U.S. Proposed Its Own Pacific Strategy after China
2020.06.22
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By Po-Chou Lin
In 2019, the diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan in the Pacific Ocean intensified. The Republic of China on Taiwan lost two Pacific allies, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, in one week of September. At present, only four Pacific friends, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, Palau, maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In fact, there seems to be a strategic contest between China and the United States lying behind the diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan over the Pacific. China has built diplomatic ties with ten Pacific island countries. And now, China is developing a comprehensive strategic partnership with these countries.
China’s Expanding Influence in the Pacific
The south Pacific used to be the traditional sphere of influence of the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. In the face of hostile expansion, U.S. Indo- Pacific Command and U.S. regional allies have been shouldering the first- line defense responsibilities for over seventy years. However, the influence of China in the Pacific, be it political, economic, technologic or social, has clearly been expanding rapidly in the past decade. In 2006, the then-Premier Wen Jiabao said, “China is concerned, to foster friendship and cooperation with the Pacific island countries is not a diplomatic expediency. Rather, it is a strategic decision.” In the first China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum held in Fiji, [1] China established the China-Pacific Island Forum Cooperation Fund (China-PIF Cooperation Fund) to promote regional cooperation. At the same time, China has also been developing cooperation with regional countries through the China-Pacific Island Countries Program of Action on Economic Development and Cooperation. Currently, nine Pacific island countries have signed bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative with China. China has invested up to $15.01 billion in infrastructure in various island nations. [2] As Xi Jinping mentioned, China also expects to strengthen communication and coordination with the Pacific island countries in international affairs, support these countries to issue “Pacific Voice”, jointly promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and support these countries in advancing the “Blue Pacific” initiative.[3] This shows China’s attempt to align different Pacific island countries’ positions on foreign policies.
There are a total of 35 countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and 14 are Pacific island countries. Pacific island countries are mostly democracies, and their main economic activities are agriculture, fishery and tourism. The land area of each country is not large, but they own extensive exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and rich marine resources. Not surprisingly, U.S. is trying to maintain its place as an existing power, and China is striving to penetrate U.S. influence in the region. Although, U.S. President Donald Trump regards the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” as a top priority, it remains doubtful whether Pacific island nations’ positions on international affairs would be in line with that of the U.S.
Figure 1-1: Chinese ship “Yuan Wang 2” in Waitemata Harbour, Auckland, New Zealand, 2005. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
China’s security and military intentions deserve more attention. In 2015, China started to deploy the BeiDou Navigation Satellite-3 (BDS-3) system to provide all-time, all-weather and high-accuracy positioning, navigation and timing services to global users. BDS-3 will be a constellation of 35 satellites. China has sent 31 satellites into the space in recent years. It is estimated that the system will be completed in 2020 to provide global services. The BDS-3 depends on the ground stations, including the reference stations, time synchronization stations, monitoring stations, and ground-based augmentation systems, to improve the accuracy of navigation. China currently has monitoring stations in Thailand, Laos, Pakistan, Australia and other countries, and is now increasing the number of countries along the “One Belt One Road ”for the construction of the stations. It is estimated that 1,000 ground stations will be built in ASEAN countries by 2020.[4]
Before 2000, most of China’s precision weapons depended on the U.S.- owned Global Positioning System (GPS). The completion of BDS-3 can reduce the dependence of China’s precision strike weapon systems on GPS. China’s Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department, namely the Strategic Support Force Aerospace System Department or the PLA’s 63680 unit, serves to support tracking and control during satellite launches. This unit frequently sends spacecraft tracking ships to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean to track rockets and satellites into orbit. The fleet comprises four spacecraft tracking ships, namely Yuanwang-3, Yuanwang-5, Yuanwang-6 and Yuanwang-7, and two rocket-carrying ships, which are Yuanwang-21 and Yuanwang-22. These vessels are all subordinate to the Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department. The fleet has executed 13 satellite maritime tracking missions and the Long March 5 transporting mission in 2019.[5]
Given that the accuracy of the Beidou system is slightly lower than that of the U.S.-owned GPS, ground-based augmentation stations need to be built in various locations in order to implement global services. Considering that the Pacific is also the main area for its anti-access/area- denial (A2AD) strategy, China needs to build land-based monitoring facilities in the Pacific, and the countries that signed the “One Belt One Road Memorandum” with China are ideal candidates. In 2018, China appeared to be preparing to set up aerospace monitoring and control stations or military bases in Vanuatu. Although local officials have denied military cooperation between the two countries, it still caused concerns in Australia. In addition, the PLA has set up its first overseas support base in Djibouti in 2017, and Tajikistan and Pakistan are also considered possible locations for China to build overseas bases.[6] In the future, China may establish an overseas support base in the South Pacific. By then, Chinese warships and aircraft will be unimpeded, and the long-term military superiority of the U.S. military in this region may be weakened.
U.S.’s Belated Commitment to the Pacific
Under the Obama administration, the U.S. defined itself as a Pacific power and proposed a rebalancing policy to Asia-Pacific. With this policy in mind, the U.S. deepened its alliance with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, and continued to support regional countries in security, development, and democracy. Nevertheless, the Pacific island countries were not included in the policy. In the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategy Reports, the Obama Administration did not propose any comprehensive Pacific policies. While the then U.S. President Obama did not regard the Pacific issue as a top priority, China has been interested in Pacific.
In Trump’s first National Security Strategy Report released in 2017, it was stated that “Working with Australia and New Zealand, we (U.S.) will shore up fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural disasters.” In high-level relationships, the U.S. sent high-level officials from the Department of the Interior, Department of State, Department of Defense, Coast Guard, Agency for International Development, and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration to attend the 31st Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) on August 16, 2019 in Tuvalu. The U.S. officials also discussed issues of regional and international challenges with Pacific islands leaders in the roundtable. [7] In 2019, President Trump, Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Secretary of Veteran Affairs Robert Wilkie, and Secretary of the Interior David Bernhardt met Pacific island leaders in different occasions to pledge to tackle regional challenges.
Figure1-2: Taiwan and the United States held the inaugural Pacific Islands Dialogue on October 7 in Taipei. (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan))
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is built upon three pillars, which are economics, governance, and security. President Trump has placed the strategy at the top of his diplomatic list. In the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the U.S. provided over $100 million assistance to the Pacific region. This included the $ 65 million announced by Secretary of State Pompeo at a meeting with Pacific island leaders on the side meeting of the UN on September 27. The other foreign assistance was the $36.5 million announced at the 50th Pacific Islands Forum in August.[8] In 2018, U.S. joined the Asian Development Bank’s Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF) to provide Pacific Island nations other financial and funding supports for infrastructure projects. PRIF received grants from Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (NZMFAT), the World Bank Group (WBG), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the European Commission (EC) the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). PRIF will become a competitor to China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).[9]
The U.S.’ engagement with Pacific Island nations among like-minded partners is a collective approach. As a close U.S. ally in the region, Australia proposed the “Pacific STEP-UP” policy in its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. Australian Pacific Maritime Security Program will provide 19 replacement patrol vessels and fund aerial surveillance in the region.[10] New Zealand announced “Pacific Reset” with the whole-of- government approach to deepen relationships with Pacific island nations. The New Zealand Defense Force will increase 1,500 service personnel to meet the regional challenges of the future. [11] U.S. and Taiwan also co-hosted the first Pacific Islands Dialogue in October 2019 to explore future issues for regional cooperation. Sandra Oudkirk, the U.S. senior official for APEC and deputy assistant secretary for Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific island nations, represented President Trump and Secretary Pompeo to kick off the inaugural dialogue. U.S. and like-minded partners are working together to strengthen engagement with the Pacific island nations, while China adopts unilateral approaches to expend relationships in the Pacific.
In security cooperation, U.S. has signed SHIPRIDER agreements with the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu in the Pacific. Through bilateral accords, U.S. can assist 11 partners to monitor waters surrounding these islands and allow local law enforcement personnel to embark on U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy vessels to patrol and safeguard their sovereign waters. The U.S. official ships will continue its presence in the region to help partners detect illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Under its close and traditional relationships with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, U.S. Department of Defense also provided $ 24.5 million to the three members of the Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) to help protect their territorial waters, conduct border security operations, and counter illegal activities. The U.S. Army also plans to expand the exercises and training events of Pacific Pathways in 2020 to reinforce its military presence in the Pacific. By then, U.S. military presence will cover an extensive area of the Pacific to include East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Tanga, Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, Palau, French Polynesia and the Federated States of Micronesia.[12]
Restore Pacific Order
As China’s regional influence and role is growing rapidly, its secret expansion and penetration, by means of One Belt One Road initiative, Digital Silk Road and military-civil fusion approaches, deserves attention.[13] The long-term military superiority of the U.S. military in this region since the end of World War II will be weakened, if U.S. does not value the Pacific as much as it used to be. It is predictable that China's influence and activities, such as infrastructure projects, overseas supply facilities, and military footprint, will continue to be seen in the Pacific. A potential Chinese String of Pearls vision will be extended from Indian Ocean to the Pacific. There is no doubt that U.S. engagement will be the only way to ensure a peaceful, prosperous, free and open Pacific region.
Po-Chou Lin is an assistant research fellow of the Institute for National Defense and Security, Taiwan. He was a researcher of Center of Strategic Studies of the Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C. He has a master’s degree in Political Science from Soochow University, Taipei. He is a PhD student in Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University, Taiwan.
[1]“Wen’s speech at China-Pacific Island Countries forum,” China Daily, April 5, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/05/content_560573.htm.
[2]“China-Pacific Island Countries Program of Action on Economic Development and Cooperation,” Ministry of Finance & Economic Management, http://www.mf em.gov.ck/images/documents/China-Pacific_Islands_Countries_Program_Oct_20 19_MoU.pdf; “China, Pacific island countries hold 3rd economic development and cooperation forum,” Xinhua, October 21, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/englis h/2019-10/21/c_138490687.htm.
[3]“China, Pacific island countries lift ties to comprehensive strategic partnership,” Xinhua, November 17, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018- 11/17/c_137612239.htm.
[4]“Full Text: China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System,” The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, June 17, 2016, https://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/34102/34674/34678/Document/1480626/148 0626.htm ; Jordan Wilson, “China’s Alternative to GPS and its Implications for the United States,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 5, 2017, pp. 2, 7-8, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Rep ort_China's%20Alternative%20to%20GPS%20and%20Implications%20for%20th e%20United%20States.pdf.
[5] Zhao Lei, “Roaring rocket lifts satellite into space,” China Daily, December 27, 2019, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201912/27/WS5e060688a310cf3e3558129f_1.html; “China’s spacecraft tracking ships depart for missions,” Xinhua, November 10, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/10/c_1385 44617.htm; “Yuanwang-3 departs for new monitoring missions,” Xinhua, June 8, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/08/c_138127150.htm.
[6]“Vanuatu and China deny holding military base talks,” Reuters, April 20, 2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN1HH0MJ; Minnie Chan, “China’s mystery ‘military base’ in Vanuatu could be a space tracking station,” South China Morning Post, April 10, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/di plomacy-defence/article/2141134/chinas-mystery-military-base-vanuatu-could-be-space.
[7] “Pacific Islands Forum – U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Islands,” Department of State, August 17, 2019, https://www.state.gov/pacific-islands-forum-u-s- engagement-in-the-pacific-islands/; “U.S. Delegation Attends the 31st Pacific Islands Forum Partners Dialogue,” Department of State, August 9, 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-delegation-attends-the-31st-pacific-islands-forum/.
[8]“U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Islands: UN General Assembly Update,” Department of State, October 3, 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-engagement- in-the-pacific-islands-un-general-assembly-update/.
[9]“United States Joins Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility,” Asian Development Bank, December 11, 2018, https://www.adb.org/news/united-states-joins-pacif ic-region-infrastructure-facility.
[10]“2017 Foreign Policy White Paper,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 24, 2017, pp.101-104, https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publi cations/Documents/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf.
[11]“Pacific Reset: The First Year,” New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 4, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/R-R-The-Pacific-reset-The-First-Year.PDF; Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018, Ministry of Defence, July 6, 2018, pp. 12-13, 26-27, 31-32, http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/download s/pdf/public-docs/2018/strategic-defence-policy-statement-2018.pdf; Defence Capability Plan 2019, Ministry of Defence, June 11, 2018, p. 13, 17, 36, https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/03acb8c6aa/Defence-Capability- Plan-2019.pdf.
[12]Jen Judson, “Pacific Pathways in 2020 lead to Oceania,” Defense News, October 14, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/20 19/10/14/pacific-pathways-in-2020-lead-to-oceania/.
[13]Steven Lee Myers and Chris Horton, “As Taiwan Loses Influence, China Gains Ground in Race With U.S,” New York Times, September 23, 2019, https://cn.nyti mes.com/asia-pacific/20190923/taiwan-kiribati-china/zh-hant/dual/.