Defense News held a conference on “Future warfare and the modern balance of power” in Arlington, Virginia, on September 4, 2019, with panels of “Defending the Pacific,” “Futures command: one year on,” “Lessons learned from NATO’s hybrid battlefield,” “We’re not there yet: closing the innovation gap,” “Sell! Buy! Global defense budgets dissected,” “State of the nuclear triad,” and “US Air Force priorities,” and keynote speakers of Matthew P. Donovan, acting secretary of the US Air Force; Ryan McCarthy, acting secretary of the US Army; James McConville, chief of staff of the US Army; and Michael D. Griffin, under secretary of defense for research and engineering. Conference sponsors included the highest-paying Lockheed Martin and second-highest paying Raytheon, among others. In the “Defending the Pacific” panel, which was the first panel of the conference, joint force capabilities and solutions in multidomain operations were emphasized in defending the Indo-Pacific region. [1]

1. Flexible multi-domain strategy is needed for new situations in the Indo-Pacific region

Flexible multi-domain strategy is needed for new situations in the Indo-Pacific region. It has been reported since late August 2019 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has developed hypersonic missiles such as the DF-17, which are capable of breaching missile shields and will be deployed in potential battleground sooner rather than later. The tension of the Japan-South Korea trade disputes has also been rising and could spill over to security issues, as a bilateral military intelligence-sharing pact between Japan and South Korea that symbolized the countries’ three-way security cooperation with the US in the face of North Korea’s nuclear threat and the PRC’s growing influence has expired on August 24, 2019, without being renewed. Although the protests in Hong Kong triggered by the Extradition Bill seem to have dimmed, there are still many unresolved issues and the demonstrators’ sentiment remains. The conditions are there for another eruption of protest which could eventually lead to suppression by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).[2] All of the above situations render the discussions of the first panel “Defending the Pacific” even more timely. This panel examined closely the Pentagon’s multi-domain strategy, which must be flexible to defend the Pacific region, how that stands up to evolving and asymmetric threats, and what role allies play in the military deterrence efforts.

Although the concept of asymmetric warfare was not emphasized in the conference, it will be increasingly utilized to fight in the modern balance of power.

2. Ongoing geopolitical threats require joint capabilities and solutions

The ongoing geopolitical threats presented by the PRC that would require joint force capabilities and solutions in multidomain operations include increased military exercises by the PRC in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLA Air Force and naval exercises in the East China Sea intended as signals to Taiwan. The PRC has never renounced the use of military force against Taiwan, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign. The PRC has also continued to militarize the South China Sea by placing anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on the disputed Spratly Islands and employing paramilitary forces in maritime disputes vis-à-vis other claimants. Although not exactly military threats, the PRC’s mistreatment of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in Xinjiang by pervasive discrimination, mass detention, and disappearances, which can develop into military intervention, can also be considered as geopolitical threats.

3. Non-conventional threats could spark military responses

The non-conventional threats posed by the PRC that could spark military responses include economic means the PRC has been using to advance its strategic interests. Although trade has benefitted both the PRC and its trade partners, its use of espionage and theft for economic advantage, as well as diversion of acquired technology to the military, remains a significant source of economic and national security risk to the US and other trade partners. Some Chinese nationals, acting in association with the PRC Ministry of State Security, were recently indicted by various judicial agencies around the world for conducting global campaigns of cyber theft that targeted intellectual property and confidential business and technological information at managed service providers.

Some of the PRC’s investments have resulted in negative economic effects or costs to host country sovereignty.[3] All of the above situations could ultimately spark military responses that will require joint force capabilities and solutions in multidomain operations.

1. Multiple nation-joint mission will be strengthened

Multiple nation-joint mission will be strengthened in defending the Indo-Pacific region. The concept of being able to connect any shooter with any weapon to any sensor, regardless of which service or country owns these, so that “the command can execute thousands of kill chains in hundreds of hours,”[4] is the vision of multiple nation-joint mission.

This vision can also be found in the section of “Modernize key capabilities” in the US National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2018. It is envisaged that joint lethality in contested environments for the Joint Force must be able to strike diverse targets inside adversary air and missile defense networks to destroy mobile power-projection platforms. In the Army Strategy released also in 2018, it also states that the US Army will train and fight as a member of the joint and multinational team, and must be able to fight not only in the land, sea, and air using combined arms, but also in all domains including cyber, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. [5]

2. More flexibility at the operational level

By emphasizing joint capabilities and solutions, flexibility at the operational level will be enhanced. Also highlighted in the NDS, transitioning from large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing that covers active and passive defenses will be prioritized. For example, the “light carriers” introduced by the US Navy-Marine are an example of enhanced flexibility that can help the US Navy to shift to a more mission survivable fleet design. The more flexible design could more easily dodge the PRC’s long-range anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles stationed at the PRC-made islands in the South China Sea than supercarriers.

3. Allies becoming increasingly important for forward-postured operations

Forward-postured operations require allies’ support. Besides joint capabilities, having resources based forward to challenge competitors who are not afraid to pursue their goals “left of conflict” were also emphasized in the Defense News conference in defending the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, allies will become increasingly important for the US national defense. This importance has also been stressed in the NDS that the US should strengthen alliances and attract new partners by upholding a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, expanding regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning, and deepening interoperability.