflects its perception of changing external environment. Record shows that China has developed and deployed more short and medium ranges ballistic and cruise missiles with conventional and nuclear warhead capability than that of ICBMs. This implies that China has not expected and foreseen a possible nuclear confrontation with the US, but a military conflict in conventional mode with a focus on Taiwan is envisioned given the fact that the US involved in the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait crisis and later frequently provided assistance to Taiwan.

The above observation does not deny China’s effort in modernizing its nuclear force. What we can see is a trend toward strengthening survival capabilities with a slow pace on developing new and longer range of ICBM. Difficulties in technological progress may have served as a constraint factor to China’s ambition to rapidly develop and deploy more ICBM and sea launched long range ballistic missiles.

China’s nuclear policy is featured as credible minimum deterrence. [8]

In conclusion, the US withdrawal from INF Treaty poses no major problem for China in both nuclear and conventional force field. It is quite unlikely for Beijing to increase its size of nuclear stockpile in a hurry manner.