A Rising China’s Military Power: Examining the U.S. DoD’s Report on China Military Developments and China’s Defense White Paper
2020.06.22
Views
308
By Jung-Ming Chang
Introduction
China is using its economic and military power to persuade other states to comply with its agenda. Such Chinese assertiveness is willing to accept friction with other states in order to pursue its own national interests. For instance, China has militarized the South China Sea and patrols Diaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea with ships and aircraft that imperil the free flow of trade while confronting against the U.S. military vessels and warplanes. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increased patrols around and near Taiwan using bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to threaten Taiwan.[1] This rising Chinese military power has become an increased concern to the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD).
The U.S. DoD’s Report on China Military Developments and China’s Defense White Paper have long been regarded the most important documents for studying China’s military development. The U.S. DoD 2019 report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, was released on May 2, 2019.[2] This report includes five chapters: understanding China’s strategy, force modernization goals, capabilities for operations along China’s periphery, resources for force modernization, and U.S.-China military-to-military contacts. Since this report is the most credible and updated assessment of China’s military build-up, it is an indispensable intelligence for those who closely observe Chinese military development. In July 2019, the PRC State Council Information Office released the Defense White Paper entitled China’s National Defense in the New Era. The content includes international security situation, defense policy, the missions of armed forces, reform in national defense, defense expenditure, and building a future community. The Paper expounds on defense policy and explains the purposes to build a national defense, with a view to helping the international community better understand China’s defense.[3] Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh Burke Chair in strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), contended that the detailed contents of the White Paper are a direct response to the U.S. reports on Chinese military power.[4] In order to come up with a neutral stance and accurate analysis of China’s military build-up during the Xi’ administration, this research revisits major points of two reports and assesses the implication of the rising Chinese military power. It will examine China’s national strategy, defense policy, force modernization and make suggestions on how Taiwan can counter China’s growing military threat.
National Strategy
Chinese leaders advance an agenda of military modernization while pursuing economic growth and improving their technological strength. China’s strategy aims at achieving the objective of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” [5] Strategic objectives are comprehensive including politics, foreign relations, economy, and military in the hope of building a powerful nation. Their overall strategies and policies are as follows:
(1) Strategic objectives
The strategic objectives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are perpetuating CCP rule, maintaining domestic stability, sustaining economic growth, defending sovereignty, and securing China’s status as a great power. These objectives have been revealed in President Xi’s “China Dream” that strives to restore China’s status as a powerful and prosperous nation.[6] Chinese leaders acknowledge that building a strong China without a stable society will be in vain. “Stability overrides all” has turned out to be their firm belief.
(2) Foreign policy
China’s foreign policy seeks to enhance its profile in international community while pursuing the establishment of new multilateral mechanisms. China advocates for the building of a “community of common human destiny” while stressing that it will defend its core national interests and not be afraid to respond to the U.S. provocations.[7] China’s foreign policies have become more confident by promoting multilateral mechanisms to counter U.S. rebalancing in Asia and to prevent U.S.’s unilateral domination of international affairs.
(3) Economic policy
Sustaining China’s economic growth is one of the CCP’s strategic objectives. Along with investments in infrastructure to support its economic growth, China is investing in technologies that will be foundational for future innovations with both commercial and military applications.[8] In recent years, the China’s most important strategy is the One Belt and One Road (OBOR) initiative that strives to develop investment opportunities, cultivate export markets, spike incomes, and maintain influence in the world.[9]
(4) Defense policy
The strategic goals for the development of national defense are: to achieve mechanization by 2020 with enhanced informationization; to advance the organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry in align with the national modernization; to complete the modernization of the military by 2035; and to fully transform the PLA into world-class forces by 2050.[10] Chinese leaders continue to emphasize developing a military that can fight and win the war through realistic combat training.[11] The military strategy will speed up its military buildup and enhance its military training to meet its security interests.
China’s national strategy includes all dimensions that ambitiously endeavor to realize Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.”[12] To achieve this goal, China needs a peaceful society, stable international environment, sustainable economic growth, and strong military.
Defense Policy
China’s Defense White Paper states that international security order is undermined by growing hegemonism and unilateralism. China faces security threats as a result of the U.S. strengthening its own military alliances and reinforcing military intervention. For example, the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea by the U.S. has undermined the East Asian strategic balance. [13] The Chinese government also views the Taiwan independence movement as the gravest threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait. [14] In response to these security threats, China will pursue a defense policy to safeguard its sovereignty, maintain its combat readiness, develop nuclear weapons, and fulfil its international responsibilities.
A Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Interceptor is seen in Seongju, South Korea, April 26,2017 (Source: Voice of America)
(1) Safeguard sovereignty
The PLA conducts air defense, reconnaissance, and an early warning to respond to security threats. The PLA aims to safeguard national security, to protect maritime interests, and to oppose Taiwan independence. Beijing claims that the South China Sea islands and Diaoyu Islands are inalienable parts of the territory. They view building infrastructure, deploying military on the reefs in the South China Sea, and conducting patrols in the waters of Diaoyu Islands as legitimate to defending national sovereignty. [15] To fight “the terrorists, extremists, and separatists” in Xinjiang, the People Armed Police (PAP) has tightened security such as guarding key targets, setting checkpoints on key passages, etc. Since 2014, the PAP has assisted the government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in capturing dissidents. [16] In addition to that, the PLA thinks it is essential to send a clear warning to the Taiwan leaders by sailing ships and flying aircraft around Taiwan.
The Paper further threatens that they will defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China at all costs.[17]
In this Nov. 4, 2017, file photo, Uighur security personnel patrol near the Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar in western China's Xinjiang region by NG HAN GUAN. (Source: The Public Radio)
(2) Maintain combat readiness
The Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Theater Commands’ (TCs) have frequently conducted regular drills to ensure combat readiness.[18] To enhance realistic training, the PLA conduct supervision on military training for emergencies and combat, implement the responsibility system for training and readiness, and organize contests. Military training in real combat conditions across different services is in full swing.[19] The increased exercises and realistic combat trainings have sharpened the PLA’s skills.
(3) Develop nuclear weapons
To safeguard China’s national security, the PLA has continued to develop capabilities of nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear weapons policy prioritizes a limited but survivable nuclear force. China has long maintained a “no first use” (NFU) policy, though ambiguity remains over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would no longer apply.[20] There has been no indication what national leaders are willing to attach to China’s NFU doctrine.[21] Chinese government is enhancing peacetime readiness levels for nuclear forces to ensure their responsiveness.[22]
(4) Fulfil international responsibilities
In order to improve its international image, China aims at fulfilling its international organization by upholding the principles of the UN charter, and building a new-model security partnership featuring equality, mutual trust, and win-win cooperation.[23] The PLA participates in vessel protection operations, and international efforts in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, strengthen international cooperation in arms control, and respond to global challenges such as terrorism and cyber security. [24] Furthermore, China’s participation in the UN Peacekeeping Operations supports China’s objectives by obtaining operational experience for the PLA.[25]
Force Modernization
China is advancing force modernization and deepening reform in its national defense. The PLA Army (PLAA) has restructured the combined- arms battalions to conduct independent operations. The PLA Navy (PLAN) has constructed 12 nuclear submarines over past 15 years. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) aims at narrowing the gap with the U.S. Air Force. The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has enhanced its “strategic deterrence” capability. Strategic Support Force (SSF) centralizes strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions.[26] The PLA force modernization has the following trends.
(1) Increased military expenditures
For decades, those who study PLA military spending have been suspicious of China’s statement of annual defense budget. China announced that its 2019 defense spending grows by 7.5 % to 1.19 trillion yuan ($177.6 billion) in 2019. The increase in defense budget is mainly to be allocated to develop new weapons and equipment, improve training conditions, and guarantee military reform and benefits for military personnel.[27] Most scholars agree that China’s actual military spending is higher than stated in the official budget. The U.S. DoD estimated it to be more than $200 billion in 2018. It is difficult to calculate China’s actual military expenses, largely because of its poor accounting transparency. According to the Report, China’s defense budget will likely increase by an annual average of 6%, growing to $260 billion by 2022. This will allow the PLA to dedicate more money for training, operations, and modernization.[28] However, China’s Defense White Paper argues that from 2012 to 2017 China’s average defense expenditure was about 1.3%, comparing to the U.S. 3.5%, Russia 4.4%, India 2.5%, the UK 2.0%, and France 2.3%.[29]
(2) Reforming the command system
The PLA has dismantled the systems of general departments, military area commands (MACs) and the force composition with a dominating ground force. First, reorganizing new CMC organs. The former four departments have been reorganized into 15 organs. Second, improving the management system for services. The PLA has established the Army Strategic Support Force (ASSF) and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF).[30] The PLA is attempting to transform from a quantity to quality force, as well as from personnel-intensive to Science and Technology- intensive force. Third, restructuring force composition. 300,000 personnel have been cut to maintain the active force around 2 million. The PLA has downsized the PLAA, maintained the number of the PLAAF, and increased number of the PLAN and PLARF. Fourth, reorganizing the troops. The previous 18 group armies have been reorganized into 13. All major combat units follow a group army-brigade-battalion system. Additionally, the former 7 MACs have been reorganized into 5 TCs.[31]
(3) Promoting military development
Chinese government has actively promoted military development. The PLA has promoted innovation in defense S&T and military theory to establish a modernized force.[32] China has increased its capability to address its security objectives. First, China will realize its goal of a multi- carrier force in 2019 when China’s first domestically produced carrier will be commissioned. Next generation of carriers will have greater endurance and a catapult launch system. The PLAN continues to develop into a global force, extending its reach beyond East Asia. Second, China is developing a new generation of long-range bombers with the features of a stealthy design and a capability to employ nuclear weaponry. Third, the Rocket Force fields multiple missiles capable of conducting strikes beyond the first island chain.[33]
The PLA has created an informatized force capable of expanding China’s security. Since the information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict, China has prioritized Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) modernization as a response to trends in modern warfare. One of the most efficient approaches in achieving an informatized military is to accelerate the development of its capable cyber forces.[34] According to the China’s Defense White Paper, the PLA accelerates their cyberspace capabilities by developing cyber security.[35] China is using cyber power to win global dominance. The Chinese government is behind the scenes in many cyber activities.[36]
(4) Espionage Activities
The international community has concerns about China’s espionage activities worldwide in acquiring important intelligence. The PLA also expedited the development of its cyber forces that has infamously intruded into other foreign government computer systems. In 2018, the U.S. government found many hard evidences of China espionage activities in the U.S. First, a Chinese national residing in the U.S. fulfilled instructions from the Chinese military to obtain dual-use technology used for anti-submarine warfare and other advanced military capabilities. Second, the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) intelligence officers were indicted on charges of conspiring to steal sensitive technological information related to engines used in commercial airliners. Third, a MSS officer was arrested with espionage involving the theft of secrets for aircraft technology related to communication systems, and jet engines and aircraft propulsion from U.S. aviation firms. Finally, the officer targeted industry experts for recruitment by facilitating travel to China under the guise of delivering university presentations.[37] The PRC security related apparatuses have attempted to steal high technology from the U.S. in support of China defense modernization. China’s intelligent community will increase their espionage activities in supporting the military; however, they will be more vigilant in their clandestine intelligent collection to avoid tarnishing China’s image.
Hu Jintao’s New Historic Missions in 2004 ushered in the incremental expansion of the PLA’s modernization. During the modernization process, PLA ground, air, naval, and missile forces have become increasingly capable to project power during peacetime and in the event of regional conflicts. [38] Under Xi Jinping, the PLA has sought to modernize its military in the hope of achieving a military world power. The PLA is speeding up its modernization process that attempts to catch up with the U.S. forces.
Recommendations for Taiwan
China’s national defense will stride forward along its own path to build a stronger military and to achieve the goal of developing world-class forces.[39] Beijing’s interest to compel Taiwan’s reunification with China and to deter Taiwan from moving toward independence has served as one of the primary drivers for China’s military modernization.[40] China’s growing military power has posed a grave threat to Taiwan’s security. Taiwan should increase its fighting power in the face of escalating military threats from China. Since Taiwan has difficulty in purchasing weapons abroad, Taiwan should continue to boost its defense-industrial sector.[41] There are several ways for Taiwanese military to secure its national interests.
(1) Strengthening Taiwan’s self-defense
Taiwan has a limited defense budget and a restraint acquisition of desired weapon systems. On the contrary, China’s rising economic power and increased defense budget has caused the cross-strait military balance to lean heavily toward China’s favor. The PLA could attack Taiwan when the Chinese leaders deem Taiwan’s violation of the so called “Anti-Sessation Law.” In time of Cross-Strait military conflicts, Taiwan has to fight for their own survival. Thus, receiving military training and defense education for people in Taiwan is significant and indispensable. The Taiwanese military should also increase its military training, strengthen its defense buildup, develop more creative asymmetrical tactics, and boost its fighting will in preparation of future potential military conflicts.
(2) Striving for peace across the Taiwan Strait
Preventing war should be the shared belief among top leaders in Taiwan and China. Unfortunately, the Chinese government has now taken a more aggressive military posture. The Taiwanese government should do all in its means to prevent war from occurring, including advocating international community to promote peace across the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese government’s response to China’s provocation should be very vigilant; otherwise, China will use Taiwan’s response as an excuse to initiate military attacks. Even though the current cross-strait relations face obstacle (The former Director of American Institute in Taiwan, Richard Bush calls it a “knot”), both governments should seek any possible means to cross the hurdles. The dialogues and contacts between governments, academics, and even militaries should be encouraged. The best approach to resolve the difference is through engagements because only the Taiwanese and Chinese can untie knot by themselves.
(3) Building a closer relation with the U.S.
To deter China, Taiwan needs America’s vigorous support, both in political and defense terms.[42] Currently, there is a trade war between the U.S. and China. The Taiwanese government could seize this window of opportunity by further enhancing relations with the U.S. In particular, Taiwan should upgrade its military capability with the U.S. assistance, including purchasing advanced weaponry, increasing military trainings, upgrading weapon systems, and improving its military fighting capability. The U.S. security apparatus is friendly to Taiwan and regards it as a reliable security partner. However, while building up the close relations, Taipei should keep a low profile to avoid China from retaliation.
Conclusion
The two reports have shown that China military power has continuously strengthened. China’s military strategy aims at expediting its military modernization process. China also participates in international space cooperation and manages space-based information resources.[43]
The key takeaways of this research are as follows: China’s strategy are wide-ranging. Chinese leaders carve for a peaceful domestic environment, sustainable economy, and strong military to realize their “China dream.” With the help of sustainable defense spending, rigorous training, and growing military civilian industry, the PLA’s fighting capability has significantly been enhanced. China’s power projection has further expanded through acquisitions of new weaponry that contributes to closing the gap with the U.S. military. As China’s response to Taiwan, and territorial disputes with claimants in East China Sea and South China Sea have become more coercive, the strain between the U.S. and China has become tense. For the interests of the both countries, the mutual military relations will continue to be for reducing risk, though differences will still exist.
China has increased military activities in large part targeted for the future invasion against Taiwan. The Taiwanese military should increase its military training, develop creative asymmetrical tactics, and boost its fighting will. Building a robust relation with the U.S. is always crucial. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese government and military should try any means to avoid any military confrontation and seek opportunity in making peace with China.
Dr. Sun is an Assistant Professor at The Citadel (The Citadel: The Military College of South Carolina). He specializes in China’s security, East Asian Affairs, and Cross-Strait relations. He can be reached at ssun@citadel.edu
[1]U.S. DoD, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019 (Washington D.C.: The Department of Defense), pp. 8-9.
[2]U.S. DoD, “DOD to Release 2019 Report on Military and Security Developments in China,” May 1, 2019, retrieved May 10, 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/Ne ws/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1833267/dod-to-release-2019- report-on-military-and-security-developments-in-china/.
[3]The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era, July 2019, (Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China).
[4]Anthony H. Cordesman, “China’s New 2019 Defense White Paper: An Open Strategic Challenge to the United States, But One Which Does Not Have to Lead to Conflict,” July 24 2019, p. 1, http://apo.org.au/node/249869.
[5]Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 (Washington. D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019), p. 1.
[6]Ibid., p. 3.
[7]Ibid., p. 6.
[8]Ibid., p. 9.
[9]Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” The Council on Foreign Affairs, Jan 28, 2010, retrieved May 16, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
[10]The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense.
[11]Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, p. ii.
[12]China Dream as attaining the “Two Centenary Goals”: the material targets of China becoming a “moderately well-off society” by around 2021, the 100th anniversary of the CCP, and the modernization target of China becoming a completely developed country by around 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC. Please see, Ehizuelen Michael Mitchell Omoruyi, “China’s march towards a moderately well-off society,” China Daily, Mar 16, 2018, retrieved May 17, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/16/WS5aab21d6a3106e7dcc142020.ht ml.
[13]The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense, p. 2.
[14]Ibid., p. 10.
[15] Ibid., p. 5.
[16]Ibid., p. 12.
[17]Ibid., p. 10.
[18]Ibid., p. 10.
[19]Ibid., p. 10.
[20]Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, pp. 65-67.
[21]Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Washington D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019), p. 36.
[22]Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, p. 67.
[23]The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense, p. 29.
[24]Ibid., p. 8.
[25]Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, p. 24.
[26]Ibid., p. 48.
[27]“China’s Defense Budget,” Global Security Org., retrieved May 19, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm.
[28]Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, p. 95.
[29]The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense, p. 26.
[30]Ibid., p. 14.
[31]Ibid., p. 17.
[32]Ibid., p. 21.
[33]Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, p. 62.
[34]Ibid., pp. 63-65.
[35]The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense, p.12.
[36]Lyu Jinghua, “What Are China’s Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 11, 2019, retrieved May 19, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org,/2019/04/01/what-are-china-s-cyber-capabiliti es-and-intentions-pub-78734.
[37]Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, pp. 103-104.
[38]Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, p. 33.
[39]The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense, p. 35.
[40] Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, p. 33.
[41]Emanuele Scimia, “The Only Way Taiwan Can Deter China,” The National Interests, retrieved May 15, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the- only-way-taiwan-can-deter-china-19988.
[42]Ibid.
[43]The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense, p. 11.